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Map 1. Iraq.
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Map 2. Baghdad.
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Map 3. Mosul, Iraqi Units, 2006-2008.
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Map 4. Al Basrah, 2007.
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Map 5. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Major Camps, 2003–2011.
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Map 6. Ethno-Religious Groups, Iraq.
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Map 7. Detention Facilities, Theater Level, 2003–2011.
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FOREWORD 
BY THE 39TH CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY
My predecessor, General (Retired) Ray Odierno, initiated this in-stride study of the 
U.S. Army’s experience in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) to share lessons, sharpen 
thinking, and promote debate.
I applaud and congratulate the team of warrior-scholars that authored this two-vol-
ume study, The U.S. Army in the Iraq War. These Soldiers devoted countless hours of 
intellectual energy to help us understand the operational lessons of OIF. They reviewed, 
analyzed, and synthesized thousands of reports, conducted numerous interviews, and 
examined the events of а war that defined а generation of Soldiers.
This study is an interim work by design. It is а waypoint on our institution’s quest 
to comprehend the OIF experience. We must continue to evaluate and reevaluate events 
and the contexts that frame them. Eventually, our Army will have а comprehensive, offi-
cial “Green Book” history that describes OIF authoritatively, but it will require years of 
research to get there. There is much left to do, but this analysis starts а long-term histor-
ical effort.
We have а professional and moral responsibility to learn the relevant lessons of the 
recent past. OIF is а sober reminder that technological advantages and standoff weapons 
alone cannot render a decision; that the promise of short wars is often elusive; that the 
ends, ways, and means must be in balance; that our Army must understand the type of 
war we are engaged with in order to adapt as necessary; that decisions in war occur on 
the ground in the mud and dirt; and that timeless factors such as human agency, chance, 
and an enemy’s conviction, all shape а war’s outcome.
Our Army is strong, and getting stronger. We are on azimuth to build а more lethal 
force that deters adversaries and is capable of a rapid transition to win the ground fight as 
а member of the joint and coalition forces. Use this work to help you and your team stay 
ready to defeat any future adversary. Understand that this is likely not the final word, but 
learn its operational lessons and add them to your kit bag of skills. 
Army Strong!
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FOREWORD 
BY THE 38TH CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY
In July 2013, 18 months after the last of our operating forces departed Iraq, I directed 
that the U.S. Army take steps to capture key lessons, insights, and innovations from our 
more than 8 years of conflict in that country. As the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, I strongly 
believed that having been at war continuously since the attacks of September 11, 2001 
(9/11), it was time to conduct an initial examination of the Army’s experiences in the 
post-9/11 wars, to determine their implications for our future operations, strategy, doc-
trine, force structure, and institutions. The two-volume study, The U.S. Army in the Iraq 
War by the Chief of Staff of the Army’s Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) Study Group 
is the first product of that effort.
The story the OIF Study Group has documented of the Army at the operational level 
is one of units and headquarters working in difficult and complex environments, with 
leaders at all levels making tough decisions under the pressure of time. As the group’s 
research emerged, I noted a number of their findings whose important implications I saw 
firsthand as a division, corps, and force commander in Iraq. First and foremost, is the 
concept that while our technological means may have become more advanced, we cannot 
ignore operational art, the principles of war, and the importance of terrain. These funda-
mental concepts were every bit as important to our counterinsurgency and stabilization 
campaigns in Iraq, as they have been in other, more conventional conflicts. Moreover, it 
is clear in retrospect, that those who rejected the idea that there is an operational level of 
war in counterinsurgency were wrong. For our operations to succeed and be sustained, 
we must have a thorough understanding of the operating environment and the local 
political and social consequences of our actions, especially when facing an enemy who 
understands the environment better than we do. When operating among a host nation’s 
population, we must constantly clarify our intentions in order to avoid creating new ene-
mies. In addition, when conditions on the ground change, we must be willing to reexam-
ine the assumptions that underpin our strategy and plans and change course if necessary, 
no matter how painful it may be.
This account of the Iraq War holds some important strategic and institutional lessons 
as well. We must seek better ways of operating effectively with our coalition allies, whose 
constraints are naturally different from ours. We must also employ better ways of gener-
ating and partnering with effective and legitimate host nation forces and of accounting 
for the political pressures that constrain those forces. The Iraq War also teaches us that we 
should improve the ways in which we develop our strategic leaders. The conduct of war 
and the nature of decision-making are becoming more decentralized and, as a result, we 
must develop leaders who are capable of thinking strategically and leading joint, inter-
agency, and multinational teams at an earlier stage in their careers.
We also have seen in the wake of the Iraq War that the United States has entered 
another historical cycle, like those that followed major American wars in the past, in 
which our civilian and military leaders debated the utility of landpower for our national 
objectives. A reading of The U.S. Army in the Iraq War indicates that, even at a much higher 
end strength than they now have, our ground forces were overtaxed by the commitments 
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in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the decision to limit our troop levels in both theaters had 
severe operational consequences. A review of these volumes also indicates that our adver-
saries are unlikely to abandon the way of war they adopted in Iraq, and that landpower 
will remain an important element of strategic deterrence in the future.
For me, as a Soldier of 40 years, the history of the Iraq War is the astonishing story 
of an Army that reached within itself to learn and adapt in the midst of a war that the 
United States was well on its way to losing. It was a formative experience for a genera-
tion of Soldiers and leaders. In addition, it was a field of sacrifice for many thousands of 
our fellow countrymen. Above all, these volumes are meant to ensure their sacrifices are 
never forgotten.
RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
General (Retired), United States Army
38th Chief of Staff
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PREFACE
In September 2013, Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond T. Odierno directed 
the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Study Group to research and write an operational his-
tory of the U.S. Army’s experience in the Iraq War from 2003 to 2011. This volume, The 
United States Army in the Iraq War, 2003-2006, is the first of two fulfilling that task. It tells 
the story of the U.S.-led campaigns to remove Saddam Hussein and his Iraqi Ba’athist 
regime from power in 2003 and to stabilize the country following those operations. It 
details the course of the campaigns up to a point in late 2006 when President George 
W. Bush and other U.S. leaders changed the strategy in Iraq to one that resulted in the 
“surge” counteroffensive by American troops in 2007–2008. That counteroffensive and 
the subsequent withdrawal of the coalition forces from Iraq are the subjects of the second 
volume of this series.
In scope, the study group members consciously modeled this history after the Army’s 
“Green Book” histories of World War II. As the Green Books did, and as General Odierno 
charged us to do, we focused on the operational level of war. These volumes are narrative 
histories that tell the story of U.S. forces in Iraq, mainly from the perspective of the the-
ater command in Baghdad and the operational commands immediately subordinate to it. 
They focus on the decisions and intent of the senior three- and four-star commanders in 
Baghdad over time. 
In writing this history, we strove to evaluate the major decisions those commands 
faced, to understand what commanders intended to accomplish, and to comprehend 
how the commands interpreted the situation at the time. We also traced many of those 
decisions to the tactical level to judge how strategic and operational intent translated 
into changes on the battlefield. At the same time, we examined the broad trends and 
tactical developments that affected the operational and strategic levels, including missed 
opportunities along these lines. Our team also assessed the impact of changes to the insti-
tutional army, such as modularization and transformation, on the operational conflict in 
Iraq. Finally, we explored the assumptions underpinning the U.S. campaign in Iraq at 
various times and assessed their validity.
We wrote this history with two audiences in mind. For current and future Army lead-
ers, we sought to explain the key operational and strategic lessons from the Iraq War that 
in our estimation should inform strategy, operations, and the Army as an institution. 
In addition, we attempted to write this history in an accessible way so that a civilian 
audience can understand the Army’s experience in the war. We believe too few mili-
tary accounts thus far explain to the American public what the armed forces have gone 
through in the post-September 11, 2001 (9/11) wars. If unaddressed, this can lead to a 
gulf between the public and its military.
Although this book is an Army history, we included other military services and inter-
national forces in the story, sometimes in great detail. In contemporary warfare, the Army 
goes to war as part of a joint force and often with coalition partners. It would be impossi-
ble to explain what the Army experienced in Iraq without including the story of the U.S. 
Marines, the British armed forces, and other coalition ground forces.
We also attempted, to the best of our knowledge and ability, to include the enemy 
perspective, the nature of the operating environment, and the political and social context 
for the conflict. We have done this to explain why various groups and peoples fought 
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against or alongside coalition forces, what they hoped to achieve, and how their leaders 
made decisions in response to (or independent of) the coalition’s actions.
Volume 2 of this series will include a concluding summary of our major findings con-
cerning the operational and strategic lessons of the war, but readers will see throughout 
this first volume some of the themes that we have drawn from our research. The March–
April 2003 campaign to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein achieved its operational 
objectives more quickly than either side or outside observer expected. But the aftermath 
of that victory was equally surprising, as the United States and its allies failed to consol-
idate their gains by stabilizing the country, rebuilding the state they had destroyed, and 
perhaps establishing the basis for a sustainable political outcome. In the first year of the 
war, a difficult post-regime-change stabilization campaign grew into an even more diffi-
cult insurgency. In the 3 years after that, the conflict became an ethnic and sectarian civil 
war among Iraqi factions that were battling for power and survival.
For the Army, the story of the 4-year period following the fall of Saddam Hussein is a 
mixed one. The stunningly swift destruction of the Iraqi military and advance to Baghdad 
showcased the U.S. military’s proficiency in conventional warfare. In the stabilization and 
counterinsurgency campaigns that followed, however, thinly stretched units and over-
taxed headquarters often found themselves undertaking unexpected missions for which 
they were doctrinally, materially, and perhaps intellectually ill-prepared. Throughout 
that period the Iraqi theater of operations was constrained, with units and leaders oper-
ating under a chronic shortage of troops and following a strategy and campaign plan 
that ultimately failed. Under these conditions, Army leaders and their Soldiers went 
through a difficult learning process, suffering painful losses—more than 36,000 killed 
and wounded during the war’s duration—as they adapted to a conflict whose character 
changed rapidly. By late 2006, many tactical Army units had come up with innovative 
solutions to their local problems—some by recalling counterinsurgency lessons from the 
Army’s distant past, others by exploiting emergent opportunities to work with tribes 
and local communities—but not until 2007 would these approaches be synchronized and 
integrated at the operational and strategic levels.
In writing this narrative history, we have relied to a great degree on military records 
from U.S. operational headquarters and interviews, many of them not previously acces-
sible to scholars. Mixing oral history interviews with archival documentary research cre-
ates, in our opinion, considerable synergy. Some readers, particularly those within the 
national security community, may be surprised with information revealed in this book. 
Our study benefited tremendously from U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) support 
in declassifying and/or redacting over 30,000 pages of material selected by our team. 
We were also aided by the products of an earlier effort led by the researchers of General 
George Casey’s book, Strategic Reflections, which had yielded over 10,000 pages of declas-
sified or redacted material. To further ensure we properly safeguarded sensitive national 
security information, this manuscript underwent security reviews at the Defense Office 
of Prepublication and Security Review and at the U.S. Army War College. We have also 
benefited from the fact that much more is known today about the enemy and about the 
actions of the Iraqi Government than was known during the early years of the war. From 
our vantage point in 2017, however, we recognize that this is a history of a war that is not 
yet over. With thousands of U.S. and coalition forces back in Iraq campaigning against 
an enemy that is a successor to al-Qaeda in Iraq, we understand that there may be many 
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more accounts written before the story truly ends. We do not expect that our work will 
be definitive. Instead, we hope our contribution helps to open the door to future research 
by others whose investigations we fully expect will supersede our own.
The scope of this project and the time available prevented us from covering a number 
of major areas of research that we will have to leave for others to examine. We hope that 
our work at the operational level will point the way for scholars to research and write the 
story of U.S. ground forces at the tactical level. Some histories at that level have begun 
to appear, such as Dale Andrade’s Surging South of Baghdad, but many more are needed.
Another omission in this history is the role of U.S. special operations forces in Iraq, 
who were involved in virtually every major development during the war, but whose 
story we have not been able adequately to tell. The special operations commands are not 
yet ready to grant researchers complete access to their operational records to chronicle 
the often amazing tales they contain. In particular, the Combined Joint Special Opera-
tions Task Force-Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP) consistently produced results far above 
what would normally be expected of a brigade level command, and little has been writ-
ten about their exploits. The sections of our history that recount the special operations 
role in Iraq represent a small fraction of what the special operators actually did, and we 
hope that someday soon that story can be fully told.
We also have not been able to provide a full account of the enemy and Iraqi forces 
of various kinds that fought during the war, though we have worked hard to assemble 
as much of that information as we can. Neither the enemy forces nor the Iraqi security 
forces have yet told their own story, and until they do, historians’ understanding of their 
perspective is necessarily incomplete.
A few other areas of research were beyond the scope of this history but should be 
undertaken by researchers, including the shared logistics that supported both Iraq and 
Afghanistan, air power in Iraq, and the maritime component of the Iraq campaign. The 
functional areas of information operations and reconstruction efforts deserve their own 
treatment as well. Even more importantly, the Defense Department needs to produce a 
history of U.S. Central Command in the post-9/11 wars, so that the operational histories 
of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars―as well as other smaller operations―can be put into 
their regional and strategic context. The fight against al-Qaeda in Iraq or the Islamic State 
in Iraq was part of a broader campaign against al-Qaeda and its associated movements. 
Fighting in Yemen, Somalia, Mali, and other locations was connected through a strategic 
framework―both ours and our enemies’―with the fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. This 
strategic history should be modeled on the U.S. Army in World War II series volume, The 
Supreme Command, an overarching history of the Allies in the European theater, without 
which the operational histories of the European theater cannot be fully appreciated.
A history set in Iraq will contain many Arabic personal and place names, many which 
have no standard spelling. In rendering these Arabic names into English, we have fol-
lowed standard transliteration in many cases, but in others, we have used the spelling 
most common within the U.S. military, whether that spelling followed transliteration 
rules or not. We also generally chose to refer to Iraqis using English formalities rather 
than the more familiar Iraqi style. Therefore, instead of the Iraqi style of referring to Gen-
eral Babakir Zebari as General Babakir, we refer to him as General Zebari. For simplicity’s 
sake, and to reflect U.S. military and Iraqi usage, we have also tended to drop the articles 
from the spelling of place names in the text. The maps are more formal and retain the 
article.
Finally, throughout these volumes, we, the authors, retain full responsibility for all 
matters of interpretation as well as for any errors or omissions of fact.
COLONEL JOEL RAYBURN
COLONEL FRANK SOBCHAK
Washington, DC
February 2016
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1CHAPTER 1
PROLOGUE: THE COLLISION COURSE, 1991-2003
BEYOND THE TRUCE TENT
The American and Iraqi military commanders who met near the Iraq-Kuwait border 
to negotiate a cease-fire on March 3, 1991, were perhaps equally surprised to find them-
selves there under the circumstances that confronted them. By the time General H. 
Norman Schwarzkopf of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and Iraqi General Sultan 
Hashem met in the truce tent at Safwan, Iraq, a lightning armored thrust had ejected 
the Iraqi armies from Kuwait, the country they had invaded in August 1990. The U.S.-
led Operation DESERT STORM, a 39-day air campaign followed by a 100-hour ground 
assault, had left an estimated 20,000 Iraqi soldiers dead and another 50,000 captured. The 
coalition, in stark contrast, had lost 245 troops killed, far fewer than the coalition com-
manders had expected, and had suspended combat operations without ever being asked 
for terms.1
Source: Department of Defense (DoD) by Sergeant Jose Trejo (Released).
General Norman Schwarzkopf During the  
Iraqi Surrender at Safwan Airfield in Iraq (March 3, 1991).2
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Source: Iraqi TV, still photo by Wikimedia Commons contributors.
Saddam Hussein.3
The 4-day ground campaign had been one of the most unequal in military history, 
and the outcome would force military professionals around the world to reexamine their 
assumptions about military effectiveness. However, it had not ended the regime of Iraqi 
dictator Saddam Hussein. Having achieved their original objective of restoring Kuwait’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, then-President George H. W. Bush and his fellow 
coalition leaders had decided not to order their troops to march on to Baghdad. Instead, 
the massive force that devastated the Iraqi military disappeared from the theater almost 
as quickly as it had secured victory. Within weeks, a force of nine U.S. Army and Marine 
divisions melted away to a single brigade left behind in Kuwait.
The U.S. and Iraqi forces that faced each other in the deserts of Kuwait and Iraq had 
little idea that they represented merely the opening phase of what became more than a 
quarter-century of warfare. From January 1991, until the time of this book’s writing, hos-
tilities between or involving the United States and Iraq never ceased. The American and 
Iraqi armies that clashed and then disengaged in 1991 were far different from the forces 
that would clash again in the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Both the U.S. military 
and the Iraqi regime of Saddam went through dramatic, even transformational changes 
during the 12-year interval. The experiences of the 1990s—a decade in which the U.S. mil-
itary was constantly engaged in contingency operations and the Iraqi regime constantly 
engaged in internal conflicts—shaped the ways in which the American forces and Iraqis 
operated and behaved in the short war of March-April 2003 and the protracted conflict 
that emerged afterward. Throughout the 1990s, hostilities between the United States and 
the Iraqi regime gradually intensified, leading to short bouts of violence in 1993, 1994, 
1996, and 1998 that presaged the reigniting of open warfare between the two sides.
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THE U.S. ARMY AFTER OPERATION DESERT STORM
The 1990s were a busy time for the U.S. military, despite the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the rapid democratization of Eastern Europe. Aside from continuing its com-
mitment to armed deterrence in Kuwait, Sinai, and the Korean Peninsula, the United 
States participated in numerous contingency operations in places such as Somalia, Haiti, 
Bosnia, and Kosovo. Despite these expanding military commitments, the nation sought 
to achieve a post-Cold War peace dividend by reducing its Cold War military structure. 
As its forces shrank, the U.S. military sought to offset the reduction in numbers by har-
nessing emerging technologies. The military force that emerged at the end of the decade 
was far different from the one welcomed home to ticker-tape parades in 1991.
Shortly after its redeployment from the Persian Gulf, the U.S. Army that achieved a 
lopsided victory against Iraq underwent dramatic changes in size. Of the 18 active divi-
sions the Army fielded in 1989, only 10 remained by 1995. In keeping with popular expec-
tations of a peace dividend, the Army’s active duty strength shrank from 770,000 in 1989 
to 510,000 in 1995, a precipitous drop that continued gradually to 490,000 by 2002. An 
even steeper reduction took place in the Army’s civilian workforce, cut by 58 percent 
between 1989 and 1993. With the reduction in personnel came a shift in roles unnoticed 
by many outside the military profession. Active duty troops performed many of the sup-
port functions for the Cold War Army, but after Operation DESERT STORM, the troops 
on active duty were to be expeditionary, focused on training to sustain their capabilities 
throughout the turbulence of the drawdown.4 As a result, contractors partially filled the 
void, becoming commonplace in the Army’s maintenance bays and training centers, and 
even accompanying the Army as it deployed abroad in the 1990s.
These cuts in personnel and combat power occurred during a period of fluctuation 
in the country’s national security strategy after 40 years of containment. As the United 
States searched for a strategy for the post-Cold War world, the military sought to under-
stand the ways in which Operation DESERT STORM might signify the character of future 
wars. One of the most prominent lessons uniformed leaders took from Operation DESERT 
STORM was that the military needed to find ways to project power more rapidly. Future 
foes were unlikely to afford the United States the luxury of the deliberate 6-month buildup 
that had followed Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Accordingly, Chief of 
Staff of the Army General Gordon R. Sullivan enhanced the Army’s expeditionary capa-
bilities in the Gulf region by pre-positioning in Kuwait and Qatar equipment from the 
Army’s deactivated units. When combined with regular troop deployments to Kuwait, 
the Army could place a division on a combat footing in that region within days, with the 
promise of more divisions arriving in shorter order than in 1990. At the same time, the 
Army continued a rotation of forces to Kuwait that included components of a maneuver 
brigade and air defense artillery units.5
Meanwhile, the Army’s first post-Operation DESERT STORM doctrine, presided over 
by the commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Gen-
eral Frederick M. Franks, Jr., who had led VII Corps during the war, offered more conti-
nuity than change with the AirLand Battle doctrine under which the Army had operated 
during Operation DESERT STORM. In addition to high-intensity combat, the 1993 edi-
tion of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, placed increased emphasis not just on force 
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projection, but also on operations other than war (OOTW), an expansive category that 
included such diverse missions as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, counterter-
rorism, and counterinsurgency. For the Army, OOTW remained a series of potential 
operations that were considered less demanding than high-intensity combat, and con-
sequently, the belief prevailed that units could be trained up for these lesser cases prior 
to any deployment, while not sacrificing readiness for high-intensity fire and maneuver.
The “Revolution in Military Affairs”
As the decade progressed, the Army came under increasing pressure to conform to 
the growing belief among military theorists that technology would transform future bat-
tlefields in accordance with a “revolution in military affairs” (RMA).6 Advocates of RMA 
believed that a new way of war in the information age had begun to emerge in the Opera-
tion DESERT STORM air campaign, one in which advanced technology would give those 
who possessed it, such as the U.S. military, a decisive advantage over any potential foe. 
RMA advocates predicted that improvements in precision-guided munitions and sensor 
technologies would create a networked battlefield in which the fog of war could be elim-
inated. On this future battlefield, U.S. forces supposedly would enjoy almost complete 
awareness of both the friendly and enemy situation, enabling small, high-tech U.S. forces 
to conduct rapid, decisive maneuvers leading to the quick collapse of the enemy.7
The impact of RMA on the Army was mixed. While these network-centric or effects-
based concepts did not find universal support within the Army, there were a substantial 
number of adherents, particularly in the fires, attack aviation, and intelligence commu-
nities. At the same time, buzzwords and phrases associated with RMA and adopted by 
the joint fires and intelligence communities, such as “information dominance,” made 
their way into the Army’s lexicon. Despite these influences, successive Army chiefs in 
the 1990s remained skeptical about the promise of technology alone to change the inher-
ent nature of war, and a number of Army officers concluded that Operation DESERT 
STORM might be a poor example of what the future was likely to bring. They predicted 
that future campaigns probably would take place under more trying conditions, and that 
America’s technological advantages would likely be fleeting and unlikely to lift the fog 
of war.8 Some Army thinkers also noted that RMA discounted the possibility that adver-
saries might challenge the U.S. military through unconventional means rather than the 
conventional ones that failed the Iraqis in 1991. Ultimately, no clear consensus coalesced 
around either RMA or its critics to guide Army force development.
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Source: U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sergeant Angela Stafford (Released).
General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army (1999-2003).9
Rather than make wholesale changes to the Army’s structure or systems, Army lead-
ers of the 1990s opted instead for an evolutionary modernization of the existing force. 
They employed a number of simulation exercises and field trials to find the best way to 
modernize the Army’s systems and force structure. Venues such as the Modern Louisi-
ana Maneuvers (1992-1994), led by Brigadier General Tommy Franks, were used to test 
ideas and concepts for modernization as part of an overarching Army concept called 
Force XXI, within which the 4th Infantry Division became the experimental force and dig-
ital test bed. The 4th Infantry Division tested evolutionary appliqués to existing systems 
such as the M1 tank and experimented with them in training in order to give the Army 
a way to make decisions about what systems to procure on a larger scale. Nonetheless, 
the resultant enhanced legacy forces did not satisfy the Army’s critics, who advocated 
a focus on leap-ahead technology and brought increasing pressure on the Army of the 
1990s to be, as Chief of Staff of the Army General Eric K. Shinseki put it, more “respon-
sive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable.”10
Operations Other Than War: Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans
While the Army sharply downsized following the Gulf war, the subsequent decade 
brought increased demand for its forces in mid-scale contingency operations and in 
low-intensity conflict, including a continuous deterrent posture to contain Saddam’s 
still-aggressive regime in Iraq.11 This trend of OOTW began with Operation PROVIDE 
COMFORT, the effort to render humanitarian assistance to the large Kurdish refugee 
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population that sought shelter from Saddam’s forces under a U.S. no-fly zone in northern 
Iraq in the immediate aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM.
After Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the next OOTW occurred in Somalia. In April 
1992, the United Nations (UN) established the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), a 
security force and contingent of observers meant to prevent Somali warlords from dis-
rupting relief supplies to the starving population.12 U.S. officials quickly discovered that 
peacekeepers and aid alone could not alleviate the suffering, and despite the intentions 
of the international community, the warlords on the ground ignored the UN-brokered 
cease-fire, rendering the humanitarian relief operation ineffective. In response, the United 
States committed forces to Somalia in December 1992, as part of a 24-country coalition 
named the Unified Task Force that aimed to secure the relief activities under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter. Under the oversight of CENTCOM, the various national contingents 
grew to about 12,000 personnel, which augmented the 25,000 American service mem-
bers deployed to Somalia. This more robust U.S. military presence, dubbed Operation 
RESTORE HOPE, succeeded in ending large-scale starvation, but it was quickly reduced 
and replaced by a U.N.-led force. When the peace enforcement mandate broadened to 
include disarming the warring parties, Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed and 
his militia forces retaliated, killing 24 Pakistani soldiers in June and 4 American Soldiers 
with a roadside bomb, or improvised explosive device (IED), in August. In response, the 
United States committed a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) to fight Aideed 
and his forces, though Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Les Aspin denied U.S. field com-
manders’ requests for armored vehicles in support of these expanded operations.13
U.S. involvement in Somalia culminated with the Battle of Mogadishu, October 3-4, 
1993, which pitted a task force of Army Rangers against thousands of Somali militia-
men. In the bloodiest urban combat American forces had experienced since the Battle of 
Hue, Vietnam, in 1968, the United States lost 18 Soldiers killed and another 77 wounded; 
while between 1,500 and 3,000 Somalis were killed or wounded. Following the battle, the 
United States ceased further offensive operations, and then-President William J. Clinton 
ordered a complete withdrawal by March 1994.14 For their part, Army leaders assessed 
the iconic clash in Mogadishu as a failure. What had begun as a response to a humani-
tarian crisis had expanded to peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and ultimately pitched 
urban combat—a mission creep that significantly shaped Army leaders’ future views 
about humanitarian intervention and nation building.15
Six months after ending the mission in Somalia, the United States embarked on another 
major OOTW in Haiti to reinstate elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, removed in 
a military coup 3 years before. On September 18, 1994, Clinton initiated a Marine and 
airborne assault on Haiti. With troops of the 82d Airborne Division en route, former 
President Jimmy Carter negotiated the peaceful exit of Haiti’s military rulers and the 
return of Aristide. Within hours, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY changed from an 
invasion into a permissive stabilization mission that would last until 2000.16 Throughout 
its 6-year presence in the poverty-stricken country, the U.S. military’s operating posture 
was in many ways a response to the disaster in Mogadishu, so that the Army in Haiti was 
on force protection to such a degree that, in one observer’s words, it “not only drove the 
mission, it almost became the mission.”17
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By 1993, the Army experienced a 100 percent increase in the number of Soldiers 
deployed on contingency operations since the end of the Cold War.18 As more Army 
units deployed in stability and support operations, the Army sought to change the way it 
prepared these units for their real-world missions by incorporating low-intensity conflict 
or peacekeeping scenarios into war games and combat training centers.19 The Combat 
Maneuver Training Center in Germany developed a “Danubian” scenario to stress an 
increased spectrum of war including ethnic factions, media, and civilians on the bat-
tlefield. In 1993, the Joint Readiness Training Center conducted its first peacekeeping 
rotation with the complexities of interagency actors and international nongovernmental 
organizations.20 The National Training Center (NTC) in California continued to focus on 
high-intensity operations, but prescient NTC leaders like Colonel William Scott Wallace 
recognized that it was time to modernize the opposing force, concluding that if his son 
had a cell phone in his car, the enemy was probably using cell phones as well.21 Training 
center rotations exercised contingency deployments by using all manner of movement, 
drawing pre-positioned equipment, and intermediate staging including airfield seizure 
for forced entry in some instances.22 The focus of these efforts was at the tactical level, 
however, and in its higher-level operational exercises, the Army struggled to develop 
simulations adequately depicting, or even incorporating, the lower-intensity end of the 
conflict spectrum.23 At the same time, the combat training centers served as barometers 
of Army readiness as the decade progressed: fiscal austerity and high operations tempo 
made for training rotations in which units performed less effectively than they had 
previously.24
By the mid-1990s, the Army’s training systems became increasingly geared toward 
the ongoing crisis in the Balkans, where the wars following the fragmentation of Yugosla-
via in 1991 had a profound impact on the Army’s assumptions and perspectives in ways 
that would affect the later campaign in Iraq. When the Yugoslav Republics of Slovenia, 
Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence in 1991 and 1992, 
ethnic and nationalist civil wars erupted.
U.S. Army battalions rotated to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as lightly 
armed UN observers in 1993 in an effort to contain the spread of conflict and forestall 
Serbian aggression. Once North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air strikes—com-
bined with the threat of Croatian Army and Bosnian Muslim ground forces—established 
a stalemate among the warring parties in Bosnia in 1994-1995, the United States was able 
to broker a fragile peace through the Dayton Accords in late 1995. As part of a larger 
NATO peacekeeping force designed to enforce the accords, the United States deployed 
the 1st Armored Division into northern Bosnia. Although U.S. leaders declared the mis-
sion would last for only 1 year, it would eventually continue for the better part of a 
decade.25
The long Balkan peacekeeping mission exposed disagreements within the ranks of 
senior American officers as they struggled to define the Army’s role after the Cold War. 
Preferring the mission of conventional warfighting, many Army leaders resisted the idea 
of focusing on OOTW, even when they were clearly the Army’s primary role in the 1990s. 
There was also the U.S. peacekeeping forces’ operating posture that emphasized force 
protection so heavily that the average Soldier’s contact with the local population was 
minimal.26 Units tended to satisfy themselves with presence patrols and inspections to 
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monitor the General Framework Agreement for the Peace, with little consideration of 
how their military tasks should contribute to the political goals of the operation, while 
elevating force protection to a mission essential task. As U.S. Army commander of the 
NATO force in Bosnia, Shinseki assessed that, with their limited numbers (fewer than 
20,000 U.S. troops), his forces could only provide general area security and could not 
be expected to perform other tasks such as replacing the functions of the local police.27 
Meanwhile, as had been the case in Haiti and Somalia, the Army adopted routinized 
patrolling; established large semi-permanent bases serviced by contractors; and provided 
extensive amenities for the deployed forces.
While the Army remained committed in Bosnia, it expanded its Balkan presence 
southward in 1999 as the United States intervened to stop Serbian forces carrying out 
large-scale ethnic cleansing against Kosovo’s Albanian majority population. In March 
1999, NATO began an air campaign focused on military, communications, and indus-
trial targets throughout Serbia and Kosovo, aiming to force Serbian President Slobodan 
Milosevic to withdraw his troops from Kosovo altogether. NATO ground forces entered 
Kosovo without a fight, 38,000 sorties and 78 days later, taking up another stabilization 
mission.28
Despite NATO’s declaration at the outset of the conflict that its troops would not 
engage in ground combat in Kosovo, NATO commanders had relied on ground forces 
deployed to Macedonia and Albania to deter the Milosevic regime from further aggres-
sion. While he had considered using ground forces, NATO Commander General Wesley 
K. Clark had also expected to be able to wield the deep strike aviation capability that had 
become the centerpiece of the AirLand Battle doctrine the Army had developed against 
the Soviets. To prepare for a deep strike against the Serbs, V Corps Commander Lieutenant 
General John W. Hendrix task organized units from the Germany-based 12th Aviation 
Brigade with elements of 2d Brigade, 1st Armored Division to form Task Force Hawk 
under the command of Brigadier General Richard A. Cody and his deputy, Colonel Ray-
mond T. Odierno. However, difficulties in deploying Task Force Hawk and its 48 AH-64 
Apache helicopters from Germany to operating bases in Albania meant that the attack 
helicopters never tested the extensive Yugoslav air defense network and did not contrib-
ute to the campaign against Serbian forces. Reviewing the aviation operation’s results 
with Hendrix, U.S. Army Europe Commander General Montgomery C. Meigs (who was 
also commander of the NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina) came to believe 
that the Army’s independent deep strike aviation capability did not really exist.29
As Task Force Hawk transitioned into a ground-based Task Force Falcon and occupied 
one of NATO’s five multinational brigade sectors in Kosovo, NATO troops encountered 
unanticipated levels of civil violence between Albanians and Serbs, so that their primary 
mission quickly became one of restoring order and maintaining peace. In Bosnia-Herze-
govina, the Army had only experienced the aftermath of sectarian violence; in Kosovo, it 
became the Army’s job to stop it. Ironically, having bombed Serbia into submission, U.S. 
troops found themselves protecting ethnic Serbs living in Kosovo from Albanian repri-
sals as the once-dominant ethnic minority felt the wrath of the long-suppressed majority. 
Further complicating the deployment was a reluctance to tie the Army’s operation to any 
political end state for Kosovo, whether as an autonomous province of Serbia, UN protec-
torate, or independent country.30
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The delays in the deployment of Task Force Hawk prompted the Army to reevalu-
ate its strategic agility. The Kosovo war highlighted other shortcomings as well, such as 
the limitations of operating heavy vehicles in areas with underdeveloped infrastructure, 
the lack of organic mobility and adequate protection in light units, and the manpow-
er-intensive nature of operations in urban areas and complex terrain. From the Ameri-
can perspective, the air campaign had compelled the withdrawal of Serbian forces, but 
the subsequent messy reality of peace enforcement had required ground troops. This 
renewed the debate within the U.S. military not only about joint operating roles, but also 
about the character of modern war in the post-Cold War era, while giving greater impe-
tus to the advocates of RMA who saw Kosovo as a validation of their ideas.
The Kosovo Campaign, however, had raised serious questions about RMA’s valid-
ity. It emerged in the operation’s aftermath that U.S. military leaders had dramatically 
overestimated the effect of the air campaign. On June 10, 1999, SECDEF William S. Cohen 
announced that air power and missiles had degraded and diminished the Serbian mili-
tary, destroying more than 50 percent of its artillery and one-third of its armored vehicles. 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Henry Hugh Shelton elaborated on Cohen’s 
figures, citing the destruction of around 120 tanks, 220 armored personnel carriers, and 
up to 450 artillery pieces and mortars, losses that U.S. leaders assessed had been the basis 
for the Serbian decision to withdraw. However, when NATO troops and Western report-
ers arrived in Kosovo, they found little physical evidence of such battle damage, noting 
instead the Serbian use of decoys and the difficulty with assessments conducted at high 
altitude.31 A Newsweek article published the following year cast doubt on the Pentagon 
and NATO figures. Rather than the 744 supposedly confirmed kills during the conflict, 
the article cited a suppressed U.S. Air Force report based on a search of Kosovo that 
found evidence of only 14 tanks, 18 armored personnel carriers, and 20 artillery pieces 
destroyed. U.S. and NATO leaders had probably vastly underestimated the importance 
in the campaign of the 18,000-strong Kosovo Liberation Army, the Kosovar Albanian 
insurgent force that had styled itself as “NATO’s ground force.”32 Overall, the Kosovo 
episode was a warning that faith in precision air strikes and information dominance to 
change an enemy state or population’s behavior might be misplaced.
Modularity, Transformation, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
By 1996, OOTW were consuming the equivalent of 4 of the Army’s 10 remaining divi-
sions. The demands of preparing units to deploy, deploying them, and then recovering 
them to training proficiency for conventional combat required a 3:1 ratio of units commit-
ted to sustain one unit on deployment.33 When considering personnel, this ratio increased 
to 5:1, given the number of individuals going through training or education programs at 
any given time.34 Though the 1990s operations tempo was much lower than the Army 
would experience in the wars following September 2001, it was nevertheless a difficult 
strain on a force that continued a strenuous regimen in which units spent months of each 
year at training centers, honing their skills for high-intensity combat operations.
To ease this pressure and generate more combat formations out of the existing force, 
Army leaders in the late 1990s began the process of moving away from a division-based 
structure in favor of modular combat brigades. With the Balkan experience in mind, 
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Shinseki developed and fielded the first Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT): brigades 
optimized to provide numbers of boots on the ground and speed of deployment similar 
to that of light units, but with tactical mobility, firepower, and protection comparable to 
heavy units.35 After evaluating a series of options, the Army selected a variant of the Cana-
dian LAV III to form the basis of the brigade and named the new vehicles Strykers. The 
IBCTs were meant to be relatively self-contained formations that could fight and sustain 
themselves independent of the division headquarters or support structures. They were 
meant to be modular, interchangeable formations that could be plugged into any higher 
division headquarters, not just the division to which they were organically assigned.36 
Army planners drawing on the ideas of the RMA expected that future Army brigades 
and divisions equipped with superior technology would be able to maintain situational 
awareness through passive, technological means, rather than using traditional combined 
arms organizations to conduct continuous reconnaissance, fight for information, and 
develop the situation in close contact with enemy forces.37
General Myers (left). Source: DoD photo by Master Sergeant James M. Bowman, USAF (Released).
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Myers and  
 SECDEF Rumsfeld.38
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Rumsfeld’s arrival at the DoD in 2001 created a significant countercurrent to the plans 
and operating posture that had marked the Army of the 1990s. Rumsfeld believed in the 
full potential of new technologies to greatly accelerate the force development process, an 
idea at odds with Army leaders’ evolutionary approach to transformation, which relied 
on the gradual integration of proven technologies rather than the quick integration of 
unproven ones. Cautious of not losing the legacy force capabilities, however, Army lead-
ers wanted to test new technologies carefully to ensure they worked first and avoid, in 
the words of future Under Secretary of Defense Michael G. Vickers, trading away “cur-
rent capabilities” for “future possibilities.”39
Rumsfeld was also disinclined to continue the 1990s trend of employing the Army 
on a large scale in OOTW, following the lead of former President George W. Bush, who 
as a presidential candidate had criticized Clinton’s use of the military for peacekeeping. 
During his January 2001 confirmation hearing, Rumsfeld told Congress, “I don’t think it’s 
necessarily true that the United States has to become a great peacekeeper” and suggested 
that peacekeeping missions could be the work of other nations.40 He later repeated this 
sentiment on nation building when speaking about Afghanistan and the concerted effort 
to maintain a small force presence and “not engage in what some call nation building.” 
Rumsfeld’s way ahead centered not on people, but equipment: missile defense and the 
harnessing of technology to make smaller forces more lethal and deployable.41
THE IRAQI REGIME IN THE 1990s
As the U.S. Army became involved in numerous contingency operations around the 
globe and debated its structure, organization, and technology for a future of force pro-
jection overseas, the Iraqi regime was on a different trajectory altogether. For Saddam, 
the lessons of 1991 would be far different from those taken by his Western enemies. For 
reasons Saddam struggled to understand, the United States had decided to stop short 
of removing his weakened regime from power, despite the stunning conventional mili-
tary victory it had just achieved. The existential threat to his regime, Saddam noted, had 
come not from the 100 hours of high-intensity combat against the U.S.-led coalition in 
Kuwait and the southern Iraqi desert, but from the popular uprising and chaos that had 
followed. For the next 12 years, Saddam would focus mainly on building the capabilities 
that would be needed to survive against internal threats and to deter the enemy Iranian 
regime, rather than those needed to fight an unwinnable war against the U.S. military. As 
the Ba’ath Party attempted to shore up its regime’s legitimacy, it set in motion changes 
that would ravage Iraqi society and lay the groundwork for future conflict among Iraqis.
 The 1991 Iraqi Intifada
For the coalition commanders who gathered at Safwan on the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border 
on March 3, 1991, the war was over. But for the Iraqi generals who walked away from 
the truce tent, the war was just beginning. On February 15, then-President George H. W. 
Bush urged Iraqis to mount a popular uprising, telling a worldwide television audience 
that “there is another way for the bloodshed to stop, and that is for the Iraqi military and 
the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the dic-
tator, to step aside.”42
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As the Iraqi divisions in Kuwait collapsed, Iraqis did what Bush had suggested they 
do. Within days of the March 3 cease-fire, Shi’a crowds and army deserters had overrun 
every major southern city and were fighting Ba’ath Party loyalists for control. Hoping to 
exploit the situation, members of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq 
(SCIRI) and the Badr Corps, twin Iraqi Shi’a groups created by the Iranian regime during 
the Iran-Iraq war, crossed the border from Iran to claim control of Basrah, southern Iraq’s 
largest city. Meanwhile, in northern Iraq, the peshmerga troops of the Kurdistan Demo-
cratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) seized the major cities of the 
Kurdish north. The Kurdish parties aimed to create an independent Kurdish zone and 
inflict a blow in retaliation for the Ba’athist regime’s Anfal Campaign of 1988, which had 
killed more than 100,000 Kurds and displaced a million more. By March 20, the uprising 
had reached its high point, with most of Iraq’s southern and Kurdish provinces in rebel 
hands.
The uprising was short-lived. Republican Guard divisions that had escaped from 
Kuwait moved into rebel-held northern and southern cities, driving the lightly armed 
rebels from city centers. Their methods were rough, especially once it was clear Ameri-
can units would not intervene. Military helicopters that Schwarzkopf had permitted his 
Iraqi counterparts to use ostensibly for humanitarian purposes were turned against muti-
nous communities such as the Shi’a holy city of Karbala, where regime troops allegedly 
dropped sarin gas and strafed fleeing rebels and civilians.43
The regime’s secret police executed thousands in the reoccupied cities and buried 
them in mass graves. The Mujahedin e Khalq (MeK), an Iranian opposition group led 
by Maryam and Massoud Rajavi and sponsored by Saddam, helped drive the KDP and 
PUK out of the northern cities and into the Kurdish mountains. In the south, hundreds of 
thousands of Shi’a fled into Iran or Iraq’s vast marshes. In the north, more than a million 
Kurds fled toward Turkey or Iran. By mid-April, the regime had retaken all major cities, 
tens of thousands of Iraqis had been killed, and one in 10 Iraqis had been driven from 
their homes.44
Although U.S. units on the ground near the southern Iraqi cities saw regime loyal-
ists suppressing the rebellion and although rebel leaders from Basrah had appealed to 
U.S. combat units to come to their aid, U.S. leaders chose not to intervene, a decision 
that allowed Saddam to remain in power and that created a generation of Iraqi Shi’a 
resentment against the United States.45 By summer 1991, the regime was carrying out 
large-scale reprisals. In the northern cities, the Ba’ath accelerated a decades-long effort to 
Arabize the most important mixed-ethnicity regions, expelling as many as 100,000 Kurds 
accused of supporting the rebellion and resettling Shi’a Arabs from southern Iraq to dis-
puted areas such as Kirkuk. An even larger regime response took place in the south. The 
vast marsh regions of the lower Euphrates and Tigris Valleys had been a safe haven for 
the Shi’a tribal rebels, but by 1992, the Ba’ath began draining the marshes by diverting 
the main channels of the rivers. By the late 1990s, 90 percent of the southern marshes had 
disappeared, forcing hundreds of thousands of Marsh Arab tribesmen to migrate into 
the Shi’a slums of the south and Baghdad. The displacement ended a Marsh Arab way of 
life that had existed for millennia and caused an ecological crisis across southern Iraq. To 
ensure against future uprisings, Saddam was sowing demographic chaos.
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The Islamicization of the Ba’ath and Deterioration of the Iraqi Army
As the U.S. Army went through its post-Operation DESERT STORM transformation, 
Saddam presided over a transformation of his own in Iraq, seeking new means to shore 
up his regime in the wake of the 1991 uprising, as well as a new ideological basis for 
his rule. Though Ba’athism was a secular pan-Arab ideology and though he had long 
suppressed Iraq’s various Islamic movements, in 1993 Saddam decided to Islamicize his 
regime in a national Faith Campaign designed to invest his rule with religious legitimacy. 
The formerly secular leader encouraged the building of mosques, offered clerics state 
sponsorship, and claimed speciously that Ba’athism’s founder Michel Aflaq (a Syrian 
Christian) had converted to Islam on his deathbed in Baghdad. Saddam also clothed him-
self in religious imagery, adding “Allah Akbar” to the Iraqi flag and having Islamic schol-
ars “discover” his descent from the Prophet Muhammad.46
Most significantly, though, Saddam sent thousands of Ba’athist military and intelli-
gence officers into mosques and seminaries to undertake Islamic studies, especially from 
Salafi clerics whom Saddam considered less threatening than the Muslim Brotherhood. 
The result was a fusion of Ba’athists and Salafis whom Iraqi Islamists believed were to 
form an Islamic resistance if ever Saddam’s regime were under assault again. Meanwhile, 
Saddam’s Vice President Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri created a similar fusion of Ba’athists and 
religious figures among the Sufi sect, known as Naqshbandis, whose largest following 
was in the upper Tigris region and Anbar. Even among the Shi’a, the Ba’athist regime 
encouraged Najaf-based Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr to build a large popular 
following as long as Sadr agreed to align politically with the regime against Iran.47
Significant changes were underway among Iraq’s military and security services as 
well. The 60 Iraqi divisions that the Third Army had eviscerated in Kuwait and southern 
Iraq were never fully reconstituted. The post-1991 Iraqi Army shrank to five corps of 
18 divisions, with an additional two corps of the Republican Guard. In December 1995, 
senior Iraqi military leaders, including Republican Guard Commander Lieutenant Gen-
eral Raad Hamdani, met with Saddam to recommend new doctrines and organizations 
based on the lessons drawn from the 1991 war. Because the U.S. military, with its tech-
nological advantages, could destroy any large formations, Hamdani observed there was 
no point in building them; instead, the Iraqis should eschew armored forces in favor of 
light infantry that would disperse and offer guerrilla resistance against an invading force. 
Saddam reportedly rejected the suggestion, asserting that had his army not possessed 
heavy forces, Iraq would not have emerged “victorious” from the 1991 war.48 Officially, 
the army would retain its pre-1991 doctrine and armaments.
Nevertheless, the Iraqi security sector changed dramatically after 1995. Whereas the 
Iraqi military of the 1980s was dominated by a huge regular army and the Republican 
Guard, the Iraqi regime of the 1990s began a proliferation of paramilitary organizations 
affiliated with the Ba’ath Party. These paramilitaries drew resources and recruits away 
from the regular military, whose large formations had already been starved of resources 
by the postwar sanctions. Most notably, Saddam’s eldest (and unstable) son Uday com-
manded the Fedayeen Saddam, a Ba’athist militia with as many as 40,000 members.49 
Probably most Fedayeen were Sunnis, but a large number were Shi’a recruited from 
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lower-class neighborhoods in Baghdad’s Saddam City (later renamed Sadr City in 2003) 
and other areas where jobs were scarce.50
The Iraqi Resistance to Saddam 
The regime’s mid-1990s restructuring coincided with a series of internal challenges to 
Saddam’s rule. The most prominent came from within his own family. In August 1995, 
Saddam’s son-in-law and kinsman, Hussein Kamal al-Majid, defected from his senior 
post overseeing Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and set himself up 
in opposition to Saddam in Jordan. Just 6 months later, however, Saddam lured Hussein 
Kamal back to Baghdad with a promise of amnesty, only to immediately execute him for 
treason.51
Other challenges came from within Ba’athist and Sunni tribal networks that had once 
been Saddam loyalists. After the 1991 uprising, Saddam hoped to bolster his regime 
by empowering Iraq’s tribes, just as he had empowered its Islamists. He reversed the 
long-standing Ba’athist policy of suppressing tribal identity and restored the power of 
tribal sheikhs, even allowing the arming of tribal militias with heavy weapons meant to 
be used against invaders or insurgents if a 1991-type crisis should recur. But the pro-tribal 
policy created new dangers as well. In May 1995, the Albu Nimr tribe, part of Anbar’s 
large Dulaim tribal confederation, rose in revolt in Ramadi after the regime executed three 
senior Dulaimi generals who had criticized Uday. The Special Republican Guard quickly 
suppressed the uprising, but the incident demonstrated Ramadi’s restiveness and the 
fractures between Anbaris and the Ba’athist regime.52 Nor was Saddam’s support within 
the Ba’ath Party fully assured. In June 1996, Saddam’s intelligence apparatus uncovered 
a coup plot involving more than 100 officers coordinated by former Iraqi general Moham-
med Shahwani, a Sunni Turkoman from northern Iraq who lost three sons among the 85 
Iraqis executed for their roles in the conspiracy.53
Others among Saddam’s opponents took advantage of his Faith Campaign to mobi-
lize against the regime. The Salafi networks that Saddam had encouraged contained not 
just Ba’athists sent for religious indoctrination, but also “pure” Salafis opposed to secular 
states in the Muslim world. In the late 1990s, the most militant of the pure Salafis began 
a low-level terrorist campaign against the Ba’ath Party, carrying out intermittent attacks 
against Ba’athist targets.54 The emergence of this threat led Saddam’s half-brother and 
intelligence chief Barzan al-Tikriti to warn Saddam in 2000 that the Islamist groups the 
regime was supporting would eventually try to topple the Ba’ath.55
Finally, from their bases inside Iran, Badr Corps members conducted cross-border 
operations into Iraq throughout the 1990s. Formed by the Iranian regime during the Iran-
Iraq war, the Badr Corps was comprised of Iraqi prisoners of war who had defected to 
Iran, as well as Iraqi refugees who had fled to Iran. The Badr Corps and affiliates such as 
the shadowy Sheibani Network sought to gather intelligence and carry out acts of sabo-
tage and subversion in the Shi’a south, intending to lay the groundwork for an eventual 
revolt. The Iranian regime directly sponsored these activities through the Quds Force of 
the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which by 1998 came under the command of 
Iranian general Qassem Soleimani.56
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THE CONTINUING U.S.-IRAQ CONFRONTATION, 1991-2000
In April 1991, a contingent of U.S. Marines and a single U.S. Army brigade in Kuwait, 
the 1st Brigade of the 3d Armored Division, covered the redeployment of the 500,000-
strong coalition as it departed the Persian Gulf theater. In June, the lone Army brigade 
was replaced by 3,600 troops of the Germany-based 11th Armored Cavalry, commanded 
by Colonel Andrew J. Bacevich. The cavalry unit initiated a rotational mission—to deter 
any future aggression by Saddam against Kuwait—that would last more than a decade 
and take place alongside an intermittent escalation of U.S.-Iraq tensions into warfare.
The deterrence mission started on a somber note for Bacevich and his 11th Armored 
Cavalry when their ammunition containers exploded at Camp Doha, Kuwait, on July 
11, 1991, killing three Soldiers and wounding 55 more, while destroying or damaging 
four M1A1 tanks and 98 other vehicles. Compared with the losses sustained by the force 
during Operation DESERT STORM, these postwar losses signified that the contingency 
mission of deterring Iraqi aggression would lack the luster and clear sense of success that 
characterized the lightning ground campaign of February-March 1991.57
Operation PROVIDE COMFORT
The rapid redeployment of coalition troops from Kuwait after Operation DESERT 
STORM was not the end of U.S. involvement on the ground inside Iraq. As Saddam’s 
troops quelled the northern uprising in April 1991, more than a half million Kurdish 
refugees entered Turkey, seeking safety from the Iraqi regime’s crackdown. Hundreds 
of thousands more migrated toward improvised camps near the mountainous border. 
Hundreds died each day of exposure and starvation. Unlike the Shi’a rebellion in the 
south, the Kurdish plight gained the attention of Western capitals and the global media, 
prompting UN intervention to alleviate the humanitarian crisis.58 The resulting oper-
ation, PROVIDE COMFORT, began with airdrops of humanitarian supplies, but soon 
expanded to include ground forces to safeguard the refugee population. In early April 
1991, a small NATO force under U.S. Army Major General Jay M. Garner carved out an 
enclave in the border zone to facilitate the safe return of the Kurds to Iraq. Garner’s mul-
tinational command included an airborne infantry battalion under Lieutenant Colonel 
John P. Abizaid and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) under Colonel James L. 
Jones, Jr., which together maneuvered inside Iraq to force an Iraqi Army corps to with-
draw from the Kurdish zone and clear the way for Kurdish refugees to return home. 
With the humanitarian mission completed, U.S. ground forces left northern Iraq in July 
1991, but NATO military operations continued in the air.59 As part of Operation PRO-
VIDE COMFORT, the United States established a no-fly zone, later named Operation 
NORTHERN WATCH, above the 36th parallel in northern Iraq to protect the population 
from the worst excesses of Saddam’s regime. A matching no-fly zone, dubbed Operation 
SOUTHERN WATCH, covered much of southern Iraq. These no-fly zones were part of a 
low-intensity conflict lasting more than a decade between the United States and Iraq. This 
state of affairs that military historian Richard Swain called “neither war nor not war” 
would continue until 2003.60
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Saddam and the Clinton Administration
Within 2 years of Operation DESERT STORM’s end, Saddam began to show that he 
was unafraid of renewing some measure of hostilities with the United States. He also 
demonstrated that his destabilizing reach still extended beyond Iraq’s borders. In April 
1993, the United States foiled a plot by Saddam’s intelligence officers to assassinate former 
U.S. President Bush during his visit to Kuwait. When the plot became known, Clinton 
ordered punitive missile strikes against Iraqi intelligence buildings in Baghdad.
In late 1994, the U.S.-Iraqi confrontation intensified further when the Iraqi regime 
ceased cooperation with UN weapons inspectors and deployed two Republican Guard 
divisions menacingly close to the Kuwaiti border. In early October, Clinton ordered the 
1st Brigade, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), and a sizable U.S.-U.K. contingent of 
air and naval forces to Kuwait to deter any Iraqi incursion. Deploying by air, the U.S. 
brigade was able to fall in on pre-positioned equipment in Kuwait in less than a week, 
demonstrating a power projection capability the United States had lacked in the region 
before 1991. The Iraqi divisions withdrew from the border zone by the end of October, 
but thereafter U.S. troops rotated to Kuwait in a continuation of a series of exercises 
known as Intrinsic Action, which, by 1999, involved the permanent stationing of a bri-
gade-sized contingent in the country.
Meanwhile, the Iraqi regime closely watched the United States’ multiplying OOTW. 
As U.S. troops withdrew from Mogadishu, Saddam took to heart what he believed was 
the Somalia expedition’s chief lesson: that America would not bear military casualties, 
and that U.S. troops, once bloodied in battle, would abandon the field. This judgment 
became a key element of Saddam’s strategic thinking, so much so that on the eve of 
the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq 9 years later, he would distribute copies of author Mark 
Bowden’s Black Hawk Down to his commanders.61
The Kurdish Civil War and Operation DESERT FOX
Operation PROVIDE COMFORT prevented the Iraqi regime from pursuing the KDP 
and PUK rebels of March-April 1991 into the mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan. As a result, by 
the time fighting between Kurdish peshmerga and Iraqi troops ceased in October 1991, 
NATO operations had essentially created an autonomous Kurdish zone beyond Bagh-
dad’s control. A Green Line separated this zone from Arab Iraq, beyond which NATO 
ground troops and aircraft deterred the advancement of Saddam’s forces. In the new 
autonomous zone, the KDP and PUK began to administer rival Kurdish “statelets” where 
several million Kurds lived independently for the first time in modern Iraqi history.
While the U.S. 1st Armored Division carried out its NATO peacekeeping mission 
among the Bosnian ethnic groups in 1996, the Iraqi regime began to encroach upon the 
autonomous Kurdish zone from which Garner, Abizaid, and Jones had expelled Iraqi 
troops in 1991. The Western powers that had enabled the Kurdish parties to establish 
self-governing statelets were surprised when in August 1996, the Kurds themselves 
invited Saddam’s forces back across the Green Line. A dispute over revenues from smug-
gled oil escalated into a Kurdish civil war between Massoud Barzani’s KDP and Jalal 
Talabani’s PUK, and with the backing of the Iranian regime, the latter was able to drive 
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Barzani and the KDP out of Erbil. Faced with impending defeat, Barzani and the KDP 
turned to Saddam for help, and soon a joint KDP-Iraqi offensive pushed Talabani’s forces 
out of Erbil toward the mountainous Iranian border, where the Iranian regime allowed 
the PUK leader and his peshmerga to shelter and survive the onslaught. As Saddam’s 
Republican Guard units prepared to advance on Talabani’s stronghold of Sulaymaniyah, 
U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf responded to Saddam’s violation of the UN-protected 
Green Line by launching cruise missile strikes against Iraqi air defense targets in south-
ern Iraq on September 3, 1996, in Operation DESERT STRIKE. Shortly after the air strikes, 
Iraqi troops withdrew to their positions on the Green Line, leaving Barzani in control of 
the Kurdish capital.
The air strikes of September 1996 were part of worsening tensions between the West 
and Saddam’s regime. In June 1996, UN weapons inspectors had destroyed a germ war-
fare facility in the desert 60 kilometers from Baghdad, but they frequently were prevented 
from inspecting other suspected Iraqi WMD sites. By February 1998, a frustrated Clinton 
pressed Congress and U.S. allies to do more to curb the Iraqi regime’s behavior, citing 
Saddam’s suspected WMD programs and his failure to comply with numerous UN res-
olutions as a threat to the region. In October 1998, Congress passed the Iraq Liberation 
Act, allocating $97 million for Iraqi opposition groups. Just weeks after the act’s passage, 
the UN confrontation with Saddam escalated into a crisis when the regime ceased all 
cooperation with UN weapons inspectors, forcing the inspection teams to depart Iraq 
on December 15, 1998. Within hours, U.S. and U.K. forces launched Operation DESERT 
FOX, which combined 600 sorties and 400 cruise missile strikes in a 70-hour air offensive 
against regime targets throughout the country.62
In the smoldering U.S.-Iraqi conflict, the late 1998 confrontation constituted a signif-
icant flare-up, in both military and political terms. Following Operation DESERT FOX, 
Iraqi air defense systems became more aggressive against Western aircraft enforcing 
the no-fly zones, prompting the United States and Great Britain to increase their sor-
ties against Iraqi targets. In 2002, Iraqi air defenders attacked coalition aircraft on 500 
occasions, prompting 90 coalition air strikes in response. Patrolling the contested north-
ern and southern no-fly zones eventually involved as many as 200 aircraft and 7,500 
airmen on a daily basis.63 The increased pressure from the Western air forces led the Iraqi 
Army to adopt tactics it had developed after the 1991 war to protect itself from enemy air 
strikes. The highest value Iraqi assets, such as air defense units, were being repositioned 
continually to different parts of the country to evade tracking by Western satellites, going 
to near-random locations on an unpredictable schedule. Despite the chaos caused by the 
constant movement of tactical formations, however, the Iraqi Army managed to provi-
sion its units without interruption, demonstrating a robust combat service support capa-
bility even in remote areas. The most actively repositioned units learned to maintain three 
command posts at once, often widely distant from one another, and to maintain weapons 
and ammunition stocks in even more locations, leading to the gradual saturation of Iraqi 
territory with vast stores of munitions.64
On the political level, the confrontation with the Iraqi regime that culminated in Oper-
ation DESERT FOX changed U.S. policy toward Iraq from containment to regime change, 
a change Clinton announced on December 18, 1998. The Clinton administration, how-
ever, showed little inclination to take direct action to implement the new policy.65 Rather 
18
THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR
than direct action, the act opened the way for official U.S. sponsorship of such groups 
as the Iraqi National Congress of Ahmad Chalabi, the Iraqi National Accord of Ayad 
Allawi, and the Kurdish parties, with the U.S. side of the relationship eventually to be 
managed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Ryan Crocker.
Sanctions and Internal Unrest
By 1999, the international sanctions that had been in place against Iraq for 8 years had 
profoundly affected the Iraqi state and Iraqi society, though not in ways that restrained the 
Ba’athist regime’s destabilizing activities as the Western powers had hoped they would. 
The sanctions had prevented Iraqis from modernizing so that Iraq’s institutions generally 
operated with the unimproved infrastructure and technology they had acquired in the 
1970s. Much of Iraq’s national infrastructure had been damaged in the air campaign of 
the 1991 war as well—one estimate put the total damage at $262 billion—and the regime 
had been slow to reconstruct after the war as international sanctions took effect. The sanc-
tioned Iraqi state lacked the means to maintain even the oil sector that provided almost the 
entirety of the state’s revenues so that a country that had appeared wealthy and modern 
in the 1970s looked blighted and poor by the late 1990s. The Iraqi education system that 
had led the Arab world since the 1950s, already seriously strained during the Iran-Iraq 
war, broke down under the weight of the sanctions; the population’s literacy rate fell, and 
the country’s human capital began to wither. Iraqi professionals, such as engineers and 
doctors, were isolated from international counterparts and could no longer keep up with 
advances in their fields. Iraq’s social fabric suffered as well. Its middle classes were hard-
hit by inflation and the shrinking of the economy, so that many educated Iraqis left the 
country, creating a brain drain that exacerbated all other problems. The state and society 
also bore the burden of a large number of orphans and widows created by successive 
wars, so that Iraqi cities contained millions of poor, quasi-literate youth.66
Under sanctions, Iraq’s economic shortages created some perverse incentives. Gov-
ernment ministries that had dispersed large oil-funded budgets in the 1970s tended to 
hoard resources rather than distribute them in the 1990s and the state’s provision of ser-
vices decayed badly. With the licit economy nearly broken, Iraqis of all kinds, includ-
ing the country’s many civil servants, participated in the robust black market trade with 
Iraq’s neighbors. This was especially true with Syria, where Saddam’s regime encour-
aged the smuggling of Iraqi oil and other commodities in order to generate illicit reve-
nues. The Iraqi population of the 1990s came to rely increasingly on the state to provide 
a subsistence level of food and electricity, with the former provided by the Iraqi Ministry 
of Trade under the supervision of the UN in the Oil for Food program.67 “We are in the 
process of destroying an entire society. It is as simple and terrifying as that,” observed 
Denis J. Halliday, UN humanitarian coordinator for Iraq, on the effect of the sanctions in 
1998.68 In retrospect, the sanctions appear to have increased Saddam’s power inside Iraq 
by making the population dependent on his distribution of increasingly limited basic ser-
vices, as the standard of living of the Iraqi middle class collapsed. Due to these underap-
preciated economic and social effects, the nation the U.S. military would occupy in 2003 
was far more destitute and ravaged than was generally understood.
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It was against this backdrop that the Iraqi regime came into conflict with the popular 
religious movement led by the Najaf-based Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, father 
of Moqtada Sadr, and the preferred spiritual guide of millions of Shi’a. The Ba’ath had 
viewed the elder Sadr as a useful Arab counterweight to the cleric-led Iranian regime 
during the Iran-Iraq war and the early 1990s. By the late 1990s, however, Sadr was an 
increasingly vocal critic of the Ba’ath. In February 1999, gunmen presumed to be acting 
for the regime killed Sadiq Sadr and two of his sons in Najaf. In the days following the 
assassination, Sadr’s followers exploded in rage against the Ba’ath across the south and 
in Saddam City, the Baghdad district later known as Sadr City. The Baghdad uprising 
reportedly grew intense enough to require the regime to use military units to suppress 
it, while fighting in Basrah ended with the regime’s execution of perhaps hundreds of 
Sadrist rebels. Within weeks, the Sadrists had succumbed to the Ba’athist counterattack, 
but not before mounting the most extensive resistance to the regime since the 1991 inti-
fada and proving they were a force with which to be reckoned.69
The CENTCOM Theater Posture
As the Clinton administration’s policy shifted to regime change in Iraq, the Third 
Army, as the Army component of CENTCOM, expanded its footprint in the Persian Gulf 
region to prepare for any future ground operation against Saddam’s regime. The same 
month the Iraq Liberation Act was signed into law, Third Army Commander Tommy 
Franks declared that all was in place to “deploy, command, control, and support major 
Army forces to deter Iraqi adventurism,” with pre-positioned equipment and a pre-de-
ployed command and control node. This would ensure that, in the event of hostilities, 
U.S. forces would not lose the “race for Kuwait.”70 Third Army had pre-positioned a 
heavy division’s worth of equipment in Kuwait and Doha, Qatar, along with an extensive 
infrastructure to deliver the large quantities of fuel required to sustain operations deep 
into Iraq.
Meanwhile, CENTCOM and Third Army regularly conducted war games that tested 
the existing war plans.71 One such war game revealed the myriad difficulties that could 
follow any campaign to remove Saddam and his regime. Under CENTCOM Commander 
General Anthony C. Zinni, CENTCOM planners conducted Exercise Desert Crossing 
in spring 1999 to examine the security, political, social, and economic challenges that 
might ensue if the regime in Baghdad collapsed under the pressure of an assault such as 
Operation DESERT FOX. Zinni, no stranger to Iraq after having participated in Opera-
tion PROVIDE COMFORT, received unsettling findings from Desert Crossing. Political 
and military planning for an invasion and post-Saddam Iraq should begin immediately, 
Zinni’s planners judged, because of the “contentious positions that must be reconciled 
and managed.” An intervention in Iraq would be “costly in terms of casualties and 
resources,” they concluded, adding, “regime change may not bring stability” because of 
factors including hostile neighbors, “fragmentation along religious and/or ethnic lines, 
and chaos created by rival forces bidding for power.”72 Exercise Desert Crossing also 
recognized the dearth of information about what was actually happening in Iraq and rec-
ommended that efforts begin immediately to engage, or at least prepare to engage, key 
Kurdish and tribal leaders.
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Exercise Desert Crossing outlined several criteria for a successful mission: elimination 
of WMD, a restructured Iraqi Army, a stable and growing oil economy, and an Iraqi Gov-
ernment that would observe international obligations and norms—but would not neces-
sarily be a democracy, though the emergence of another dictator, Zinni’s officers noted, 
would be an “unspinnable contradiction.” Oil revenue might be one way of paying for 
a liberation, but there was the matter of Iraqi debt acquired during the 1990-1991 war, 
and stability in Iraq would depend on the successor state’s economic viability in any 
case. Regional powers were unlikely to support an enduring American presence in Iraq, 
CENTCOM planners judged, but if the United States had to return to Iraq, an extended 
presence was precisely what they predicted would be required. The outcome of a U.S. 
intervention would probably be a “Bosnia scenario,” they told Zinni, under which a 
10-year U.S. military occupation was not unlikely.74
THE POST-9/11 ENVIRONMENT
For the George W. Bush administration, the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), lent 
urgency to the problem of the long conflict with Saddam. Al-Qaeda’s demonstration of 
the potency of state-sponsored terror networks, along with some U.S. leaders’ unsub-
stantiated suspicion that Saddam somehow had been involved in the attacks, meant 
that Saddam’s removal changed overnight from a notional U.S. policy goal to a security 
imperative for the Bush administration (see Chapter 2). The subsequent surprisingly brief 
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campaign to topple the Taliban in Afghanistan had a profound impact on U.S. decision 
makers as well. The apparent success of a tiny footprint of U.S. forces—mainly special 
operations forces—working with indigenous Afghan fighters from the Northern Alliance 
appeared to some in the U.S. national security apparatus, especially those who already 
espoused RMA, to point the way toward a similar method by which Saddam might be 
toppled with far less cost and trouble than the Clinton administration or CENTCOM’s 
Desert Crossing had assumed. In other words, the experience of the 9/11 attacks and the 
weeks that followed them indicated to some U.S. leaders that the removal of Saddam was 
not only an immediate necessity, but also an easy prospect—a dramatic change from the 
outlook of the 1990s.
Back in Baghdad, for reasons well documented by the Iraqi Perspectives Project and 
other engagements with former Ba’athist regime insiders, the 9/11 attacks and the U.S. 
invasion of Afghanistan made little impact on Saddam’s strategic calculus. He continued 
to harbor a greater fear of an internal Iraqi uprising than of an attack by the United States 
and remained convinced that he had to maintain the fiction of possessing WMD in order 
to deter regional enemies, especially Iran. Saddam took from the Afghanistan example 
only those points that reinforced his assumptions about the United States, including his 
overarching judgment that the United States would never mount a large-scale land inva-
sion to remove him from power, just as the United States had declined to do against the 
Taliban, relying largely on indigenous forces instead. Nor did the demonstration of U.S. 
military technology make an impact on the Iraqi Army’s operating concepts. Saddam did 
not recognize that the U.S. will to use force to remove him had fundamentally changed 
after 9/11, and, as a result, he would fail to allow his military leaders to make profession-
ally sound plans to resist a U.S. invasion.75
The invasion of Afghanistan had a much more significant impact on other American 
adversaries. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who had commanded a group of Arab mujahideen 
in Afghanistan, led his organization into Iran as the United States and its Afghan allies 
toppled the Taliban in late 2001, proceeding from there to Iraqi Kurdistan. There they 
sheltered in a small enclave near Halabjah controlled by Ansar al-Islam, a militant group 
comprised of mainly Kurdish Islamists who had fought in Afghanistan and were actively 
fighting against local PUK peshmerga. From his Iraqi sanctuary, Zarqawi began to orga-
nize his Tawhid wal-Jihad terrorist group to carry out attacks in the region, including the 
2002 assassination of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) official Lau-
rence M. Foley, Sr., in Jordan, and to look for opportunities to expand his jihad.76
***
On the eve of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the U.S. Army was much decreased from its 
Cold War size, while sustaining a high tempo of stability operations around the world. 
Defense thinkers concluded that Operation DESERT STORM marked a revolution in 
the nature of war, after which technology would enable the U.S. military to defeat any 
enemy with a relatively small force. The U.S. military of the 1990s, writ large, had devel-
oped a low tolerance both for casualties and for mistakes by tactical commanders. As it 
reduced its combat formations, the Army had outsourced much of its logistical services, 
including for contingency operations, on which it had become accustomed to deploying 
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in a somewhat non-expeditionary posture with large base camps and amenities. As its 
involvement in stability operations mounted, the Army found its real-world activities at 
odds with its doctrinal emphases, including the previous assumption that OOTW were a 
lesser included capability for forces that were trained and ready for major combat oper-
ations. There also lingered in many Army quarters the sense that OOTW were extrane-
ous, if not detrimental, to the Army’s core mission. Throughout the 1990s, the Army had 
evolved from a static, Europe-focused force to one accustomed to deploying in contin-
gency operations worldwide, though it continued to judge its commanders mainly by 
their success in high-intensity conflict war games and training exercises—even as their 
units became increasingly involved in low-intensity conflicts in the real world. In Haiti, 
Bosnia, and Kosovo, the U.S. military had acquired the assumption that the cessation of 
hostilities in a conflict would lead naturally to a peacekeeping-type mission by an inter-
national force. After 9/11, many defense leaders believed the brief campaign in Afghan-
istan seemed to validate the RMA, and that meant that even more could be done with 
fewer U.S. forces.
Meanwhile, on the eve of the 2003 war, the Iraqi regime remained focused on inter-
nal threats to Ba’athist rule, fixed in its assumption that the external threat posed by 
the United States was not an existential one. However, even if Saddam and his regime 
had fully recognized the gathering threat, they had little with which to resist it, having 
hollowed out the conventional Iraqi military of 1991, and replacing it with numerous 
militias whose raison d’etre was to preserve the regime against insurgency. Within the 
regime itself, the secular Arab socialism of the Ba’ath was replaced by a strange fusion 
of Ba’athists and Islamists, mirrored outside the regime by a seething Shi’a Islamist mass 
movement organized by underground leaders with links to the Iranian regime and its 
long-standing militant networks. Across Iraq, the country’s infrastructure was in sham-
bles, with state institutions devastated by the combined effect of sanctions and the ram-
pant corruption the regime encouraged in response to them. The country’s social fabric 
was frayed as well, with the middle class sinking into poverty and social divides among 
sects and ethnic groups deepening. Iraq was a country with a regime and population 
little aware of the changes about to be thrust on them.
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PART I:
FROM INVASION 
TO INSURGENCY, 2002-2003

CHAPTER 2 
REGIME CHANGE
IN THE SHADOW OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
The normally festive season between Thanksgiving and Christmas, in 2001, was a 
frenetic affair for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). CENTCOM Commander General 
Tommy Ray Franks was supervising U.S. and coalition military operations in Afghani-
stan, where, since October, they had been fighting alongside members of the Northern 
Alliance to remove the Taliban from power. In addition to the battles in Afghanistan, 
Franks was overseeing planning for what the George W. Bush administration had coined 
the “War on Terrorism,” a campaign against major terrorist groups and the countries that 
supported them. Neither of these campaigns was conducted to the satisfaction of Franks 
or the administration of then-President George W. Bush. Despite the rapidity of the U.S.-
led advance in Afghanistan, Osama Bin Laden, Mullah Omar, and other key perpetra-
tors of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks and the Taliban leaders remained at large. 
Moreover, concerns about state-sponsored terrorist organizations acquiring and using 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and “dirty bombs” permeated U.S. national secu-
rity decision-making during the latter months of 2001, driven in part by a public feeling 
of sudden vulnerability. Security policies and contingency plans under revision before 
the attacks suddenly received elevated amounts of attention. In the immediate aftermath 
of 9/11, that attention became focused on another target well outside of Afghanistan: 
Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime in Iraq. Within days of the 9/11 attacks, senior offi-
cials in the Bush administration began exploring options to remove Saddam from power. 
Their efforts culminated in surprising instructions to the CENTCOM commander to for-
mulate contingency plans to invade Iraq and destroy Saddam’s regime.1
PLANNING FOR REGIME CHANGE
A New Mission for CENTCOM
As the events of 9/11 unfolded, Department of Defense (DoD) leaders scrambled 
to respond to the attacks whose origins were then unknown. Hours after the attacks 
occurred, the Joint Staff issued an order directing CENTCOM to begin contingency plan-
ning against five named countries in the command’s area of responsibility, one of which 
was Iraq. Franks and other CENTCOM leaders were too preoccupied to devote much 
attention to this tertiary planning effort, as, from October to November 2001, they were in 
daily contact with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) concerning information 
requests and orders about the prosecution of the wars against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. 
Unlike Iraq and other long-planned contingency operations, there had been no prepared 
war plan for Afghanistan or for a nonstate actor with global reach like al-Qaeda. As a 
result, when Franks and his staff were not actively responding to requests for information 
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from the SECDEF, the national policy team, or the President, they devoted most of their 
organizational energy to building plans and campaigns around what were essentially 
piecemeal deployments to South Asia that were approved directly by the SECDEF. While 
Franks received periodic updates on events in the northern and southern no-fly zones, 
Iraq did not feature prominently in his thoughts.2
The situation changed on November 27, 2001, when SECDEF Donald H. Rumsfeld 
relayed to Franks the president’s requests for revised military options on Iraq. Rumsfeld 
asked for an update on the existing contingency plan for Iraq—numbered 1003–98—the 
following week, and outlined the desired end state for an Iraq campaign as follows:
1. Iraq’s regime enablers, leadership, and power base destroyed;
2. Iraq’s WMD capability eliminated;
3. Iraq retains sufficient forces to defend itself but no longer has the power to  
threaten neighbors;
4. Iraq has an “acceptable provisional government in place;” and,
5. Iraq’s territorial integrity remains intact.3
Rumsfeld’s guidance marked a significant shift from previous contingency planning on 
Iraq, very little of which had envisioned an invasion to enact regime change and replace-
ment in Iraq.4 The changes rendered Franks incredulous, as he was fully occupied by 
the new wars against the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and terrorism more broadly, but he and his 
operations director, Air Force Major General Victor “Gene” Renuart, Jr., duly assembled 
a small planning team to develop a concept for regime change in Iraq.5   
Source: U.S. Navy photo (Released).
General Tommy R. Franks, Commander, CENTCOM (2000-2003).6
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As the CENTCOM commander, Franks was at the pinnacle of his career. He was one 
of the few who had risen through the enlisted ranks to become one of the Army’s most 
senior general officers. After enlisting in 1965, and training as a cryptanalyst, he was com-
missioned as a field artillery officer in 1967 and served in Vietnam, Korea, and later, as 
assistant commander of the 1st Cavalry Division in Operation DESERT STORM. Before 
ascending to CENTCOM, he had commanded the Third Army, where, as the dual-hat-
ted commander of the Army component of CENTCOM (ARCENT), he had been deeply 
involved in developing the 1998 version of the contingency plan for Iraq.7
When Franks took the helm of CENTCOM on July 7, 2000, the command was 
comprised of five service component commands: ARCENT, the Navy component 
(NAVCENT), the Air Force component (CENTAF), the Marine component (MARCENT), and 
the Special Operations Component (SOCCENT).8 However, with the onset of the Afghan-
istan war in 2001, Franks judged that CENTCOM “could not keep up with the operational 
demands of the fast-changing tactical situation in Afghanistan” and directed a reorgani-
zation of his service components into functional commands on November 10.
The result was the Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC), the Coa-
lition Forces Maritime Component Command (CFMCC), the Coalition Forces Special 
Operations Component Command (CFSOCC), and the Coalition Forces Land Compo-
nent Command (CFLCC).9 CFLCC combined all of the ground forces—U.S. Army, U.S. 
Marines, and coalition ground forces—into a single command under a single commander. 
Its primary contributors were the Third Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Paul 
T. Mikolashek, and the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), commanded by Lieutenant 
General Michael W. Hagee; although the two commanders were peers, Mikolashek 
became the overall commander for CFLCC.
Third Army’s recent history had prepared it to be the ground component command 
for the planned invasion of Iraq, though it was already committed in Afghanistan. Franks 
relinquished command of the unit just before taking over CENTCOM and was familiar 
and comfortable with the unit’s capability. He had also fought—and won—a battle to 
relieve the Third Army commander position of its other “hat” as the deputy commander 
for the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), making it entirely a CENTCOM com-
ponent command. Third Army had small command posts already forward in Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar, and, on 9/11, had placed personnel and equipment into posi-
tion for Exercise Bright Star in Egypt.10
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Source: DoD photo by Susan Norvick, Civilian (Released). 
General Paul T. Mikolashek, Commanding General, Third Army (2000-2002),  
Speaks During a Commander’s Conference 
at Fort McPherson, GA.11
In November, Third Army was heavily engaged in responding to post-9/11 Joint Staff 
orders calling for updated plans for an invasion of Iraq. When finished, the new plans 
called for using a single Army corps with Marine augmentation to “seize terrain in south-
ern Iraq in preparation for future operations.” This limited objective focused on Iraq’s 
southern oil fields near Rumaila and did not require any U.S. forces to maneuver north 
of the Euphrates River. It was this plan that Third Army and, eventually, CFLCC used as 
the basis for more expansive operations in Iraq.12
The Army had four different corps eligible to execute such a plan: III Corps based at 
Fort Hood, TX; the V (“Victory”) Corps based in Germany; the I Corps headquartered in 
Fort Lewis, WA; and the XVIII Airborne Corps based in Fort Bragg, NC. However, in the 
fall of 2001, the XVIII Airborne Corps was engaged in Afghanistan, I Corps was focused 
on the Pacific theater and Army transformation and lacked the proper composition to 
take on a large fighting role, and III Corps was dedicated to contingency operations for 
the Korean peninsula. As a result, V Corps was selected to serve as the major Army com-
ponent of ground operations in Iraq and to participate in Exercise Vigilant Guardian in 
late 2001.13 The selection took V Corps Commander Lieutenant General William “Scott” 
Wallace by surprise. Wallace had taken command of V Corps 3 months before on July 
18, 2001, expecting that his corps would remain focused on the Balkans and specifically 
Kosovo, where it maintained a large NATO peacekeeping mission. After 9/11, he recog-
nized that the emphasis would likely change, but had thought V Corps would be given 
primarily defensive operations, including preventing another terrorist attack on U.S. soil 
REGIME CHANGE
35
or interests abroad. Once the United States established a solid defensive posture, General 
Wallace expected that the Corps would then transition to offensive operations “on our 
terms against whatever enemy we were able to uncover thereafter.”14 However, he had 
not anticipated that V Corps would be named the main planning headquarters for invad-
ing Iraq and removing the Ba’athist regime from power.
The Initial Concept and Assumptions
As CENTCOM began to plan for regime change in Iraq, Franks and others started 
to note some assumptions that were driving expectations for the operation and its out-
come. The first concerned military operations in Afghanistan, where the combination of 
air power and employment of Special Operations Forces (SOF) had seemingly validated 
the Office of the SECDEF’s views on the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and its 
determination to limit the number of American troops involved in close combat and sta-
bilization. The SECDEF insisted that the Afghanistan model could be applied against the 
planned invasion of Iraq. Throughout the planning process, Deputy Secretary of Defense 
(DSECDEF) Paul Wolfowitz and others in the Office of the SECDEF pressed military com-
manders and planners to reduce the number of forces required and the timeline for mobi-
lization, deployment, and redeployment.15 The back-and-forth exchanges among Franks, 
the Office of the SECDEF, the national policy team, and Bush continued throughout the 
planning process, affecting both the time spent on military planning and the manner in 
which forces flowed into theater.
The second major assumption influencing planning for Iraq, promoted by Wolfowitz 
and others, was that the United States and its partners could liberate Iraq rather than 
occupy it, much as they had liberated France in 1945. Defense leaders thought that Iraqis 
who were not loyal to the Ba’athist regime would welcome U.S. and allied forces with 
parades, flag-waving, and an eagerness for democratic government. These expectations 
were reinforced by members of the Iraqi expatriate community in exile such as Iraqi 
National Congress leader Ahmad Chalabi.16
Beyond these overarching assumptions, CENTCOM made planning assumptions of 
its own that had repercussions for both the invasion and efforts to stabilize Iraq after-
ward. The first was that CENTCOM would be able to open a northern front in the 
operation by sending a U.S. Army corps or division through Turkey. Franks and his 
commanders saw the operational value in surrounding Saddam’s forces in the push 
toward Baghdad. However, because they needed the support of the European Command 
(EUCOM) to make the proposal a reality, CENTCOM instead began planning operations 
merely to deceive Saddam into thinking coalition military forces would be maneuver-
ing south toward Baghdad from Turkey. When EUCOM Commander General James L. 
Jones informed Franks in May 2002 that using Turkey was a real possibility, EUCOM and 
CENTCOM began looking at concrete options to move a division-sized element through 
Turkish territory.17
CENTCOM’s second major assumption concerned Saddam’s alleged WMD program. 
Although CENTCOM and U.S. policymakers did not believe Saddam had a nuclear 
weapon just yet, their judgment, matching the consensus position of the U.S. intelligence 
community, was that the Iraqi regime was seeking to enrich uranium in preparation for 
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building one. The fact that the Iraqi dictator had used chemical munitions during the 
Iran-Iraq war and against the Kurds in 1988 also loomed large in their minds.18 The third 
key assumption driving CENTCOM planning was that the bulk of the Iraqi Army would 
not fight, but would either surrender or capitulate during the invasion and, with the right 
treatment and messaging, could be recalled to active service after the regime fell. The 
recalled Iraqi forces could then be used to augment U.S. and coalition military troops to 
provide security while an interim Iraqi Government was being established.19
These assumptions, when taken together, were the lens through which the Office of 
the SECDEF guided military plans, resulting in a proposal for a relatively light ground 
force component for the invasion, a near-simultaneous air and ground attack, and few 
forces or detailed planning dedicated to the post-regime Iraq. Decision makers believed 
the United States would not need a large number of forces because of the seemingly suc-
cessful precedent set in Afghanistan: that U.S. forces would be welcomed as liberators, 
and that the Iraqi Army would help provide security under a new, more enlightened 
Iraqi Government. Based on these two assumptions, there was no need for U.S. forces to 
conduct large-scale security operations. With these planning principles in place, Franks 
and his team briefed Bush and Rumsfeld at Camp David on December 28, 2001, outlining 
the invasion plan in four phases. Phase I involved building the coalition and interna-
tional support necessary to conduct offensive operations in Iraq. Phase II was a shaping 
effort—a combination of psychological and military deception operations designed to 
encourage segments of Iraqi society and its armed forces not to resist. Phase III involved 
military operations to destroy Iraq’s remaining armed forces and decapitate the Iraqi 
regime. Phase IV, or stability operations, addressed the transition to a new Iraqi Govern-
ment. Franks’s concept briefing also contained three potential force packages. A robust 
option assumed that basing was available from most of the U.S. partners in the Middle 
East and that the United Kingdom would contribute troops. A reduced option required 
approximately the same number of personnel but assumed that support was unavailable 
from Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. A unilateral option assumed that 
the United States would conduct operations without support from either its Middle East-
ern partners or the United Kingdom. The U.S. contingent required for all three proposals 
was approximately 105,000 initial forces, with the size of the follow-on component rang-
ing from 225,000 to 238,000 boots on the ground.20 Because these two force figures were 
additive, the final projected strength on the ground was well more than 300,000.
The President’s response at the Camp David briefing was clear: he strongly desired 
to remove Saddam from power, and sooner rather than later. The President even offered 
that invading Iraq on Saddam’s birthday, April 28, 2002, might be an appropriate sym-
bolic time to destroy the regime, a proposal that CENTCOM and its component com-
mands determined would present too short a window in which to prepare and mobilize 
its forces.21 Regardless, CENTCOM’s sense of urgency to build the plan increased, and 
the command’s focus rapidly shifted from operations in Afghanistan to Iraq.
Tensions in the Iraq War Planning
The intense planning period that followed the Camp David briefing was colored by 
significant tensions between DoD civilian and military leaders. Rumsfeld arrived at the 
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Pentagon in 2001 determined to transform how the U.S. military prosecuted the nation’s 
wars and to strengthen civilian control of the military.  This agenda created tensions 
with senior officers.22 Other factors also contributed to difficult relationships among the 
civilian leadership in the Office of the SECDEF, the Joint Staff, the service chiefs, and the 
combatant commands. Stovepipes within the Office of the SECDEF, combined with some 
personality conflicts, distrust, and institutional intransigence, tended to inhibit joint and 
interagency situational awareness and caused inordinate amounts of planning time and 
energy to be spent on revisions to the plan.
Most of the previous contingency planning for limited military objectives in Iraq, 
including Desert Crossing, had been coordinated among CENTCOM, the Joint Staff, and 
the service chiefs as force providers. The new plans for regime change in Iraq, however, 
were highly compartmentalized, classified Top Secret with an additional caveat called 
Polo Step, access to which Rumsfeld limited to a small number of people in the Office 
of the SECDEF, the Joint Staff, and CENTCOM. Rumsfeld’s restriction barred the Joint 
Chiefs and services from synchronizing and resourcing the early planning efforts, and 
it also prevented CFLCC and its subordinate corps elements from developing parallel 
plans in any detail until after Franks’s first commander’s “huddle” in Ramstein, Ger-
many, in March 2002.23
Rumsfeld’s managerial style affected the war planning as well. According to Abram 
“Abe” Shulsky, a special assistant to Under Secretary Douglas J. Feith, Rumsfeld “was 
very reluctant to give a direct order,” preferring instead to “nudge” people in the direc-
tion he wanted “without being direct about it” and by asking questions like, “do you 
need that,” and “what are other ways of doing this?”24 The secretary’s aversion to defin-
itive guidance was oddly juxtaposed with his tendency to micromanage. After serving 
nearly a year under Rumsfeld, Franks was accustomed to receiving the secretary’s mus-
ings, ideas, and pointed questions in intermittent memoranda known as “snowflakes,” 
so-called by DoD personnel because of the prolific white paper they generated in senior 
offices. A veritable blizzard had descended on CENTCOM since 9/11. The snowflakes, 
personal phone calls, and secure video teleconferences drew the secretary into the minu-
tiae of tactical operations instead of the overall strategy and policy guiding them, a fact 
that bred resentment among military leaders.25
From the beginning of his tenure, Rumsfeld’s military transformation agenda and 
management style had alienated Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Henry “Hugh” 
Shelton and Chief of Staff of the Army General Eric K. Shinseki. Although Shinseki sup-
ported the idea of restructuring and transforming the Army, he gained a reputation, first 
with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and, later, the SECDEF for being 
hard-headed over his decision to change the Army’s headgear from service caps to a 
black beret. The seemingly trivial issue had grown to be significant when former and 
retired members of the Army Rangers (the only unit authorized to wear the black beret 
at the time) resisted the change, raised the issue with Congress and the President, and 
thus created political difficulties for the SECDEF. In meetings discussing the beret issue, 
Rumsfeld commented on Shinseki “making another bad decision,” suggesting the rela-
tionship between the two had already soured.26 For their part, Shinseki, Secretary of the 
Army Thomas E. White and, to a lesser extent, Shelton, saw themselves and the Army as 
a bureaucratic target of Rumsfeld’s aim to reduce the size of the armed forces. Rumsfeld, 
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a former Navy fighter pilot, “seemed partial to the Navy and Marines,” they believed, 
and he also disliked the Cold War mindset and Balkans-type stability missions that were 
the main focus of the Army throughout most of the 1990s. The Army found itself engaged 
in a battle to limit further downsizing while the administration debated the feasibility 
and force structure required to engage in two land wars simultaneously.27
Leaks of sensitive planning information gradually eroded trust in the already conten-
tious relationships among CENTCOM, the Joint Staff, the service chiefs, and the Office 
of the SECDEF. The first major leak of war plans occurred at the same time as the March 
21 “commander’s huddle” in Germany, leading CENTCOM planners and Franks to sus-
pect that someone from the air component—frustrated with the proposed abbreviated 
bombing campaign discussed at the conference—had communicated their displeasure 
privately to the media. Relations were further strained in May 2002 when, during the 
height of war preparations for Iraq, The Washington Post journalist Tom Ricks reported 
that the Joint Chiefs were waging a “determined behind-the-scenes campaign to per-
suade the Bush administration” against war with Iraq. The Joint Chiefs and Franks, Ricks 
reported, had told the President that ousting Saddam’s regime would require at least 
200,000 troops, and remained “shoulder-to-shoulder” against the SECDEF. Rumsfeld also 
believed Shinseki had implied to colleagues that Rumsfeld’s own office was leaking Iraq 
war plans to the press, which infuriated the secretary. In a harsh verbal reprimand to the 
Joint Chiefs, Rumsfeld accused the military leaders of not being forthright with him; told 
them that their complaints about not being consulted about war plans were unfounded; 
and declared that, if they had problems with any of the combatant commanders, they 
should confront that commander directly rather than via leaks to the press.28
The “problems with combatant commanders” apparently referred to problems 
between the Joint Chiefs and Franks, with the latter’s direct line to Rumsfeld and the 
President effectively isolating the Joint Staff from the planning process. From Franks’s 
perspective, the service chiefs were mired in service parochialisms and jealous of the 
combatant commanders’ mission to “command forces in wartime,” and he had even 
referred to the Joint Chief of Staff representatives in public and private as “Title Ten 
Motherf——s.” Sensing that they were being marginalized and feeling distanced from 
the planning process, the Joint Staff often issued planning guidance and orders well after 
CENTCOM had already begun working on the guidance it received directly from the 
SECDEF.29 Taken together, these factors tended to discourage collaboration among the 
services, the Joint Staff, and CENTCOM.
Generated Start, January–May 2002
Within 60 days of the Camp David briefing, the Joint Staff formally directed CENT-
COM to transition from planning for a limited attack to planning for regime change. 
Through the winter and spring of 2002, CENTCOM developed six iterations of an inva-
sion plan that, based on guidance from Rumsfeld, would contain ever smaller numbers of 
forces and shorter deployment timelines. This first series of CENTCOM plans—renum-
bered 1003V and eventually known as Generated Start, envisioned a rapid buildup from 
three divisions at the onset to between five and six Army, Marine, and coalition divi-
sions as the campaign progressed. Movement of forces was to begin on N-day—the day 
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that the President notified the command to commence—after which CENTCOM would 
have 30 days to prepare its forces until C-day—the day the forces began flowing into 
theater. Deployment of the initial force of three divisions or two corps would take an 
additional 60 days, during which special operations forces would suppress Saddam’s 
long-range missile systems and link up with Kurdish militias in northern Iraq. D-Day—
the beginning of combat operations on Iraqi soil—would commence while the remain-
ing divisions deployed to Kuwait. Air and ground campaigns would commence nearly 
simultaneously in order to catch the Iraqi military by surprise, a stark contrast to the 
5-week air campaign of 1991. The two corps worth of ground troops would also attack 
simultaneously to overwhelm Iraqi forces. Maneuvers to isolate Baghdad would take 
approximately 45 days, with regime destruction and the onset of stability operations 
occurring over an additional 90 days. The entire operation from start to finish would take 
approximately 215 days.30
While Franks and his planners refined Generated Start in Tampa, FL, CENTCOM and 
service logisticians met at the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) headquar-
ters at Scott Air Force Base, IL, to develop unit deployment packages and timelines using 
the time-phased force and deployment list or data (TPFDL or TPFDD), a complex plan-
ning tool DoD developed for similar contingency plans. Because the TPFDD planning 
was concurrent with Generated Start refinements, each component was able to estimate 
the force structure that might be needed to support variations on the plan and to verify 
the logistical feasibility of their proposed timelines and maneuvers.31 It was a valuable 
innovation in the logistical planning that Rumsfeld would ultimately discard entirely.
“Shock and Awe” and Running Start, May–July 2002
Rumsfeld’s intent for Iraq was to enter with a light footprint, be able to move fast, and 
be able to exit Iraq very quickly, a vision that differed sharply from the initial CENTCOM 
plan. In response to Franks’s iterative concept briefings on Generated Start, Rumsfeld 
sent Franks a paper written by Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade in late April 2002. 
It outlined the concept of “shock and awe” and how it could be applied in devising war 
plans.32 Ullman and Wade advanced the idea of “rapid dominance” in which a compar-
atively small-sized military force could, through a display of military might, enforce its 
will on a powerful country and military to enact change. Some of the mechanisms to 
induce shock and awe included the use of “unstoppable, lethal” weapons like long-range 
air power to “impose a regime of unrelenting and ever-increasing stress.” Any of the rel-
atively small number of ground forces used to enact the change must “arrive suddenly, 
strike without remorse, and terminate their presence quickly” before the adversary had 
the opportunity to recover. Rumsfeld had previously introduced Franks to Army Col-
onel Douglas A. Macgregor, an officer working on Army transformation for Shinseki 
who shared Rumsfeld’s vision for wars of the future. Both the shock and awe authors 
and Macgregor argued that the U.S. military could topple the Iraqi regime with a divi-
sion-sized element or less, an idea that shaped the war planning guidance Rumsfeld pro-
vided to CENTCOM.33
Some senior U.S. officers had difficulty envisioning a light footprint for an invasion 
of Iraq and opposed modifications to tried and tested processes for deployment and 
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conduct of major combat operations. Lieutenant General George W. Casey, Jr., then the 
Joint Staff J–5, recalled that there seemed to be no middle ground between what the Office 
of the SECDEF leadership envisioned for Iraq, and what the senior Army leaders and 
CENTCOM demanded in terms of time and resources. Casey believed that the President, 
the SECDEF, and some of the Joint Staff viewed the Army as overly tied to a deliberate 
and comparatively slow TPFDD process that Rumsfeld and others regarded as a Cold 
War–era relic. For his part, Casey believed “the [Army] was quick to cry ‘micromanage-
ment’ instead of considering how to refine their processes.”34 The ensuing tension would 
only be resolved once Rumsfeld decided to discard the TPFDD for Iraq and instead use 
the request for forces model DoD had employed in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 
in Afghanistan, in which commanders requested force packages piece by piece as the 
requirements for them arose.
Although CENTCOM’s proposed force numbers for Generated Start began at 385,000, 
by the time Rumsfeld and Bush were briefed again in the late spring, the numbers had 
been whittled down to 275,000, a force Rumsfeld insisted was still “way too heavy.” 
Rumsfeld suggested that the roughly two brigades for a routine training exercise with 
the Kuwaitis should suffice as an invasion force for Iraq. These units consisted of a bri-
gade-sized Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), an Army brigade, and a special operations 
company whose teams were embedded with Kuwaiti military units. Franks strongly dis-
agreed with this radical proposal, arguing that such limited forces would be unable to 
topple the regime and lacked the logistics to make it to Baghdad. Rumsfeld raised the 
idea again with Bush during a briefing at Camp David on May 11, 2002, but Franks per-
suaded the President and the SECDEF instead to give CENTCOM additional time to 
refine Generated Start into a faster deploying plan with a lighter force.35
As these discussions about the size and speed of the ground forces unfolded in May 
and June, U.S. officials began to worry that Saddam might conduct a preemptive attack 
into Kuwait, complicating the planned U.S. invasion. U.S. officials had received indica-
tions that the Iraqi Army was on the verge of collapse, and they feared Saddam might 
decide to use his forces while he still could. The President, national policy team, and 
Office of the SECDEF were also concerned that, as U.S. and coalition forces flowed into 
theater in the middle of Iraq’s internal difficulties, the movement would provide Saddam 
with “unambiguous warning” about the U.S. intention to invade. This might provoke an 
attack on Kuwait, the Kurds, or the Shi’a; flood Iraq’s southern marshes; sabotage Iraq’s 
infrastructure; attack Israel; or, in the worst-case scenario, use WMD. U.S. leaders wanted 
a plan that would give them the flexibility to prevent these contingencies but still main-
tain the ability to remove Saddam from power. The new plan CENTCOM developed in 
response to these concerns was a branch plan Generated Start called “Running Start,” in 
which smaller ground forces would begin major combat operations, while the rest were 
still deploying. Unlike Generated Start, which called for a two-corps ground invasion 
in conjunction with an air campaign, Running Start planned for a Marine division and 
an Army division to lead ground operations, followed by a second corps-sized Army 
element, with the overall movement into theater shortened from 60 to 45 days or less. 
Running Start also contained three different options for the timing of an air campaign 
depending on what the immediate situation in Iraq demanded.36
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As CENTCOM developed the Running Start plan, the inevitability of the Iraq inva-
sion began to hit home. When Franks returned from briefing Bush in June, he announced 
to his component commanders that the invasion of Iraq was no longer a matter of “if,” 
but “when.” He judged that the President wanted to conduct the invasion sometime in 
the late fall of 2002.37
The Hybrid, August 2002
The Running Start concept had obvious flaws that CENTCOM planners were quick 
to highlight, most glaringly that it lacked enough troops to guarantee the destruction of 
the Iraqi regime. While the ground component of Running Start could probably arrive in 
theater and achieve some limited military objectives, there would not be enough support 
forces to sustain the maneuver force. In addition, Running Start, if executed as planned, 
would lack the near-simultaneous application of national power critical to executing the 
shock and awe concept. Because the initial thrust could not be sustained all the way to 
Baghdad, Saddam would probably be afforded the space required to reinforce Bagh-
dad and sue for peace on the international stage. The short time horizon for Running 
Start would also shorten the time available for diplomacy to secure basing and overflight 
agreements with partner countries, jeopardizing deployment timelines. When Franks 
briefed Bush on Running Start in July 2002, he advised the President that it would be 
impossible to launch the plan by October 2002, because the requisite operational and 
strategic follow-on forces could not be mobilized in time.38
With the Running Start creating concerns because of its low number of forces and 
the Generated Start too unwieldy, CENTCOM and its components began developing a 
“Hybrid” option, with a starting ground force similar to that of Generated Start entering 
theater sequentially as in Running Start, but in greater numbers. In the Hybrid, 30,000 
Marines and Army Soldiers would enter Iraq on G-day, and the remainder of I MEF and 
V Corps would flow in over the next 18 days. By the time 2 months had elapsed in the 
ground campaign, the entire Generated Start force of 200,000 troops would be operat-
ing in Iraq. The proposed air campaign for the Hybrid was similar to an option in the 
Running Start in which ground operations would commence 16 days after the initial air 
strikes. The deployment timelines in the Hybrid were longer, too, to allow U.S. diplo-
mats more time to finalize agreements for staging and basing in the region. Meanwhile, 
CFACC and CFLCC could use an expansion of Operations Northern Watch and Southern 
Watch and training exercises to increase their footprint subtly in Kuwait and the north.39
In the Hybrid plan, CENTCOM aimed to minimize both the force footprint and the 
risks associated with putting maneuver forces into theater too quickly and maximizing 
opportunities to take advantage of Saddam’s behavior and achieve operational surprise. 
The Hybrid plan also contained a more detailed breakdown of Phase IV operations, out-
lining four discrete periods of stabilization, recovery, transition to security operations, 
and full transition to a stable Iraqi Government and redeployment of all U.S. forces over a 
period of 32–45 months. On August 14, Franks briefed the modified plan to the secretary 
of defense and, after gaining Rumsfeld’s approval, ordered his component commanders 
to develop execution details for the Hybrid plan on August 22.40
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Weapons of Mass Destruction
Iraq’s WMD program had been a major U.S. and international security concern since 
the end of the Gulf war. After 9/11, U.S. policymakers worried that Saddam’s WMD 
materials would fall into terrorist hands, and CENTCOM, along with the rest of the 
U.S. intelligence community, assumed that Saddam would, at a minimum, use chemical 
weapons against an invasion force.41 Interestingly, however, there were no specific plans 
to eradicate those materials or the sites at which they were suspected of being developed, 
as WMD elimination was not part of the deliberate planning process or joint military 
planning doctrine in the 1990s and the early 2000s. Consequently, although U.S. contin-
gency plans for Iraq from the 1990s and the revisions in 2000 identified the elimination 
of Saddam’s ability to make WMD as an end state, none of them assigned any units or 
organizations the responsibility for exploiting and destroying suspected WMD sites.
As planning for 1003V was finalized, CENTCOM realized that there was no inter-
agency group or special operations plan to take on the task of finding and eliminating 
Saddam’s WMD. By default, CENTCOM, as the combatant command, was stuck with the 
mission in a combat scenario. Franks and his planners realized they needed to incorporate 
the seizure of suspected WMD sites into the final war plan for Iraq. When CENTCOM 
requested a list of the suspected sites, they received a list of 900 potential WMD facility 
locations compiled by the Defense Intelligence Agency containing input from some of the 
other national intelligence agencies. CENTCOM planners then began to prioritize those 
suspected sites based on their size, composition, and assessed viability and lethality. The 
final product was entitled the Weapons of Mass Destruction Master Site List and was 
incorporated into the final war planning effort for operation plan 1003V.42
The Result: Little Phase IV and WMD Planning
By late August 2002, Franks and CENTCOM had made headway in persuading U.S. 
leaders to accept the Hybrid concept but had become thoroughly frustrated with what 
they viewed as micromanagement from the Office of the SECDEF on all aspects of the 
plan. Rumsfeld’s iterative demands for reductions in troop levels and deployment time-
lines had consumed 9 months of CENTCOM’s planning time and yet had resulted in a 
prospective invasion force Franks and his commanders believed might be insufficient 
for the job. Despite the functional—if somewhat strained—working relationships Franks 
developed with the SECDEF and other senior decision makers, he was frustrated by his 
inability to educate them about the minimum requirements to ensure success in toppling 
Saddam Hussein’s regime, a frustration Third Army leaders shared.43 Most importantly, 
though, the intense focus in the planning process on the invasion itself meant that only a 
relatively small amount of attention had been paid to Phase IV, the period of post-conflict 
activities when the U.S.-led coalition would be shepherding a new Iraqi state into being. 
At the time 1003V was issued formally to the CENTCOM components in October 2002, 
there was only a sparse outline for post-hostility plans apart from redeployment opera-
tions and nascent plans to secure the Iraqi regime’s suspected WMD stockpiles.
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THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN IRAQ
In retrospect, the most significant aspect of the Iraq invasion planning was not the 
shortage of troops or the lack of Phase IV planning, but rather the gaping holes in what 
the U.S. military knew about Iraq. This ignorance included Iraqi politics, society, and 
government—gaps that led the United States to make some deeply flawed assumptions 
about how the war was likely to unfold. One reason for the U.S. military’s problematic 
intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) was the lack of reliable sources on the 
inner workings of the regime and Iraqi society. Analysis on Iraq in the interwar period 
focused principally on Iraq’s WMD program and the positioning of large Iraqi military 
formations and major weapons systems. Little emphasis was placed on examining Iraqi 
society in anything more than a cursory sense. What little information available about the 
sustainability of the Ba’ath regime and the Iraqis’ willingness to support regime change 
came primarily from the Iraqi expatriate community. Apart from having agendas that 
did not necessarily align with U.S. policy interests—or Iraqi national interests for that 
matter—the expatriates tended to be disconnected from the Iraqi population that had 
remained behind and suffered under Saddam Hussein’s rule. The highly compartmen-
talized war planning also made it difficult for CENTCOM to integrate additional sources 
of information into assessments of Iraq’s societal and military characteristics.
CENTCOM and its partners identified some groups and populations within Iraq 
that were probably willing to assist the ground invasion as it moved northward. Some 
were resistance groups in the Kurdish and Shi’a populations who had armed themselves 
against the Ba’ath, while most of Iraq’s Shi’a were expected to provide at least passive 
support to military efforts to decapitate the regime. While U.S. military estimates pointed 
out some of the Iraqi opposition groups were “generally skeptical of the U.S. commitment 
to regime change,” they expected that the coalition could take key actions to demonstrate 
its resolve and motivate latent opposition groups, such as the destruction of select, highly 
visible regime security forces, Ba’ath Party headquarters, and other symbols of regime 
power. Other actions that CENTCOM thought might embolden indigenous resistance 
groups involved efforts to encourage the capitulation of large segments of Iraq’s Army 
and, of course, regime removal.44
Not all of the military assessments of Iraqi society’s likely response to the invasion 
were so sanguine. CENTCOM planners reviewed the reactions of Iraqi society to Opera-
tion DESERT STORM and discovered some unnerving lessons for the 2002 war plan. One 
was an invasion might ignite a sectarian bloodbath as the Iraqi factions retaliated against 
each other in post–Saddam Hussein Iraq, with widespread reprisal attacks beginning 
immediately after the collapse of the regime.45 Unfortunately, these dissenting assess-
ments had little impact on planning for the invasion and its aftermath.
Iraqi Military Capabilities and Intentions
Despite some of the shortcomings in the IPB analysis, CENTCOM built an extensive 
assessment of the Iraqi regime’s defense plans and capabilities based on Iraqi military 
defense plans in CENTCOM’s possession. CENTCOM described Iraq’s defense and secu-
rity apparatus in terms of concentric rings of defense, the center of which was Baghdad. 
The outer ring was comprised of the Iraqi Army, while the interior rings were comprised 
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of the Republican Guard, Special Republican Guard, Special Security and Intelligence 
Organizations, and Ba’ath Party militia and special intelligence services at the center. The 
purpose of these forces was to protect Saddam Hussein, his inner circle, and Baghdad, in 
that order. CENTCOM also expected Saddam to use chemical weapons at various points 
to delay or fix coalition forces outside of Baghdad while the inner ring consolidated to 
defend the city. Thus, CENTCOM assessed that the operational center of gravity for the 
Iraqi defense was the Special Security Organizations, Special Republican Guard, and 
the Republican Guard forces in the vicinity of Baghdad, along with Saddam’s surface- 
to-surface missile inventory. Even though CENTCOM judged that Saddam had a coher-
ent defense plan for Baghdad, they believed his military forces had significant opera-
tional weaknesses. United Nations (UN) sanctions, Saddam’s distrust of his own forces, 
and Operations NORTHERN WATCH and SOUTHERN WATCH may have degraded 
the capabilities of the Iraqi Air Force, Army, and air defense systems.46 CENTCOM 
also had some information on what they labeled Saddam’s “vanity forces,” including 
the Quds force—not to be confused with the Iranian regime organization of the same 
name—and the Fedayeen Saddam. Some sources suggested that the Quds force was a 
national-guard-like force of lightly trained Iraqi volunteers whose purpose was to defend 
their locales from any outside incursion. The Fedayeen were another matter, as they were 
led by Saddam’s eldest son, Uday Hussein, known for his sociopathic tendencies and 
mental instability. The Fedayeen did not seem to have a place within the tightly con-
trolled security structure Saddam had built around himself. Some reports noted that the 
Fedayeen were an unconventional force trained in guerrilla tactics with a “golden com-
pany” devoted to suicide missions, but CENTCOM had few details about the unit’s size, 
strength, and mission. Additionally, because the Fedayeen were managed by Uday, U.S. 
analysts considered them a token force with which Uday could cement his place in his 
father’s regime, rather than a viable defense mechanism.47
The Regime’s Strategic Perspective
Political and military matters were intrinsically mixed in the Iraqi regime. Saddam 
Hussein’s concerns about assassination and remaining in power translated into a focus 
on internal security and a proliferation of competing paramilitary and intelligence enti-
ties. Moreover, Iraqi society had undergone some fundamental changes since 1991 that 
affected both how it behaved and how Saddam prepared to respond to that behavior. In 
the early 2000s, Saddam’s primary concern remained internal threats, both from disaf-
fected segments of Iraqi society and from prospective insider coup attempts by Ba’ath 
Party rivals or the Iraqi military. Saddam’s secondary concern was regional threats, Iran 
and Israel foremost among them.48 The threat posed by an American-led coalition ranked 
only third on Saddam’s list of dangers to his rule.
Because his first priority was to counter any further 1991-style uprisings from Iraq’s 
Kurdish or Shi’a populations, Saddam distributed the bulk of the Iraqi Army and Repub-
lican Guard in northern and southern Iraq. He also sent his intensely loyal paramili-
tary forces to locations in southern Iraq to prevent the population there from rebelling. 
Saddam addressed his second defense priority—Iran—by deploying other regular army 
units along Iraq’s southeastern border and highways to prevent Iran from taking advan-
tage of any civil chaos.49
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In truth, the capabilities of Iraqi conventional forces were even more degraded than 
CENTCOM assessed. The more professional conventional military forces tried to mod-
ernize and reset their formations while dealing with continuous reductions in resources 
and the Iraqi military industrial commission’s inability to deliver specialized secret weap-
ons for Saddam. Because Saddam created an environment in which he generally received 
only positive information, Iraqi Army leaders were reluctant to communicate the true 
state of their diminished forces’ capabilities. The command, control, and communica-
tions networks across different Iraqi security services, too, were not nearly as coherent 
or organized as analysts thought them to be, reflecting Saddam’s wariness of any well- 
coordinated security force structure that might coherently mount a coup attempt. Instead, 
he deliberately inhibited communication between the regular army and the Republican 
Guard, and he forbade the Republican Guard from operating inside Baghdad. The Spe-
cial Republican Guard—the only conventional military force he authorized to operate 
within Baghdad city limits—was expressly forbidden from communicating with other 
Iraqi forces.50
U.S. military analysts may have overestimated some of Iraq’s military capabilities, but 
they underestimated others. During the course of Operations NORTHERN WATCH and 
SOUTHERN WATCH, Saddam’s forces became adept at using mobile weapons systems, 
hide sites, and caches that were not easily detected or tracked.51 It was, however, the 
overlooked so-called vanity forces that would create the most pressing difficulties for the 
coalition invasion. Movements and capabilities of paramilitary forces like the Fedayeen 
were also difficult to detect, and the secrecy in which they operated precluded adequate 
information on their composition, strength, and activities.
Finally, beyond the regime’s politics and security apparatus, Iraqi society was not 
particularly well primed for a second American invasion. The U.S. failure to support the 
Kurdish and Shi’a uprisings in 1991 had left Saddam’s regime free to brutally repress 
them. There had been no equivalent to Operation PROVIDE COMFORT for Iraq’s Shi’a, 
many of whom remained deeply angry and skeptical about U.S intentions. The UN sanc-
tions on the regime had also taken a significant toll on the Iraqi public’s goodwill toward 
the international community and the United States and the United Kingdom in particu-
lar. The sanctions not only reduced the amount of humanitarian aid that reached needed 
Iraqi citizens, but also allowed Saddam to control the delivery of aid and, in so doing, to 
solidify his power base. Saddam’s propaganda placed much of the blame for the sanc-
tions squarely on the United States; as a result, significant portions of the Iraqi popula-
tion became embittered and hardened against the perceived source of their suffering, 
the United States. The sanctions also made it difficult for well-educated Iraqis to make a 
reasonable living, and many of them had no choice but to leave Iraq. The mass departures 
of Iraq’s intelligentsia effectively removed most of the political opposition to the regime.52 
Iraqis were not, then, a population that would necessarily welcome a coalition “libera-
tion” with open arms. Instead, they were a segmented population with pockets of people 
who were very suspicious of Western intentions for their country.
Saddam’s WMD Deception Program
Saddam had indeed used chemical weapons in the past, but, unknown to the rest of 
the world, had dismantled almost all of his WMD program and stockpiles by 1999. Why, 
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then, did he go to such lengths to encourage the world to believe that he still had them, 
or, at the very least, that he retained some clandestine WMD capability? We now know 
Saddam believed he had to convince both his rivals inside Iraq and his regional adversar-
ies that he retained the capability to make and use WMD to deter attacks from inside and 
outside Iraq, even as he struggled to persuade the rest of the international community 
that the program no longer existed.53 Saddam had used chemical weapons against Iran 
and the Kurds in the 1980s to demonstrate not only that he maintained a chemical weap-
ons stockpile, but also that he would not hesitate to use them if he believed the survival 
of his regime was at stake. Privately, Saddam told his inner circle afterward that simply 
threatening to use chemical weapons would achieve the desired psychological impact on 
his adversaries:
I mean, sometimes what you get out of a [chemical] weapon is when you keep saying, ‘I will bomb 
you’. It is better than bombing him actually. It is possible that when you bomb him, the material 
effect will be 40 percent, but, if you stick it up to his face, the material and spiritual [psychological] 
effect will be 60 percent, so why hit him? Keep getting 60 percent!54
Saddam frequently reminded his close advisers that Iraq was in an environment where 
even perceived vulnerabilities could draw attackers. Ultimately, he wanted to retain the 
ability to reinitiate his WMD program once the sanctions had ended in order to maintain 
the internal and external security of his Ba’ath regime. Thus, his goal between 1991 and 
2003 was to encourage the international community to remove the UN sanctions and 
simultaneously keep a repository of scientific expertise. He organized several front com-
panies, engineered UN Oil for Food program contracts, and created separate protocols 
outside of the UN with other countries to continue trade under the sanctions regime. 
The UN sanctions also permitted Iraq to maintain and build weapons delivery systems 
with a range under 150 kilometers, thereby allowing Iraq to keep its weapons manufac-
turing infrastructure intact and to keep the human capital to run it. Saddam also kept 
all of his nuclear weapons scientists in the country and continued researching a nuclear 
weapons capability in the 1990s. Finally, Saddam did take steps to destroy his chemical 
weapons stockpile after the 1991 Gulf war, but he maintained the expertise necessary to 
create chemical agents and construct chemical weapons.55 The invading U.S. and coali-
tion troops would later discover remnants of these Iraqi chemical weapons stockpiles.
Iraq and Terrorism
In the interwar period, Saddam dabbled in financing terrorist organizations and pre-
paring his special intelligence and security services to conduct terrorist attacks. As he 
did so, Saddam was careful to avoid overt relations with terrorist groups and provided 
no direct support to al-Qaeda, whose ambitions for an Islamic caliphate clashed with his 
own desire to preserve his regime in Iraq. Saddam had better relations with other terror-
ist organizations. Although he did not sponsor terrorist organizations on his own soil, 
he did provide financial support to some terrorist groups in the decade prior to Opera-
tion IRAQI FREEDOM, including the Abu Nidal organization, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, 
the Palestinian Liberation Front, and Hamas. Saddam was particularly interested in sup-
porting Palestinian terrorist groups and had a long-standing relationship with Hamas, 
through whom he funded families of suicide bombers who attacked Israel. In exchange 
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for Iraqi support, Saddam expected these groups to follow guidance from Baghdad when 
required.56
In the early 2000s, Saddam and his security and intelligence directorates became 
keenly interested in using assassinations, suicide bombings, and improvised explosive 
devices (IED) against Iraqi opposition groups and Iranian targets. To that end, Sadd-
am’s “Ghafiki Project,” nested within the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), began recruiting 
suicide bombers from other countries, while special mission units in the IIS criminol-
ogy (M16) directorate received training on building car bombs and other IEDs. The IIS 
worked extensively to perfect IED construction, analyze the technical aspects of terrorist 
attacks, and conduct lessons learned sessions for failed operations and explosive uses. 
At the same time, the IIS Directorate of Liberation Movements (M8) hosted Palestinian, 
Lebanese, Libyan, Syrian, and North African fighters in paramilitary training camps and 
proposed in its 2002 annual report to activate another training camp for an Arab Libera-
tion Front inside Iraq.58
The Fedayeen Saddam benefited from Saddam’s growing interest in using terror-
ism domestically and abroad. In 1999, Saddam decided that he would assign the top 10 
recruits from each Fedayeen class to conduct operations in Europe against Iraqi oppo-
sition leaders, with Ahmad Chalabi explicitly among the targets. Other Fedayeen were 
designated for operations in the Kurdish regions of Iraq and Iran. Saddam later outfit-
ted the Fedayeen’s Golden Company to wage war against any rebellion or uprising that 
might occur inside Iraq, to include one that might arise with support from an American 
invasion. The Golden Company’s primary tactic was suicide bombings using vests or 
other similar mechanisms.58
There was one independent Islamist terrorist organization known to be operating on 
Iraqi territory. Ansar al-Islam, an affiliate of al-Qaeda, was engaged in an active war with 
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) as the terrorist group attempted to expand its 
territory beyond a small corner of Sulaymaniyah Province. After Saddam attacked the 
northeastern Iraqi Kurdish town of Halabjah with chemical weapons in 1988, many of 
the Kurds in the area fled across the border to Iran, where an extremist Sunni Kurdish 
cleric, Sheikh Abd al-Latif, convinced a number of the refugees that jihad was the proper 
response. His adherents returned to Halabjah under the leadership of another extremist 
cleric, Mullah Bin Abdulaziz, and together they formed the Islamic Movement of Kurd-
istan (IMK). In the 1990s, the IMK took advantage of the civil war between the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP) and PUK to expand its influence from Halabjah into other areas 
of Sulaymaniyah and eventually into parts of Erbil. Military pressure from the PUK later 
fractured the IMK into several splinter groups, some of which became hardened Salafis 
and developed relationships with al-Qaeda. With al-Qaeda’s encouragement, these orga-
nizations merged in September 2001 into a single group that eventually became known 
as Ansar al-Islam.59
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Al-Qaeda leaders viewed the emer-
gence of Ansar al-Islam as an opportunity 
to expand their foothold in the Middle 
East. Ansar al-Islam’s leaders, Mullah 
Krekar and Abu Abdullah al-Shafi, worked 
openly with al-Qaeda, and al-Qaeda, in 
turn, provided resources, training, and 
guidance to the group, enabling it to carve 
out a miniature Islamic state in the Hal-
abjah area. From there, Shafi used his ties 
with Iraqi Salafis to grow Ansar al-Islam’s 
support base further by incorporating 
underground Sunni extremist networks in 
Ninawa Province.60
With the fall of the Taliban in late 
2001, Ansar al-Islam sheltered a number 
of al-Qaeda members and affiliates flee-
ing Afghanistan. One of those who sought 
refuge with Ansar al-Islam was Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi, who had served with 
al-Qaeda in Afghanistan but had been 
reluctant to swear fealty to al-Qaeda’s senior leadership. Zarqawi’s stubborn indepen-
dence and international ambitions complicated Ansar al-Islam’s efforts to establish an 
Islamic emirate in Kurdistan. The secular PUK viewed Ansar al-Islam and Zarqawi as 
a threat, particularly after the organization began targeting Kurdish civilians and PUK 
affiliates. Zarqawi also used the Ansar al-Islam infrastructure to conduct crude experi-
ments with chemical and biological weapons, though the limitations of the group’s facil-
ities and his peoples’ lack of chemical expertise constrained his efforts. One unintended 
consequence of these experiments was that they attracted the attention of Western and 
Middle Eastern security services that began targeting and detaining members of Zarqa-
wi’s network.62 The experiments brought Ansar al-Islam unwanted attention that would 
eventually lead the coalition, with support from the PUK, to destroy the group’s Halab-
jah safe haven, though the alliance between Ansar al-Islam’s survivors and Zarqawi’s 
fledgling Salafi group would become the core of al-Qaeda in Iraq.
***
The dearth of information about Iraq’s social dynamics and internal turmoil since the 
1991 Gulf war led the United States to misjudge Iraqi military activities and to formulate 
policies and plans at odds with the reality of a deeply segmented and traumatized Iraqi 
society. U.S. policymakers and CENTCOM failed to account for the amount of distrust 
Iraqis felt toward the United States because of the 1991 uprising and the 1990s sanctions 
regime. Flawed U.S. assumptions about how the Iraqi people and state institutions would 
respond to regime decapitation led to inadequate preparation for post-regime governance 
and stability requirements. At the same time, while the national intelligence agencies and 
Source: Wikimedia Commons, the free media repos-
itory by Frida Tørring.
Ansar al-Islam Leader Mullah Krekar.61
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CENTCOM were aware that Saddam had no direct ties to al-Qaeda at the time of the 
9/11 attacks, they were largely unaware of his indigenous paramilitary capability to con-
duct terrorist attacks. They were also unaware that he had focused his regime’s security 
forces almost exclusively against internal threats rather than against external adversaries. 
Finally, CENTCOM was aware of Ansar al-Islam’s activities in northern Iraq but did not 
appreciate how far the group’s networks extended into the broader Iraqi Salafi commu-
nity or that Islamist militancy had gained a significant foothold in northern and western 
Iraq.
Within the DoD itself, structural stovepipes inhibited information sharing and inclu-
sive planning and, when combined with Rumsfeld’s managerial style and the personality 
conflicts among key leaders, resulted in a tightly compartmentalized planning process 
that focused too heavily on major combat operations and was not coordinated across DoD 
or the broader U.S. Government. The quick tactical victory over the Taliban and al-Qaeda 
in Afghanistan in late 2001 seemed to validate Rumsfeld’s views about the future of war-
fare and convinced him and others that a small U.S. force aided by indigenous fighters 
and air power could replicate the feat in Iraq.63 The secretary’s continual downward pres-
sure on CENTCOM’s force requirements for the invasion and its aftermath resulted in a 
plan that, when executed, would speedily topple Saddam Hussein’s brittle regime but 
would prove unequal to the task of consolidating a tactical military victory.
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CHAPTER 3
MANEUVERING INTO POSITION
Throughout the fall of 2002, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), Coalition Forces 
Land Component Command (CFLCC), and V Corps refined and rehearsed their war plans 
for regime change in Iraq. In the last few months before the invasion, CENTCOM and 
CFLCC confronted some mandated additions and challenges that consumed a substan-
tial amount of their planning energy. The focus on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
as the casus belli for war would require additional forces to secure Saddam Hussein’s 
suspected WMD sites, while a late-breaking early regime collapse scenario would alter 
the force structure for the invasion and change how the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) 
deployed forces to the theater. A policy decision to develop an expatriate Iraqi military 
force to serve as an Iraqi face on the liberation would draw a mixture of support and ire 
from the agencies and military units planning the invasion. Turkey’s 11th-hour refusal 
to allow the coalition to cross Turkish territory would have profound consequences for 
the invasion and its aftermath. In light of these distractions, military planning for Phase 
IV was a late, uncoordinated effort, with U.S. strategic and operational headquarters so 
consumed by moving forces and finalizing plans that they gave little attention to what 
might occur after the fall of Baghdad.
In contrast, Saddam’s preparations to confront the coalition forces were virtually non-
existent until December 2002. Although Ba’athist militias and Iranian regime-sponsored 
militant groups were well prepared for the American-led offensive, Saddam failed to pre-
pare his military until just weeks before the operation—a result of his disbelief that the 
United States would actually invade Iraq. Not until the eve of the invasion did Saddam 
reposition some of his forces south and reinforce the vulnerable Iraqi southern cities with 
his loyalist paramilitary forces, including the Fedayeen Saddam and the Ba’ath Party 
militia.
THE GROUND FORCES PREPARE FOR WAR
Lieutenant General David McKiernan Takes Command
As U.S. war planning intensified in the late summer of 2002, and the main effort began 
to shift to the tactical headquarters that would execute the invasion under the CFLCC, 
General Tommy Franks decided to remove his CFLCC commander, Lieutenant General 
Paul Mikolashek, who was responsible for overseeing the conflict in Afghanistan and 
preparing for combat in Iraq. Mikolashek had disagreed with Franks about the prose-
cution of the war in Afghanistan, and Franks had expressed his frustration with Miko-
lashek, considering him too cautious to oversee an aggressive invasion campaign.
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Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan (left).  
Source: DoD photo by Lance Corporal Bryan J. Nealy, USMC (Released).
Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan, Commanding General, 
Third Army/CFLCC (2002-2004) and Brigadier General Richard Natonski, 
CG, 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade.1
Two important changes followed from the decision to remove Mikolashek. First, the 
Office of the SECDEF—seconded by Franks—proposed setting up a separate combined 
joint task force for Afghanistan and the War on Terrorism so that CFLCC could focus 
entirely on Iraq for the time being. Second, Franks received permission to replace Miko-
lashek as CFLCC commander with Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan. McKiernan, 
then serving as the Army’s operations officer or G–3, had most recently commanded the 
1st Cavalry Division and was familiar with the Iraq invasion plan. He had also served 
in the Gulf war and Bosnia; although Franks and McKiernan had not previously worked 
together, McKiernan’s rapport with General Eric Shinseki combined with his reputation 
for being cool under fire had earned him Franks’s respect.2
McKiernan’s appointment as the new CFLCC commander signaled to CFLCC forces 
that the invasion of Iraq was near certain to occur. At the CFLCC headquarters, he wel-
comed a number of new senior staff officers hand-picked by the Army’s senior leadership 
to prosecute the war, including Major General William “Fuzzy” Webster as McKiernan’s 
deputy, Brigadier General James “Spider” Marks as his intelligence director, and Major 
General James D. Thurman as his operations chief. The I Marine Expeditionary Force 
(I MEF) was also placed under CFLCC’s tactical control, meaning the MEF and its new 
commander, Marine Lieutenant General James “Jim” Conway, effectively worked for 
McKiernan, allowing the CFLCC commander to plan a land campaign as a coalition and 
a joint component command. By October 22, McKiernan relocated the entire CFLCC 
headquarters from Fort McPherson, GA, to Camp Doha, Kuwait. He then began a series 
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of exercises that led to CFLCC’s operational plan for the invasion, which he named Cobra 
II after General Omar Bradley’s operation to liberate France in 1944.3
CENTCOM, meanwhile, was finalizing operations plan 1003V. As CENTCOM officers 
worked with CFLCC and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) on its 
details, it became apparent that the Hybrid plan did not afford the coalition the element 
of tactical surprise that Generated Start had offered. As a result, CENTCOM decided to 
revert to the original Generated Start plan that called for initiating the air and ground 
campaigns simultaneously in hope of building surprise back into the invasion.4
Shaping Operations
CENTCOM’s plans for the shaping operations that would precede the main invasion 
consisted of three components: special operations to destroy the long-range ballistic mis-
siles the coalition believed the Iraqi regime possessed; a link-up with indigenous militias 
and resistance organizations in Iraq; and strategic communications aimed at Saddam’s 
regular army forces. Part of 5th Special Forces Group would enter western Iraq to find 
and neutralize Saddam’s suspected long-range ballistic missile sites in order to prevent 
him from launching missiles at Israel. The remainder of 5th Group would move from 
Kuwait into southern Iraq to make contact with Iraqi Shi’a resistance groups and seize the 
bridgeheads near Nasiriyah in order to prevent Saddam’s forces from destroying them 
and slowing the main invasion forces’ advance. The 10th Special Forces Group would 
insert units into northern Iraq and link up with Kurdish peshmerga militias, secure the 
northern oil fields near Kirkuk, and prevent Kurdish incursions south of the Green Line.5
These unconventional operations were to be followed by a two-pronged supporting 
effort. First, CFACC would begin a bombing campaign to destroy Iraq’s air defense sys-
tems as well as prominent symbols of the regime. The intent of destroying those key 
regime nodes was not only to create confusion and disarray among Iraq’s command hier-
archy but also to prevent a “Fortress Baghdad” scenario in which the regime might con-
solidate its forces in a defense-in-depth of Baghdad. Concurrent with the air campaign, 
the coalition would mount information operations to erode the resolve of the Iraqi mil-
itary and encourage them to surrender. These efforts would set conditions for coalition 
maneuver forces to begin operations to destroy the Republican Guard and other loyalist 
military forces and topple the regime.6
Major Combat Operations
Although CENTCOM had overall responsibility for the timing of major combat 
operations and the plan to position units in theater, CFLCC, V Corps, and I MEF were 
ultimately responsible for developing the ground forces’ scheme of maneuver.7 In CENT-
COM’s 1003V plan, the stated objective for the ground component was to isolate the 
regime and defeat the Iraqi Regular Army and Republican Guard forces. According to the 
operations order for CFLCC’s Cobra II first issued in October 2002, I MEF was the main 
effort for the first part of the invasion. It was tasked to seize the Tallil airfield, establish a 
bridgehead on the Euphrates River at Nasiriyah, defeat or fix any remaining Iraqi III or 
IV Corps units in southern Iraq, and set conditions to conduct decisive operations north 
and west of the Euphrates River. At the same time, V Corps would continue flowing into 
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Kuwait and, upon I MEF’s completion of these tasks, would become the main effort as 
V Corps advanced to defeat the Republican Guard’s Medina Division and other security 
forces and isolate Baghdad. The CFLCC operations order also instructed V Corps to be 
prepared to exploit sudden regime collapse with rapid ground maneuver to Baghdad. 
The key task for both V Corps and I MEF after they isolated Baghdad from two directions 
was to remove the regime from power.8
The V Corps was tasked with defeating the Iraqi Army in southern Iraq and the 
Republican Guard near Baghdad. The Corps’ scheme of maneuver would begin with 
Apache helicopter attacks against the Medina Division, followed by ground maneuvers 
to destroy the Medina and secure key terrain at the Karbala Gap, a critical avenue of 
approach to Baghdad from the southwest near Lake Razzazah. Because defeating the 
Medina Division and other Iraqi forces would require a rapid advance to the Karbala Gap 
and the Iraqis were expected to welcome the U.S. presence and offer little resistance, V 
Corps instructed its mechanized forces—the 3d Infantry Division and 1st Armored Divi-
sion—to bypass the southern Iraqi cities quickly rather than enter them to clear enemy 
forces. V Corps also tasked the 101st Airborne Division to seize Saddam International 
Airport in Baghdad as a critical element of isolating the capital.9
Two wargames in December 2002 and late January 2003 convinced McKiernan to 
reconsider this scheme and make V Corps—the mechanized force—the main effort for 
the entire mission, given that it could cover Iraq’s terrain more quickly than the I MEF’s 
light infantry forces. The winter wargames also highlighted for coalition commanders 
that their advance could be delayed if the Iraqis destroyed the bridges along the main 
routes of attack in southern Iraq, and as a result, CFLCC and V Corps allocated additional 
forces to secure those bridgeheads. While the wargames proved useful in refining the 
tactical plan, they reinforced flawed assumptions about Iraqi capabilities. In particular, 
they overestimated the effectiveness of the Iraqi conventional military forces. CFLCC and 
V Corps did not account for the impact of sanctions on the capabilities of Iraq’s military, 
and the simulated Iraqi units that CFLCC and V Corps fought in the exercises were full 
strength, fully coordinated formations that were assumed to be able to conduct brigade, 
division, and, on occasion, corps-level operations. As a result, the exercises led analysts, 
operations officers, and commanders to focus on finding and destroying conventional 
formations and equipment.10
The simulations used in the run-up to the invasion also pitted ground forces against 
a new enemy—the “contemporary operating environment opposing force” that departed 
from Cold War enemy models in that it was an amalgamation of conventional and para-
military forces. The latter sought to draw U.S. forces into complex urban terrain to wear 
them down there rather than engage them in direct combat on a battlefield devoid of 
civilians. In addition to the greater numbers of unconventional forces, the new enemy 
simulations included fractured social institutions in an attempt to replicate the battlefield 
complexities U.S. forces had experienced in Bosnia and Kosovo. The new virtual oppos-
ing force was certainly more appropriate than the Cold War–era situations, but it had the 
side effect of reinforcing the U.S. military aversion to urban combat and seemingly val-
idated a scheme of maneuver that called for coalition troops to bypass rather than clear 
Iraq’s southern population centers en route to Baghdad.11
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The differences between the capabilities of the contemporary operating environment 
opponent force and the Iraqi military were significant enough to raise questions about 
the usefulness of the exercises and the time and energy spent adjusting the plans as a 
result of them. The exercises also tended to create unlikely scenarios, particularly where 
force composition was concerned. During Victory Scrimmage, the V Corps wargame of 
January–February 2003, all five Army divisions on the deployment list—the 3d Infantry 
Division, the 101st Airborne Division, the 1st Cavalry Division, 1st Armored Division, 
and 4th Infantry Division—participated in the exercise. This wargame was designed to 
train V Corps how to command and control the maximum number of units possible, even 
though, as 101st Airborne Division Commander Major General David Petraeus pointed 
out, it was becoming increasingly unlikely the invasion could involve more than three. 
In the end, Victory Scrimmage created confusion about the division of responsibility 
across an unrealistically crowded theater and even more uncertainty about deployment 
timelines.12
The late prewar exercises also favored the traditional idea of corps-level deep attacks 
with helicopters against major enemy formations. Despite the disappointing results of 
Task Force Hawk 3 years before, the aviation community believed a new training regi-
men, an upgraded aircraft in the form of the Apache Longbow helicopter. Better organi-
zation had eliminated the difficulties, and a V Corps exercise using live-fire munitions on 
a range in Poland was deemed to validate the deep attack concept. Consequently, CFLCC 
and V Corps retained deep aviation attacks as part of the scheme of maneuver.13
Planning for Baghdad
The Joint Staff issued planning guidance on May 20, 2002, directing CENTCOM to 
begin developing plans for the “liberation” of Baghdad, after which CENTCOM passed 
the task on to CFLCC. The task came as no surprise but presented some difficulties. The 
simulation exercises for Iraq had raised fears that urban combat in Baghdad could resem-
ble that in the city of Grozny in the Chechen Republic or Mogadishu in Somalia. Two 
urban warfare conferences held separately by the Marines and Army in the fall of 2002 
concluded that the invasion plans at that time did not sufficiently account for how to 
seize and secure Baghdad itself. McKiernan shared some of these concerns and, during 
the last 2 months before the invasion, instructed V Corps to draw up more detailed plans 
for urban operations in and around Baghdad. Within V Corps, the task eventually fell 
to Major General Ricardo Sanchez and the 1st Armored Division, a unit that SECDEF 
Donald Rumsfeld had apparently decided not to include in the initial invasion force. 
Drawing on exercises and works that included Roger Spiller’s Sharp Corners, V Corps 
and the 1st Armored Division developed a Baghdad security plan that included a graph-
ical dissection of the city to allow air and ground units to pinpoint critical locations. It 
contained details about Baghdad’s subterranean landscape, the locations and conditions 
of electrical and sewer systems, and how money flowed in and out of the city. These 
extensive urban preparations for Baghdad provided a baseline for some of the missions 
V Corps and I MEF units would assume in the city after the fall of the regime.14
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Turkey: The Northern Option
In spring 2002, CENTCOM had conceived an idea to use psychological operations to 
deceive the Iraqi military into believing that the United States would send ground forces 
through Turkey to attack Iraq, a mission that CENTCOM judged could be performed by 
the 10th Special Forces Group. However, after a May 2002 session with the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and some of the combatant commanders (held in the 
Joint Chiefs’ Pentagon conference room known as the “tank”), CENTCOM recognized 
that more forces might be required in northern Iraq, particularly if the psychological 
operations failed to convince the Iraqi Army units there to capitulate. In conjunction with 
European Command (EUCOM), CENTCOM began to look at options to move another 
U.S. division through Turkey in order to augment the 10th Special Forces Group.15
Using Turkish territory to stage a large invasion force would require consent from the 
newly elected Turkish Government of Recep Erdogan and his Justice and Development 
Party, a group with long-time ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. Because Turkey, a North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member, was within EUCOM’s area of respon-
sibility, EUCOM was in charge of Operation NORTHERN WATCH and for operations 
in northern Iraq. With the permission of Turkish authorities, EUCOM deployed 2,200 
Soldiers of the 1st Infantry Division to Turkey by January 2003 to arrange maintenance, 
logistics, and other support for the U.S. and coalition troops that needed to move along 
a 700-kilometer-long supply line across Turkey to the Iraqi border, a major logistical 
challenge.16
Once the logistical basics were in place, it was then time to designate the forces to 
invade from Turkey and obtain Turkish Government support to use its territory for the 
invasion. The units designated for the Turkish front were the 4th Infantry Division from 
Fort Hood, TX, and the 173d Airborne Brigade based in Vicenza, Italy. The V Corps did 
not practice, exercise, or otherwise discuss operations with the 4th Infantry Division 
because of its assumption that those units would advance from the north and thus be 
out of the V Corps area of responsibility. It did, however, draw up contingency plans for 
the 4th Infantry Division’s possible redirection to Kuwait in the event that the Turkish 
Government denied the use of its territory for the invasion. In that case, Wallace and 
McKiernan decided that they would “plug them in wherever they could plug them in.”17
Alterations to the Plan: WMD, Regime Collapse, and the “Free Iraqi Forces”
Military planners and U.S.-based analysts had long believed a “Red Line” existed 
in Iraq that, once crossed by coalition forces, would trigger Saddam’s use of chemical 
weapons. Therefore, the invasion plan allowed for the possibility that coalition units 
would need to undergo decontamination and react to attacks by WMD. However, CENT-
COM and CFLCC did not assign an organization to secure Iraq’s presumed WMD until 
3 months before the invasion, even though the Iraqis’ alleged nuclear, biological, and 
chemical weapons stockpiles were the U.S. casus belli. The U.S. interagency’s list of 900 
suspected WMD sites was too extensive for the CFLCC to secure with a small invasion 
force that needed to focus its combat power on destroying the Iraqi military and defeat-
ing the regime security forces in Baghdad. In December 2002, the 75th Field Artillery 
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Brigade was designated as the unit responsible for this mission and renamed the 75th 
Exploitation Task Force (XTF). Once assigned to CFLCC, the 75th brigade divided the 
200 personnel assigned to the mission into sensitive site exploitation teams and mobile 
exploitation teams, then linking up with other U.S. Government agencies to gather the 
information necessary to fulfill its new mission. The 75th Field Artillery Brigade also 
participated in CFLCC’s Lucky Warrior exercise in February 2003, but the late notice the 
brigade received, combined with its lack of WMD expertise and the sheer volume of the 
suspected sites, would quickly overwhelm the 75th once Saddam’s regime fell. Like other 
postwar planning entities, the 75th Field Artillery Brigade was not sufficiently resourced 
or integrated within enough time to achieve its objectives.18
In December 2002, analysts again received increasing indications that the Iraqi regime 
was on the verge of internal collapse. These circumstances led CENTCOM to develop 
contingency plans for an early regime collapse scenario that was similar to Running Start. 
Among other things, the analysts suspected that the growing political pressure on the 
regime and the buildup of coalition troops in Kuwait were leading to a prospective coup 
attempt or internal revolt. They believed that, once Saddam was removed from power, 
the Iraqi Army would capitulate and Saddam’s more loyal military forces, including the 
Republican Guard, would fall into disarray and confusion, providing CENTCOM with a 
small window of opportunity in which to complete the destruction of the regime. Coali-
tion air strikes would sever Saddam’s remaining command and control nodes and destroy 
any Republican Guard units that attempted to mount a defense. The V Corps would then 
race toward Baghdad as special operations forces moved to seize Saddam International 
Airport. A brigade of the 82d Airborne Division would relieve the special operations 
forces in place as V Corps units surrounded Baghdad. Once conditions were set, CFLCC 
would relocate its headquarters to the secured Saddam International Airport. Like 1003V 
and Cobra II, this branch plan assumed risk along the lines of communications near the 
urban centers because of the need for an expeditious movement to Baghdad.19
The introduction of the early regime collapse scenario at the operational level signifi-
cantly affected the composition of the invasion force. The units selected to participate 
in the invasion were separated and sequenced for deployment in a manner that would 
fulfill CENTCOM and CFLCC’s desire to have greater flexibility earlier in the campaign. 
The initial invasion force was reduced to only the 3d Infantry Division, the 11th Attack 
Helicopter Regiment, a reinforced brigade combat team from the 101st Airborne Divi-
sion, and I MEF. These invading units would be followed by the 1st Armored Division, 
the rest of the 101st Airborne Division, the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), and the 
1st Cavalry Division. Continual changes to the forces available for additional contingen-
cies made it unclear what units came under V Corps’ direct command.20
Another alteration to the invasion plan concerned an effort to create an Iraqi contin-
gent for the invasion force. In spring 2002, Under SECDEF for Policy Douglas Feith—in 
consultation with Iraqi expatriate leaders—became concerned about putting more of an 
Iraqi face on the invasion so that it would truly be seen as liberation rather than an occu-
pation. Feith’s idea was to recruit Iraqis living abroad to fight alongside the invading 
coalition forces, much like the Free French had helped liberate France in 1944, and, in 
fact, the Department of Defense (DoD) dubbed the Iraqi unit the Free Iraqi Forces (FIF). 
Recruitment efforts were directed at Iraqi expatriates in America and Western Europe, 
62
THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR
where thousands initially volunteered, including some from groups led by expatriate 
leaders Ahmad Chalabi and Ayad Allawi. However, turning volunteers into soldiers 
proved difficult. There were legal problems concerning how much the recruits could be 
paid, as well as law of war considerations about whether the FIF were legal combatants. 
These issues were superimposed over efforts to build a transitional Iraqi Government in 
exile, also involving Chalabi and Allawi, and to link the FIF into that government. The 
amount of vetting required for each recruit was considerable, reducing the number that 
could be processed properly. Franks was not supportive of the effort, allocating little of 
his command’s time or energy toward it and asking the Office of the SECDEF why he 
should be responsible for “5,000 Iraqis who would have given him the combat power of 
150 U.S. soldiers.” Of the 5,000-7,000 FIF soldiers envisioned in Feith’s original concept, 
only a few hundred were ultimately vetted, trained, and sent to Iraq in time for the inva-
sion and the post-regime stability phase.21
Deployment of the Invasion Force
As CENTCOM and CFLCC finalized their plans, coalition commanders waited anx-
iously for N-day—the day that the President would notify them when the invasion 
would occur, with the deployment order that would initiate movement into Kuwait in 
accordance with the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) to follow shortly 
thereafter. Uncertain of the operation’s start date, the coalition’s ground force com-
manders were concerned they might not be able to build up the required force in time 
to conduct the invasion on the President’s timeline. Therefore, they used some innova-
tive ways to pre-position forces in Kuwait in advance of N-day. Beginning in September 
2002, CFLCC, V Corps, and I MEF used a series of scheduled exercises as cover to move 
units into theater ahead of the expected deployment order. By October 2002, portions of 
the 3d Infantry Division and I MEF were in place in Kuwait to participate in scheduled 
training exercises and maneuvers. In October and November, CFLCC’s Exercise Lucky 
Warrior and CENTCOM’s Exercise Internal Look in Kuwait provided an opportunity for 
headquarters to prepare using an Iraq-based scenario and for the 3d Infantry Division 
and portions of I MEF and V Corps to remain. While CFLCC and V Corps moved the 
key components of their ground forces into theater, CENTCOM worked to get its stra-
tegic-level assets in place. Under the cover of Internal Look, CFLCC’s Lucky Warrior, 
and a V Corps exercise called Juniper Cobra, CENTCOM discreetly deployed Patriot air 
defense batteries into Kuwait and Israel to defend against the Iraqi regime’s short-range 
ballistic missiles and its suspected medium-range Scud and Husayn missiles. Finally, the 
Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command (CFSOCC) used Operation 
DESERT SPRING to place part of 5th Special Forces Group in Kuwait.22
This flow of forces was interrupted, however, when Rumsfeld decided in early 2003 
not to use the TPFDD and instead chose to deploy troops in a series of force packages as 
he had done for Afghanistan. His decision to discard the TPFDD was driven by several 
factors. First, in order to forestall a preemptive Iraqi attack as well as to show domestic 
and international audiences that the United States had given diplomacy every chance of 
success, Rumsfeld and Bush wished to delay any formal announcement of their intent to 
use military force in Iraq until the last possible moment. This was difficult to do once the 
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very noticeable machinery of the TPFDD had been set in motion. They both also wanted 
to provide CENTCOM with greater flexibility earlier in the campaign to respond to the 
early regime collapse scenario if necessary. Finally, despite the value U.S. military lead-
ers placed on the TPFDD, Rumsfeld believed the process was too cumbersome for the 
mobile, versatile force he envisioned.23
In Rumsfeld’s view, the TPFDD was a symbol of some military leaders’ stubborn 
resistance to his efforts to implement the revolution in military affairs—he “always 
thought the [military’s] requests for forces were off by a factor of two or three; he saw 
himself as bringing discipline to the force deployment process,” Secretary of the Army 
Thomas White later recalled.24 In order to control and limit the size of the invasion force, 
Rumsfeld required his commanders to submit a series of requests for forces (RFFs) for 
his approval. The SECDEF believed using RFFs would enable DoD to rearrange the flow 
of forces into theater more responsively so that any units that were not needed could 
be easily scratched from the deployment list. The force package in each RFF was built 
around a U.S. Army division, armored cavalry regiment, or a Marine Corps equivalent. 
Enabler units, such as combat service support, field artillery, or military police, could 
be added or removed to the base force packages as needed. Each force package would 
require the approval of both Rumsfeld and Franks before its deployment.25
The RFF and force package model had some significant flaws, the biggest of which 
was that changes to the order in which combat units were scheduled to arrive would 
also alter the flow of logistical units and other enablers critical to building and sustain-
ing CFLCC’s combat power in theater. The sequence of arriving combat and sustain-
ment forces changed numerous times based on when various divisions were required for 
the campaign. When Franks decided that he needed the 101st Airborne Division on the 
ground before the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, for example, the enablers for each unit 
could not be correspondingly rearranged. As a result, the enablers for the 3d Armored 
Cavalry Regiment were in place when the 101st arrived in theater, but those for the 101st 
were not. The force package method also meant that Army units could be shuffled in the 
deployment order without accounting for the fact that many Army sustainment units 
were in direct or general support of CFSOCC or Marine units.26
By late February 2003, the 3d Infantry Division, the 11th Attack Helicopter Regi-
ment, two brigades of the 101st Airborne Division, portions of I MEF, and the British 1st 
Armored Division had arrived in Kuwait, though some key pieces of those units were still 
moving into position. Portions of the 4th Infantry Division and the 1st Infantry Division 
were loading onto ships ahead of anticipated authorization to traverse Turkey for the 
invasion. The gathering of forces in Kuwait enabled the invasion force to begin rehearsals 
for N-day. Although CENTCOM, CFLCC, and V Corps had conducted extensive rehears-
als and exercises with each other, they had only infrequently incorporated the Marines 
and the British forces into joint and coalition rehearsals of the plan. Throughout February 
and March 2003, first CENTCOM and then CFLCC held a series of rehearsal of concept 
drills to ensure all U.S. components and the British forces were familiar with the plan, its 
changes, and its contingencies.27
On the eve of the invasion, CFLCC had slightly more than three divisions with which 
to destroy Iraq’s military, topple the regime in Baghdad, and secure the country until 
follow-on forces and transitional authorities arrived in an incremental fashion. Despite 
64
THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR
McKiernan’s request that the follow-on forces should be included in the invasion force, 
Franks and Rumsfeld decided in February 2003 that the 1st Armored Division and 1st 
Cavalry Division would not participate in the invasion itself, but would be used in its 
wake. The 1st Armored Division would deploy after the invasion, while the 1st Cav-
alry Division—unknown to McKiernan at the time—would not deploy to Iraq at all, but 
would be held for future contingency operations arising from escalating tensions on the 
Korean peninsula.28
Planning for a Post-Regime Iraq
The responsibility for a post-regime Iraq was a contentious topic as invasion plans 
circulated among various government agencies. Not until summer 2002 did the National 
Security Council establish an executive steering group to manage planning for Iraq after 
Saddam. Participants included the Department of State, DoD, intelligence agencies, and 
the Office of the Vice President. The executive steering group loosely coordinated several 
initiatives to create the conditions for a democratic and stable post-Saddam Iraqi Gov-
ernment. The State Department’s Future of Iraq project aimed to identify Iraqi opposi-
tionists who could help build a successor government and to study issues expected to be 
important in the new Iraq, such as oil and energy infrastructure, security forces, legal and 
judicial systems, and economics and trade. Alongside the Department of State, the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) formed another working group focused 
on post-regime reconstruction tasks.29
Some leading Iraqi oppositionists, including Ahmad Chalabi, refused to participate, 
thus hampering these U.S.-led working groups. More importantly, the conferences and 
working groups themselves produced no plan, but rather a series of papers on Iraq that, 
while informative, were not linked directly to any action arm. Many of the working papers 
were based on the same flawed assumptions that influenced military plans for Phase IV: 
that Iraqis would welcome the United States as a liberating force, and that the Iraqi Gov-
ernment would retain some functionality after the senior Ba’ath leadership was removed. 
As a result, the executive steering group and its supporting working groups spent exten-
sive time on building a humanitarian assistance package for Iraq, but comparatively little 
time on the functions of a post-regime government outside of the oil ministry.30
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Colin Powell (second from right), Abdul Aziz Hakim (second from left) and 
Ahmad Chalabi (right). Source: U.S. State Department photo by Michael Gross (Released).
Secretary of State Colin Powell After the Invasion of Iraq With Members of the Iraqi 
Governing Council, Including Abdul Aziz Hakim and Ahmad Chalabi.31
As the executive steering group did its work, the Office of the SECDEF was simulta-
neously working on its own postwar plan. Feith formed an Office of Special Plans under 
William “Bill” Luti to study the requirements of a successor Iraqi Government—a task 
redundant and uncoordinated with the State Department’s Future of Iraq project. Among 
other requirements, Luti’s group judged that the U.S. military would need to remain in 
Iraq to support stability, governance, and reconstruction for several years.32
To remove the conflict of overlapping efforts, on January 20, 2003, Bush issued National 
Security Presidential Directive–24, designating DoD as the lead agency for postwar Iraq. 
The State Department and Powell were not pleased with this arrangement, particularly 
when DoD leaders declared their intention to put a U.S. Embassy in Iraq under its con-
trol, a plan that the Office of the SECDEF did not synchronize with any of the ongoing 
military planning for postwar Iraq.33
National Security Presidential Directive–24 also instructed DoD to establish an Office 
of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) that would oversee humani-
tarian assistance and some initial reconstruction efforts immediately following the inva-
sion. To head ORHA, Rumsfeld selected retired Lieutenant General Jay M. Garner as 
commander of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, who had experience with humanitar-
ian assistance in Iraq.34 As it formed in February–March 2003, Garner’s group focused 
mostly on reconstruction planning, but without the resources of the U.S. interagency at 
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its disposal. Instead, ORHA was expected to link 
its efforts with the Phase IV planning already 
ongoing at CENTCOM and CFLCC.
Late Military Planning for Phase IV
As the invasion approached, CENTCOM and 
CFLCC began to pay more attention to Phase IV 
of the operation. However, the bulk of their plan-
ning remained staunchly based on deployment 
efforts and major combat operations, resulting in 
a number of belated, overlapping plans for Phase 
IV at higher echelons and almost no preparations 
for Phase IV at the Corps level and below, where 
neither V Corps nor I MEF made time to develop 
Phase IV plans.
CENTCOM’s planners expected Phase IV 
to last approximately 2 years, and its concept 
was one of a military occupation force operat-
ing under an unspecified civilian authority. As 
CENTCOM envisioned it, the military occupa-
tion would consist of all four of the Army’s civil 
affairs commands—the majority of which were 
Army Reserve units―arranged in geographical 
sectors covering Baghdad, western Iraq, northern 
Iraq, and southern Iraq. These civil affairs com-
mands would assist the civilian authority with 
reconstruction and humanitarian assistance, with 
Iraqi Army units assisting the civilian authority and civil affairs commands in provid-
ing security during the transition period after the collapse of the regime.36 As General 
Richard Myers saw it, however, Franks had little interest in Phase IV. In one December 
2002 meeting, Myers was astonished by Franks’s insistence that the invasion force’s focus 
would not extend beyond taking Baghdad.37
CFLCC’s post-invasion plan was more advanced than any of the other Phase IV 
efforts. McKiernan and Wallace both assumed that CFLCC was the lead command in 
Iraq after major combat operations concluded. They expected that CFLCC would provide 
support to a joint and interagency coordination group to sustain humanitarian assistance 
operations, conduct critical life support infrastructure repair, destroy pockets of resis-
tance, support an interim Iraqi security assistance force, and provide overall maintenance 
of general and public order as key Iraqi institutions were rehabilitated over a period of 
5 to 7 months. After that period CFLCC expected to become or to hand over its duties to 
the Combined Joint Task Force–Iraq (CJTF-I), which would eventually transition its oper-
ations to Iraqis, nongovernmental organizations, or international control over an addi-
tional 4 or 5 years. This CFLCC plan, upon which work was well underway in January 
2003, was named Eclipse II after the Allied plan to occupy Germany in World War II.38
Source: DoD photo by R.D. Ward (Released).
Lieutenant General (Ret) Jay M. 
Garner, Director, ORHA  
(April-May 2003).35
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Source: DoD photo by R.D. Ward (Released).
General George W. Casey, Joint Staff J5 
(Later Director, Joint Staff, 2001-2003).39
ORHA, meanwhile, was just getting on its feet when CFLCC issued its Eclipse II plan. 
Franks was delighted to have found someone willing to take responsibility for Phase 
IV, and equally pleased by the prospect of “getting the inter-agency off his ass.” Inter-
estingly, Garner saw regime replacement—rather than humanitarian assistance—as the 
coalition’s fundamental postwar task, and ORHA accordingly began developing plans to 
reform Iraq along political, economic, and security lines of operation.40
At the Pentagon, the sparseness of CENTCOM’s Phase IV planning had concerned 
Lieutenant General John Abizaid, director of the Joint Staff, who noted in September 2002 
that CENTCOM’s rudimentary plan was not sufficiently detailed or resourced to achieve 
the President’s end state. He also noted the CENTCOM plan required every civil affairs 
Soldier in the Army. To come up with something more effective, Abizaid detailed the 
Joint Staff J–5, Lieutenant General George Casey, to work with CENTCOM to develop a 
more in-depth plan. At Casey’s direction, the Joint Staff sent more than 50 personnel to 
CENTCOM under Brigadier General Stephen R. Hawkins to take charge of planning for 
post-major combat operations for Iraq. Designated as Joint Task Force–4 (JTF-4), Hawkins 
and his team arrived at CENTCOM in the third week of January 2003. JTF-4 and CENT-
COM were immediately at odds owing to Hawkins’s difficult manner and the challenges 
of integrating planning at so late a stage. JTF-4 deployed to Kuwait in late January and, 
after declining an offer from Garner to work under ORHA’s auspices, Hawkins’s group 
was eventually absorbed by CFLCC to augment its Phase IV planning efforts.41
Other military Phase IV efforts also began and ended in isolation as the United States 
ramped up for war. In October 2002, the Army G–3 directed the Strategic Studies Institute 
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(SSI) to identify and evaluate prospective missions for ground forces in a post-regime 
Iraq. SSI responded with a report published in February 2003 that superimposed lessons 
learned from reconstruction operations in the Philippines, Germany, and Japan with some 
of the unique characteristics of Iraq’s physical and social infrastructure to distill the most 
likely challenges ground forces would face after the fall of Saddam. In a detailed mis-
sion matrix for Iraq, the report identified probable key tasks for humanitarian assistance 
and reconstruction operations, and recommended military and civilian organizations to 
achieve them. Unfortunately, the report came out less than a month prior to the invasion 
and was not incorporated into the ongoing Phase IV planning efforts. By March 2003, 
EUCOM created its own Phase IV organization, the Military Coordination and Liaison 
Command (MCLC), to work with military and humanitarian assistance organizations 
and organize the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Iraq from the north. The MCLC 
was a small team commanded by Marine Lieutenant General Henry “Pete” Osman with 
two offices pre-positioned in the Kurdish region.42
These six overlapping military planning efforts for Phase IV were insufficiently 
detailed and largely uncoordinated with interagency efforts or with each other. Most 
of the plans were based on the same flawed assumptions about the Iraqi Government, 
people, and military that were contained in the larger invasion plan. The redundant 
groups created by DoD and the Joint Staff caused confusion about which one had pri-
macy for postwar Iraq and, consequently, diffused responsibility for the planning effort 
across commands.43
The Rumsfeld–Shinseki Showdown
While relations between the SECDEF and the Army’s senior leaders were already 
tense, Shinseki’s February 24, 2003, testimony to the Senate Armed Services Commit-
tee brought them to the breaking point. In response to a question from Senator Carl 
Levin about the number of troops required for a post-invasion occupation force in Iraq, 
Shinseki estimated that the force required was “something on the order of several hun-
dred thousand soldiers.” He later explained to the SECDEF that this open-ended answer 
was designed to permit him and Franks the “maximum flexibility in arriving at the final 
number” of required forces.44 For Shinseki, the estimate was a simple matter of taking the 
force ratio he had seen that was required to secure Bosnia in 1997 and extrapolating it to 
the much larger Iraqi population and territory. Appearing before the same committee 2 
days later, after privately requesting that Levin ask him the same question, White publicly 
endorsed Shinseki’s estimate. The Army leaders’ public opinions differed sharply from 
those of Rumsfeld and Deputy SECDEF Paul Wolfowitz and quickly caused a political 
storm. The following day, House Democrats accused Wolfowitz of “concealing internal 
administration estimates on the cost of fighting and rebuilding the country,” prompting 
the deputy secretary to retort that Shinseki’s estimates were “wildly off the mark.”45
The very public disagreement between the Army and the Office of the SECDEF over 
Rumsfeld’s judgment that Iraq could be won with minimal money, energy, and forces 
ended with the removal of senior Army dissenters from the equation. The same day Wol-
fowitz rebutted Shinseki’s troop estimate, Rumsfeld summoned White into his office and 
fired him, though White would nominally retain the post for a 2-month transition period. 
Shinseki, instead of being fired, was allowed to retire as scheduled in June.46
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Paul Wolfowitz (left). Source: DoD photo by Donna Miles (Released).
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz With  
Lieutenant Colonel Steven Russell in Tikrit.47
The Shinseki-Office of the SECDEF dispute came during a stormy week for the inva-
sion’s architects. On March 2, the day after Rumsfeld fired White, the Turkish Parliament 
voted to deny the U.S. request to send ground forces through Turkey to attack across 
Iraq’s northern border. Throughout January and February 2003, U.S. diplomats and rep-
resentatives from EUCOM, CENTCOM, and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) 
had worked with the Turkish military to define a package of benefits and concessions 
to entice Turkey to authorize the United States to use its territory without allowing the 
Turkish military to expand its military footprint in northern Iraq. However, a series of 
miscommunications and a fundamental misunderstanding of the ongoing internal power 
struggle between Recep Erdogan’s Islamist government and the Turkish military resulted 
in U.S. leaders watching as the Turkish Parliament unexpectedly disapproved U.S. basing 
rights by a mere three votes. Though CENTCOM and EUCOM were able to keep troops 
of the 1st Infantry Division along the Turkey-Iraq border, Turkey’s denial of a northern 
route had a profound impact on the invasion and its aftermath.48
IRAQ PREPARES FOR WAR
As coalition units moved into position in Kuwait, CENTCOM, CFLCC, and V Corps 
refined their assessments of the Iraqi regime’s likely defense plans. Upon the initiation 
of coalition air and ground attacks, they expected Saddam to disperse his forces, initiate 
his plan to defend Baghdad, activate the Iraqi Quds force, and conduct either a defense 
of Baghdad in-depth or a deliberate attack. They assessed that the most dangerous Iraqi 
course of action was a deliberate attack against Kuwait as coalition forces flowed into 
that country. The most likely course of action, however, was a defense-in-depth across 
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southern Iraq, a scenario in which Saddam’s main effort would likely consist of six of the 
regular army divisions positioned along the major highways leading to Baghdad. The 13 
regular army and Republican Guard divisions positioned along the Green Line would 
defend against any coalition attack from the north. CENTCOM anticipated that Saddam 
would use controlled flooding to delay the coalition ground forces, and, after stopping 
them with flooding, use artillery and short-range missiles against them. CENTCOM also 
believed that Saddam would launch missiles against Israel to fracture the coalition politi-
cally and to attack the Kurds and Shi’a at any signs of uprising or collusion with the coa-
lition ground attack. Finally, CENTCOM expected that, as coalition forces approached 
Baghdad, Saddam would authorize the use of chemical weapons against them.49
CENTCOM and CFLCC were convinced that Saddam and his inner circle would fight 
intensely once coalition forces entered Baghdad, but that Iraqi forces outside of Bagh-
dad would vary widely in their capability and will to fight. CENTCOM expected the 
Republican Guard to fight in company-sized units and perhaps even battalion forma-
tions, while the paramilitary forces would bolster the Iraqi Army’s smaller formations. 
The general expectation was that, even with a reduced invasion force, coalition military 
forces could achieve a rapid and decisive victory over the Iraqi security forces. Coalition 
leaders judged the most challenging fight would be the battle for Baghdad.50
Saddam’s Expectations
Saddam did not significantly alter Iraqi Army and Republican Guard plans for the 
defense of Iraq until the end of 2002. Although it was becoming apparent that a coali-
tion invasion was imminent, Saddam’s primary concerns remained: preventing internal 
regime collapse and preparing for a popular uprising. If the coalition did invade, Saddam 
expected only limited coalition military operations that would seize key terrain but not 
necessarily remove him from power. Therefore, while he anticipated some initial military 
defeats, he expected they would be followed by protracted military operations during 
which he could buy time and sue for peace with support from the international commu-
nity. Saddam told his commanders to expect a considerable air campaign followed by a 
limited ground war, as in 1991, and warned them not to expect to be very mobile because 
of the air campaign. Once the air attacks and limited ground maneuvers concluded, how-
ever, Saddam anticipated that coalition operations would slow or come to a halt as the 
United States gauged the Iraqi regime’s next move.51
On December 18, 2002, Saddam, through his second son, Qusay, ordered the Repub-
lican Guard to reorient their defensive posture along a series of concentric rings around 
Baghdad based on the assumption that coalition forces would be worn out with fighting 
by the time they reached the outer ring. Qusay instructed the Republican Guard lead-
ership to engage the American forces on the outer rings and gradually withdraw to the 
inner rings if defeated on the outer ones. If forced to withdraw into the city, the Republi-
can Guard was directed to fight to the death.52
Despite these defensive orders, Saddam remained confident that he and his forces 
would survive long enough for him to encourage the United Nations or other interna-
tional powers to intervene and halt the coalition advance. Saddam’s optimism was rein-
forced by his ignorance of how decrepit and ineffective were his own forces. Over the 
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years, his demands for positive information from his commanders had created a culture 
of rhetoric and reporting that was detached from reality, in which commanders who 
reported problems were seen as unfit. Thus, the true state of affairs—that most of the 
conventional forces under his command were not properly resourced, trained, staffed, 
or otherwise prepared to engage the coalition military—seems never to have entered his 
mind.53
Not until the final weeks before the invasion did Saddam consider some of the defen-
sive measures the coalition had expected. In March 2003, Saddam received intelligence 
reports about U.S. intentions to set up coalition military rule and a democratic govern-
ment after dismantling the Ba’athist regime. Saddam subsequently reviewed military 
assessments that the United States would likely target in order—Saddam himself; his air 
defense systems; the military command, control, and communication infrastructure; and 
his suspected WMD sites—with an extended bombing campaign. Because he anticipated 
his forces would be immobilized by coalition bombings, Saddam gave orders to stockpile 
arms, munitions, and equipment in military schools, training areas, and similar locations 
inside Iraq’s cities, after which Iraqi military units built large caches of weapons and 
ammunition.54 In order to further slow any coalition advance on Baghdad, Saddam made 
plans to destroy the northern and southern oil fields, as CENTCOM had long projected 
he would—although in the course of events Iraqi troops and officials would obey few of 
his instructions for this scorched earth approach.55
Saddam also decided to reinforce his military defense with paramilitary and terrorist 
operations. In January 2003, Saddam issued an emergency order for the Ba’ath Party mili-
tia and the Fedayeen to prepare to defend against internal uprisings in the event of limited 
attacks on Iraqi soil.56 This was the first of a series of orders directed at his paramilitary 
forces in advance of the coalition invasion. (See Map 8.) He subsequently directed the 
Fedayeen to work with its foreign affiliates and use a combination of coercion, intimida-
tion, and propaganda to induce collaboration from Iraq’s citizens in key population cen-
ters. Trained on “small-unit tactics, sabotage techniques, and military surveillance and 
reconnaissance tasks,” the Fedayeen were adept at guerrilla and sabotage techniques. As 
the invasion approached, they also began planning suicide operations against the coali-
tion. Less than 30 days prior to the start of the war, the special mission unit of the Iraqi 
military intelligence directorate took charge of a group of Fedayeen volunteers to form 
into “small kamikaze combat groups” equipped with weapons and munitions suitable 
for use behind enemy lines and on the flanks by damaging enemy armor and helicop-
ters. These volunteers attended a 30-day course to prepare for these missions beginning 
in March 2003. With its heavy presence in Iraqi cities and its new mission to resist the 
coalition through terrorist-type activities, the Fedayeen had effectively become the Iraqi 
regime’s first line of urban defense.57
Iraqi Military Expectations
Iraqi Army leaders were much more concerned about the American military capabili-
ties and intentions than was the overconfident Saddam. According to a report written by 
senior Iraqi military leaders, the Iraqi Army believed that the United States would likely 
use airborne assaults, psychological operations, and technologically superior maneuver 
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forces to move quickly to Baghdad. They believed that the U.S.-led invasion force would 
“avoid capturing whole cities,” and would focus instead on “important [routes] to con-
trol entry and exit points for towns and cities with the objective of preventing the arrival 
of [Iraqi] reinforcements in order to create a strict siege against cities.”58
Many Iraqi military leaders were familiar with U.S. military superiority and were 
pessimistic about the outcome. Lieutenant General Kenan Mansour Khalil al-Ubaydi, the 
dean of the Iraqi military academy, later commented that “[we] military officers knew 
that the war was coming and that it would be the end. . . . I knew U.S. forces would go for 
Baghdad and that those forces would go all the way . . . we knew also of the U.S. fight-
ing capabilities.”59 Elsewhere, some Republican Guard leaders expressed veiled concerns 
about the “ring defense” plan as operationally unsound, but were told by Qusay that 
Saddam had approved the new plan, effectively ending the discussion.60
Even as the Iraqi Army continued to fortify its defensive positions, its senior lead-
ers generally believed that the invasion and their defeat were both imminent. Gather-
ing scores of Iraqi general officers at a base near the Baghdad airport in March 2003, 
army chief of staff General Sultan Hashim told his assembled officers that diplomacy had 
failed, a coalition invasion was imminent, and Iraq’s military defeat was certain. Never-
theless, Sultan told the generals their duty was to fight hard and stave off defeat as long 
as possible. Iraqi Major General Najim Jabouri recalled that Sultan’s intended pep talk 
had the opposite effect; it caused the senior officers’ morale to plummet. Iraqi military 
officers assessed that the U.S.-led invasion forces would first seize Basrah and move into 
Maysan and Qadisiyah Provinces from the south and east before moving from Fallujah 
into Baghdad from the west. This estimate did not deduce the coalition’s eventual main 
northward thrust west of the Euphrates, but was much closer to reality than Saddam’s 
expectations. Unlike Saddam, the Iraqi military thought these maneuvers would take the 
U.S. military a week or less rather than months.61
Like Saddam, however, the Iraqi military expected that, much like Operation DESERT 
STORM, the coalition would conduct a lengthy air campaign prior to any ground cam-
paign; the early leaflet drops only reinforced that assessment. Iraqis obtained intelligence 
that suggested the air campaign would begin between March 18 and 20, 2003, and the 
first targets would be Saddam’s suspected locations.62 They then expected that the air 
campaign would be followed by a ground assault from the north, south, and west. The 
northern avenues of approach were the highways heading south from Mosul and Kirkuk; 
those in the west and southwest went through Rutbah to Ramadi and through Karbala, 
respectively; and the approaches from the south split from Basrah toward Amarah and 
Nasiriyah and converged at Kut before continuing up the Tigris to Baghdad. The inva-
sion forces would then move along these major highways, securing urban centers as they 
went. Because Iraqi military leaders expected the targets of the air campaign would be 
active military forces, known headquarters buildings, and ammunition depots and ware-
houses, they intended to disperse their supplies and units as widely as possible to avoid 
losing large amounts in a single bombing. They aimed to do the same with their military 
command and control.63
The Iraqis had long expected that the coalition invasion would include a western front 
from Jordan, and a number of indicators seemed to validate their assessment. The Iraqi 
M4 intelligence directorate kept a close watch on the coalition force buildup in Jordan, 
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where the arrival of additional aircraft and medical equipment coupled with indicators 
that the Jordanian Government was reassuring foreign embassies that they were pro-
tected, all seemed to point to a coalition western front. The Iraqis also expected that the 
coalition would conduct reconnaissance missions in western Iraq to locate any missiles 
that could be fired at Israel and to evaluate the security at Iraq’s western airfields. Iraqi 
officers believed these missions would be followed by airborne assaults of combat troops 
onto the airfields near Rutbah, Nukhayb, and Al Walid, among other locations, and then 
continue toward key terrain on the outskirts of Baghdad. Beginning in mid-February 
2003, the Iraqi military was aware that U.S. and British special operations forces were in 
western Iraq, and they believed those forces were the early reconnaissance element they 
anticipated from the west. In mid-March, coalition troops inside western Iraq captured 
an Iraqi special mission unit whom they mistakenly assumed to be an Iraqi conventional 
force, after which the U.S. special operators agreed to release the Iraqis on condition that 
they would capitulate once the invasion commenced. The presence and demands of those 
forces, combined with other reports of coalition vehicles near Al Qa’im, Rutbah, and else-
where in Anbar, seemed to confirm an impending invasion to the west. The Iraqis were 
also aware of U.S. special operations outreach to the Kurds in northern Iraq but believed 
that the Kurds would only be acting as scouts for the coalition follow-on invasion force 
from the north. They did not expect the Kurds, at least not the KDP peshmerga, to par-
ticipate in the fighting. They expected that the U.S. special operations forces in the north 
would move quickly to “carry out assassinations in Iraqi cities upon the commencement 
of the invasion.”64
The Iraqis’ Final Preparations
Once it became clear in early March that Turkey would not permit the coalition to 
transit through Iraq’s northern border, Saddam and his military commanders, at last, 
reinforced their defenses in the southern, south central, and central zones along south-
ern and western avenues of approach to Baghdad. Just days before the invasion began, 
Qusay ordered the Fedayeen to reposition from Baghdad, which they originally intended 
to defend, to cities in the southern zone to mount a defense from those locations instead. 
The Iraqi regime reinforced these Fedayeen with volunteer fighters (called mujahideen) 
and suicide bombers from Egypt, Sudan, and other Arab countries with terrorist orga-
nizations or entities sympathetic to the Iraqi cause. The Fedayeen were also likely to be 
tasked to assist the local Ba’ath Party headquarters, the Iraqi Quds forces, and intelli-
gence services with preventing the large-scale desertion or capitulation of the conven-
tional Iraqi military forces. Saddam, likely in coordination with Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, 
also arranged for the Nebuchadnezzar Division of the Republican Guard—assigned to 
the northern zone—quietly to leave its vehicles in place in the north but move its soldiers 
south to Babil Province the week prior to the invasion, a large-scale troop movement that 
went undetected by the coalition.65
Iranian and Badr Corps Militia Preparations
The Iraqi regime and its troops were not the only military actors preparing to respond 
to the invasion of Iraq. Documents captured from members of the Islamic Revolutionary 
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Guard Corps of Iran operating in Iraq in the summer of 2003 revealed Iran’s detailed 
courses of action for military operations in Iraq in the event of an American invasion. The 
Iranians intended to use the Badr Corps—expanded from its original brigade size and 
directed by Iranian agents—to subvert American efforts to occupy Iraq successfully, with 
the subversion including military, political, and social means. In the months before the 
coalition invasion, Badr Corps units accompanied Iranian infantry and missile brigades 
as they moved into positions along the border. The Badr Corps also developed assassi-
nation lists of Sunni military personnel, Ba’athists, and others who collaborated with the 
regime that they intended to execute systematically once the opportunity presented itself. 
The leadership of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq intended for 
the Badr Corps to enter Iraq surreptitiously as Saddam’s regime collapsed and to seize 
towns and government offices to fill the vacuum. Establishing local control and carrying 
out reprisal attacks would set the conditions necessary for SCIRI to mobilize their politi-
cal base in the aftermath of the regime.66
* * *
After months of hard planning, wargaming, and rehearsals, the coalition ground 
forces assembled in Kuwait in March 2003 were confident they could defeat Saddam’s 
military and topple the regime. Although getting the forces into theater quickly using 
the RFF packages proved to be challenging logistically, the pre-positioning of maneuver 
forces and Patriot missile batteries made McKiernan and Wallace comfortable with the 
smaller contingent of forces they had available for the invasion. They also knew that the 
4th Infantry Division and 1st Armored Division were moving toward Kuwait and pre-
sumably would be available well before the main invasion force was expected to reach 
Baghdad.67 Despite the fact that Phase IV preparations and new Phase IV entities like 
ORHA lagged far behind in the planning office, Franks and other senior leaders expected 
that those plans and organizations still had 2 or 3 months in which to prepare before sta-
bility operations and a civilian authority would be needed. In any case, Franks and other 
commanders believed stability operations were a far less pressing matter than the major 
combat operations at hand.
Saddam’s focus on positive information and his own wishful thinking led his military 
leaders to provide him with assessments that were highly unrealistic. As a result, the 
Iraqi dictator expected some early defeats but  was confident his forces could hold Bagh-
dad long enough for him to appeal to international allies to halt the American invasion. 
At the last minute, however, the massing coalition forces in Kuwait caused Saddam to 
panic, and he deployed the Fedayeen and Ba’ath Party militias south, throwing his own 
military plans to defend Baghdad into disarray.
Iraq’s actual military preparations sharply contrasted with coalition estimates of 
what the Iraqis were likely to do, which focused on Iraq’s Republican Guard units and 
Saddam’s expected use of chemical weapons as the principal threats against the coa-
lition ground force advance. These threat projections, combined with unrealistic exer-
cises, led the coalition to underestimate Iraq’s paramilitary forces and employ a scheme 
of maneuver that used helicopter deep attacks as the primary shaping operation, while 
assuming risk around the urban areas in southern Iraq that Saddam’s regime at the 11th 
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hour effectively had made its main effort. These choices would create surprises for the 
coalition in the invasion to come.
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CHAPTER 4
THE INVASION OF IRAQ, MARCH-APRIL 2003
On March 21, 2003, the main coalition force in Kuwait launched its attack into Iraq, 
beginning an operation that toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime in just 20 days, much 
less time than anyone, especially Saddam, had anticipated. There were other surprises 
on the way to Baghdad as well. The coalition’s maneuver forces expected to defeat and 
bypass depleted or capitulated Iraqi Army units in southern Iraq en route to the more 
robust Republican Guard units protecting the main avenues of approach into Baghdad. 
Instead of Iraqi armor and infantry, however, Coalition Forces Land Component Com-
mand (CFLCC) units found themselves engaged in fierce firefights with the Fedayeen 
and other paramilitary forces Saddam sent to reinforce the defense in and around Iraq’s 
southern cities. This unexpected enemy attacked from the urban centers CFLCC intended 
to bypass, ambushed a transportation company on the second day of the invasion, and 
derailed the first scheduled helicopter deep attack against the Medina Division of the 
Republican Guard. U.S. special operations forces in western Iraq fought additional bat-
tles with paramilitary forces in the vicinity of Rutbah and the Hadithah Dam, while the 
special operations task force in northern Iraq worked with Kurdish peshmerga and the 
Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) to defeat a stubborn defense by 
Iraq’s northernmost conventional forces. Amid these unexpected circumstances, a major 
sandstorm halted the invasion for days but gave CFLCC units an opportunity to gather 
themselves for an unexpected quick push to Baghdad. As the outgunned Iraqi forces 
defending Baghdad collapsed in disarray, troops from the 3d Infantry Division conducted 
armored raids termed “Thunder Runs” into the capital city between April 5 and 7, 2003. 
After this, the regime collapsed, although most of northern and western Iraq remained 
uncontrolled by the coalition forces.
THE INVASION BEGINS
Shaping Operations, March 17–19, 2003
By March 17, 2003, the last of the United Nations (UN) weapons inspectors departed 
Iraq, and intelligence suggested that Iraq ceased its destruction of the Samoud missiles it 
possessed, apparently in violation of the agreements it had made to destroy them. That 
evening, then-President George W. Bush announced that Saddam and his sons had 48 
hours to step down or face “military conflict at a time of our choosing,” signaling to the 
world and his military commanders that the long-expected attack was imminent.1
On March 19, 2003, Bush announced that coalition forces had begun operations to 
remove Saddam’s regime from power. As the President made his announcement, mul-
tiple special operations units were conducting shaping operations in preparation for the 
CFLCC invasion, scheduled to begin on the evening of March 21. Combined Joint Special 
Operations Task Force–West (CJSOTF-W), under the command of Colonel John F. Mul-
holland, was responsible for southern and western Iraq, Baghdad, and the area northwest 
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of Baghdad to Tikrit. They were to find and destroy Saddam’s suspected long-range bal-
listic missiles and launch sites in order to prevent attacks against Israel that might pro-
voke the Israelis to enter the war. Some of the first coalition troops to enter Iraq consisted 
of special operations detachments who infiltrated through Iraq’s southwestern desert to 
link up with tribes and resistance groups. They also secured an airfield at Wadi al Khirr, 
approximately 80 kilometers west of Najaf, as a launch point for further infiltrations into 
western and southwestern Iraq. On March 19, CJSOTF-W units breached the berms along 
Iraq’s border with Jordan to begin their Scud-hunting mission.2
Meanwhile, in southern Iraq, Captain Robert S. Harward’s Naval Special Warfare 
Group was responsible for securing Iraq’s southern gas and oil platforms and for sup-
porting I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) operations. On March 19, at 9 p.m., the 
160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment attacked Iraqi observation posts across 
the Kuwait border, while the Naval Special Warfare Task Force, along with British and 
Polish commandos, secured the oil platforms off the shore of the Faw Peninsula, Umm 
Qasr, and Rumaila. Special operations detachments from CJSOTF-W simultaneously 
positioned themselves near key crossing sites and bridges in the vicinity of Nasiriyah and 
Samawah as CFLCC forces moved northward and another special operations detach-
ment began moving toward the Karbala Gap. Colonel Charles Cleveland’s Combined 
Joint Special Operations Task Force–North (CJSOTF-N), which was responsible for all 
territory north of the Green Line, Ninawa Province, and Kirkuk, ordered elements of the 
10th Special Forces Group to make their way to the peshmerga leadership in advance 
of the CJSOTF-N main body. Their task was to expand relationships with the Kurds 
that had existed since Operation PROVIDE COMFORT and to develop a northern front 
despite Turkey’s refusal to authorize coalition transit across its borders.3 Elements from 
CJSOTF-N also began working toward one of their non-Iraqi military targets—the Ansar 
al-Islam enclave in northeastern Iraq. 
The President’s March 17 ultimatum had also triggered a large-scale coalition psy-
chological operation designed to encourage specific behaviors from Iraqi soldiers. Leaf-
lets dropped on Iraqi military positions urged the soldiers to capitulate, but to remain 
available for recall once the regime was no longer in power. Tape-recorded phone calls to 
specific Iraqi military leaders sent the same message, while also discouraging Iraqi com-
manders from using Saddam’s suspected chemical weapons stockpile against the coali-
tion.4 Separate leaflet drops in Baghdad emphasized to the population in the capital that 
the coalition’s targets were Saddam and the Ba’ath Party regime, not the Iraqi people. 
Leaflets dropped on the Rumaila oil fields in southern Iraq urged the Iraqis there not to 
destroy the oil infrastructure, the heart of Iraq’s wealth. CENTCOM also prepared a letter 
for the northern Iraqi Army commanders, signed by Deputy Commander Lieutenant 
General John Abizaid, stating, “If you deliver Northern Iraq to us, you will be absolved 
and given immunity.” The letter was passed by special operations forces in northern Iraq 
to couriers who were supposed to provide it to the Iraqi corps commanders in the north.5
These operations had varying degrees of success. The leaflets in southern Iraq may 
have achieved part of their intended result, as the Iraqis ultimately destroyed only a 
handful of wells in the southern oil fields. Later evidence indicated Iraqi regime officials 
might have simply ignored instructions from Baghdad to destroy oil infrastructure.6 The 
accuracy with which the leaflets landed on regime targets and Iraqi military formations 
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“shook [some of] the Iraqi military commanders” to their core, leading them to conclude 
that if the Americans could attack their positions with paper so accurately, then lethal 
munitions would be just as precise.7 Some of the Iraqi units in southern Iraq began to 
experience large numbers of desertions after the leaflets fell, but the anticipated large-
scale capitulations or whole-unit surrenders did not occur. Iraqi units in northern Iraq, 
however, did not appear to be capitulating at all. Interrogations of captured Iraqi mili-
tary leaders later established that, while the leaflets were received, Iraqis in the north did 
not follow the leaflets’ instructions because of a combination of miscommunication and 
threats. Some Iraqi soldiers who fought in northern Iraq were coerced into fighting by 
the Iraqi military leaders who threatened to shoot deserters. Interrogations also revealed 
that the quality of the Arabic on the leaflets was so poor that Iraqi soldiers reading them 
were confused about what the coalition wanted them to do. Turkey’s very public refusal 
to authorize U.S. forces to invade from Turkish territory limited northern capitulations as 
well because it left the Iraqi divisions arrayed on the Green Line with the belief that they 
would not be facing a significant coalition threat from the north and would pay no price 
for remaining in place.8
DISPOSITION OF IRAQI FORCES
In the week prior to the invasion, the Iraqi military was only partially prepared for 
what was to come. After months of misplaced confidence that the U.S.-led coalition would 
not invade Iraq at all, Saddam finally began to prepare to defend against an increasingly 
likely coalition offensive just weeks ahead of the actual invasion. Nevertheless, the Iraqi 
leader’s defensive preparations were as unrealistic as his previous assumptions about 
U.S. intentions. Despite the massive U.S. buildup in Kuwait, Saddam believed that the 
main coalition attack would come from the west and, therefore, most of his Republican 
Guard forces were oriented toward Jordan rather than to the south. He also left his 1st 
Army Corps in Kirkuk and 5th Army Corps in Mosul, though both were available to be 
moved, and many of his conventional army forces remained facing toward the east to 
guard against opportunistic attacks from Iran.
Saddam and his military leaders divided Iraq’s forces into four zones: northern, cen-
tral, central Euphrates, and southern (see Map 8 in Chapter 3). The northern zone was 
spread across Ninawa and Tamim (Kirkuk) Provinces and was commanded by Saddam’s 
Vice President, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri. The central zone consisted of Baghdad, Anbar, 
Salahadin, and portions of Wasit Province and was commanded by Qusay Hussein, who 
controlled four Republican Guard divisions and the 2d Iraqi Army Corps. The Fatah 
Corps of the Republican Guard, which included the Medina, Nida, and Baghdad Divi-
sions, was positioned to defend Baghdad from the west and south; with the Medina Divi-
sion arrayed in the vicinity of Suwayrah, Musayyib, and Karbala; and the Nida Division 
east of the Diyala River and in Baqubah. The Allahu Akbar Corps of the Republican 
Guard was deployed to defend northern Baghdad with the Hammurabi, Adnan, and 
Nebuchadnezzar Divisions of the Republican Guard. To the west, the Iraqi border com-
mand defended the frontier and the western approaches with a few border brigades rein-
forced by a special forces regiment. While not capable of mounting a significant military 
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defense, the border brigades had the ability to observe and report on enemy forces in 
their sectors.9 
The central Euphrates and southern zones were much more sparsely manned. The 
former—which included Babil, Karbala, Qadisiyah, Najaf, and Muthanna Provinces—
was only defended by the Iraqi regime’s Quds forces and Ba’ath Party militias. The south-
ern zone (Basrah, Maysan, and Dhi Qar Provinces), contained the III and IV Iraqi Army 
Corps, as well as some naval forces. Like the II Army Corps in the central zone, however, 
the primary task for these conventional forces was to defend against an Iranian attack. 
While Saddam’s idea of a reserve was unclear, Iraqi military leaders recommended using 
the Quds force as a reserve in the southern zone.10
An Early Start, March 19-23, 2003
After Bush’s March 19 announcement that an invasion was imminent, G-hour—the 
time at which CFLCC ground forces would cross the border between Iraq and Kuwait—
was set for 9 p.m. on March 21, 2003. However, two intelligence indicators caused the 
President and secretary of defense (SECDEF) to initiate ground operations before the 
planned hour. On March 19, intelligence reports suggested that Saddam and some of his 
key advisers were at a location in southern Baghdad called Dora Farms. CFACC launched 
cruise missiles at that location to destroy the regime’s leadership, marking the first attack 
on Iraqi soil, and effectively alerting Iraq’s leaders that the invasion had begun. Although 
the reports were inaccurate—Saddam, in fact, had last visited that site in 1995—and the 
missile strike ineffective, the message was clear: coalition forces were coming for Saddam. 
The Iraqi regime responded with a series of 17 missile strikes on CFLCC encampments in 
Kuwait, all of which either missed their intended targets or were destroyed by coalition 
air defenses.11
During this missile barrage from the Iraqi military, U.S. Central Command (CENT-
COM) and CFLCC encountered a difficulty with the British contingent. The invasion plan 
called for the British to advance alongside the Marines and “pass through Al Basrah and 
continue up the eastern flank.” However, less than 24 hours before the ground attack, 
Abizaid and General Tommy Franks received a letter from the British Command indicat-
ing that officials in London were unsure whether combat operations in Iraq were legal 
and might not allow British troops to cross the border. The date of the invasion came 
close on the heels of a key vote in the United Kingdom that could have lost Prime Minis-
ter Tony Blair his government and, consequently, the British military’s authorization to 
support the invasion. While Franks’s initial thought was to continue the invasion without 
the British forces, Abizaid convinced him that CFLCC was already short one division and 
that removing the British forces put the mission at risk. Franks then approached SECDEF 
Donald Rumsfeld, and, within hours, the senior British commander informed CENT-
COM that the British forces would, indeed, participate in the invasion.12
The other trigger for the early onset of ground operations was the detection by 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) of Iraqi forces preparing to sabotage the oil infrastruc-
ture in southern Iraq. Because preserving Iraq’s oil infrastructure was one of his key 
tasks, General David McKiernan decided to initiate ground operations as quickly as pos-
sible. In the late hours of March 20, the 3d Infantry Division, 101st Airborne Division, and 
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I MEF moved into their attack positions in Kuwait. As soon as the sand berm between 
Iraq and Kuwait was sufficiently reduced, CFLCC ground forces, led by the 1st Battalion, 
7th Marines, crossed the border and moved immediately to the Rumaila oil fields.13 The 
time was approximately 4 a.m. on March 21, 2003.
The coalition’s early move into Iraq took senior Iraqi regime leaders by surprise. The 
leaflet drops had reinforced Saddam’s assumption that the coalition had planned for a 
lengthy air campaign, perhaps to be followed by a limited ground incursion. Because 
CFACC could not adjust its complicated targeting mechanisms in time to conduct their 
operations simultaneously with the ground forces, they began their bombing campaign 
at the scheduled G-hour of 2100 on March 21, 17 hours after the ground forces had begun 
their advance, targeting the regime’s top leaders, air defenses, and artillery and ballistic 
missile sites. As coalition units moved farther into Iraq, CFACC’s targeting transitioned 
to focus on close air support. Ultimately, the delayed air campaign assisted the ground 
forces in achieving tactical surprise: the Iraqis were convinced that the coalition would 
not commence ground operations until after a lengthy air campaign and were unprepared 
when coalition ground forces materialized in southern Iraq. Thus, as V Corps and I MEF 
approached the Iraqi 1st Infantry Division and 51st Mechanized Division, respectively, 
they encountered far fewer Iraqi troops than they anticipated, with the Iraqis mounting 
only a disorganized, sporadic defense. CFLCC later determined that some of the Iraqi 
forces had deserted after the leaflet drops, while others fled to the surprising sound of 
approaching tanks and mechanized vehicles instead of the coalition air campaign they 
expected.14
As soon as I MEF and V Corps forces crossed the berm, they began maneuvering 
toward their initial objectives. I MEF and the British 1st Armoured Division moved to 
the east of V Corps toward Al Faw, Umm Qasr, and the Rumaila oil fields. According to 
Iraqi Lieutenant General Raad al-Hamdani, the first attackers to come in direct contact 
with the Iraqi forces were British troops who, in conjunction with I MEF, seized the port 
of Umm Qasr and the bridges over the Shatt al Arab from the Iraqi 51st Mechanized 
Division, which had only arrived in the area about 72 hours earlier. The British 3d Royal 
Marine Commando Brigade, I MEF, and other special operations forces secured the oil 
fields and then headed for Nasiriyah, leaving the British armored forces to isolate, secure, 
and clear southern Iraq’s largest population center, Basrah, of Iraqi forces.15
CENTCOM and CFLCC had expected at least a portion of the British forces to con-
tinue with I MEF north toward Baghdad, but as the operation unfolded, the British troops 
remained in Basra, a change that Abizaid believed to be the result of a British national 
directive to British commanders. CFLCC adjusted and sent the Marines north without 
the British forces, while 3d Infantry Division, the V Corps main effort, advanced toward 
Tallil Airfield near Nasiriyah. At Tallil, where CFLCC intended to establish its main logis-
tics and aviation hub for the march to Baghdad, the 3d Infantry Division easily defeated 
remnants of the Iraqi 11th Infantry Division and members of the Basrah-based Iraqi Quds 
forces and continued toward Nasiriyah.16
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An Unexpected Enemy
In the days leading up to the invasion, the coalition’s reconnaissance had focused on 
Iraqi defensive positions, signs that Saddam might flood the southern canals or destroy 
the oil infrastructure, the locations of surface-to-surface missiles, and the disposition of 
the Republican Guard divisions. CFLCC paid little attention to Iraq’s irregular forces, 
and even less was known about what to expect from those forces other than that they 
were paramount to the defense of Baghdad and key regime locations. The other major 
movement that went largely undetected—due to the dearth of intelligence collection 
directed toward it—was the repositioning of the Fedayeen Saddam from Baghdad to 
Iraq’s southern cities.
Special operations detachments in position in the Karbala Gap began to realize some-
thing was amiss on March 22 when they did not observe armored columns of the Medina 
Division they had expected to be there, but instead saw trucks filled with Fedayeen in 
black uniforms. When their reports were received by CFSOCC and CFLCC headquarters, 
they were met with incredulity.17 No one in the coalition command understood what the 
irregular Iraqi forces were doing there, let alone their composition and capability.
At Nasiriyah, Samawah, and Zubayr, CFLCC units first unexpectedly encountered 
tenacious resistance from the Fedayeen instead of the Iraqi Army units they had antici-
pated fighting. In accordance with the invasion plan, the 3d Infantry Division deliberately 
stayed outside of Nasiriyah, blocked the city, secured the crossing site on Highway 1 over 
the Euphrates River, and prepared to pass the 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Task 
Force Tarawa), through its lines to occupy Nasiriyah and the secured bridge. The 3d 
Infantry Division could continue north to Samawah.18 Task Force Tarawa, commanded 
by Brigadier General Richard F. Natonski, arrived at Nasiriyah on March 22, and took 
control of the Highway 1 Bridge from the 3d Infantry Division, which continued west. In 
addition to assuming responsibility for that bridge, the task force was directed to secure 
two bridges in the eastern part of the city that would facilitate the continued rapid move-
ment of I MEF north to Kut along Highway 7. Natonski’s goal was to have both locations 
secure by 10 a.m. on March 23 and to avoid getting bogged down in urban combat. As 
his forces moved into the city, they took a barrage of artillery as well as small-arms fire 
from irregular forces moving around in trucks mounted with machine guns. The assaults 
became more frequent and powerful, and Nasiriyah transformed from a mission to secure 
bridges into what McKiernan described as “a damned tough urban fight.”19
The Marines and CFLCC soon determined that the enemy they faced must be the 
Fedayeen. The Fedayeen “death squads,” as reporters began to call them, did not appear 
to conduct large-scale coordinated operations. Instead, they attacked haphazardly in 
small groups, using well-rehearsed guerrilla tactics. They operated out of Ba’ath Party 
headquarters and military facilities, but they also used hospitals, schools, and mosques 
as bases and did not hesitate to use civilians as human shields. Some wore black uni-
forms, but many wore plain clothes and drove civilian vehicles so they could blend 
into the population ahead of the coalition advance. Their lack of uniforms often led to 
nighttime battles in extremely close quarters, with Fedayeen fighters crawling up beside 
coalition tanks and armored vehicles, requiring crewmembers to fight them off with pis-
tols and captured Iraqi AK-47s.20 The ferocity of the Fedayeen attacks also surprised the 
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coalition—Fedayeen attacked coalition vehicle and troop formations “in waves in an 
almost suicidal manner.”21
 V Corps’ first encounter with the Fedayeen occurred as the 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, 
3d Infantry Division, screened for the division en route to Samawah. Although special 
forces units reported that the Fedayeen were setting up ambush teams and checkpoints 
around Samawah, that information had not filtered down to V Corps’ tactical units. As 
the troops prepared to seize the bridges southwest of Samawah, they waved to some 
Iraqis, anticipating that the Iraqis would welcome them. Instead, they received small 
arms, rocket-propelled grenade (RPG), and mortar fire from Fedayeen in pickup trucks. 
The cavalry squadron remained under fire until they were relieved by 3d Brigade, 3d 
Infantry Division on the afternoon of March 23. In conjunction with CFACC close air 
support and special operations units in the area, the 3d Infantry Division systematically 
began destroying irregular forces in and around Samawah. Intelligence on the location of 
the Fedayeen units did not come from the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System 
(JSTARS), UAVs, and other similar systems that the division had rehearsed using in exer-
cises prior the invasion. Instead, 3d Infantry Division leaders found themselves using the 
division cavalry squadron and special operations units to locate enemy forces. This more 
traditional tactical reconnaissance capability became the 3d Infantry Division’s eyes and 
ears on the battlefield.22
In Zubayr, a Sunni-majority suburb west of Basrah, the British 1st Armoured Division 
also came under heavy fire from irregular forces. After probing the enemy it faced, the 
division placed checkpoints around the town. During the day, local Iraqis approached the 
British checkpoints, surrendered, and then identified the location of Republican Guard, 
Fedayeen, and Ba’ath Party headquarters and strongpoints inside Zubayr. The division 
then conducted nighttime raids into the town to destroy the Iraqi forces and weapons in 
those facilities and add to their emerging intelligence picture.23
The Iraqis, meanwhile, were astonished that the coalition appeared to be bypassing 
the southern cities entirely and leaving their supply lines along the Euphrates open to 
attack. They had assumed coalition units would at least partially secure each city along 
their intended avenues of approach, and early reports of heavy fighting near the out-
skirts of Zubayr, Nasiriyah, and Samawah had reinforced this Iraqi assumption. Once 
it became clear that the coalition units operating near these cities had no intention of 
remaining for any length of time, the high command in Baghdad ordered reinforcements 
against the Marines in Nasiriyah.24
By March 23, a little over 2 days into the ground fight, nearly all tactical reporting on 
enemy activity shifted from conventional troop formations and movements to reports 
of irregular forces, especially the Fedayeen.25 The intelligence analysts at CFLCC and V 
Corps assessed that the bulk of the regular Iraqi Army units in southern Iraq had either 
surrendered or deserted, but that Fedayeen and other “loyal security forces . . . seem to 
be offering the most resistance encountered thus far,” manning abandoned Iraqi Army 
weapon systems, establishing ambush points, and returning small-arms fire. The drastic 
change in the enemy situation confounded the coalition’s operational-level analysis and 
collection systems, which struggled to fit the incoming information into preexisting tem-
plates of a conventional enemy and tried vainly to maintain the sophisticated digital battle 
maps with company-sized and larger enemy formations.26 This pattern of bottom-driven 
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reporting from tactical units and an inaccurate and outdated enemy picture at the opera-
tional headquarters persisted for the remainder of the invasion (see Map 9).
Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.
Map 9. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, March 20-28, 2003.
Special Operations Forces Move Inward
With major combat operations underway in the south, special operations units 
expanded their operations in western and northern Iraq. On the evening of March 22, ele-
ments of 5th Special Forces Group linked up at the improved airfield at Wadi al Khirr and 
met with their established Iraqi contacts in the vicinity of Nasiriyah, Samawah, Hillah, 
Karbala, and Najaf to obtain a better picture of enemy and friendly activity within those 
cities. This mission was imperiled when two of these Iraqi contacts were captured by Iraqi 
troops, who broadcast the capture on television. Special operations units subsequently 
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decided to forgo using resistance organizations in those cities and instead spent the next 
several days gathering as much information as possible about the location of the Ba’ath 
and Fedayeen headquarters, artillery positions, and military compounds in preparation 
for 3d Infantry Division’s arrival in the area. Other Operational Detachment Alphas 
(ODAs) pushed forward to obtain information about the activity of enemy forces in the 
Karbala Gap, the Republican Guard Medina Division in particular.27
In the west, CJSOTF-W and other coalition troops searched for Scud missiles and 
suspected weapons of mass destruction (WMD) sites. At the same time as the invasion 
began in southern Iraq, special operations detachments moving along Highway 1 toward 
Rutbah encountered a line of traffic in which Iraqi military forces were dispersed among 
the civilian vehicles. The detachment called in close air support and was able to defeat 
the military forces, but had effectively announced their presence in the west. A simi-
lar announcement came when British special operations forces under the command of 
Major General Graeme Lamb in CJSOTF-W inadvertently clashed with Iraqi special mis-
sion units on their way to link up with Iraqi tribes in western Iraq. Traveling in lightly 
armored tactical vehicles, Lamb’s special operators were forced to withdraw, and some 
of his troops inadvertently ended up across the Syrian border.28
Meanwhile, in the north, CJSOTF-N moved into Iraq in a hastily prepared, high-risk 
air insertion operation the special operations troops nicknamed “Ugly Baby” because, 
they joked, “only a mother could love it.” After Turkey refused to allow U.S. forces to 
cross into Iraq from its country, Combined Forces Special Operations Component Com-
mand (CFSOCC) and CFACC developed aggressive flight paths along the western spine 
of Iraq’s border with Jordan and Syria. As the aircraft flew over Sinjar Mountain, some 
were struck by Iraqi air defenses, but the need to get on the ground and show the Kurdish 
peshmerga the extent of U.S. resolve was great enough that the insertion mission pushed 
forward. By the first week in April, more than 50 special operations detachments were 
inserted into northern Iraq and made contact with forces from the Kurdistan Democratic 
Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).29 In addition to notifying Kurd-
ish leaders that the Americans were coming, CJSOTF-N units were tasked to reinforce 
the 65,000-strong peshmerga against the Iraqi Army and Republican Guard corps posi-
tioned along the Green Line and to destroy the Ansar al-Islam enclaves in Sulaymaniyah 
Province. Their third and more subtle task was to ensure that the Kurds did not take the 
opportunity to annex Kirkuk, which the United States intended to remain under coali-
tion and, eventually, Iraqi Government control. The U.S. special operations leaders on 
the ground with the Kurds convinced reluctant Turkish officials to reopen Turkish air-
space for use in the invasion, after which CJSOTF-N coordinated with CFACC to destroy 
established Iraqi Army and Republican Guard defenses. After falling back from their pre-
pared positions due to an untenable amount of coalition firepower, the Iraqi Army corps 
and Republican Guard units retreated. CJSOTF-N then used Kurdish reporting and other 
sources to locate and destroy additional Iraqi military equipment and formations while 
they prepared to continue south.30
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SETBACKS AND A CHANGE IN PLANS FOR CFLCC
Despite crumbling Iraqi divisions and the rapid advance of the coalition divisions in 
the south, not all went well in the first days of CFLCC’s invasion. The A–10 aircraft called 
in to attack moving enemy targets north of Nasiriyah on March 23 mistakenly attacked a 
company of Marines instead, killing as many as 10 Marines and wounding several others. 
Combined with those killed or wounded by enemy fire that day, Marine losses in the city 
totaled 18 killed and at least 19 wounded, the highest losses of any single engagement 
during the invasion.31
Fratricide was not the only bad news from Nasiriyah. The first strong signal that 
CFLCC lines of communications were threatened occurred just outside the city when 
Marines from Task Force Tarawa encountered a U.S. Army convoy driving south toward 
them on Highway 7 on March 23. This was a surprise meeting, given that there were no 
plans or rehearsals suggesting that any Army units were ahead of the Marines along the 
eastern approach. An Army captain then informed the Marines that there were wounded 
American Soldiers in Nasiriyah. This was the ill-fated 507th Maintenance Company, a 
unit that had accidentally driven into Nasiriyah instead of around it. Ambushed by the 
Fedayeen in the city, the 507th lost 11 killed and 9 wounded, with 7 of the 9 captured by 
Iraqi forces, including Private First Class Jessica Lynch.32
As the Marines fought in Nasiriyah, V Corps prepared for one of the most signifi-
cant planned operations of the invasion: a deep aviation attack against the Republican 
Guard’s Medina Division, the main conventional force defending Baghdad. On March 
22, the 101st Airborne Division moved along the 3d Infantry Division’s western flank to 
establish refueling points for itself and the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment in prepara-
tion for two deep strikes through the Karbala Gap. There was an urgency to the operation: 
CFLCC expected a major sandstorm to arrive sometime on March 24, which would either 
delay or cancel the planned deep attacks altogether if they were not executed beforehand. 
In order to use the western avenue of approach and avoid urban areas, the 11th Attack 
Helicopter Regiment would require a flight path that crossed the boundary between the 
3d Infantry Division and the 101st Airborne Division, a request the 101st denied. The final 
chosen flight path moved instead from southwest of Nasiriyah west toward Samawah 
and then turned north, risking taking the helicopters past urban areas.33
The attack went awry from the outset. The preparatory suppression of enemy air 
defense fires took place on time, but the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment’s departure 
was delayed 2 hours as its aircraft refueled, desynchronizing the attack from its prepa-
ratory fires. While the suppressive fires were able to destroy some enemy air defense 
systems, they also unintentionally provided early warning of the helicopter attack. Iraqi 
spotters, who were now primed to look for approaching aircraft, notified awaiting forces 
via cell phone of the impending attack, exactly as General Lewis Wallace had once pre-
dicted during his 1990s experiences at the National Training Center. Intercepted signals 
of Iraqi early warning, although received by higher coalition headquarters, did not reach 
the regiment before their departure. Finally, the bright moonlight that evening perfectly 
silhouetted the aircraft against the clouds and made them prime targets for the Iraqis. 
As the regiment’s aircraft approached the built-up areas along their flight path, lights 
in the cities of Haswah and Iskandariyah were switched off, signaling to Iraqi forces on 
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rooftops to launch barrages of antiaircraft and small arms fire that inflicted significant 
damage on the American helicopters. The 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment was forced 
to abort the mission long before reaching the Medina Division, and the damaged aircraft 
returned to their staging point. Of the 30 AH–64 Apaches that had left that evening, one 
was shot down, and all 29 that returned were damaged by enemy fire.34
The capture of the 507th Maintenance Company personnel and the fierce fighting in 
Zubayr, Nasiriyah, and Samawah convinced McKiernan and Wallace that CFLCC and V 
Corps could no longer bypass urban areas en route to Baghdad. In order to protect the 
force’s vulnerable lines of communications, CFLCC would have to allocate forces to clear 
the towns and villages along and near Highways 1 and 8. In addition, I MEF determined 
that parts of Task Force Tarawa would need to remain in Nasiriyah and continue clearing 
operations until all of the bridges crossing the Euphrates and the Saddam Canal were 
secure. The failed helicopter attack against the Medina Division also illustrated the peril 
of not clearing urban areas along the lines of communications and discouraged the fur-
ther use of attack aviation in that manner. “From that point on, I was not at all confident 
we could execute a successful deep operation [with helicopters], and we didn’t need to,” 
Wallace later recalled. “Over-the-shoulder direct ground fires was the best tactic given 
the uncertainty of the enemy situation, and General McKiernan agreed.”35
THE SANDSTORM AND OPERATIONAL PAUSE
As the expected sandstorm blew in on March 24, bringing with it violent rain and 
limited visibility that halted coalition units’ advance, McKiernan and Wallace made sig-
nificant adjustments to how they planned to use their forces before maneuvering through 
the Karbala Gap. The two commanders welcomed the operational pause as an opportu-
nity to posture their forces properly before the final attacks on Baghdad.36 Contrary to 
media reports, a temporary cessation of maneuver operations was already planned in 
Cobra II to allow sufficient time and space for logistics units to arrive, to refuel, and to 
refit the maneuver units for operations to first isolate Baghdad and then conduct armored 
raids into the city. The pause was also necessary for forces to prepare properly for Sadd-
am’s expected chemical weapons attack once coalition forces neared Baghdad. Neither 
McKiernan nor Wallace was willing to cross the Iraqi regime’s supposed trigger line for 
chemical weapons attacks without the logistics and the security along the lines of com-
munications necessary to complete operations to Baghdad.37
Franks did not share McKiernan and Wallace’s view that a pause was necessary and 
urged the two commanders to keep going. At CENTCOM’s level, the sophisticated battle 
tracking technology that showed the locations of friendly and enemy units seemed to 
show no real resistance that merited slowing the V Corps advance. In Franks’s mind, 
the Fedayeen and other irregulars were merely a harassing force that should not dis-
tract from the main effort to destroy the Republican Guard. Nevertheless, McKiernan 
persuaded Franks that adjustments were in order as he remained fixed on clearing the 
cities that threatened CFLCC’s lines of communications.38 If the Fedayeen could cause 
that much damage to one transportation convoy, they could wreak similar havoc on 
other logistics and support convoys moving north to assist the other CFLCC maneuver 
forces. In addition, even though the V Corps forces had halted temporarily on the west 
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side of the Euphrates to refit and refuel, other CENTCOM units continued to pressure 
the enemy. At CENTCOM, Franks and Central Air Force (CENTAF, now AFCENT or 
Air Force Central) Commander Lieutenant General Ted Michael Moseley used the cover 
provided by the storm to fly additional sorties to destroy enemy military positions and 
regime strongholds, including the Nida, Baghdad, and Hammurabi Republican Guard 
divisions around Baghdad.39
Wallace used the temporary halt in major operations to evaluate how he would secure 
his lines of communications. Looking at a map of friendly forces, he observed that V 
Corps was operating west of the Euphrates, and I MEF was largely operating to the east 
of the Euphrates toward the Tigris River, leaving a huge salient between the Euphrates 
and Highways 1 and 8 running from Samawah north to Najaf and Karbala. In addition 
to the threat posed by Iraq’s paramilitary forces operating in the urban areas, Wallace 
was also concerned that if the Iraqis chose to put artillery into that salient they could 
fire laterally into the V Corps and I MEF formations. Wallace, therefore, tasked the 101st 
Airborne Division and the remaining elements of the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment to 
isolate and clear Najaf and Karbala, and he requested that the 82d Airborne Division be 
allocated to him to secure Samawah.40
The sandstorm also provided McKiernan the opportunity to make his final decision 
about which units he would use to seize Saddam International Airport (SIAP) and which 
he would allocate to secure CFLCC’s lines of communications. In January 2003, CFLCC 
and V Corps discussed a branch plan tasking special operations forces or a brigade from 
the 82d Airborne Division to seize the airport in the event of early regime collapse, but 
that scenario had not occurred. Both the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions also had been 
ordered to be prepared to seize SIAP, but the failed deep attacks and intelligence about 
the substantial Iraqi air defense preparations on the airfield gave McKiernan pause about 
air insertions. Because the 3d Infantry Division had advanced far more quickly to Bagh-
dad than the plan envisioned, its units were best positioned to reach the airport, where a 
brigade-sized unit of the Special Republican Guard was preparing to defend the airfield. 
Accordingly, on March 26, McKiernan decided to use a brigade of the 3d Infantry Divi-
sion to seize the airfield and the brigade of the 82d Airborne Division in Kuwait—CFL-
CC’s operational reserve—along with a portion of the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment to 
clear the urban areas along CFLCC’s lines of communication in the south. CFLCC would 
not reconstitute an operational reserve until the 4th Infantry Division arrived in theater 
in April.41
Franks had reservations about McKiernan’s changes. Franks preferred that the 101st 
Airborne Division take SIAP, a dramatic move that would immediately put forces in 
Baghdad. Based on his experiences in Afghanistan, where special operations forces and 
air power had defeated the irregular Taliban forces, he believed the operators and other 
units with A–10 close air support could dispose of the Iraqi paramilitary forces in the 
southern cities. What Franks failed to account for, McKiernan pointed out, was that the 
special operations forces in Afghanistan had worked with organized resistance groups 
who were familiar with the terrain and could provide pinpoint targets and assessments, 
but there were no such linkages between coalition special operations and Iraqi resistance 
groups. McKiernan’s argument carried the debate.42
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Meanwhile, the Iraqi military was temporarily emboldened by its early, perceived 
successes against U.S. and British forces near Samawah, Nasiriyah, and Umm Qasr, par-
ticularly after news reports spread about the American prisoners of war from the 507th 
Maintenance Company. These supposed successes led Iraqi military leaders to believe 
that the coalition forces would enter Iraqi cities—including Baghdad—only reluctantly, 
and reaffirmed their misplaced faith in the abilities of the Iraqi military. However, this 
Iraqi optimism was short-lived. Although the Fedayeen were fierce fighters, their recent 
arrival into the southern cities meant that they were unfamiliar with the terrain, and they 
also were at a distinct disadvantage in terms of firepower and skill.43 As a result, their 
casualties tended to be severe.
As the “mother of all sandstorms,” as media reports dubbed it, descended on Iraq, 
Saddam, his son Qusay, and other senior military leaders were in the process of guess-
ing wrong about the coalition’s advance, having convinced themselves they were being 
attacked from three directions. The presence of coalition special operations forces in 
Anbar led the Iraqi leadership to conclude that a conventional military force was moving 
on Baghdad from Jordan, while the Marine operations near Kut encouraged the belief 
that the coalition’s main effort was maneuvering east of the Euphrates River. While it was 
clear coalition units were also moving north along the west bank of the Euphrates, the 
Iraqi senior defense leadership considered that approach only a tertiary effort, and, con-
sequently, Qusay denied Republican Guard requests to destroy a main Euphrates bridge 
leading into the Karbala Gap, a move that might have slowed the advance on Baghdad 
considerably.44
While V Corps moved toward the Karbala Gap, the Republican Guard divisions pre-
pared to defend as far forward of Baghdad as possible. The Medina Division remained in 
place near Karbala and Suwayrah and became the primary conventional force defending 
the east side of the Karbala Gap. The Baghdad Division of the Republican Guard was near 
Numaniyah and Kut, guarding the Tigris approach to Baghdad, while the Nebuchadnez-
zar Division near Hillah covered the central approach to Baghdad. One regiment of Iraqi 
special operations forces remained in Baghdad, while another moved south to patrol the 
area around Diwaniya, and the Iraqi 26th Division prepared to raid the coalition troops 
securing lines of communications between Najaf and Hillah.45
Securing the Lines of Communications
As the sandstorm subsided on March 27, Task Force Tarawa was reinforced by two 
Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) and began to clear and secure Nasiriyah, destroy-
ing Iraqi military and paramilitary bases in the city. By April 2, the Marines and special 
operations forces had rescued the surviving 507th Maintenance Company Soldiers cap-
tured on March 23, and Natonski declared the city secure. I MEF then split, with a small 
element moving toward Amarah and the main body continuing northwest toward Bagh-
dad. The 101st Airborne Division, meanwhile, conducted deep aviation attacks against 
the Republican Guard Medina Division in an operation incorporating lessons learned 
from the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment’s failure. The 3d Infantry Division continued 
north toward Najaf and prepared to isolate that shrine city before seizing the bridge over 
the Euphrates at the town of Kifl between Najaf and Hillah.46
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On March 28, V Corps was ready to launch a five-pronged attack to clear the way for 
the eventual entry into Baghdad. The 1st and 2d Brigades of the 101st Airborne Division 
went to Najaf to secure the highways leading north from the city, and then began clear-
ing the city itself along with the 2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, and special operations 
teams in the area, while one brigade of the 101st conducted a feint toward Hillah. The 
brigade of the 82d Airborne Division moved into Samawah with the 2d Armored Cav-
alry Regiment, relieving the 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, and then began clearing 
the city as McKiernan had directed. Between March 28 and 30, the 3d Infantry Division 
handed over the fights in Najaf and Samawah to the 101st and 82d, respectively, and then 
moved north to prepare for operations to isolate Baghdad. On March 31 and April 1, the 
3d Infantry Division seized the bridge between Hillah and Karbala with the 3d Squadron, 
7th Cavalry, while 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division cleared the all-important Karbala 
Gap.47
Two incidents of note occurred as the 3d Infantry Division moved through the Kar-
bala Gap. As the division’s troops neared Karbala, they captured Iraqi soldiers claim-
ing to be from the Republican Guard Nebuchadnezzar Division, which CFLCC had not 
detected as it moved south and still believed to be fighting in northern Iraq. Although 
these soldiers initially were thought to be deserters, interrogations revealed they had 
been ordered south to defend the capital; but, instead of moving with their tanks and 
mechanized vehicles, they had donned civilian clothes and moved in trucks and techni-
cal vehicles. As a result, V Corps deduced that the Republican Guard presence around 
Baghdad might be more robust than the coalition anticipated. Another incident was still 
more disturbing. On March 29, when 3d Infantry Division Soldiers stopped a taxi for 
inspection at a checkpoint the vehicle exploded—the coalition’s first encounter with a 
suicide car bomb. Though it was the only incident of its type at the time, it had a jarring 
psychological impact on U.S. units and proved to be the first of many such encounters in 
the months and years to come.48
The Battle for Hadithah Dam
The sandstorm did not halt the special operations activities in Anbar Province. During 
March 26–27, elements of the 75th Ranger Regiment seized the Qadisiyah Research 
Center, an airfield near Nukhayb in southwest Iraq, and the H–1 airfield. Having secured 
these essential points of entry, the Rangers’ focus shifted to critical western infrastructure 
targets, which included the main bridge over the Euphrates at Ramadi and the Hadithah 
Dam. Although in poor condition, the dam provided one-third of Iraq’s electrical power 
and regulated the flow of the Euphrates.49 If it was destroyed by Saddam’s forces, subse-
quent flooding could devastate the lower Euphrates River Valley, potentially hampering 
V Corps’ movement through the Karbala Gap.
On April 1, a company of the 3d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, conducted a pre-
dawn raid to seize the dam, meeting stiff resistance from local Iraqi guards. Soon after 
seizing the dam, the Rangers realized a much larger Iraqi force was stationed in the area. 
Over the following week, Iraqi troops mounted counterattacks against the small Ranger 
force, which beat back the attackers with the help of close air support. The Rangers also 
faced an unexpected emerging threat: in an incident on April 4, three Rangers were killed 
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by a suicide car bomb driven by female attackers who had made videotapes prior to the 
suicide mission and aired them on the Al Jazeera television network, with the message 
that they intended to wage jihad to expel the Americans from Iraq.50
As they turned back successive Iraqi attacks, the Rangers actually found themselves 
engaged in another battle to prevent the dam from collapsing. Poor maintenance had 
caused its turbines and overflow machinery to deteriorate to such a degree that the dam 
was close to catastrophic failure at the time the Rangers seized it, even as many of the 
dam workers fled to avoid the fighting. Recognizing the danger, the Rangers and civil 
affairs personnel persuaded the captured dam superintendent that the U.S. troops did 
not intend to destroy the dam and convinced him and many of the remaining dam work-
ers to return to work.51 By the time Baghdad fell on April 9, Hadithah Dam was secure, 
albeit still in need of repair.
Kirkuk and Operation VIKING HAMMER
While the Rangers seized the Hadithah Dam, Cleveland’s CJSOTF-N was linking up 
with the Kurds and receiving Mayville’s 173d Airborne Brigade under its tactical control. 
Executing a combat jump into a secured airfield in northern Iraq on March 26, the 173d 
provided Cleveland with additional combat power that could take and hold ground as 
special operations and peshmerga forces advanced on Kirkuk.52
Elsewhere, to the northeast, the 3d Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group, began Oper-
ation VIKING HAMMER to remove Ansar al-Islam from its base in Iraqi Kurdistan. With 
PUK peshmerga helping the 3d Battalion move to its targets, the special operators esti-
mated the Ansar al-Islam sites at Halabjah and Sharqat contained approximately 700 
fighters and a suspected biological warfare development site. Special operations forces 
and PUK peshmerga commenced the main attack on March 28, a week after 64 tomahawk 
missiles had first hit the Ansar al-Islam building and facilities. The fighting continued 
until March 30, by which time all the Ansar al-Islam fighters had either been killed or fled 
across the border to Iran. It would be far from the last time the coalition would hear from 
this terrorist group.53
THE REGIME FALLS
Securing Baghdad and Basrah
While the 101st and 82d Airborne Divisions cleared the V Corps lines of communi-
cations, I MEF finished clearing Nasiriyah and moved along the east side of the CFLCC 
area of operations toward Diwaniya. A growing problem was that Highway 8, which ran 
through Diwaniya, was in the V Corps area of operations and not occupied by any Army 
units, thereby creating an area 80 kilometers wide that was a virtual Fedayeen sanctu-
ary. Alerted to Fedayeen who were massing in Diwaniya, V Corps called in an air strike 
that destroyed a stadium in the city where the Fedayeen were gathering, after which 
CFLCC ordered Marine units to secure and clear the city. On March 31, CFLCC ordered 
I MEF to attack east along Highway 6 toward Amarah to provide a second clear line into 
Kut. From April 2 to 3, the 1st Marine Division crossed the Tigris River at Numaniyah, 
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destroyed what remained of the Baghdad Republican Guard Division, and moved north 
to destroy the Nida Division (see Map 10).54
Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.
Map 10. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, March 29-May 1, 2003.
Back on the Euphrates, V Corps used the 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry and the 101st Air-
borne Division to reconnoiter enemy forces along the corps’ western flank and the south-
west side of Karbala Lake. From April 1 to 2, units of the 3d Infantry Division crossed 
through the Karbala Gap, the last checkpoint at which they were vulnerable before 
approaching Baghdad. The 3d Infantry Division then began destroying the remnants of 
the Medina Division and seized the al Qa’id Bridge. With assistance from special opera-
tions teams, the 101st Airborne Division moved into Hillah and began to clear and secure 
that city.55
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Iraqi commanders discerned the coalition’s main effort too late. On April 1, as V 
Corps forces were moving on Karbala, Hamdani recognized that he had little with which 
to stop the V Corps’ push through the Karbala Gap and the Marine advance at Kut. As 
the Marines successfully moved through Kut, the Iraqi Army IV Corps collapsed, and 
the central-Euphrates-based units were in a similar state of disarray. In an emergency 
meeting of the senior Iraqi military leaders on April 2, Hamdani asked for permission to 
move the Republican Guard Nida and Medina Divisions to defend avenues of approach 
to Baghdad along the east and west banks of the Euphrates. Qusay and defense minister 
General Sultan Hashem, however, conveyed Saddam’s continued belief in the need to 
defend against the supposed American main effort from Jordan and, based on informa-
tion he received from Russian sources, the Iraqi dictator did not believe the Americans 
would attack Baghdad until the arrival of the 4th Infantry Division. Therefore, Qusay 
instead ordered the Nida Division to reinforce the Republican Guard I Corps’ defenses 
against an American attack from Jordan that would not be coming.56
By April 3, CFLCC was ready to begin the attack on Baghdad. The 3d Infantry Divi-
sion had safely pushed through the Karbala Gap and was prepared to advance toward 
the Baghdad airport, while I MEF had crossed the Saddam Canal and was prepared to 
advance toward Baghdad from the southeast. Using remnants of the Medina Division, 
Hamdani attempted a counterattack on the morning of April 3 to destroy the al Qa’id 
Bridge, but coalition air power quickly decimated the attacking Iraqi units. With no forces 
left at his disposal, Hamdani gave up, quitting his post and returning to a relative’s house 
in Baghdad to await the inevitable.57
Seizing Saddam International Airport
On the western outskirts of Baghdad, Saddam had designated a brigade of the Special 
Republican Guard and a contingent of special operations forces to defend the airport. 
The Special Republican Guard was the final vanguard defending Baghdad. It was also 
Saddam’s most substantial armored force, armed with the country’s most powerful (and 
best maintained) T–72 tanks and artillery systems. As coalition forces advanced toward 
the airport, Saddam ordered some of the paramilitary fighters assigned to the defense of 
Baghdad to reinforce the units at SIAP, but most of these forces were destroyed by coali-
tion aircraft before they reached the gate leading to the airfield.58
The 3d Infantry Division began its attack on SIAP with preparatory artillery fires late 
on the evening of April 3. By 11 p.m., 3d Infantry Division units had breached the air-
port wall, and in the early hours of April 4, the division’s 1st Brigade began securing the 
airport itself, taking considerable time to clear the obstacles the Iraqis had emplaced on 
the airfield to make it unusable for coalition aircraft. In conjunction with members of a 
special operations task force, the division began clearing the remaining Special Republi-
can Guard and paramilitary forces on the airfield, a process that required 2 days because 
of the complex tunnel and bunker systems the defenders had prepared. The securing 
of the airport involved some intense fighting. In one instance, troops from Company B, 
11th Engineer Battalion had come under attack by a force of up to 100 enemy soldiers 
as they constructed a holding area for Iraqi prisoners. Under intense fire, Sergeant First 
Class Paul R. Smith, an engineer platoon sergeant, organized a hasty defense. When an 
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armored personnel carrier was hit, Smith evacuated three wounded Soldiers while under 
intense fire. He then returned to use the vehicle’s 50-caliber machine gun and killed up to 
50 of the attackers before being mortally wounded. For his actions, Smith was awarded 
the Medal of Honor posthumously, becoming the first recipient of that award since 
1993.59 With SIAP under the 3d Infantry Division’s control, the 2d Brigade moved toward 
Baghdad from the west and southwest, and, by April 5, was in a position from which its 
commander, Colonel David G. Perkins, intended to conduct armored raids into the city.60
 
 
Source: U.S. Army photo by Specialist Daniel T. Dark (Released).
Colonel David Perkins, Commander, 2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division.61
Basrah
While the 3d Infantry Division and I MEF prepared to attack into Baghdad, the British 
1st Armoured Division completed its efforts to secure Basrah far to the south. The Brit-
ish commanders approached the operations to secure Basrah much as they had secured 
Zubayr. As with Zubayr, they were reluctant to enter Basrah until conditions were right 
to capture the city. Using a combination of information acquired from tribal and munici-
pal leaders from the city and targeting information provided by special operations forces, 
the British forces prepared to enter the city using a combination of lethal and nonlethal 
means. On April 4, they conducted an air strike on the suspected location of Ali Hassan 
al-Majid’s (dubbed “Chemical Ali” for his use of chemical weapons in attacks against 
the Kurds) headquarters, which, while unsuccessful, had a dramatic effect on the popu-
lation of Basrah. Believing Chemical Ali to be dead, the population appeared to become 
more willing to cooperate. By the time the British 1st Armoured Division began con-
ducting reconnaissance missions into the city on the morning of April 6, British units 
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had encountered no resistance. The division commander, Major General Robin Brims, 
decided to go into the city in force and attacked into Basrah from three directions as coa-
lition aircraft carried out precision air strikes on the remaining Ba’ath command targets. 
By the morning of April 7, Basrah was under British control.62
 
SECDEF Rumsfeld (left). Source: DoD photo by Helene C. Stikkel (Released).
SECDEF Rumsfeld With British Major General Robin Brims, 
General Officer Commanding, 1st Armoured Division (United Kingdom).63
The “Thunder Runs”
Wallace’s intent for Baghdad was to “avoid owning the city but yet still [be] able to 
control it from the outside.” He intended to establish bases outside the city and conduct 
armored raids against enemy targets inside Baghdad for approximately 30 days, after 
which he expected the remaining Iraqi leadership would capitulate.64 The V Corps plan-
ners believed they could target Baghdad’s key nodes in a manner that would limit col-
lateral damage but expeditiously facilitate the final collapse of the regime. Their targets 
included Ba’ath Party headquarters, symbolic regime structures, and Saddam’s numer-
ous palaces and offices, all sites that CFACC repeatedly had bombarded for 2 weeks.
Wallace originally wanted the 3d Infantry Division to probe into the city with brigade 
strength to evaluate the Iraqi response and prepare for follow-on operations. Thus, he 
expected that, when the division’s 2d Brigade received the order to prepare for the first 
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of these armored raids into Baghdad on April 5, they would return rather than remain 
somewhere in the city by themselves. Major General Buford C. “Buff” Blount, the divi-
sion commander, had a somewhat different view. Having encountered little coherent 
Iraqi defense on the approach to Baghdad, Blount preferred to keep his brigades moving 
and attack through Baghdad rather than merely probe it. Blount and Perkins thus set 
out to conduct what amounted to a movement to contact into the city, an attack the unit 
dubbed a “Thunder Run.” For his part, Perkins defined his task as “to enter Baghdad for 
the purpose of displaying combat power, to destroy enemy forces . . . and to simply show 
them that we can.”65 As had been the case with other Iraqi cities, the attacking coalition 
units had no detailed breakdown of the enemy forces they could expect to face in Bagh-
dad. Prewar intelligence estimates anticipated the city was defended by company-sized 
units of Special Republican Guard as well as paramilitary forces. These forces, the coali-
tion believed, would anchor their defense at Saddam’s palace complex in central Bagh-
dad, which was surrounded by outer sectors of defense reminiscent of the first Battle of 
Grozny.66
What the 2d Brigade encoun-
tered instead as it moved into the 
city on April 5 was a hodgepodge 
of uncoordinated attacks by dif-
ferent groups of Iraqi defenders, 
some in uniform, some in civilian 
clothes, and some in jihadi-type 
“black pajamas,” as coalition 
troops dubbed them. The 3d 
Infantry Division suspected 
the Fedayeen were running the 
fight along with other miscella-
neous paramilitary forces and 
uniformed Special Republican 
Guard soldiers. On the morning 
of April 5, from its position at the 
intersection of Highway 1 and 
Highway 8 just north of Mah-
mudiyah, the 2d Brigade moved 
north on Highway 8 through the 
southwest Baghdad district of 
Rashid, encountering heavy fire 
from the uncoordinated regime 
paramilitaries as it went. Repel-
ling one lightly armed group of 
attackers after another, Perkins’s 
men penetrated into west Bagh-
dad and turned west on the airport road later known to the coalition as Route Irish. 
Moving through a series of ambushes, the brigade arrived at the airport and linked up 
with the other 3d Infantry Division units there.68
SECDEF Rumsfeld (left), Lieutenant General Wallace (center) 
Lieutenant General McKiernan(right). Source: DoD photo by 
Staff Sergeant Cherie A. Thurlby (Released).
SECDEF Rumsfeld With Lieutenant General  
Wallace, CG, V Corps, and Lieutenant General 
McKiernan, CG, 3d Army/CFLCC.67
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The regime’s response to the 2d Brigade’s attack was to claim that it had not happened. 
Despite the fact that media outlets had reported video of the Thunder Run, Baghdad’s 
information minister, Mohammed Saeed al-Sahhaf, derisively called “Baghdad Bob” 
by the coalition, insisted on television that there were no U.S. forces in Baghdad, and 
claimed that the 3d Infantry Division attack on the airport had been repelled. Wallace and 
McKiernan were concerned that this disin-
formation campaign would only harden the 
forces that were defending in Baghdad and 
could potentially cause V Corps and I MEF 
to lose the initiative in the city.69
Linking up with other 3d Infantry Divi-
sion units at SIAP, Perkins reported that in 
his judgment the remaining enemy forces 
in the city would fight hard, but could “no 
longer mount effective resistance,” a conclu-
sion that validated Blount’s instincts to press 
the attack. Elsewhere, Mattis, whose Marines 
were closing in on Baghdad from the east, 
also believed that pulling back from the city 
would constitute a “forfeiture of the initia-
tive to the Iraqis” and would allow Saddam 
to “thicken” the defense of Baghdad.70
In order to fully isolate Baghdad and pro-
tect 2d Brigade’s forays, Blount ordered his 
3d Brigade, commanded by Colonel Daniel 
B. Allyn, to attack across the western flank 
of the city and seize key bridges to its north. 
After fighting through elements of the Ham-
murabi Republican Guard Division, as well 
as Fedayeen forces, Allyn had taken the bridges and sealed off Baghdad by the evening 
of April 6. Iraqi forces, desperate to break through, attacked 3d Brigade for the next 60 
hours straight, sending tanks, Russian infantry fighting vehicles (BMPs), infantry, bridg-
ing vehicles, and even a crane in massed wave assaults. The attacks resulted in some of 
the most intense fighting of the invasion, with nearly overrun units calling in their final 
protective fires and artillery units firing in direct fire mode—actions that had not occurred 
since the Vietnam war. Despite the onslaught, Allyn’s brigade held, buying time for the 
remainder of the division to continue its assault into Baghdad.72
With 3d Brigade blocking Iraqi reinforcements from the north and preventing units 
trapped in Baghdad from escaping, Perkins and Blount made plans for another Thunder 
Run to occupy the regime’s central node in downtown Baghdad and stay there overnight. 
Wallace was concerned about the plan to remain in the city, as he did not believe the divi-
sion or his corps was ready for the move into Baghdad, but he authorized Blount to send 
forces on the same route through Baghdad and occupy ground for several hours before 
withdrawing. However, Perkins never received these instructions, so when his brigade 
attacked into the city again on April 7 they advanced back into the central Baghdad 
Source: U.S. Marine Corps photo by  
Master Sergeant Buzz Farrell (Released).
Major General James N. Mattis, CG,  
1st Marine Division.71
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government center (later, the Green Zone), including Saddam’s iconic “crossed swords” 
military parade ground, and stayed there. Wallace was surprised when Blount confirmed 
reports that 2d Brigade alone had occupied the center of Baghdad, but decided not to 
pull Perkins and his troops out. Though the brigade ran low on fuel and its brigade 
command post was hit by a surface-to-surface missile causing heavy casualties, Perkins 
was adamant about remaining in position. The 1st Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, mean-
while, sustained heavy fire from what it believed were foreign fighters as it attacked to 
secure overpasses south of the city and support the 2d Brigade. The supporting attack 
along with continued coalition air strikes enabled Perkins and his troops to remain on the 
ground they had seized at the very heart of the regime’s territory.73
The Fall of the Regime
As the 3d Infantry Division brigades penetrated through west Baghdad, Mattis and 
his 1st Marine Division crossed the Tigris River on April 6–7, and attacked into the east 
side of the city, encountering intense fighting but linking up with 3d Infantry Division 
units on April 8. The little Iraqi resistance that continued was disorganized and sporadic. 
On April 10, Allyn’s 3d Brigade launched an attack south into Baghdad, linking up with 
Perkins’s 2d Brigade. As those two brigades joined forces with Mattis’s Marines, virtually 
all resistance in Baghdad collapsed, and the Ba’athist regime lost control of its capital. 
Iraqis began celebrating in the streets, and, in one memorable celebration, encouraged 
U.S. forces to topple an iconic statue of Saddam in Firdos Square on the east side of the 
city. Amid the chaotic situation and with two American divisions in Baghdad, Saddam 
made one final public appearance in the Sunni neighborhood of Adhamiya on April 9, 
walking through a crowd of supporters in front of Arabic television cameras. As U.S. 
Marines and tanks approached the neighborhood, Saddam quit the capital, becoming a 
fugitive whom U.S. forces did not see again until December 13, 2003.74
In retrospect, Hamdani judged that, had it not been for what he termed the “extreme 
caution” of the American forces as they approached Baghdad from Abu Ghraib, Baghdad 
might have fallen as early as April 5. By the time U.S. units reached Baghdad, most of 
the Republican Guard units responsible for the outer defenses of the city had collapsed, 
and all of the corps and division headquarters were destroyed. Many of the remaining 
paramilitary forces tasked to defend the city, including the Fedayeen and some “special 
security and protection forces,” were sent to their deaths at the battle for SIAP instead. 
Thus, little organized military resistance remained in the city apart from Saddam’s per-
sonal guard. Even he knew the end was near; from an obscure residence in Mansour he 
ordered his remaining militia and irregular forces to make a last-ditch attempt to stall 
the coalition, which they did by attacking the 3d Infantry Division’s armored raids on 
April 7 and 8. Chemical Ali, meanwhile, made a failed attempt to organize officers to 
carry out suicide bombings against the American mechanized vehicles. As the statue of 
Saddam fell, the remaining Iraqi security forces donned civilian clothes and faded into 
anonymity.75
The near-simultaneous collapse of Basrah and Baghdad—two of Iraq’s three largest 
cities—along with Saddam’s abrupt departure was greeted at CENTCOM and CFLCC 
as the effective destruction of the regime. However, these events in Baghdad and the 
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south eclipsed the fact that Mosul and the upper Tigris Valley remained under enemy 
control. Several days elapsed before a small contingent of special operations forces from 
CJSOTF-N and peshmerga arrived in Mosul to announce the fall of the regime. For the 
moment at least, the future hub of the Sunni insurgency was, in the coalition’s thinking, 
an afterthought.
***
A VALIDATION OF THE RMA?
Despite facing unexpectedly tenacious irregular Iraqi defense in southern Iraq, U.S. 
and coalition forces succeeded in forcing regime change in just under 3 weeks, far ahead 
of the 70–120 days the invasion plan envisioned. Forced to adapt quickly to several unex-
pected factors, coalition units had used rapid maneuver and overwhelming firepower to 
destroy the sizable Iraqi security and intelligence forces in less than a month. The inva-
sion showcased some successful innovations in joint and combined arms operations but 
also highlighted flaws in intelligence, aviation deep attacks, and the risks associated with 
unsecured urban centers along maneuver lines of communications.
The invasion also marked one of the largest—if not the largest—special forces oper-
ations in history, involving almost all of Air Force Special Operations Command, two 
Special Forces Groups and part of a third group, a Naval Special Warfare Group, and 
international special operations elements from the United Kingdom and Poland. For the 
bulk of the invasion, combat operations remained largely compartmentalized between 
special operations and conventional forces, with each having mostly separate missions, 
terrain, and key tasks.76
On the surface, the special operations forces component of the invasion appeared to 
validate preexisting expectations of those forces’ capabilities. With a comparatively small 
number of troops, special operations forces completed all of their tasks—except locat-
ing the nonexistent Scud launch points—in western and northern Iraq and supported 
conventional force efforts to identify and destroy Iraqi irregular forces. However, spe-
cial operations forces faced significant challenges in Hadithah and Kirkuk in seizing and 
holding terrain by themselves. Eventually, those cities would have to be occupied by 
larger conventional military units.
Assuming risk in the urban areas was a problem that neither exercises nor simulations 
identified ahead of time. CFLCC, V Corps, and I MEF, however, were able to rapidly 
reallocate their forces, adjust their plans, and employ the reserve force to manage that 
difficulty during the operational pause provided by the “mother of all sandstorms.” At 
the same time, the deep attack that had served as a standard prewar winning move in 
simulations against peer military forces simply did not work in Iraq. The dismal failure 
of the first scheduled deep aviation attack against the Medina Division of the Republican 
Guard made the CFLCC and V Corps commanders reluctant to use attack aviation in 
future shaping operations. When aviation assets were used to support light or mecha-
nized infantry in combined arms operations to secure the lines of communications and 
key objectives for the remainder of the invasion, those operations were very successful.77
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In the aftermath of the invasion, advocates of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) 
pronounced the rapid coalition attack to Baghdad validated the RMA’s contentions that 
speed and technological superiority would supplant mass and firepower in contempo-
rary military operations and render large ground forces less relevant. Among the RMA 
advocates, Rumsfeld himself hailed the invasion plan as “an unprecedented combination 
of speed, precision, surprise, and flexibility.”78 Speaking before the Senate Armed Ser-
vices Committee 3 months after the fall of the Iraqi regime, Rumsfeld told the senators 
that the principal military lessons of the invasion included “the importance of speed, and 
the ability to get inside the enemy’s decision cycle and strike before he is able to mount a 
coherent defense,” as well as the importance of jointness, intelligence, and precision, with 
the latter defined as “the ability to deliver devastating damage to enemy positions, while 
sparing civilian lives and the civilian infrastructure.”79 He also posited that the invasion 
had shown that:
In the 21st century ‘overmatching power’ is more important than ‘overwhelming force.’ In the 
past, under the doctrine of overwhelming force, force tended to be measured in terms of mass—
the number of troops that were committed to a particular conflict. In the 21st century, mass may 
no longer be the best measure of power in a conflict. After all, when Baghdad fell, there were just 
over 100,000 American forces on the ground. General Franks overwhelmed the enemy not with the 
typical three to one advantage in mass, but by overmatching the enemy with advanced capabilities, 
and using those capabilities in innovative and unexpected ways.80
It was certainly true that the invading coalition forces had displayed an impressive 
flexibility in their operations, as Rumsfeld and other RMA advocates noted. But more 
importantly, the invasion highlighted some of the shortcomings of U.S. military intel-
ligence and the associated precision of coalition operations. The prewar intelligence 
estimates failed to anticipate the role of Saddam’s irregular forces sufficiently, and the 
coalition intelligence apparatus had difficulty absorbing the enormous volume of infor-
mation at its disposal and analyzing new information outside their premade templates of 
Iraqi regime forces. In reality, the enemy did not behave much like the coalition planners, 
psychological operations specialists, and intelligence analysts expected. Although air 
strikes and the rapid coalition advance demoralized segments of the Iraqi military, wide-
spread capitulations did not occur; nor did coalition forces see the “massed tank battles” 
they expected from the Republican Guard. Saddam did not use chemical weapons as coa-
lition forces advanced on Baghdad, and the bulk of the resistance in southern Iraq came 
from Iraq’s irregular forces—the Fedayeen in particular—rather than the Iraqi Army and 
Republican Guard. From the first engagement with the Fedayeen, Ba’ath Party militias, 
and other paramilitary forces, intelligence personnel across CFLCC had difficulty com-
prehending the true enemy picture. This placed the responsibility for understanding and 
targeting the enemy almost entirely on the shoulders of the maneuver units and special 
operations forces in contact.81
Assets that were supposed to provide real-time tactical targeting information—for 
example, Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), UAVs, and nation-
al-level platforms—were often focused on large Iraqi mechanized formations, forcing 
the coalition divisions to rely on the more traditional cavalry squadrons, long-range sur-
veillance units, and special operations forces for reconnaissance and surveillance against 
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paramilitary forces. In short, it was an exact reversal of the late 1990s trend, which Rums-
feld and RMA advocates had encouraged, toward technological platforms and away 
from combined arms reconnaissance units that could fight for information. When put to 
the test, the technological platforms were found wanting.
The lessons Rumsfeld and RMA advocates took from the invasion also tended to 
ignore the simple fact that the Iraqi regime was a  weak enemy whose leaders struggled 
to mount a coherent defense, and that this factor might have played a larger role in the 
apparent ease of the coalition invasion than the coalition’s own advanced technological 
capabilities. For example, a lengthy 2007 report by Stephen Biddle of the U.S. Army War 
College found that the Iraqi military had performed exceptionally poorly in March–April 
2003 and that the coalition advance was not so speedy that the Iraqis could not have 
taken advantage of some significant opportunities had they been a fully competent force. 
The Iraqis had, among other things, failed to flood the Karbala Gap or destroy bridges to 
slow down the coalition, use the Republican Guard in an urban warfare environment to 
inflict coalition casualties, conduct a scorched-earth campaign, or even competently per-
form simple gunnery and hit close coalition targets. If the coalition’s easy victory rested 
on Iraqi military incompetence, Biddle concluded, then the supposed lessons of the new 
importance of speed and precision might not apply to a future conflict against a more 
competent enemy as Rumsfeld had implied.82
Within the Iraqi regime and military, years of preparing to wage war against Iran 
or an internal insurgency left Iraqi forces ill-prepared for a coalition onslaught. Sadd-
am’s overconfidence in the abilities of his forces, fed by years of demanding only posi-
tive information about them, caused him and his inner circle to make military decisions 
far removed from what their operational commanders observed or requested. Although 
some Iraqi conventional and unconventional forces mounted energetic defenses of Iraq’s 
southern cities and key terrain, they never gained the initiative. Select Iraqi units were 
able to mount some tactical counterattacks near Nasiriyah, Samawah, Kut, Najaf, Hillah, 
and the Karbala Gap, but at no point did the Iraqi forces have sufficient command and 
control or combat power to conduct an operational-level counterattack. In reality, the 
Iraqi regime and its military never stood a chance.
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CHAPTER 5 
“WE’RE HERE. NOW WHAT?”
As 3d Infantry Division troops seized downtown Baghdad on April 2, 2003, Lieutenant 
General William Wallace called Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) 
operations chief Major General James D. Thurman for instructions. “Okay, Bubba, we’re 
here,” Wallace said. “Now what?”1
Wallace’s question foreshadowed what became the private views of many coalition 
commanders in the weeks following the toppling of Saddam Hussein. Like Wallace, 
many were unprepared for the new situation that emerged as the Iraqi state collapsed, 
which necessitated a combination of combat operations, intense policing operations, 
reconstruction, and the establishment of new local governments. As they had done in the 
exercises leading up to the invasion, U.S. ground forces expected to be able to seize their 
objectives, conduct after action reviews of the operation, and prepare for redeployment, 
leaving the post-conflict phase as some other agency’s responsibility.2 These expecta-
tions were reinforced by overly optimistic strategic assessments that the Iraqi popula-
tion would welcome the coalition and resume normal activities quickly. The Army and 
Marine forces that had spent their organizational energy focusing on their immediate 
objectives of destroying the Iraqi military and forcing regime change were not prepared 
for the complicated Phase IV they were about to face.
The speed with which coalition forces arrived in Baghdad also caught the few plan-
ners at CFLCC and the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) who were finalizing Phase 
IV plans by surprise, meaning that much of that planning was completed while the transi-
tion to Phase IV was already in progress. Consequently, CFLCC conducted a very rough 
“rolling transition” from major combat operations to stability operations, with some 
units beginning their humanitarian assistance missions while still engaged in combat 
operations. As CFLCC scrambled to reposition its limited forces across the contested ter-
ritory, units also encountered new enemies that intelligence estimates mischaracterized 
and underestimated.
Phase IV operations were complicated by a number of other factors. Widespread 
public disorder and looting surprised coalition commanders, and the coalition’s efforts 
to restore order undermined the legitimacy of the entire coalition enterprise in Iraq. Nei-
ther CFLCC nor V Corps had accounted for looting during planning for the invasion, and 
neither they nor CENTCOM were prepared to declare martial law in Iraq in the interim.3 
In addition, the collapse of the regime did not mark the end of major combat operations. 
Iraq’s borders with Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia were wide open, and Saddam, his 
sons, and most of the Ba’ath Party senior military and internal security leaders remained 
at large, as were suspected weapons of mass destruction (WMD) materials. CFLCC units 
continued to encounter pockets of resistance in Baghdad and Anbar, while Mosul, Kirkuk, 
and the upper Tigris River Valley remained unsecured by coalition forces although many 
government buildings and posts were seized by peshmerga and Badr Corps militias. As 
Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan later recalled:
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We’re in Baghdad . . . we know the Ba’ath party has ruptured, no one can find Saddam, but in a city 
of 6 million people, we don’t know if we’re in control yet. There is not a lot of combat going on, it is 
a fluid situation. We are still trying to exploit WMD [weapons of mass destruction] sites and there 
is fighting in other areas of Iraq, so it is a very complex, convoluted situation.4
IRAQI STATE COLLAPSE
The Dissolution of Public Order
Once it became clear that Saddam was no longer in power, Iraqi citizens began wild 
celebrations in the streets of Baghdad and other liberated areas. Coalition troops were 
unprepared for the utter dissolution of public order that followed. Within days of the 
regime collapse, Baghdad and other areas of Iraq descended into chaos. Looting and 
arson began in Baghdad almost immediately, and disorder spread throughout southern 
Iraq and in Kirkuk as well. Opportunists took advantage and ravaged Ba’ath Party and 
Iraqi Government facilities, critical infrastructure sites, public houses, and the homes of 
wealthy Ba’athists who had fled. Regime loyalists and security and intelligence person-
nel who remained destroyed a substantial amount of government security documents 
and ministry information, all of which was intricately maintained only in hard copy 
form. The Iraqi police structure was severely damaged, and many police stations were 
destroyed. Looting at hospitals resulted in the disappearance of much-needed pharma-
ceuticals. The National Museum of Baghdad was looted as well, and ancient Iraqi arti-
facts quickly began appearing in black markets outside of Iraq.5
By April 11, CFLCC recognized that the presence of coalition troops deterred looting, 
and McKiernan ordered units to increase patrols around important governance locations, 
hospitals, and other facilities. CFLCC tasked its civil affairs units with helping to recover 
local museum items and, with some outside assistance, made progress towards that goal 
by the end of April. The gradual reduction in looting and violence was at least partially 
due to coalition units’ efforts to find local police willing to conduct joint patrols in vari-
ous areas of Baghdad, and CFLCC began providing new uniforms to the Iraqi police to 
distinguish them from the old regime.6 By April 16, coalition and Iraqi police joint patrols 
were on the streets of Baghdad. CFLCC judged that the looting was dramatically reduced 
and that Iraqis, in Baghdad at least, were beginning to resume normal activities. Isolated 
pockets of looting in other cities and ammunition depots continued across Iraq through 
the end of April 2003.7
In some areas, the looting of April 2003 was accompanied by rioting that the small 
number of Iraqi police who remained at their posts were unable to quell. Demonstra-
tions in Baghdad, Anbar, and some cities of southern Iraq increased steadily toward the 
end of April. During some of those demonstrations, CFLCC units determined that anti- 
coalition agitators in the crowds were attempting to provoke coalition troops into a vio-
lent response to pin blame for the instability on the coalition. Another hurdle to halting 
the demonstrations arose as Iraqis began competing with each other for political power 
and positions in hastily organized governance structures. Just 10 days after Baghdad’s 
fall, CFLCC observed that Iraqi religious leaders from various sects were “establishing 
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themselves as local leaders or pushing support for their designated candidates in the 
cities,” creating local rivalries. In response to rising civil unrest, many CFLCC units began 
implementing curfews, especially ahead of major events that included the Shi’a Arba’een 
holiday and Saddam’s birthday.8
Changing Rules of Engagement
The coalition’s difficulty in arresting the looters was symptomatic of a larger prob-
lem—unclear and varied application of the rules of engagement, the guidelines under 
which coalition troops were instructed to use force. The rules of engagement had already 
changed significantly from the beginning of the invasion through its completion. Both 
the 1003V and Cobra II war plans initially called for very restrictive rules of engage-
ment against nonuniformed personnel, and those who were captured in uniform were 
expressly categorized as prisoners of war. “There was also a lingering concern if we 
should put U.S. soldiers in a position to stand between the Iraqi people and symbols of 
the regime from whom they had been liberated,” recalled Wallace.9 Because the coalition 
did not want the Iraqis to perceive them as oppressors, coalition commanders directed 
their troops to apply the minimum amount of force needed for each situation. During 
the invasion, however, commanders at all levels had gradually eased restrictions on the 
use of force, as the number of paramilitary attacks by the Fedayeen Saddam and others 
increased.10
As looting and disorder spread throughout Iraq, commanders were unclear about 
how to apply the rules of engagement that had governed the invasion. Coalition units 
had shifted from taking prisoners of war to taking looters and criminals into their cus-
tody, designating them as “detainees” rather than prisoners of war. Commanders and 
civilian leaders differed on how to deal with looters and violent dissidents they could not 
capture. Some believed it was best to allow the Iraqis to blow off some steam after years 
of oppressive rule. On the opposite end of the spectrum, others proffered that shooting 
looters and instituting martial law might be suitable deterrents to disorder, albeit unpop-
ular ones. After a discussion concerning a theoretical order to shoot looters in the act was 
leaked to the press, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald H. Rumsfeld expressed his 
concern that the rules of engagement established by the headquarters in Baghdad “were 
being diluted as they were passed down the chain of command.” Lieutenant General John 
P. Abizaid, empowered as the CENTCOM deputy to make decisions about Iraq, quickly 
agreed, and decided to “reenergize the chain of command to ensure [they had] robust 
rules of engagement in place and that every Soldier and Marine [understood] them.”11
In response to the emerging circumstances on the ground, CENTCOM made an 
addendum to the rules of engagement in OPORD 1003V on April 25. These additional 
rules of engagement contained provisions for commanders to implement curfews and 
the use of force during civil-military operations, which included authorization to use 
deadly force to prevent the theft or destruction of property belonging to U.S. troops or 
private Iraqi citizens. U.S. forces also were permitted to use deadly force to prevent the 
escape of detainees or enemy prisoners of war, to exercise law enforcement powers, and 
to guard WMD and other hazardous materials that were deemed “inherently danger-
ous to others.” In addition, the addendum permitted commanders to authorize searches 
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and detention of civilians, vehicles, and property and to use nonlethal riot-control agents 
on unruly crowds and demonstrations. Brigade commanders had the authority to retain 
detainees in their custody for up to 10 days, after which they were required to present 
probable cause for holding them longer in a “hearing held by a competent authority.”12
Despite Abizaid’s efforts and those of his subordinate commanders, the rules of 
engagement and directives concerning coalition unit behavior in the summer of 2003 
remained loosely understood and applied across the theater. For example, the order to 
conduct presence patrols to stop looting was not uniformly applied. The light infantry 
101st Airborne Division conducted many foot patrols, while the mechanized 3d Infan-
try Division remained more tied to its mechanized platforms and tended not to engage 
in dismounted patrols.13 Moreover, there were often no specific instructions for how 
patrolling units should respond to looting. For the remainder of the conflict, some units 
maintained the more restrictive rules of engagement, believing that shooting or detaining 
large numbers of civilians undermined stability and security. Others adopted more per-
missive rules of engagement, asserting that harsher penalties for misbehavior and vio-
lence deterred further violent behavior and guerrilla-like attacks. Finally, the new rules of 
engagement really applied only to American units and personnel, not coalition partners, 
and some conflicts in the theater rules of engagement were not immediately resolved. 
Consistent understanding and application of the rules of engagement remained problem-
atic for the rest of the war.
Combat Operations Continue
Although the Ba’ath Party was clearly no longer in charge of Iraq after April 9, combat 
operations to eliminate pockets of Iraqi military and paramilitary resistance continued, 
with Baghdad and some other population centers not yet fully under coalition control. 
“This fight is nowhere near over,” McKiernan told his subordinate commanders on April 
10, “but we have momentum and we’ve got initiative on our side. So everywhere we get 
in contact . . . with the remaining regime resistance, we’re going to get a stranglehold 
on it.”14 From April 9 to 11, V Corps and I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) com-
pleted the outer cordon of Baghdad and continued to quash enemy resistance in the city. 
They secured key lines of communications and highways leading into Baghdad, secured 
Saddam International Airport, and destroyed the remnants of the Iraqi Republican Guard 
units that remained around Iraq’s central zone.15
CFLCC units also turned their attention toward seizing physical symbols of the 
regime, including Ba’ath Party headquarters, Fedayeen outposts, and Saddam’s special 
security and intelligence headquarters. They also secured ministry buildings, major infra-
structure, and other government facilities in Baghdad. The V Corps and I MEF contin-
ued to clear Baghdad through April 15. Apart from encountering “several disorganized 
counterattacks by irregular forces,” the V Corps and I MEF units in Baghdad did not face 
significant enemy resistance; they easily destroyed the technical vehicles full of fighters 
and small outposts with close air support.16
South of Baghdad, CFLCC troops secured population centers along the main lines 
of communication. The 101st Airborne Division secured Karbala and Najaf and cleared 
Hillah. The 82d Airborne Division cleared Samawah, and Task Force Tarawa secured 
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Diwaniya, Numaniyah, and the highways leading into Kut before advancing east toward 
Maysan. En route to Amarah, the Marines destroyed abandoned equipment from the 
10th and 14th Iraqi Army Divisions but encountered no resistance. In Basrah Province, 
the British 1st Armoured Division secured the remainder of the Rumaila oil fields and 
Qurnah and patrolled Basrah and Zubayr.17
While Task Force Tarawa isolated Kut, other I MEF units maneuvered north of Bagh-
dad. The I MEF troops crossed the Diyala River northeast of Baghdad on April 9 and 
prepared to secure areas near Saddam’s home in Salahadin Province. Between April 13 
and 15, I MEF attacked Baqubah and Tikrit and secured Bayji, Samarra, and the highways 
leading from those cities into Baghdad. They then prepared to secure the remainder of 
Salahadin Province ahead of the arrival of the 4th Infantry Division, which had made 
its way by sea to Kuwait after its northern invasion route was shut off by the Turkish 
Government.18
Elsewhere in northern Iraq, Colonel Charles Cleveland’s Combined Joint Operations 
Task Force-North (CJSOTF-N) fought remnants of the Iraqi Army and Republican Guard 
divisions. By April 13, the task force judged that the Iraqi I and II Corps were reduced to 
about 30 to 40 percent of their original strength, with the remainder of the forces having 
deserted. The fighters of Ansar al-Islam who survived the coalition air strikes had crossed 
over into Iran, and CJSOTF-N verified that the organization no longer had a presence on 
Iraqi soil. In Ninawa Province, CJSOTF-N and its peshmerga partners had put the Iraqi V 
Corps to flight and entered Mosul, northern Iraq’s largest population center and the loca-
tion at which the Iraqi V Corps commander surrendered to the task force on April 11.19
Meanwhile, CJSOTF-West (CJSOTF-W) began establishing checkpoints on Iraq’s con-
siderable borders with Jordan and Syria. Portions of a separate special operations task 
force, the Rangers, and the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, started to transi-
tion from operations against Iraqi military and paramilitary forces to hunting high-value 
regime targets.20
A Country Full of Weapons
In the turbulent weeks after Baghdad’s fall, coalition units discovered an astonishing 
amount of munitions across the country. In the months prior to the invasion, Saddam’s 
forces placed large numbers of weapons and stockpiles of ammunition in dispersed caches 
to improve access for Iraqi forces that Saddam assumed would be immobilized by coali-
tion air power. Many of those caches remained intact after the Iraqi regime was defeated, 
along with the vast stores the Iraqi military had dispersed during the 12 years of no-fly 
zones. In addition, many usable tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces, 
abandoned during combat operations, remained vulnerable to looters and militia groups. 
CFLCC and Coalition Forces Special Operations Component Command (CFSOCC) lead-
ers worried that munitions and equipment looted from these caches would find their 
way into the black market and either be used against coalition forces or be used by Iraq’s 
factions against one another if the caches were not secured.21
For coalition ground forces, the scale of that mission was overwhelming. Many of the 
caches were spread across large areas virtually impossible for units to physically secure, 
and the sheer volume of munitions was equally daunting. When 4th Infantry Division 
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troops arrived at Taji military depot on April 18, for example, they found that they had 
to secure and empty hundreds of bunkers. The weapons ammunition depot outside of 
Rutbah was larger in size and composition and required significant numbers of troops to 
secure it. Less than 3 weeks into Phase IV, CFLCC assessed that major problems remained 
with leftover Iraqi arms and munitions.22
In northern Iraq, CJSOTF-N was concerned about the equipment the regime’s troops 
had abandoned, some of which was left fully loaded with ammunition, and proposed 
establishing several locations to store the armored vehicles and artillery pieces scattered 
throughout the north. However, CFLCC had no troops to allocate to that mission, and the 
peshmerga seized the tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, small arms, and 
ammunition and moved them north of the Green Line into Kurdish-controlled territory.23
From Humanitarian Assistance to Reconstruction and Governance
In his commander’s intent for Cobra II, McKiernan envisioned a “blurred” or “roll-
ing” transition between Phase III and Phase IV in which humanitarian assistance would 
begin in cleared areas even before the conclusion of major combat operations.24 In fact, 
McKiernan and Wallace both expected their post-regime focus to be almost exclusively on 
humanitarian missions, much as it had been after the Gulf war. This assumption proved 
incorrect. By the end of April 2003, CFLCC’s units had shifted from clearing and securing 
territory to restoring essential services, repairing infrastructure, and establishing meager 
local and national governance capabilities.25
The British forces began their humanitarian aid distribution in Umm Qasr on March 
31 and later spread to Basrah and Zubayr. CFLCC units in Nasiriyah, Najaf, Samawah, 
and Baghdad followed suit in mid-April, and the Marines established a civil-military 
operations center at the Palestine Hotel in Baghdad. Civil affairs units opened the port of 
Umm Qasr as a theater humanitarian distribution center and prepared to reinitiate the 
Oil for Food redistribution program as planned. These humanitarian assistance opera-
tions were, however, much smaller than what most CENTCOM leaders envisaged for 
the post-hostilities period because the widespread humanitarian crises that CENTCOM 
and policymakers expected did not occur. Instead, CFLCC discovered that Iraqis’ most 
pressing concerns were not food and water, but the restoration of basic services and func-
tions of the state, meaning CFLCC units abruptly shifted from humanitarian assistance 
to finding Iraqi engineers, technocrats, and bureaucrats to help them maintain the elec-
trical, water, sanitation, medical, and oil systems and infrastructure—another mission 
for which CFLCC was unprepared.26 In addition to these new infrastructure operations, 
CFLCC began to assume some governance-related responsibilities for which they had 
not planned. These included recalling local police to duty, enforcing the rule of law, and 
assisting with the establishment of the new Iraqi provincial and national governments. 
On April 10, CENTCOM directed CFLCC to “provide all support necessary to establish 
a central coordination mechanism within each governate [province] of Iraq,” likely in 
response to pressure from both U.S. policymakers and Iraqis to prepare the country for 
Iraqi rule.27 CFLCC units operating in relatively stable areas like Hillah and Basrah began 
to establish interim city councils.28
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Meanwhile, the CFLCC planners who had continued during the invasion to develop 
Eclipse II—the Phase IV sequel to Cobra II—found themselves in the middle of planning 
operations that were already ongoing. CFLCC did not issue the commander’s intent for 
Phase IV until April 15, shortly after rushing through a more final version of Eclipse II 
that differed somewhat from the initial version prepared in early March. Far fewer forces 
were available to secure the country than CFLCC planners anticipated: the 4th Infantry 
Division had just arrived, the 1st Armored Division was preparing to enter the coun-
try, and, apart from scattered and disorganized Iraqi police, there were no recalled Iraqi 
security forces available to assist the coalition in maintaining law and order. The threat, 
too, was different: instead of anticipating that the greatest sources of instability would be 
reprisal attacks, the new Eclipse II judged the major threat would be “the Sunni minority, 
primarily represented by remnants of the regime-sponsored paramilitary forces” and 
ethno-religious flashpoints in Mosul, Kirkuk, Saddam City (later renamed Sadr City), Kar-
bala, Najaf, and Basrah. Notably, Anbar Province’s cities were omitted from the CFLCC 
estimate. The new version of Eclipse II also identified the Office of Reconstruction and 
Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), rather than the Coalition Joint Task Force–Iraq (CJTF-
I), as the lead agency for civilian governance.29
Unfortunately, the Eclipse II plan came too late to prevent significant disparities in 
each division’s interpretations of how to implement Phase IV directives in their areas 
of operations, areas that varied enormously in their characteristics. Moreover, V Corps 
and I MEF were unprepared to incorporate the lone agency assigned to run post-regime 
Iraq—ORHA—into their efforts to restore stability.
Just prior to the invasion, CFLCC first began incorporating ORHA into its Phase IV 
planning and operations in Kuwait. Like CFLCC, ORHA quickly acknowledged that 
reconstruction issues were far more pressing than humanitarian requirements. What 
CFLCC and ORHA discovered once inside Iraq was that Saddam had not invested in the 
physical infrastructure of the country for years, particularly in the Shi’a south and Sadr 
City. The water, sewage, electricity, transportation, and communications infrastructure 
in those areas was decades old and crumbling—in much more dire circumstances than 
anyone in CENTCOM or CFLCC had guessed. An early prospective hurdle emerged 
when large numbers of Iraqi utility workers failed to arrive to perform their jobs due to 
pay disputes in early April. Over the next 2 weeks, coalition units worked with ORHA to 
come up with expedient methods of payment, using Iraqi civil leaders as designated pay 
representatives.30
Governance was a much more complicated mission for ORHA. Just days after the fall 
of the regime, retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner was surprised to receive instruc-
tions from Washington to have ORHA build governing capacity within the Iraqi Interim 
Authority in Baghdad. Like CENTCOM’s leaders, Garner had been planning to build 
governance structures starting at the municipal level, and then build toward national 
elections. The decision to run the process from the top down—originating from Under 
Secretary of Defense Douglas J. Feith’s office—meant that Garner needed to adjust how 
he developed relationships with the Iraqis.31 Throughout April, Garner strove to meet 
important Iraqi leaders, apprise them of the ORHA mission, and gain their support for 
an interim Iraqi Government. He met with Kurdish leaders in the third week of April and 
began liaising with national-level leaders shortly thereafter, subsequently establishing 
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offices in Mosul and Baghdad. CFLCC assisted ORHA with organizing the first meet-
ings of the Iraqi Interim Authority in Baghdad on April 26 and 28, and a CFLCC-bro-
kered security town hall meeting in Baghdad on April 29. On April 27, Garner conducted 
his first radio broadcast, in which he “urged the Iraqi people to return to normalcy and 
[assured] them that ORHA would assist in their recovery,” and pledged to “expedite the 
establishment of the new Iraqi Government.” ORHA personnel and resources continued 
to flow into the country for the remainder of April, and Garner planned to have his head-
quarters in Baghdad fully operational by May 3, 2003, not knowing that his organization 
would be gone in less than 30 days.32
As the demand for reconstruction and local policing increased, mission requirements 
for engineers, civil affairs personnel, and military police expanded considerably. How-
ever, the comparatively small numbers of engineer, civil affairs, and military police 
battalions were task organized to support the divisions rather than the broader theater 
during the invasion, and there was no plan to reallocate those forces to support either 
ORHA or CFLCC in Phase IV. This lack of support left the theater command and the 
reconstruction authority with no assets with which to begin the reconstruction. By mid-
April, McKiernan’s command began to consolidate and redistribute the support units for 
the reconstruction mission, though most of them ultimately remained in Baghdad.33
New Actors on the Battlefield
The transition to Phase IV also introduced a host of new actors to CFLCC battle space. 
Coalition partners who had declined to participate in combat operations began sending 
military forces and humanitarian assistance units to support stability operations. Jordan 
established a field hospital west of Baghdad, and Italy agreed to set up its own field 
hospital in Baghdad proper. CFLCC met with a delegation from Japan to discuss using 
Japanese defense forces in northern Iraq. Albania and El Salvador sent forces to assist the 
101st Airborne Division in Mosul, and CFLCC began assembling a multinational force to 
assume I MEF’s battle space as I MEF redeployed to the United States.34
The number of private contractors also increased substantially once stability opera-
tions commenced. Most of CFLCC’s subordinates used systems that required contrac-
tor maintenance, most notably the 4th Infantry Division, whose deployment was briefly 
imperiled by the sheer number of private contractors who refused to support the unit in 
direct combat. The arrival of civilian-run agencies on the battlefield along with increased 
logistical requirements after the fall of the regime generated an increasing demand for 
contractor support. ORHA was particularly reliant on private companies for its recon-
struction operations, including Raytheon and Kellogg, Brown & Root.35 Other contrac-
tors provided a range of services, including personal and facilities security, training and 
advising capabilities, communications management, and life-support operations.
Problems in Northern Iraq
As the Iraqi Army in northern Iraq melted away after April 11, Cleveland and his 
special forces troops quickly found that they faced challenges far beyond the means of a 
CJSOTF to handle. The first challenge was averting another Kurdish civil war between 
the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), 
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while also preventing Kurdish reprisals against Arabs in Kirkuk and Mosul. CJSOTF-N 
attempted to work with Colonel William C. Mayville’s 173d Airborne Brigade to develop 
an updated picture of the locations of peshmerga units so as to prevent Kurdish “land 
grabs” in the Mosul and Kirkuk areas that exacerbated the already tenuous security sit-
uation in those mixed-ethnicity cities. The situation in Kirkuk was the more pressing of 
the two. CSJOTF-N was concerned that the remaining Iraqi Army and Republican Guard 
units might move south of Kirkuk and back to Tikrit. In addition, the last of the Iraqi 
military resistance in the north had collapsed and there was nothing “holding the Kurds 
back” from taking the city. Both the KDP and PUK claimed Kirkuk and its oil fields, and 
shortly after the fall of Baghdad, the groups began accusing each other of rogue efforts to 
seize them. CJSOTF-N also observed a surprising number of internally displaced persons 
returning to Kirkuk, where coalition leaders were concerned they would target Arab 
civilians occupying formerly Kurdish homes. Many Kurds were indeed eager to exact 
reprisals in Kirkuk, from which tens of thousands of Kurds had been expelled by Sadd-
am’s regime after the 1991 rebellion.36
Cleveland tasked Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth E. Tovo with trying to maintain secu-
rity in Kirkuk, and Tovo, in turn, worked to restrain his peshmerga counterparts from 
going into Kirkuk ahead of the coalition troops, a job that proved futile. On April 10, 
before either Tovo’s men or Mayville’s 173d Airborne Brigade reached Kirkuk, the Iraqi 
Army abandoned the city and looting began. On the same day, peshmerga units arrived 
in Kirkuk and occupied the city in defiance of their prior agreement with U.S. forces. 
While select peshmerga units made a concerted effort to stop the looting, others actively 
participated in looting and began reprisals against the city’s Sunni Arab and Turkoman 
population. Jalal Talabani, the PUK leader, declared an interim government in Kirkuk 
under PUK leadership, though because of the rapport the U.S. military and Kurds had 
built during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in the 1990s, Kurdish leaders were some-
what receptive to entreaties to move the peshmerga out of the city.37 Tovo’s units were 
also able to reach Kirkuk in time to end some of the reprisals against Arabs. To reassure 
Kirkuk’s civilian population that the city remained under coalition control, Tovo ordered 
his special operations troops to exchange their Kurdish garb and long hair for military 
uniforms and haircuts; these troops began handing out small American flags, claiming 
that they were from American paratroopers. These actions created the visual effect of 
thousands of American airborne troops in Kirkuk when, in fact, there was only Tovo’s 
small special operations contingent. The ruse worked long enough to allow the larger 
173d Airborne Brigade to move into Kirkuk and make the act a reality.38
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Waltemeyer, another of Cleveland’s subordinates, used 
similar methods to restrain the KDP peshmerga from seizing Mosul, even going so far 
as to put his vehicle—marked with a large American flag—at the head of the peshmerga 
convoys racing toward the city, thereby putting a nominal coalition face on operations 
there. He was joined by reinforcements from the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) 
on April 14. In the interest of preventing ethnic conflict and maintaining order, CJSOTF-N 
worked with Kurdish leaders to withdraw the peshmerga from Mosul and Kirkuk, which 
was difficult considering that the peshmerga had assisted the coalition in clearing both 
cities in the first place.39 The situation in Mosul did not stay calm for long. The 26th MEU 
unwittingly stirred up unrest by failing to stop a returning former Saddamist, Mishan 
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al-Jabouri, from declaring himself the mayor of Mosul. Jabouri’s power grab angered 
local Moslawis, who responded with a large protest on April 20 in which they rioted, 
burned Jabouri’s car, and threw stones at him. Things got out of hand when the 26th 
MEU intervened to break up the demonstration. Shots fired from the crowd appeared 
to be aimed at the Marines, who fired back and killed between 10 and 15 civilians in the 
process, causing the crowd to erupt even further. With the situation in Mosul slipping 
into chaos, CENTCOM ordered CFLCC to move troops north to control the city as soon 
as feasible.40
Yet another northern problem came in the disposition of the Mujahedin e Khalq (MeK), 
an armed Iranian opposition group that had for 2 decades been sponsored by Saddam. 
With Saddam’s support, the MeK’s militia had frequently conducted cross-border opera-
tions into Iran from its base in Diyala and had helped the Ba’athist regime crush the 1991 
Kurdish rebellion.41 The MeK had not resisted coalition forces during the invasion, but 
the group remained armed and was also on the State Department’s list of foreign terrorist 
organizations. However, no policy was in place for how coalition forces should approach 
this organization if it did not fight, so the problem fell to CJSOTF-N to sort out by default. 
With plenty of other security challenges to deal with, Cleveland recommended that the 
coalition give the MeK amnesty in exchange for assisting in identifying Badr Corps infil-
tration points along the Iranian border, a recommendation a skeptical CENTCOM chose 
not to take. In the meantime, MeK leaders requested a formal cease-fire with the United 
States, which Cleveland signed in the absence of any other instructions. The Department 
of Defense (DoD) agreed afterward to treat the MeK as a recognized force and accept its 
armed capitulation until its final disposition could be decided.42
The Iranian-backed militias like the Badr Corps infiltrating into northern Iraq were 
another problem. CJSOTF-N began tracking Badr Corps infiltration across the Iranian 
border in mid-April and became concerned that the Badr Corps intended to draw the 
MeK in Diyala into a fight, derailing the cease-fire negotiations. After CJSOTF-N con-
fronted the Badr Corps and threatened to target them with lethal force if they did not 
leave the area within 24 hours, the group left the region around April 19.43 Turkey and the 
ethnic Turkoman population added a final complication to the already difficult situation 
in northern Iraq. Coalition leaders were concerned about Turkey’s reaction should the 
Kurds take steps to achieve their ambition of an independent Kurdish state in northern 
Iraq. Cleveland expected that Turkey might use the Kurdistan Workers Party’s (PKK’s) 
annual “spring offensive” and the instability in Iraq as an excuse to advance a larger 
Turkish military presence into northern Iraq. CJSOTF-N also judged that Turkey was 
using a Turkoman political party, the Iraqi Turkoman Front, to gain a foothold in Kirkuk 
and might use any ethnic incidents—however minor—involving the Turkomans as an 
excuse to infiltrate Turkish paramilitaries into the area. Turkey already used the Peace 
Monitoring Force, established by the United Nations (UN) at the conclusion of the Kurd-
ish civil war in 1996, as a cover for Turkish special forces operations, and those, too, had 
the potential to expand to Kirkuk.44
To prevent these various crises from becoming a general conflagration across the 
north, Cleveland had only three special forces battalions and the 173d Airborne Brigade 
at his disposal, plus the 26th MEU, the unit that had fired on the crowd in Mosul. The 
U.S. forces that had been bolstered by 60,000 peshmerga during the invasion now found 
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themselves responsible for preventing those same peshmerga allies from unsettling the 
complex ethno-religious issues that permeated the region, a task CJSOTF-N could not 
hope to accomplish with its limited means.
REPOSITIONING THE FORCE
With the transition to Phase IV underway, McKiernan, Wallace, and Lieutenant Gen-
eral James Conway met to discuss how best to position their forces to stabilize the country. 
McKiernan was faced with shortages in his task organization that he had not anticipated. 
Although his invasion force was sufficient for toppling the regime, he now had approxi-
mately 2 1/2 fewer divisions than he had expected to execute the Eclipse II plan. Because 
CFLCC had advanced on Baghdad so rapidly, the 4th Infantry Division, 1st Armored 
Division, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, 416th Engineer Brigade, and 352d Civil Affairs 
Command were still flowing into theater at the time the regime fell. More importantly, 
Rumsfeld had canceled the participation of the 1st Cavalry Division in the invasion in 
February 2003, but McKiernan had assumed that, along with the 1st Armored Division, 
the 1st Cavalry Division would be available for use with other follow-on forces in Phase 
IV.45 He was therefore dumbfounded when Franks told him in the last days of April 2003 
that the SECDEF had decided to off-ramp the 1st Cavalry Division. He would receive 
only the 1st Armored Division to augment his thinly spread units, especially considering 
that I MEF was already preparing to depart the theater and CFSOCC was likewise pre-
paring to redeploy a significant portion of its forces. Franks had also given McKiernan 
explicit guidance on April 15 that “we’re not staying and we’re going to take as much 
risk leaving Iraq as we did attacking Iraq.” With that bold statement in mind, and recog-
nizing that with the impending departure of the Marines and special operations elements 
in CJSOTF-W, the thinly stretched remaining Army divisions would be responsible for 
securing most of the country, McKiernan and Wallace set about rearranging their units in 
accordance with the general plans they had discussed prior to the invasion.46
As planned, they placed the boundary between V Corps and I MEF at Baghdad, 
with V Corps assuming responsibility for Baghdad itself as well as the provinces to the 
north and west of the city. I MEF was assigned all provinces south of Baghdad with the 
exception of Basrah, which remained under British control. The 3d Infantry Division, 
augmented by the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, remained in Baghdad before being 
relieved by the 1st Armored Division later in the summer and redeploying home. McKi-
ernan and Wallace had intended to place the 101st Airborne Division in Baghdad as well, 
but with the growing crisis in the north, Wallace decided to dispatch the 101st—the only 
division whose air assets allowed for a rapid deployment—to confront the rising chal-
lenge in Mosul and Ninawa Province. Major General Raymond T. Odierno and the 4th 
Infantry Division relieved the Marines in Salahadin and Tamim (Kirkuk) Provinces, and 
the soon-to-arrive 3d ACR would move to Anbar to augment CJSOTF-W.47 At CFLCC’s 
direction, V Corps began building up Saddam International Airport (renamed Baghdad 
International Airport in mid-April) as the coalition’s future headquarters for the theater.
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Source: DoD photo by USAF Staff Sergeant Jeffrey A. Wolfe (Released).
Major General Raymond T. Odierno, Commanding General,  
4th Infantry Division (2001-2004).48
Two factors prevented the immediate reposturing of CFLCC’s forces. The first was 
current unit positions. “The difficulty was that everyone was out of position to [move 
into their (planned) Phase IV areas] at the time the regime fell,” recalled Wallace. The V 
Corps units could not move north until the Marines assumed responsibility for the south-
ern zone, and the Marines could not move south until the 4th Infantry Division assumed 
control of Salahadin Province and the 3d Infantry Division took control of Baghdad in 
its entirety. In other words, the major units were about to conduct a “clockwise relief in 
place” so that the center could get set.49 The other factor that prevented an immediate 
Phase IV reset was the need to provide security for the Shi’a holiday and its associated 
pilgrimage known as Arba’een, scheduled to occur between April 20 and 23. (This holi-
day commemorated the martyrdom of Imam Hussein in 680 AD, grandson of the Prophet 
Muhammad. It involved a pilgrimage to the shrine city of Karbala, where Imam Hussein 
was killed by the army of Caliph Yazid.) Saddam had banned the pilgrimage for the 
previous 25 years, however, the coalition intended to facilitate Shi’a participation in the 
pilgrimage for the first time in the newly liberated Iraq. Wallace directed the 2d Brigade, 
82d Airborne Division, in Samawah with some augmentation from the 101st Airborne 
Division to provide security for the more than one million pilgrims who participated in 
this event.50
With Arba’een complete, V Corps set about relieving I MEF of its responsibilities 
in Baghdad and northern Iraq. Between April 15 and 24, the 4th Infantry Division and 
the 3d ACR off-loaded the remainder of their equipment and personnel in Kuwait, and 
the 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, assumed control of Najaf, Karbala, and Hillah. 
The 4th Infantry Division moved north toward Baghdad, conducted a passage of lines 
through the 3d Infantry Division’s battle space, and then relieved I MEF units in Samarra 
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and Tikrit, establishing full control of their new area of operations by April 20. The 4th 
Infantry Division assumed operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade in Kirkuk 
and tactical control of CJSOTF-N by the end of April, after which CJSOTF-N handed the 
Kirkuk security mission to the 173d and then transferred the MeK camp in Diyala to the 
4th Infantry Division’s control.
As the 4th Infantry Division moved into the upper Tigris River Valley, two brigades of 
the 101st Airborne Division conducted one of the largest and longest air assaults in U.S. 
military history, moving almost 500 kilometers by helicopter from the Karbala region to 
Mosul to begin operations to calm the northern city. Elsewhere, V Corps completed its 
relief in place of the I MEF and CJSOTF-W units in Baghdad, freeing I MEF to move south 
and assume responsibility for Samawah, Diwaniya, Karbala, Najaf, and Hillah by April 
23, and allowing the brigade of the 82d Airborne Division to move to Anbar Province 
in response to the deteriorating security situation there. British forces relieved I MEF in 
Maysan, and I MEF began to prepare the provinces under its control for the transition to 
a multinational headquarters so that it could redeploy to the United States.51
As this vast reset began, CFLCC became increasingly concerned about the transit of 
foreign fighters, former regime leaders and assets, and museum artifacts across Iraq’s bor-
ders with Syria and Jordan. On April 10, CENTCOM had ordered CFSOCC to take control 
of Anbar’s border crossings, where it was to prevent Iraqi regime leaders from escaping 
across the border while apprehending any foreign fighters trying to cross in either direc-
tion and preventing loot and cash from transiting out of the country. CJSOTF-N, recog-
nizing that some of the top regime high-value targets (HVTs) were using Highway 1 out 
of Mosul to flee into Syria, moved to secure the highway to cut off that escape route.52 
CJSOTF-W requested that it be relieved of the Hadithah Dam so it could begin secur-
ing border crossings in the area and hunt the HVTs on CENTCOM’s “deck of cards.”53 
Accordingly, a battalion of the 101st Airborne Division arrived at Hadithah Dam and 
relieved the CJSOTF-W forces there by April 20.
Securing border posts was not the only difficulty in Anbar. McKiernan had origi-
nally intended to put the 1st Cavalry Division in the province at the conclusion of major 
combat operations, but with that division no longer at his disposal, McKiernan and Wal-
lace decided that Anbar would have to be an economy of force mission. As early as April 
13, however, McKiernan’s command had received reports that the Dulaim and Albu 
Risha tribes had taken control of military equipment formerly belonging to the Iraqi 12th 
Armored Division near Ramadi, and that they had also been somewhat successful in 
forcing foreign fighters out of the province. Because of these early reports, CFLCC had 
expected the situation in Anbar to be favorable to the coalition presence, but as the reset 
began, it became apparent that an armored cavalry regiment alone was insufficient to 
quell the deteriorating situation there.54 Demonstrations in Fallujah and Anbar’s provin-
cial capital of Ramadi grew increasingly violent, with the local police either unwilling or 
unable to restrain the crowds or stop the looting. CFLCC assessed that former regime loy-
alists or paramilitaries remained in the area, which had not been cleared during the inva-
sion, and were inciting violence. Coalition analysts also suspected tribal factions were 
playing a role in the problem, but had little awareness of the root causes of local tensions 
in these areas. General Wallace temporarily sent the 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, to Ramadi 
on April 14 to better appraise the situation, but by the third week of April, Fallujah and 
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Ramadi were spiraling out of control, and the Ramadi police chief begged the coalition 
for reinforcements. Concluding that the situation in Anbar could not wait for the 3d ACR 
to arrive from Kuwait, Wallace decided to send the 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division 
in southern Iraq to Ramadi ahead of the 3d ACR’s arrival in order to “thicken” the thin 
coalition presence there. Unfortunately, Anbaris became even further incensed when Sol-
diers of the 82d Airborne Division returned fire coming from a crowd of angry Fallujah 
citizens, killing 17 locals. The 3d ACR then took over the province from the 82d Airborne 
Division on April 28 after relieving the battalion of the 101st Airborne Division at Had-
ithah Dam.55
Although the coalition’s corps and division boundaries fell along Iraq’s provincial 
borders and were based on what CFLCC and its subordinate units had judged to be 
operationally appropriate, they were incongruous in many places with Iraq’s physical 
and human terrain and were not coordinated with ORHA’s northern, central, and south-
ern zones of influence.56 The division and corps boundaries also did not account for the 
areas most likely to be difficult to control, nor did they align with the zones of opera-
tion Saddam had used to control the country. As a result, the new coalition operational 
boundaries created opportunities for hostile forces to exploit. The 4th Infantry Division’s 
area of operations included Salahadin and Diyala Provinces, split by the Hamrin moun-
tain range and the Diyala River, while the boundary between the 101st and the 4th Infan-
try Division arbitrarily bisected the upper Tigris River Valley. This arrangement meant 
that the division controlling Tikrit also controlled the Diyala Valley, even though Diyala 
was customarily linked to Baghdad, while the traditional link between Mosul and Tikrit 
was broken. The boundary between the 101st and the Anbar-based 3d ACR, meanwhile, 
bisected the Jazeera, the large desert in northwestern Iraq that stretched into Syria, plac-
ing the traditional smuggling routes between Iraq and Syria on a seam between units. 
Although a boundary between the Baghdad-based 3d Infantry Division and the 3d ACR 
was established, the allocation of forces created a large gap in the physical presence of 
coalition forces between western Baghdad and Fallujah, leaving uncovered the “west-
ern belts” area that later became al-Qaeda in Iraq’s biggest staging base against Bagh-
dad. Finally, Anbar Province itself, later the heartland of Sunni resistance groups, was 
an enormous area that bordered Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, far too large for a bri-
gade-sized element to control.
By the end of April, CFLCC units were in their new, unanticipated Phase IV areas, 
adjusting to new surroundings with little background data or guidance on how to pro-
ceed. Few, if any, CFLCC units had had time to mature security operations completely 
in their initial positions before the entire coalition spent 3 weeks conducting reliefs in 
place, just as Iraq’s urban areas most urgently needed security. Additionally, CFLCC 
was so busy repositioning units that it had little time to provide an overarching strategic 
direction to its subordinate units. As a result, divisions in each region developed their 
own mechanisms for addressing their unique circumstances. The 101st Airborne Division 
established a civil-military operations center in Mosul and prepared to host municipal 
elections. The 4th Infantry Division in the Tikrit area focused on presence patrols and 
security operations in its contentious areas which had been the most fervent Saddamist 
strongholds and had never been cleared during the invasion phase. The 82d Airborne 
Division transitioned from conducting pilgrimage security to intensive patrolling and 
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security operations in the increasingly restive Anbar Province. The U.S. Marines and 
British forces in southern Iraq focused on stability operations but implemented force 
protection standards in accordance with local commanders’ guidance rather than CFL-
CC’s direction.57 It was becoming clear that CFLCC’s troop numbers had been sufficient 
to topple the regime, but, as General Eric Shinseki had predicted, were inadequate for 
securing the country, especially without the expected assistance of the Iraqi Army.
MILITANTS AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE
Foreign Fighters, Fedayeen, and IEDs
On April 15, CFLCC made the determination that all Iraqi conventional and Repub-
lican Guard forces had abandoned their positions and were combat ineffective. Various 
CFLCC and CFSOCC units accepted the sporadic surrenders of senior military officials 
and commanders at the corps level and below, while a special operations task force began 
searching for fugitive members of the senior military leadership. Most of the Ba’ath Party 
militias and Fedayeen were believed to have either fled or gone underground in Iraq’s 
major cities as well. Initially, CFLCC believed that residual attacks against coalition 
troops were the work of foreign fighters, not Iraqis. In mid-April, CFLCC analysts judged 
that foreign fighters were the most significant enemy threat in Baghdad and believed 
them to be responsible for the sporadic ambushes and sniper fire directed against coa-
lition troops. By late April, however, CFLCC shifted from targeting foreign fighters to 
destroying hostile former regime elements and death squads that coalition analysts now 
believed to be behind ambushes, sniper fire, and grenade attacks. Concerns about this 
activity increased as Saddam’s April 28 birthday approached, and CFLCC units prepared 
for widespread attacks and demonstrations spurred by the former regime elements. The 
nuclei of these activities were Tikrit, where the 4th Infantry Division encountered large 
pockets of resistance from Taji to Bayji; and Anbar, where the 82d Airborne Division and 
the 3d ACR had difficulty addressing the former regime threat within the almost daily 
protests in Ramadi and Fallujah.58
Coalition ground forces also encountered a type of attack they had not really seen 
during the invasion—remote-detonated and suicide improvised explosive devices 
(IED) and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED). The number of suicide 
bombings and remote-detonated IEDs steadily increased throughout April. On April 
14, Marines on patrol in Baghdad were seriously wounded when attacked by a suicide 
bomber wearing an explosive vest, a practice that became gruesomely common in the 
months and years to come.59
Shi’a Reprisals and Hints of Iranian Influence
Unknown to the coalition at first, Iraqi society had only just begun to respond to the 
absence of a repressive and sectarian rule. Reprisal attacks against the former regime 
began almost immediately. The Badr Corps militia led by Hadi al-Amiri had spent months 
preparing lists of regime loyalists it intended to target once Saddam was no longer in 
power. According to Iraqi politician Ali Allawi, shortly after major combat operations 
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ceased, approximately 10,000 Badr Corps personnel organized into death squads began 
hunting and executing senior Sunni regime loyalists, as well as Shi’a citizens who had 
collaborated with the regime. Badr acquired weapons by looting Ba’ath Party militia and 
Iraqi Army depots, rapidly established footholds in Basrah, Amarah, and Baghdad, and 
set its sights on Diyala as well. In response to the Badr reprisals, some other militias 
and tribes began to form protection forces in Baghdad and across southern Iraq. CFLCC, 
meanwhile, began to monitor Badr Corps activities and infiltrations through Maysan 
Province more closely as reports surfaced that the group was acquiring weapons from 
supporters inside Iraq.60
In the southern provinces, I MEF and the British 1st Armoured Division also saw signs 
that groups linked to Iran were having a disruptive effect in their areas of responsibility. 
Iranian-linked Shi’a clerics used anti-coalition messages in their Friday religious sermons 
in April, something Sunni imams were doing elsewhere as well. Coalition units also sus-
pected Iranian agents of inciting public disturbances and undermining the coalition’s 
ability to establish new local governments, leading CFLCC to caution its units that Iran 
might try to develop “shadow governments” in southern Iraqi towns. These concerns 
were amplified when, on April 25, citizens of Kut removed a new city council member 
they suspected of being an Iranian puppet. I MEF and British troops later apprehended 
some Iranian citizens in Iraq and reported that Iran might be sending agents to infiltrate 
the Arba’een pilgrimage and disrupt coalition stability operations more broadly.61
The Khoei Murder
In April 2003, coalition troops inadvertently stumbled into the longstanding intra-
Shi’a battle among rival religious families in Najaf. On April 5, Ayatollah Abdul Majid 
al-Khoei, son of the former Grand Marja’ and a leader of the 1991 uprising, returned to 
Najaf from his 12-year exile in London. Upon arriving in the holy city, Khoei moved to 
the Imam Ali shrine. News of his return quickly spread to supporters of Moqtada Sadr, 
son of the murdered Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr. At the time, Moqtada 
Sadr was largely unknown to the coalition other than as the son of the venerated Shi’a 
cleric assassinated by Saddam’s regime in 1999. Sadr and his followers, however, had a 
popular following in Najaf and viewed Khoei as a Western-backed interloper, much as 
they viewed the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq and the Badr Corps 
as Iranian-backed interlopers. On April 10, personnel from the 5th Special Forces Group 
in Najaf introduced the 101st Airborne Division leadership to Khoei, whose presence in 
the city seemed to offer a local partnership for the stability operations and reconstruction 
to come. However, Khoei was dead before the day was out. Within hours of his arrival, 
a mob of Sadr’s supporters made their way to the Imam Ali shrine, where Khoei was 
meeting with Haider Kelidar, the shrine’s regime-appointed caretaker. Attacking Khoei 
and his small entourage, the Sadrist mob, reportedly led by future Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq 
(League of the Righteous) leader Qais al-Khazali and Moqtada Sadr’s brother-in-law, 
Riyad al-Nuri, killed Kelidar and dragged the gunshot-wounded Khoei down the street 
to Sadr’s door, where Sadr allegedly denied Khoei sanctuary. The Sadrist mob then killed 
Khoei in a nearby shop.62 This shocking murder, of which the coalition was only dimly 
aware when it happened, had profound political consequences for Iraq and the coalition.
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***
Two notable events occurred on May 1, 2003. At the strategic level, then-President 
George W. Bush announced that U.S. forces had achieved victory and declared an end 
to major combat operations in Iraq. The pronouncement took place aboard the aircraft 
carrier USS Abraham Lincoln in front of a banner emblazoned with the words, “Mission 
Accomplished.”63 That optimistic declaration belied the semi-controlled chaos on the 
ground. The other event was less publicized, but was important for the ground forces: on 
May 1, CENTCOM formally announced a full transition to Phase IV stability operations, 
and CFLCC, instead of transitioning its operations to a follow-on command or agency, 
became dual-hatted as the Combined Joint Task Force for Iraq, numbered CJTF-7.
It was already apparent to the ground force commanders that the mission was far 
from accomplished. When Saddam fled the capital, the physical presence of the Iraqi 
state had disappeared, and no entity or organization, including the coalition, was pos-
tured to take its place. Though most of the looting and rioting had died down by the 
end of April, governance, utilities, and threats to stability varied hugely from region to 
region. With little planning or direction, CFLCC’s units took on missions to defeat the 
remaining enemy forces, stop looting, contain demonstrations and reprisals, distribute 
humanitarian assistance, engage in widespread reconstruction, and build Iraqi gover-
nance capacity; but they did so by using unit boundaries that were misguided for Iraq’s 
geography and human terrain.
CFLCC also struggled to allocate its comparatively small number of forces properly 
for the growing operational requirements at hand, while incorporating a host of new 
coalition partners, humanitarian aid organizations, and contractors into its battle space. 
Enemy activity increased in April, and enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well 
as its lack of identifiable organizations, confounded the coalition. These mounting chal-
lenges were oddly juxtaposed with I MEF’s and the 3d Infantry Division’s preparations 
to leave Iraq. The coalition military’s inability to meet Iraqi expectations and secure the 
country in the wake of a collapsed state also initiated a divide between the coalition and 
Iraqi society that only grew wider as coalition leaders set about implementing deeply 
misguided policies in the summer of 2003.
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CHAPTER 6
LOST IN TRANSITION, MAY-JULY 2003
Throughout the month of April, Coalition Forces Land Component Command 
(CFLCC) units had struggled to address the gamut of operational and strategic chal-
lenges of a postwar Iraq. The declared transition from major combat operations to stabil-
ity operations on May 1 foreshadowed several other transitions that ultimately proved 
disruptive to the coalition’s post-combat efforts. Over the course of the next 45 days, 
many key leaders and organizations central to the invasion left the country, as did a 
large number of troops. The remaining theater command was a sparsely staffed, under- 
resourced corps headquarters commanded by a general officer who had arrived in Iraq 
weeks before as a division commander. The senior diplomat who arrived to partner with 
him had extensive antiterrorism and reconstruction experience, but none that was on the 
scale of Iraq’s requirements.
Additionally, the overarching assumption governing Phase IV planning—that the 
military would be responsible for fighting the war and then quickly turn operations over 
to civilian control—evaporated as the civilian body formed for the job, the Coalition Pro-
visional Authority (CPA), arrived in the country with far too little capacity to relieve the 
military of its stabilization tasks. Transitions in the upper echelons of the theater created 
a vacuum at the operational level of war that the U.S. Army, Marine, and British forces on 
the ground filled by adapting to the new requirements of their diverse and wide-ranging 
areas of operations. However, the coalition divisions and brigades soon found themselves 
dealing with disparate regions of a country whose society was imploding—a process 
made far worse by disastrous coalition policies that collapsed the Iraqi state in May-June 
2003, creating a dangerous power vacuum at all levels.
TRANSITIONS AT ALL LEVELS
Civilian Oversight: From Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance to 
Coalition Provisional Authority
In the days following Saddam Hussein’s fall, CFLCC, as the nominal Combined Joint 
Task Force–Iraq (CJTF-I) headquarters, made a concerted effort to consolidate reconstruc-
tion and governance activities to bolster the capability of the Office of Reconstruction and 
Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and accelerate the transition of Iraq from military to 
civilian control. ORHA’s primary focus was securing the Iraqi ministries, defining secu-
rity requirements, making emergency payments to the Iraqi military and civil servants, 
and developing the Iraqi police.1 CJTF-I intended to continue building up ORHA’s capa-
bility in accordance with its Eclipse II lines of operation.2
Viewed from Washington, however, ORHA appeared to be overwhelmed, lacking 
even basic communications and logistical infrastructure, which precluded even its move-
ment into Iraq without assistance. Furthermore, ORHA was too small to foster Iraqi gov-
ernance capacity at the ministerial level, having been developed on the assumption that 
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Iraqi ministries would continue to function after a short hiatus. ORHA’s mandate, too, was 
more as an emergency relief force than an organization tailored for long-term reconstruc-
tion and capacity building. Recognizing that U.S. leaders had probably underestimated 
the requirements of managing a postwar Iraq, National Security Adviser Condoleezza 
Rice asked Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld whether he thought that the 
ORHA mission was failing. Rumsfeld agreed and informed Rice that he was working on 
some new ideas for the President.3
From the beginning of the Iraq campaign, then-President George W. Bush made it 
clear that he wanted the Department of Defense (DoD) to lead the reconstruction effort 
until it transitioned back to Iraqi control.4 His intent was to maintain a single chain of 
command for postwar operations and keep the responsibility for interim Iraqi gover-
nance squarely on the shoulders of DoD rather than the State Department. These prin-
ciples led to the creation of the Office of the Coalition Provisional Authority—a more 
robust organization than ORHA―empowered to bypass the interagency processes and 
bureaucracy in Washington in order to make important policy decisions in the face of a 
dynamic situation. CPA would replace ORHA as the ground-level agency responsible for 
Iraq’s reconstruction and for establishing a new Iraqi Government to which the coalition 
could transfer control.5
The President and SECDEF selected Ambassador L. Paul Bremer to lead this new 
organization. Bremer had no Iraq or Middle East experience, but had plenty of inter-
agency experience and had served in Afghanistan and East Africa. He had also served 
as the Chairman of the National Commission on Terrorism in 1999 and on the National 
Academy of Sciences’ Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism 
in 2002. After the President and SECDEF confirmed that he would indeed lead CPA in 
April 2003, Bremer spent 2 weeks assembling his team and attending briefings to prepare 
for the task ahead of him. The result of these hasty efforts, however, was a CPA that 
was anemically manned by civilians with little experience working with the military and 
ill-prepared for the challenges that lay ahead.6
Back in Baghdad, Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay M. Garner was unaware of the effort 
in Washington to bolster the CPA and was surprised when Rumsfeld notified him on 
April 24 that Bush planned to appoint a new presidential envoy to run the Iraq recon-
struction effort just a week after Garner had arrived in Baghdad. Garner was not the 
only one surprised by Bremer’s appointment. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad had also 
been working as a special envoy and ambassador-at-large to the Iraqi opposition since 
2002, and in April 2003, he was in Iraq working to link the Iraqi expatriate leaders with 
indigenous Sunni, Shi’a, and Kurdish leaders to form a new Iraqi Government. When 
Garner informed Khalilzad that Bremer was assuming responsibility for governance in 
Iraq, Khalilzad expressed shock that he was being replaced and that no one in the admin-
istration had notified him. After threatening to resign, he was only convinced to remain 
in Baghdad temporarily at Garner’s entreaty.7
On June 15, ORHA was formally redesignated as CPA, and Bremer spread the remain-
ing ORHA personnel across seven major directorates: oil, civil affairs, economics, aid, 
operations, security affairs, and press and public affairs. His new organization was thinly 
manned by a conglomerate of civilians and military personnel who had volunteered for 
Iraq from Washington or had worked in ORHA. Although Bremer complained that many 
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of the CPA personnel who volunteered lacked the requisite experience for the tasks they 
were assigned, few additional personnel were forthcoming from outside Iraq.8 It would 
be the military headquarters in Baghdad that would fully staff the CPA.
Theater Command: From CFLCC to V Corps
On May 1, 2003, CFLCC formally became dual-hatted as Combined Joint Task Force–
Iraq (CJTF-I), which was numbered soon after as CJTF-7. The rebranding of CFLCC was 
another sign that, as far as most U.S. policymakers and military leaders outside Iraq were 
concerned, major combat operations were over.9 Generals David McKiernan and William 
Wallace, however, were still grappling with balancing the complexities of Iraq’s secu-
rity and reconstruction requirements with the number of forces they had been assigned. 
They were thus both surprised when the SECDEF abruptly decided to send McKiernan’s 
CFLCC and Wallace home and make the V Corps the new CJTF-7 headquarters under 
the command of newly minted three-star general Ricardo Sanchez. Rumsfeld made this 
decision in early May and originally instructed that Wallace should leave the country 
immediately, but given the uncertainty of the situation, McKiernan persuaded Rumsfeld 
to delay the change of command until June 15, 2003.10
Adnan Pachachi (left) Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez (center).  
Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Reynaldo Ramon, USAF (Released).
Iraqi Governing Council Leader Adnan Pachachi and Lieutenant General Ricardo 
Sanchez, Commanding General, V Corps/CJTF-7, Speak to the Media During a Press 
Conference in Iraq.11
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From the time they were notified about the changing of the guard for CJTF-7, Wallace 
and McKiernan prepared to move their headquarters and transition responsibility for the 
mission. Wallace had already made plans to split the V Corps into a main and supporting 
headquarters but  had intended to put his main headquarters at Balad, 64 kilometers north 
of Baghdad, from which he believed he could exercise better control over the V Corps 
subordinate commands. That effort came to an abrupt halt with the impending plans for 
ORHA to leave Iraq, and Wallace decided instead to make Baghdad International Airport 
(BIAP) the operational headquarters for V Corps as it became CJTF-7, assuming that the 
new civilian authority in CPA would make its headquarters in central Baghdad.12
Once on the ground, Bremer was quick to establish his authority and harness the mil-
itary presence under his leadership. Upon his arrival in Iraq, he informed Wallace and 
then Sanchez that they worked for him and that he wanted them by his side in the CPA 
headquarters in central Baghdad for the reconstruction effort.13 It was then clear that V 
Corps needed to split its headquarters to co-locate with CPA and simultaneously manage 
its operational and theater requirements. Sanchez left CJTF-7 operational headquarters at 
BIAP with V Corps deputy commander, Major General Walter Wojdakowski, in charge, 
while Sanchez himself and some key staff members moved to Baghdad’s Green Zone 
with the CPA. From that point forward, the CJTF-7 commander’s responsibilities became 
oriented on theater strategy and policy, while the remainder of the V Corps headquarters 
at BIAP ran combat operations, published orders, and built infrastructure.14
The May 18 CFLCC order setting out these command and control changes also estab-
lished the mission and timelines for the transfer of responsibility for Iraq operations to 
V Corps, which became dual-hatted as CJTF-7 on June 15, 2003. The order further stated 
that I MEF was under the tactical control of CJTF-7, while CJTF-7 itself was under the 
operational control of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). CFLCC would revert to 
its pre-conflict designation as the Third U.S. Army, and its Iraq-related responsibilities 
would change to reconstituting forces, force sustainment, and redeployment operations 
from bases in Kuwait and Qatar.15
The change from CFLCC to CJTF-7 left the Iraq theater in the hands of a much smaller 
and less capable headquarters than the one that had led the invasion. The headquarters 
that had run the ground war and conducted the most in-depth planning and preparation 
for Phase IV of any military or civilian agency suddenly found itself in Kuwait, while 
the new, smaller, and less experienced CJTF-7 found itself managing a two-corps-sized 
force with few of the resources needed to prosecute stability operations at the strategic 
and operational level. Unlike CFLCC headquarters—which was at more than 100 percent 
strength with approximately 1,200 personnel and contained general officers in all its key 
staff positions—the V Corps headquarters was far smaller, with fewer than 300 personnel.
The V Corps would also do all of this with a new commander. While General Tommy 
Franks had long planned to retire from CENTCOM in the summer of 2003, Wallace 
believed he would remain in command of V Corps until at least fall 2003, when his sched-
uled 2 years as a corps commander were complete. However, Wallace’s widely reported 
comments about the Fedayeen as an unplanned-for enemy during the invasion had irri-
tated Rumsfeld, who had come to believe Wallace had displayed a lack of aggressiveness 
during and after the invasion. Although McKiernan had been able to dissuade Rumsfeld 
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from relieving Wallace in the middle of the invasion, he was unable to convince the 
SECDEF to maintain Wallace as the V Corps commander for Phase IV.16
Sanchez, Wallace’s replacement, was identified as the next V Corps commander in 
April 2003, but he, too, had not expected the change of command to take place before 
the fall. He had arrived in Iraq shortly after the invasion in command of the 1st Armored 
Division, which was replacing the exhausted 3d Infantry Division in Baghdad, and San-
chez had expected to remain in that more limited capacity for several months as a two-star 
general. Now, just days later, he learned he would be in command of the entire theater 
within a month. Still, Sanchez had participated in the planning for Iraq and his division, 
in particular, was well-briefed on operations in Baghdad. He was also optimistic that his 
joint and interagency experience from the United States Southern Command (SOUTH-
COM) and, more recently, his experience leading a multinational force in Kosovo had 
prepared him to manage another joint, interagency, and multinational organization in 
Iraq. His experience working in a joint environment placed him high in Rumsfeld’s favor, 
suggesting that he possessed enough credibility with the SECDEF to ensure he received 
the support he needed. Therefore, Sanchez took command of CJTF-7 on June 15, expect-
ing a challenging but not impossible mission.17
Important Individual Transitions
In addition to the major organizational transitions that took place in Iraq in the summer 
of 2003, many of the key personnel and much of the military’s resident Iraq expertise 
moved out of the theater. At the end of April 2003, Franks informed Rumsfeld of his 
intent to retire that summer. Feeling that his mission was complete now that the Iraqi 
regime had been toppled, Franks had no desire to follow through with what he antici-
pated would be a messy and lengthy postwar period, and the CENTCOM commander 
had even begun plans to take leave in the Caribbean in May before Rumsfeld intervened 
to deny the leave request. Franks proposed that his deputy, Lieutenant General John Abi-
zaid, replace him as the CENTCOM commander, and Rumsfeld agreed. From that point 
onward, Franks largely disengaged from leading efforts in Iraq, leaving Abizaid with the 
difficult task of running CENTCOM without actually being its commander. The Penta-
gon announced at the end of May that Abizaid would be promoted to four-star general 
and succeed Franks on July 7, 2003.18
Abizaid’s selection as CENTCOM commander aligned well with his professional and 
personal background. An Olmsted Scholar and Arabist of Lebanese descent, Abizaid 
had considerable experience with the Middle East and Arab culture. His efforts to focus 
CENTCOM and the Joint Staff on Phase IV operations in the fall and winter of 2002, 
combined with the engagements he conducted with Iraq’s neighbors before the invasion, 
gave him ample relevant regional experience. In fact, the original plan for the post-in-
vasion command in Iraq had Abizaid commanding a CENTCOM forward command 
post in Baghdad, and he later was slated as the commander for the projected Combined 
Joint Task Force–Iraq.19 As the CENTCOM commander, however, Abizaid needed to con-
sider many other countries in addition to Iraq and the Middle East, as well as the broader 
Global War on Terrorism.
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John P. Abizaid (front center). Source: DoD photo by John Valceanu (Released).
General John P. Abizaid, Commanding General, CENTCOM, With Members of 
Multi-National Division–Central South.20
Across Iraq, routine Army institutional transitions were also taking place. Sanchez’s 
replacement at the 1st Armored Division, Brigadier General Martin E. Dempsey, did not 
arrive to take over command of the division until September, so Brigadier General Fred 
“Doug” Robinson, Sanchez’s deputy, assumed command in the interim. Just as Robinson 
took command, all of the division’s brigade commanders who had recently embarked 
on Phase IV operations in Baghdad were replaced as well, leaving few leaders with Iraq 
experience in charge and putting many new personalities together within that division 
alone. Elsewhere, several other brigade and battalion commanders changed command 
as part of the Army’s standard 2-year command cycle. Substantial numbers of Army 
field grade officers and senior noncommissioned officers who had participated in the 
Iraq planning and combat operations also left for new assignments or the next level of 
professional military education.21
The final transition that indirectly affected Iraq was General Eric Shinseki’s retirement 
in the midsummer. On June 11, 2003, Shinseki sent Rumsfeld a lengthy “End of Tour 
Memorandum” articulating how he believed that many of his intentions and actions as 
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the Chief of Staff of the Army had been misconstrued 
by the Office of the SECDEF. The memorandum also 
reinforced the emphasis on Army transformation and 
asked the secretary to maintain momentum in that 
direction.22 After Shinseki retired on July 31, his Vice 
Chief, General John M. “Jack” Keane, became the acting 
Chief of Staff of the Army, charged with both leading 
Army transformation and supporting two wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.
WMD Mission: From 75th Exploitation Task Force to 
Iraq Survey Group
In addition to securing conventional weapons 
caches, one of CFLCC’s key tasks was to secure, investi-
gate, and exploit weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
sites, a mission assigned to the 75th Field Artillery Bri-
gade. It quickly emerged that the scale of the problem 
was more than the 75th Field Artillery Brigade could 
handle. The sensitive site exploitation mission had been secondary to the invasion itself 
during CENTCOM’s planning, and assigning the 75th Field Artillery Brigade had almost 
been an afterthought.24 The 75th Field Artillery Brigade’s leadership recognized early on 
that they were not adequately equipped or operationally embedded in the plan. The secu-
rity vacuum after the invasion hampered the unit in deploying its teams and accessing 
the suspected sites without security support. It also had no access to Iraqi Government 
documents about the WMD program. Nor did the 75th Field Artillery Brigade follow the 
prioritized list of suspected WMD sites it had received. Instead, the 75th Field Artillery 
Brigade’s inspection teams tended to move quickly around the country responding to 
any and all reports of sites that might be associated with WMD.25
The 75th Field Artillery Brigade’s failure to uncover large WMD stockpiles in its first 
month in Iraq was a serious matter for policymakers in Washington. At the recommen-
dation of Under SECDEF for Intelligence Stephen A. Cambone and Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA) Director Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, Rumsfeld moved to supplant the 
75th Field Artillery Brigade with a much larger Iraq Survey Group (ISG). The ISG mis-
sion was threefold: to locate U.S. Navy pilot Captain Michael “Scott” Speicher shot down 
over Iraq in 1991; to gather evidence of the regime’s ties to terrorism and war crimes; and, 
most importantly, to locate Saddam’s WMDs and the associated programs that suppos-
edly produced them.26
With several hundred people drawn from across the intelligence community, the ISG 
was led by Major General Keith W. Dayton, DIA’s Director of Operations, with David A. 
Kay serving as chief scientist. Although the shorthanded 75th Exploitation Task Force 
expected to be integrated into the ISG, that never happened. On June 22, the ISG formally 
took charge of the WMD mission, and the 75th Field Artillery Brigade redeployed in frus-
tration, bringing an unceremonious end to the unit’s abortive mission to verify the casus 
belli of the Iraq invasion.27
Source: U.S. Army photo by  
Mr. Scott Davis (Released).
General John M. “Jack” Keane, 
Vice Chief of Staff of the 
Army (1999-2003).23
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THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE IRAQI STATE AND SOCIETY
The coalition military had invaded Iraq with the intent of toppling the Iraq regime but 
had assumed that, beyond the regime, the state administrative apparatus would remain 
largely intact. The invading U.S. forces had also expected to have assistance from the 
Iraqi military to maintain a secure environment and enable a peaceful handover to a tran-
sitional Iraqi Government. Once on the ground, however, U.S. officials made a series of 
decisions that dramatically expanded the invasion’s impact on the Iraqi state and society, 
precipitating a governance vacuum at all levels in Iraq.
The Disbanding of the Army and Outlawing of the Ba’ath Party
The unexpected pairing of the CJTF-7 headquarters and the new CPA in May 2003 
was rocked by immediate and sharp differences of opinion about the nature of their rela-
tionship. Although Bremer ostensibly worked for the SECDEF, his approach in prac-
tice resembled that of a presidential envoy consulting directly with the White House 
rather than with DoD or the rest of the interagency. The CPA and Bremer were under 
the impression that they would command the military forces by issuing military orders 
designed to fulfill CPA’s objectives. Meanwhile, CJTF-7, under Sanchez, believed that the 
relationship was one in which military leaders would set their own priorities and direct 
their own operations to support CPA’s objectives.28 For his part, Abizaid later noted that 
the formal relationship between CENTCOM and CPA was never made clear to him.29 
The most difficult policies that CJTF-7 had to operationalize in the first months of CPA’s 
tenure were those dealing with de-Ba’athification, the dissolution of the Iraqi Army, and 
the control of weapons. The National Security Council (NSC) had been working on a 
de-Ba’athification plan for Iraq within the U.S. interagency for months, and CENTCOM 
and CFLCC both had plans to recall Iraqi civil servants and select members of the mili-
tary to run the government and secure the country. Both the NSC and CENTCOM agreed 
that the Ba’ath Party itself should be outlawed, but, as Rice put it, “the question was to 
what degree were you going to allow government employees and military people to 
retain their positions.”30
The general thought among senior U.S. officials was that members of the top two 
levels of the Ba’ath Party—that constituted only a small fraction of the Iraqi population—
should be prohibited from holding office with some exceptions, but that all other Ba’ath 
Party members could denounce the party and remain in position through a separate pro-
cess. CENTCOM, for its part, planned to disband select segments of the Iraqi military 
that were loyal to Saddam, but intended to retain at least the regular army to assist with 
reconstruction. The NSC and ORHA plan for the Iraqi military called for the retention of 
about five divisions of the Iraqi Regular Army, with a select portion of field grade officers 
removed by a relatively forgiving de-Ba’athification policy. Like CENTCOM’s plans, the 
interagency proposal was to use the retrained Iraqi military for reconstruction and stabi-
lization tasks, keeping Iraqis who were used to wielding weapons gainfully employed.31
Bremer, however, arrived in Baghdad with very different guidance and intentions on 
de-Ba’athification. On May 9—his last day spent at the Pentagon before going to Bagh-
dad—Bremer received his orders in a memorandum from Rumsfeld, which included 
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instructions to “actively oppose” the legacy organizations loyal to Saddam, including 
the Ba’ath Party and regime security organizations. That afternoon, Bremer also paid a 
visit to Under SECDEF Douglas Feith, who showed him a draft order for the de-Ba’ath-
ification of Iraqi society that would marginalize the top four levels of the Ba’ath Party, 
thereby expanding the prohibition to tens of thousands of additional Ba’athists. Accord-
ing to Bremer, he understood that the order as written had been reviewed and approved 
by the White House, DoD, and Department of State. Although Feith planned to have 
Garner issue the order immediately, Bremer argued that the order was so important that 
it should wait until he arrived in Baghdad to issue it himself, a move that Bremer believed 
would establish his authority as he took up his duties in Iraq.32
Bremer’s thoughts on how to manage the former regime security institutions were 
shaped by conversations that his senior adviser for defense and security affairs, Walter B. 
Slocombe, had held in May with Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld, who judged that most Iraqis 
feared the return of Saddam Hussein’s repressive security institutions and that the Iraqi 
Army had melted away of its own accord after the regime collapsed. Additionally, all of 
these institutions were predominantly Sunni and not representative of the Iraqi popula-
tion, or so the DoD leaders believed. On May 19, Bremer sent a memorandum to Rums-
feld recommending that all of these institutions—including the Iraqi Army—be formally 
dissolved, to which the secretary agreed.33
Once in Baghdad, Bremer discussed de-Ba’athification and the status of the Iraqi mili-
tary with Abizaid, indicating to the presumptive CENTCOM commander that de-Ba’ath-
ification efforts focusing on only the top two levels of the Ba’ath Party were not stringent 
enough and that he intended to disband the Iraqi Army formally.34 Abizaid thought 
Bremer’s plans extreme, “I think the model that was being used in Washington was 
the WWII model of de-Nazification,” Abizaid recalled later, “Saddam [was] Hitler, the 
Republican Guards the SS, and the Ba’ath Party the Nazi Party. This notion of this great 
crusade against evil had no bearing in reality to what was on the ground and the histor-
ical context of Middle Eastern politics and Iraq politics in particular.” Abizaid protested 
to Franks that Bremer’s proposals went far too deep into Iraqi society and were bound to 
cause problems, but his protests had no effect on the policy.35
In retrospect, it appears the more moderate de-Ba’athification proposals previously 
approved by the President and the Executive Steering Group in Washington before the 
invasion either were not transmitted to Bremer or were overridden by those he received 
via the Office of the SECDEF as he moved forward with the de-Ba’athification order he 
had first viewed with Feith and Rumsfeld.36 On May 16, 2003, Bremer issued CPA Order 
1, De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society, which banned Iraqis who had been in the upper 
four levels of the Ba’ath Party—rather than just the top two levels—from holding govern-
ment office, effectively putting between 30,000 and 50,000 Iraqis out of work, including 
senior civil servants, military leaders, and university professors.37
While Iraqis and the coalition military were still processing the implications of the 
de-Ba’athification order, Bremer issued CPA Order 2, The Dissolution of Entities, 1 week 
later on May 23, 2003, and just 4 days after his memo to Rumsfeld declaring his intention 
to take this step. CPA Order 2 dissolved most of Iraq’s security and intelligence appara-
tus, including the Ministry of Defense, Iraqi Intelligence Service, Special Security Orga-
nizations, and paramilitary forces. It also disbanded all branches of the Iraqi military in 
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their entirety, negating in a stroke the NSC plan for the new Iraqi Army and CENTCOM 
and CFLCC plans to recall it. CPA Order 2 also suspended pay for members of those 
entities and, because many security officials were also in the top four levels of the Ba’ath 
Party, it essentially prohibited them from public employment in the new Iraq.38
The extensive de-Ba’athification policy had both immediate and far-reaching conse-
quences. Because most senior civil servants and university professors across Iraq had 
been required to be level four or higher in the Ba’ath Party, many key players in the 
Iraqi ministries and education systems were either forced from their positions or opted 
to leave them in the absence of other instructions. This severely disrupted the reconstruc-
tion plans ORHA and CJTF-7 had been making. In the coalition, units discovered they 
now had to screen their scarce interpreters for Ba’ath Party membership and potentially 
arrest or dismiss them. The feedback that CPA and the coalition received about the policy 
ranged from “relief that [they] were purging Ba’ath Party members to outrage [they] 
were going overboard in [their] pursuit of former Ba’ath Party members.”39
The order to dissolve the Iraqi military generated a more inflammatory response. 
Although the Republican Guard was loyal to Saddam, the Iraqi Regular Army had been 
more distant from the regime and contained members from all of Iraq’s ethno-religious 
communities. Its dissolution created a large population of seasoned military men who 
suddenly had no livelihood. The order to dissolve the Iraqi military resulted in increased 
demonstrations and demands for jobs, pay, and the immediate reconstitution of the 
Army. Some of these protests disintegrated into violent confrontations with the coalition, 
resulting on occasion in the deaths of coalition troops.40
These two CPA policies in rapid succession sent shockwaves throughout the country. 
Concerned about the backlash to his de-Ba’athification memo, Bremer added an adden-
dum to CPA Order 1 on June 3. Instead of dismissing all senior Ba’ath Party members 
outright, the addendum set up an investigatory process and an Iraqi-led de-Ba’athifi-
cation council that would gradually assume full control of the process. Based on inter-
views, public records, and testimony, this committee would determine the nature of 
citizens’ Ba’ath Party membership, assist with appeals, and either grant or deny requests 
for exceptions to the CPA policy. Exceptions included provisions for those “judged to 
be indispensable to achieving important coalition interests.”41 For many senior U.S. mil-
itary leaders, the disbanding of the Iraqi Army was an unwelcome step taken without 
their input. Abizaid later recalled being pulled from a planning meeting in Baghdad to 
be told that Bremer had issued the order without consulting him, even though Abizaid 
and other U.S. commanders had already formulated plans that counted on the use of the 
Iraqi Army as auxiliary manpower.42 In an even more jarring moment, on the day CPA 
Order 2 was announced, Brigadier General Mark P. Hertling, assistant commander of the 
1st Armored Division, was in the middle of addressing a gathering of 600 senior Iraqi 
officers in Baghdad to solicit their participation in the reconstitution of the Iraqi Army 
when, as he recalled it, “my aide came in to tell me that CPA had just made the announce-
ment [disbanding the army] . . . The Iraqi generals got the word, too, a few minutes later 
through their channels.”43
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The Debate Over Disbanding the Iraqi Army
To a large extent, the military men in Baghdad were seeing the result of conflicting 
policy positions in Washington. Senior U.S. policymakers had differed in their views on 
how deeply the Iraqi Ba’athist state should be dismantled. On the one hand were senior 
officials who believed much of the Iraqi state and security structure would need to be 
retained in order for the coalition to manage the post-regime-change turbulence success-
fully. On the other hand, as Abizaid observed, were senior officials who feared that keep-
ing the Ba’athist structure in place would mean Iraq would not transition to democracy 
but would revert to “Saddamism without Saddam.”44 They also feared that the Kurdish 
and Shi’a opposition parties, such as Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq 
(SCIRI) and the Badr Corps, might become hostile to the coalition occupation if the Ba’ath 
and the Iraqi security apparatus were not fully disempowered.45 Speaking to journalists 
in 2005, Bremer postulated that the disbanding of the Iraqi Army had been “probably the 
most important decision I made, and it had the effect of avoiding a civil war in Iraq” by 
reassuring the Kurds in particular that the United States was intent on making serious 
changes in Iraq.46
In later years, Bremer and Walter Slocombe held fast to the explanation that CPA 
Order 2 had merely codified the reality that the Iraqi Army had disbanded itself by dis-
solving during the course of the invasion. By April 15, “there simply was no organized 
unit” in the Iraqi Army, Slocombe told reporters in Baghdad in 2003.47 However, this was 
an explanation with which Garner and others did not agree. On April 15, the date he said 
the Iraqi Army had dissolved itself, Slocombe was still in Washington and did not arrive 
in Iraq until weeks later. On the ground in Baghdad in April, Garner and Colonel Paul 
Hughes, an Army officer who worked for Slocombe, were receiving dozens of contacts 
with groups of Iraqi officers (such as those Hertling was meeting). These officers wished 
to arrange for the recall of tens of thousands of their soldiers to duty or to reorganize the 
Iraqi forces with the coalition’s assistance. Hughes had even formulated a plan to give 
Iraqi officers an emergency payment of $20 each to buy essentials for their families. Other 
officers had drawn up plans to use Iraqi troops to guard the Iranian border.48 Slocombe 
and Bremer’s promulgation of CPA Order 2 caught Garner, Hughes, and other military 
leaders by surprise and cut short their negotiations with the Iraqi military.
Bremer’s sweeping actions in Baghdad also appeared to catch the President and his 
advisers by surprise. Speaking to Army historians in 2015, Bush recalled that Bremer had 
“informed” him of the decision to disband the Iraqi Army rather than seeking guidance 
or saying, “Mr. President, here are your choices.” The decision had effectively counter-
manded Bush’s pre-invasion decision to retain and use the Iraqi Army. Echoing Bremer 
and Slocombe’s rationale, however, Bush recalled:
I always felt that to the extent we could use the Iraqi Army as a stabilizing force [it]would be a plus 
. . . but the problem is that, when we got there, there was no Iraqi Army left . . . they just evaporated, 
there was no structure. . . . I remember Bremer telling me that we disbanded the army but there 
was no army to begin with.49
Bremer’s choices conflicted with the President’s original guidance, Bush told Army 
historians, but, as commander in chief, he believed it important to trust the judgment of 
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the U.S. officials on the ground as they were closer to the dynamic situation and whom 
Bush wished to empower rather than micromanage from Washington.50 Nevertheless, 
Rice concluded later that Bremer had not perceived the “fine line between empowerment 
to act in a kind of tactical sense and knowing when an issue is really a strategic issue” 
requiring input from the President, SECDEF, and national security advisor. Bremer would 
spend months attempting to walk this fine line, but the President subsequently reined in 
some of Bremer’s authority: he and Rice would have direct contact with Bremer at least 
every few days and require him to consult more closely on strategic policy issues.51
Reconstructing an Iraqi Army and Disarming an Armed Society
The fallout from disbanding the Iraqi military, along with the clear necessity to secure 
Iraq, lent more urgency to the project to build a new Iraqi security force. Hoping to stymie 
the civil unrest generated by CPA Order 2, Bremer announced that an organization was 
already established to build the new Iraqi Army. This effort, led by Slocombe, actually 
began before the CPA order was issued. On May 9, Major General Paul D. Eaton, then 
commander of the U.S. Army infantry school at Fort Benning, GA, was notified by U.S. 
Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) that he had been chosen to lead the 
new Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT). CMATT was comprised of a 
skeleton staff of military personnel and contracted military and police trainers who were 
expected to configure 27 Iraqi motorized infantry battalions over 2 years—an army that 
would be too small to wage wars of aggression and, interestingly, incapable of defending 
the country from outside invasion. Arriving in Iraq on June 13, Eaton found his efforts 
to create a new Iraqi Army immediately hindered by two factors. Although Wallace 
and Sanchez agreed that constructing a new Iraqi Army should be a military operation, 
Bremer did not. Based on Bremer’s guidance, CMATT would work directly for the CPA, 
outside of the CJTF-7 chain of command and operations. Second, CMATT itself was an 
economy of force mission. Its trainers were drawn from the 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain 
Division, other individual augmentees from the U.S. Army, and contractors, with the 
latter initially making up most of CMATT’s personnel.52
With no concrete relationship with the main force on the ground and with few 
resources of its own, Eaton’s CMATT was unlikely to resolve the immediate security 
problems generated by the dissolution of the Iraqi military. Thus, clarification of the 
de-Ba’athification policy and Eaton’s new mission could do little to improve matters for 
coalition ground forces in the short term. CJTF-7 leaders now had a delicate situation on 
their hands: they could not flagrantly ignore Bremer’s orders, but implementing them 
would further disrupt a precarious security situation. CJTF-7 and its divisions needed 
to balance their operational requirements subtly against CPA policy directives, but on a 
quiet, ad-hoc basis.
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Paul Bremer (seated, left) and Major General Paul Eaton (far left).  
Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Quinton Russ, USAF (Released).
Ambassador Paul Bremer Signs an Order for the CPA, While Major General Paul 
Eaton, Commander, CMATT (2003-2004), Stands in the Background.53
Some units began to hold meetings with local leaders and tribal sheikhs to find ways 
to reinstate professors or gainfully employ Ba’athist civil servants and former military 
members. Other units began locally hiring former Iraqi soldiers to protect government 
facilities and key infrastructure sites. The 101st Airborne Division in Mosul found a legal 
loophole that allowed it to bring some university faculty and other teachers back into 
their respective schools. Still, other units tacitly allowed key players and interpreters to 
continue working while seeking similar mechanisms to restore or replace their jobs.54
The unrest spawned by CPA Orders 1 and 2 was exacerbated by yet another far-reach-
ing directive: CPA Order 3, Weapons Control, which forbade Iraqis who were not police 
from possessing or carrying firearms, grenades, rocket-propelled grenades, and other 
munitions.55 Implementing this order was fraught with difficulty. Most Iraqis had weap-
ons in their homes, and in rural areas, weapons were both part of the culture and essen-
tial to the Iraqi lifestyle. Many Iraqis viewed personal weapons as necessary for their 
protection in the security vacuum following the invasion, and most of the Kurdish and 
Shi’a political militias carried weapons as a matter of course. The sheer volume of weap-
ons and munitions available in the open and in unsecured military facilities rendered 
enforcing the order impossible.
Once again, CJTF-7 and its subordinate units had to develop mechanisms to cope 
with an order they could not fully enforce. CJTF-7 first established a weapons amnesty 
program in June, which allowed Iraqis to turn in weapons and other munitions without 
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penalty. When the weapons amnesty program expired on June 14, measures to enforce 
the policy had still not been published, and much confusion about the requirements 
remained. CJTF-7 units then began buyback programs in which Iraqis who turned in 
weapons received cash payments for those weapons, but compliance with the weapons 
policy was not widespread, signifying an unwillingness of the Iraqi populace to trust the 
coalition to provide basic security. The Marines also conducted their own weapons col-
lection program but had little to show for the significant effort it required.56
Marginalization of Iraq’s Tribes
The fourth CPA pronouncement that had the potential to deepen Iraq’s instability 
concerned the country’s tribes, toward whom CPA’s attitude tended to be dismissive. 
Believing they were shaping a new, modern Iraq, Bremer and many of the CPA offi-
cials who accompanied him initially saw little place for “backward” tribal culture, a per-
spective Bremer would later change.57 By mid-May, the experiences of CJTF-7’s divisions 
confirmed that Iraq’s tribal infrastructure was intertwined closely with the country’s pol-
itics and governance, and that engagement with tribal sheikhs was crucial to identifying 
and resolving issues for Iraqis in both rural and urban areas. Consequently, many units 
decided tacitly to overlook CPA’s official stance toward Iraq’s tribes for the time being. 
Military units at all levels began a concerted effort to reach out to the tribal sheikhs to 
identify reconstruction requirements and set up interim governance structures.58 How-
ever, because of their lack of knowledge about Iraq’s tribal rivalries, coalition forces found 
themselves immersed in, and often manipulated by, long-standing tribal disputes over 
resources and power.
CJTF-7’S TRIAL BY FIRE
The Drawdown of the Invasion Force
After June 15, the new CJTF-7 faced numerous challenges that consumed nearly all 
of its organizational energy and made it difficult to manage security, reconstruction, and 
governance operations. Franks’s instructions were to remove the invasion force, particu-
larly the 3d Infantry Division and I MEF, from Iraq as quickly as possible. The 4th Infan-
try Division, the 1st Armored Division, and later, the 101st Airborne Division would 
remain an additional 120 days to complete the planned transition to civilian control, a 
timeline that CENTCOM would later extend to 6 months and beyond as it became appar-
ent that the redeployment needed to be more gradual. Franks also expected ORHA or 
another civilian agency to establish a functioning Iraqi transitional government in the 
same time period. The resulting drawdown was to reduce the number of troops commit-
ted to Kuwait and Iraq from just more than 300,000 to approximately 113,000 between 
May and September 2003. CJTF-7’s task was to facilitate the reduced U.S. footprint in 
Iraq while completing the Phase IV tasks outlined by CENTCOM and Eclipse II. As the 
looting and demonstrations died down, Franks decided to accept the risks involved with 
moving forces out of the country while the situation on the ground was still developing. 
His thought—and that of the Army and Joint Staff—was to reconstitute the force for other 
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operations and reinforce the strategic message that the United States was liberating Iraq, 
not occupying it.59
It quickly became clear that the sum total of these decisions was to leave a stateless 
theater of war with a civilian authority and a military command that were each woefully 
incapable of doing what was necessary to control the situation. The combined effects of 
the transition from a theater to a corps headquarters and institutional movements of indi-
viduals in Iraq reduced theater headquarters staffing to around half of what was required 
for manning and intelligence architecture in the summer of 2003. The corps staff and the 
normal corps intelligence cell and assets, already woefully inadequate for an area the size 
and scope of Iraq, were split between the two headquarters. Furthermore, the corps had 
a small logistics footprint and almost no organic civil affairs or strategic communications 
capability. CPA’s staffing, too, remained filled at approximately 65 percent strength in 
Baghdad, even when augmented by the military. Without military personnel loaned by 
CJTF-7, its strength would have dropped to nearly 40 percent. At the height of the inva-
sion, CFLCC staff had numbered more than 1,200 people, including an intelligence direc-
torate of almost 400.60 With the change to V Corps as CJTF-7, the CFLCC was handing 
control of the theater of operations to a headquarters less than one-quarter of CFLCC’s 
peak size. Sanchez estimated that he required between 600 and 700 personnel to manage 
all of his missions appropriately, more than twice the May 2003 strength of the V Corps 
staff, which stood at 280 at the time.61
In the DoD manning plan for Sanchez’s CJTF-7 headquarters, 344 positions were to 
be filled by the U.S. Army, 210 by coalition partners (including 40 from the United King-
dom), and 195 slots by other branches of the U.S. military. The deputy commander of 
CJTF-7 was a British officer; however, manning the command proved to be more chal-
lenging than designing it. With an end to major combat operations having been declared, 
the force-provider organizations turned their attention to reconstituting the forces used 
in the Iraq invasion so they could be available for other contingencies. Staffers in the 
Pentagon were understandably lethargic in finding personnel for a CJTF-7 headquar-
ters whose mission was understood to be a short-lived one. As Sanchez watched CFLCC 
return to Kuwait, he asked the departing command to leave its field grade staff officers 
to fill out his headquarters. Since many of those personnel had nearly completed their 
90–180-day temporary duty assignments, the numbers CFLCC was willing to leave with 
CJTF-7 were small.62 Few outside Iraq understood the urgency of the deteriorating sit-
uation there in May 2003, creating a disconnect between operational requirements and 
resourcing agencies that would persist until late 2003.
Six Areas of Operations
Managing Iraq’s vast and complex terrain was a colossal task for any military, but 
particularly the overextended coalition units in summer 2003, most of whom found 
themselves in areas they had not expected to be and largely without any local knowledge. 
The country that coalition units occupied was extraordinarily diverse in geography and 
demographics. When V Corps became CJTF-7 on June 15, its area of operations extended 
to all but the Kurdish provinces of Dahuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah, though these, too, 
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fell under its purview. The remaining 15 provinces constituted 6 subordinate areas of 
operations (see Map 11).
 
Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.
Map 11. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Combined Joint Task Force-7,  
June 2003-May 2004.
In Northern Iraq, the 101st Airborne Division’s area of operations was a region with 
porous borders that various tribes and groups had used for smuggling routes for decades. 
In Ninawa Province, bordering Turkey and Syria, the 101st Airborne Division made its 
headquarters in the city of Mosul, whose approximately 2 million inhabitants made it one 
of the three most populous cities in Iraq. Ninawa’s population is predominantly a mix 
of Sunni Arabs and Kurds, with significant minorities of ethnic Turkomans, Shi’a Arabs, 
Christians, and Yazidis spread across the province’s plains and the area of the Sinjar 
mountain range extending west into Syria. In the eastern portion of the division’s area 
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of operations, the remaining three of Iraq’s northernmost provinces—Dahuk, Erbil, and 
Sulaymaniyah—comprised a semiautonomous region operated by the joint PUK–KDP 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) separated from Iran and Turkey by the Qandil 
Mountains and the larger Zagros mountain range. The high peaks and steep terrain of 
these mountains provided a haven for smugglers, terrorists, and the Kurdistan Work-
ers Party (PKK), which had fought an insurgency against the Turkish Government for a 
quarter century.
To the south of the 101st Airborne Division, the 4th Infantry Division occupied Sala-
hadin, Tamim, and Diyala Provinces. Kirkuk, the capital of Tamim Province, was the 
focal point of conflict between Arabs and Kurds and, by default, between the Kurdish 
autonomous region and Iraq. The nearby Kirkuk oil fields were critical to Iraq’s oil pro-
duction, a source of contention between the KRG and the Iraqi Government. West of 
Kirkuk, Salahadin Province contained Saddam’s home area of Tikrit and had been the 
center of political power in Iraq for 35 years. Separated from Kurdistan by the Hamrin 
mountains, Salahadin contained Tigris River towns and the “Zaab Triangle” long used as 
a transit area for smugglers, with the points of the triangle at Sharqat, Hawijah, and the 
oil-refinery town of Bayji. On the other side of the Jabal Hamrin range from Salahadin, 
Diyala Province sat at a strategic crossroads: the province’s physical terrain offered easy 
access to Baghdad and the south as well as routes into Iran. Diyala’s isolated hamlets, 
thick palm groves, and fragrant citrus orchards provided plentiful hiding places that 
allowed smugglers and resistance groups to thrive. Baqubah, Diyala’s largest city and 
capital, was also on a fault line between Iraq’s religious sects: Sunnis controlled the area 
west of the city near the Tigris River, and Shi’a controlled most of the city east of the 
Diyala River. Farther up the Diyala Valley, the towns of Jalawla and Khanaqin sat on sim-
ilar fault lines between Arabs and Kurds. Diyala’s fertile land, canals, and tributaries had 
long made it Iraq’s breadbasket, with valuable farms and irrigation systems over which 
locals were willing to fight.
In the center of the country, the 1st Armored Division occupied Baghdad and its six 
outlying districts: Abu Ghraib, Istiqlal, Mada’in, Mahmudiyah, Taji, and Tarmiyah. The 
city of Baghdad contained more than 7 million inhabitants, a quarter of the country’s pop-
ulation, with a mixture of religions, sects, and cultures spread across a geographic area 
the size of Los Angeles, CA. One of the city’s subdistricts, Sadr City, was the poorest and 
most densely populated area in the country with more than 2 million Shi’a Arabs living 
in eight square miles of squalor. Under Saddam Hussein, the Republican Guard had used 
a system of “belts” to defend and control the key territory leading into Baghdad. The 
northern portion of the belts systems included Taji and Tarmiyah, while the western belt 
ran from Karma south to Abu Ghraib. To the south of Baghdad, the belts included the 
important towns of Yusufiyah, Mahmudiyah, and Jurf al-Sakhr west of the Tigris. East 
of the river, the belt ran from Salman Pak to the town of Nahrwan in Diyala. All of these 
areas lay within 48 kilometers of Baghdad and connected the capital to the rest of Iraq.63
West of Baghdad, the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment occupied Anbar Province, an 
area the size of Arkansas sharing extensive borders with Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. 
Although virtually all of the province’s population lived in the towns along the lush 
Euphrates River Valley, much of Anbar was covered by the Jazeera Desert that extended 
south from the Anatolia Mountains of Turkey. Anbar’s other desert—the Hajarah—had a 
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complex topography of rocky desert, deep wadis, ridges, and depressions, many of them 
ideal smuggling routes. Anbar’s harsh, arid terrain was home to some of the toughest of 
Iraq’s Sunni tribes, many of whose historical lands extended across Anbar’s borders into 
Ninawa, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. Anbar’s capital, Ramadi, was the largest city 
in the province, but the nearby city of Fallujah presented the most difficult urban area. 
Located on the banks of the Euphrates River, Fallujah, known as the “city of mosques” 
with over 200 in the city, had been a hotbed for conservative Sunni Islam and criminal 
activity under the Ba’athist regime. The largest lake in Iraq, Lake Tharthar, was located in 
Anbar between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, while the Hadithah Dam on the Euphra-
tes was the country’s most important source of irrigation and hydroelectric power pro-
duction. Between Ramadi and Fallujah lay Lake Habbaniyah, where a series of fishing 
villages were used as bypass routes for smugglers looking to avoid Highway 10 when 
shuttling arms, goods, and cash.64 Highway 1 was Anbar’s other main thoroughfare, run-
ning west from Fallujah to Rutbah near the Jordanian border.
South of Baghdad, I MEF occupied the provinces of Najaf, Karbala, Babil, and Wasit—
an area almost as large as West Virginia. Najaf and Karbala Provinces contained the holi-
est shrines in the Shi’a Islamic world, and Najaf historically had been the main religious 
and intellectual center for all of Shi’a Islam. Saddam had been careful to avoid major 
confrontations in Najaf for fear of igniting a sectarian civil war. Karbala’s historical signif-
icance extended back to the 680 AD battle in which the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson, 
Hussein Ibn Ali, had been martyred at the hands of an army sent from Syria. Faithful 
Shi’a constantly guarded the Imam Hussein shrine there, and large crowds of Iraqi and 
Iranian Shi’a pilgrims traveled to both shrines during annual holidays. Situated between 
Karbala and Najaf, Babil Province, with its capital at Hillah, was the site of the ancient 
city of Babylon, surrounded by lush farmland and date palm groves crisscrossed by irri-
gation canals.
South of I MEF, the British 1st Armoured Division occupied Basrah, Maysan, Dhi Qar, 
and Qadisiyah Provinces, an area almost half the size of England. Basrah, the region’s 
most populous city, contained 2 million people, most of them Shi’a Arabs. The surround-
ing province was home to the country’s largest oil fields and reserves, the largest being the 
Rumaila field located approximately 32 kilometers north of the Kuwaiti border. Basrah 
Province and the Shatt al Arab waterway bordered Iran and had been heavily contested 
in the war between the two countries. The terrain northeast of Basrah into Maysan Prov-
ince was filled by dense marshland that Saddam drained in the 1980s to prevent Iran 
from using the marshes to move troops and supplies into Iraq, and had further drained 
in the 1990s after many of the area’s inhabitants—known as Marsh Arabs—had joined in 
the 1991 rebellion against his regime. In the mid-Euphrates region, Qadisiyah Province 
was sparsely populated, with most of its Shi’a-majority population in its capital, Diwan-
iya, but was of both geographic and historical significance. Located south of Baghdad 
and east of Najaf along Highway 1, Diwaniya was on the strategic outer perimeter of the 
defense of Baghdad. The city was also the site of an ancient battle in which early Muslim 
Arabs soundly defeated a Persian army, enabling the spread of Islam to Iraq and Iran. 
All four of these southern provinces had received little benefit from the south’s oil riches 
under Saddam.
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The transitions at the operational and strategic levels left most of the coalition’s units 
without a campaign plan or overarching guidance that could link their six areas of oper-
ations together. In the absence of specific directions, CJTF-7 subordinate commands 
tended to operate in their areas as they saw fit, yielding wide variances in unit activities 
across the country. Unit reporting in the summer of 2003 was indicative of both the types 
of challenges each unit faced as well as where commanders placed their emphasis.
In Baghdad, coalition units tended to have strategic resources and civilian agencies 
and assistance missions at their disposal that were not available in the rest of the country. 
The 3d Infantry Division received assistance from ORHA to secure the Iraqi ministries 
and disseminate emergency payments to thousands of Iraqi civil servants. The division 
then began implementing neighborhood missions to clear and repair facilities and ser-
vices in Baghdad, one neighborhood at a time. The 3d Infantry Division’s handover of 
the Baghdad area of operations to the 1st Armored Division began in mid-May and was 
complete by May 29. Like the 3d Infantry Division, the 1st Armored Division focused 
on patrols, raids, and security of fixed sites, but also had unique missions such as pre-
paring Baghdad’s airport for commercial travel, as well as similar reconstruction proj-
ects. The division also found that increased patrolling at night reduced curfew violations 
and improved the security situation, and the unit continued the 3d Infantry Division’s 
efforts to establish Neighborhood Advisory Councils in Baghdad’s neighborhoods, or 
mahallas.65
In Ninawa Province, the 101st Airborne Division worked with ORHA’s northern 
office, local technocrats, neighborhood leaders known as mukhtars, and tribal sheikhs to 
organize municipal and provincial elections in Mosul. On May 5, 2003, the 101st Airborne 
Division installed a new city mayor and town council for Mosul and organized elections 
for a new provincial governor shortly thereafter. The division’s focus next shifted toward 
standing up a multi-ethnic police force and facilitating the return of displaced Kurds and 
the relocation of Arab families occupying their property. For the rest of May, the 101st 
Airborne Division worked with tribal sheikhs to organize and distribute the products of 
the spring harvest delayed due to the invasion, distribute essential supplies, and secure 
border-crossing points between Iraq and Syria. By June 15, the 101st Airborne Division 
also graduated its first class from a new police academy in Mosul. In May and June, how-
ever, the 101st Airborne Division encountered pockets of resistance and began to increase 
the number of raids on suspected Ba’athists and Fedayeen.66
The 4th Infantry Division’s area of operations was far less permissive. As the divi-
sion expanded into its assigned battle space, it encountered significant resistance from 
remnants of the regime’s security apparatus and began to encounter Iranian-affiliated 
militias as well. The division conducted several raids against buildings of an organiza-
tion “believed to be running a shadow government” in Baqubah, during which it seized 
dozens of personnel, weapons, and specialized communications equipment. On May 
15, the division raided villages near Ad Dawr, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri’s home territory, 
detaining 250 Iraqis, including the 52 individuals on the CENTCOM “Deck of Cards” list, 
and a former Ba’ath Party branch command chairman. Tikrit and its surrounding areas 
remained problematic, and the 4th Infantry Division frequently conducted searches and 
raids throughout June. The Badr Corps also began to create problems in Baqubah, where 
4th Infantry Division troops detained the traffic chief and police chief for suspected 
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involvement in Badr Corps militant activities. In late May and early June, the 4th Infantry 
Division began screening toward the Iranian border in Diyala and raiding Badr Corps 
and SCIRI headquarters, capturing some Iranian nationals suspected of militant activity. 
Many of the division’s activities, however, were not combat operations. For example, the 
division assumed responsibility for accepting the capitulation of the MeK and proctoring 
its disarmament. Toward the end of May, the 4th Infantry Division reported more gover-
nance-related missions, including elections in Kirkuk and the payment of police officers 
and civil servants. The 173d Airborne Brigade’s sector in Kirkuk remained tense, with 
scattered clashes between Kurds and Arabs in Kirkuk and Hawijah and attacks against 
the local oil infrastructure.67
To the west, Anbar’s major urban areas and borders were unsecure, and the activities 
of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) reflected increasing incidents of violence 
and demonstrations in Fallujah and Ramadi. Although the regiment spent considerable 
effort improving the numbers and capabilities of the local police force to assist them in 
those cities, those efforts and the regiment’s attempts to use joint “show of force” mis-
sions with the Anbar provincial police failed to deter violence. By the beginning of June, 
the 3d ACR was reporting near-daily enemy contacts and violent disruptions in Fallujah, 
Ramadi, and Habbaniyah. Meanwhile, concerns about Anbar’s largely unsecured west-
ern border with Syria and Jordan led CJTF-7 to task the Marine Task Force Tripoli to con-
duct a reconnaissance in force along the border. After the 3d Infantry Division completed 
its relief in place of the 3d ACR in Fallujah and Ramadi on June 3, the cavalry unit moved 
to Rutbah to focus solely on the mission of patrolling the Syrian border.68
In the south, most of I MEF’s activities in May and June focused on battle handover to 
multinational replacements and preparations for redeployment. In the interim, Marines 
in Iraq’s south-central provinces worked with the United Nations (UN) to establish a 
satellite UN office in Hillah, conducted police training, distributed fuel, and distributed 
emergency payments. Like the 101st Airborne Division in Ninawa, I MEF worked with 
municipal, religious, and tribal leaders to set up city and provincial councils. As it pre-
pared to depart the theater, however, I MEF increased its patrols and security operations, 
including raids against suspected Ba’ath Party members and sympathizers. It also spent 
considerable effort conducting counter-ambush operations on Highways 1 and 8, which 
coalition troops had designated Main Supply Routes Tampa and Jackson, respectively.69
In Iraq’s southernmost provinces, British troops continued their efforts to secure key 
oil infrastructure and expand humanitarian operations in Maysan while trying to estab-
lish law and order in Basrah. They adjudicated emergency payments for invasion ref-
ugees who were returning to their homes and professions and proctored a vote of no 
confidence in the Umm Qasr town council in early May. By mid-May, they were working 
to restore essential services such as Basrah’s deteriorating water and sewage systems. 
British units also found that local citizens were concerned about the date palm harvest for 
the fall, and requested assistance with crop sprays and distribution for that economically 
important crop, illustrating the wide variety of unexpected activities the Iraq invasion 
forces found themselves conducting after Saddam Hussein’s fall.70
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CJTF-7 Attempts to Synchronize Operations
As the summer progressed, the undermanned CJTF-7 often found itself lagging behind 
these subordinate units’ vast and varied initiatives, though it did attempt to implement 
some of the more useful operations countrywide. As a result, CJTF-7 struggled to bring 
order and focus back to the theater level. Apart from issuing orders that attempted to 
operationalize CPA policies, CJTF-7, in consultation with the divisions, began issuing 
orders and providing much-needed resources to all six areas of operations in an attempt 
to recentralize the coalition’s operations. One example involved the development of local 
police capability. While the divisions had been working with and hiring new local police 
forces since April, CJTF-7 began to nationalize the process in May. In order to give com-
manders more capability to support local requirements immediately, CJTF-7 distributed 
commander’s discretionary funds down to the brigade level beginning the 3rd week in 
May. On June 11, CPA released $10,000 for each brigade commander to use as their oper-
ational requirements necessitated, a forerunner of the massive commander’s emergency 
response program funds that would come later in the war.71
The road to synchronization of the far-flung coalition units was not an easy one. As 
the de facto operational commander, General Walter Wojdakowski was effectively trying 
to lead his peer division commanders without having been one himself, an unusual cir-
cumstance. Moreover, the uniqueness of each area’s environmental dynamics rendered 
some of the CJTF-7 instructions inappropriate or irrelevant for some units.72 It was most 
often the case that CJTF-7 centralized operations for crisis management—as was the case 
with the CPA policies—rather than routinely.
CJTF-7 encountered difficulties in several areas that required synchronization. To 
forestall an impending food shortage, on May 8, CJTF-7 and ORHA reactivated Iraq’s 
Oil for Food program distribution by coordinating with Turkey to authorize food convoy 
movements. A severe fuel shortage also required immediate central action. The Iraqis, 
accustomed to receiving subsidized fuel under the regime, quickly ran through most 
of the remaining fuel supplies in the country. Lines at government gas stations grew 
enormous, and tempers were short as temperatures rose, generating unruly crowds that 
sometimes became violent. With assistance from Iraq’s Oil Ministry personnel, CJTF-7 
worked with ORHA and the divisions to expedite the movement of benzene and diesel 
fuel into the country and gradually transition fuel distribution from government gas sta-
tions to privately owned stations.73 CJTF-7 also recognized early in May that establishing 
Iraqi media networks would facilitate success in other key tasks, and subsequently pro-
vided some guidance for assisting and improving media outlets, as well as supporting 
pro-coalition newspapers and broadcasts, and disseminating its own newspapers and 
messages through national and local media.
Though coalition units in the summer of 2003 were repairing infrastructure, facilitat-
ing crop harvests, and delivering services, Iraqis were becoming impatient with the lack 
of services, jobs, and basic security, as well as the absence of clear decision-making on the 
disposition and allocation of crops and harvests. Some supportive imams attempted to 
“influence the climate in a positive way” in exchange for favors, but CJTF-7 failed to ade-
quately promote its successes and the progress being made, a fact that was recognized 
and reported to CJTF-7 by sympathetic Iraqi journalists.74 The focus of CJTF-7’s efforts, 
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however, remained the city of Baghdad. While CJTF-7 did incorporate feedback from 
the outlying divisions into some of its operations, its formal guidance to its units beyond 
Baghdad in the early summer of 2003 was minimal, leaving them largely to their own 
devices.
THE SECURITY SITUATION DETERIORATES
In early May 2003, CFLCC prematurely assessed that the security situation was 
improving with calm settling on the country. Reports of looting had fallen significantly, 
as had random acts of violence and subversion. This relative calm gave way to attacks 
against coalition military targets that gradually grew in size and scope through May 
and June. Until early June, most coalition soldiers moved through the Iraqi cities in soft-
skinned vehicles, often lightly armed with pistols and without helmets. According to 
Eaton, that posture changed abruptly when a U.S. Soldier in Baghdad was shot in the 
back of the head at point-blank range while shopping for CDs. “When that happened, 
there was an immediate ratcheting up of security measures to protect the force,” recalled 
Eaton.75 The new measures required all CJTF-7 personnel to drive in at least two-vehicle 
convoys and wear protective vests and helmets, items that were not available to all of the 
coalition personnel in Iraq. The rapid acceleration toward war and delayed deployment 
orders had left 40,000 of the 130,000 U.S. Soldiers in Iraq without the ceramic plates for 
their protective vests, and the light infantry and support units had few armored vehicles 
allocated to them.76 The Baghdad shooting incident heralded more rocket-propelled gre-
nade attacks, convoy ambushes, and drive-by shootings against coalition forces and joint 
patrols with Iraqi police as the summer wore on. After 8 coalition deaths from hostile fire 
in May, 24 coalition troops were killed in enemy attacks in June and 28 in July. CFLCC 
and CJTF-7 attributed most of these small-arms attacks to former regime death squads, 
Fedayeen, and paramilitaries thought to be reconstituting themselves in Ninawa, but 
carrying out attacks elsewhere in Iraq. The most contentious areas were the Baqubah to 
Tikrit corridor; the urban part of Anbar consisting of Fallujah, Habbaniyah, and Ramadi; 
and the corridor between Hadithah and Hit.77 On June 8, the lethality and volume of 
attacks in these predominantly Sunni areas of Iraq led the newly formed Combined Joint 
Special Operations Task Force–Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP) to assess that the great-
est long-term threat in Iraq would come from “a resurgent, amorphous Ba’ath Party 
orchestrating insurgent warfare.” This is the first recorded use of the term “insurgent” to 
characterize enemy behavior and intentions.78 Because attacks had increased most rap-
idly in Sunni regions, CJTF-7 judged that, although some of the resistance might have 
been planned before the war or was being executed by former regime leaders, coalition 
policies were also to blame. CPA Orders 1 and 2 led many Sunnis to believe they would 
have no employment or advancement opportunities when the new Iraqi Government 
assumed power. Members of the now-defunct Iraqi military were clearly capable of orga-
nizing armed resistance.79
Other CJTF-7 reporting in May–June 2003 indicated additional subversive influences 
were disrupting the security situation, most of which were coming from Iran. The Badr 
Corps and SCIRI undercut coalition efforts to the point that CJTF-7 considered itself 
engaged in “an active IO war in Najaf” and believed over 4,000 Badr Corps personnel 
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were operating in Iraq.80 In turn, unidentified militias attacked Badr Corps headquarters 
across Iraq as the summer approached, including a strike against one in Baqubah that 
included a female suicide bomber on May 25.81 CJTF-7 also determined that at least one 
major intra-Shi’a rivalry was already getting out of hand—that between Moqtada Sadr 
and his followers in Najaf and eastern Baghdad, and SCIRI’s representatives in Karbala 
and parts of Najaf. The Iranian regime appeared to be supporting SCIRI at that time, but 
it was also encouraging the Sadrists’ anti-coalition stance. These activities led at least the 
special operators of the CJSOTF to judge, in June 2003, that Iran was “executing a long-
term campaign to further its national interest.”82
Throughout Iraq, the removal of the Ba’ath Party and Saddam from power opened the 
door for more open expression of religious freedom, although along with that freedom 
came a rise in religious extremism. Beginning in late May 2003, nongovernmental orga-
nizations in Iraq reported that female schoolchildren and teachers were receiving death 
threats from an organization calling itself “The Popular Committee for Punishment,” 
as well as the Badr Corps, designed to deter their attendance. In many places, women 
began to fear kidnapping and rape and avoided going to work or school because of the 
risk. CJTF-7 later identified at least two Islamic fundamentalist groups trying to jump-
start political parties in order to seize power in areas of Iraq the coalition had not occu-
pied, and Sunni Islamic fundamentalism, including Salafism, was thought by CJTF-7 to 
be the unifying factor among restive groups in Anbar. Many Iraqi Salafis were virulently 
anti-coalition, calling for and executing attacks against coalition forces. Signs emerged 
that Ansar al-Islam, having survived the coalition’s attack on it in early April, was begin-
ning to reestablish itself in northern Iraq with support from al-Qaeda.83 Unlike CJTF-7, 
the armed groups and anti-coalition factions appeared to conduct effective information 
operations, emphasizing in their messaging the coalition’s failure to restore security, ser-
vices, and jobs or highlighting the damage the coalition’s Western values would suppos-
edly inflict on Iraqi society. By mid-June, coalition units were reporting that local radio 
stations had begun to broadcast anti-coalition propaganda, while imams continued to 
spread anti-coalition messages during their Friday sermons. In mid-May, CJTF-7 units 
observed graffiti suggesting that Baghdadis seemed to be losing confidence in the ability 
of U.S. forces to control the situation. When some Iraq-based and international media 
outlets began inciting elements of the Iraqi population to violence, CPA issued a procla-
mation criminalizing the practice on June 13, and CPA shut down an Iraqi paper called 
Nation’s Echo in Najaf because it advocated violent resistance to the coalition.84
Farther south, British expectations that their experience in Iraq would be similar to 
their peacekeeping efforts in Northern Ireland or the Balkans were upended on June 23, 
2003, in a violent incident in the town of Majar al Kabir, 20 kilometers south of Amarah. 
When the British 1st Parachute Regiment began conducting searches for heavy weapons 
in the town, an angry mob of several thousand Iraqis closed in on the British troops. After 
an exchange of gunfire that left several Iraqis dead, the troops had to be extracted under 
fire, after which the mob surrounded a small patrol of six British military policemen who 
had taken refuge in a police station. With little ammunition and no means to contact other 
British forces, the British patrol was quickly overwhelmed and massacred.85
It was the most costly engagement for the British military since the 1991 Persian Gulf 
war, and the deaths had significant military and political consequences.86 Concluding the 
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incident had resulted from overly aggressive tactics and a loss of Iraqi popular support, 
cautious British military leaders would tend to limit future operations in order to avoid 
another such ambush and to maintain force protection. Meanwhile, the gruesome details 
of the incident undermined support for the war among the British public, which had 
expected the Iraq campaign to transition into a stabilization mission after the invasion. 
The Majar al Kabir killings became a political cause against the Tony Blair government, 
with the father of one of the slain military policemen later unsuccessfully challenging 
Blair for his parliamentary seat in the May 2005 British parliamentary election.87
Targeting the Iraq Regime’s Remnants and Saddam’s Sons
Despite the growing number of attacks attributed to the Ba’ath Party, CJTF-7 remained 
focused in its early days on the activities of defeated or disintegrated conventional Iraqi 
Army forces that had fought during the invasion. The coalition’s reporting did not shift 
to an emphasis on the Ba’athist insurgency and Iranian-associated subversion until June, 
by which time it was clear that the coalition was struggling to grasp the complexities of 
the post–Saddam environment.88
The Sunni areas of Iraq were clearly problematic, and the porous western borders 
contributed to the influx of foreign fighters and assistance to indigenous Iraqi fighters. In 
May, CJTF-7 conducted a corps-level operation to target Ba’ath Party and Fedayeen resis-
tance groups and camps in the Sunni Triangle between Tikrit, Balad, and Ramadi, and to 
create the conditions to secure Fallujah. The operation’s intent was to find those respon-
sible for organizing attacks on coalition forces and against Iraqis working with the coali-
tion to establish a new government. The main effort of Operation DESERT SCORPION, 
as it was called, was the 3d Infantry Division, supported by the 101st Airborne Division, 
the 4th Infantry Division, and the CJSOTF.89 In the lead-up to the main operation, the 4th 
Infantry Division conducted its own Operation PENINSULA STRIKE beginning on June 
10 in order to set conditions for Operation DESERT SCORPION by defeating Ba’athist 
elements in the Tigris River Valley. The 4th Infantry Division troops raided arms markets 
and dealers, seized illicit munitions, and detained approximately 400 Iraqis. At the same 
time, coalition special operations and V Corps units destroyed a suspected Ansar al-Is-
lam camp near Rawah, killing 61 fighters. In order to prevent the further resurgence of 
Ansar al-Islam, V Corps inserted its long-range surveillance company into Sulaymaniyah 
to reconnoiter old Ansar al-Islam camps and try to monitor the organization’s activity, 
though these actions ultimately did not prevent the group’s comeback.90
Operation DESERT SCORPION commenced on June 15, 2003, the day that Sanchez 
took command of CJTF-7. CJTF-7 divisions conducted simultaneous attacks and raids in 
Fallujah, Habbaniyah, Ramadi, Hit, and Baqubah, and later continued those operations 
into Tikrit and Hadithah. Over the next 2 weeks, coalition troops destroyed at least 1 sus-
pected militant training camp and captured or killed over 400 suspected Sunni resistance 
fighters and terrorists.
CJTF-7 and CJSOTF-AP believed Operation DESERT SCORPION had yielded a major 
victory against what coalition commanders viewed as an insurgency led by remnants 
of Saddam’s regime. Coalition forces reinforced the operation with a series of attacks 
on Deck of Cards targets and other important Ba’athists well into July. These efforts 
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culminated in the 101st Airborne Division’s raid that killed Uday and Qusay Hussein in 
Mosul on July 22. The brothers and Qusay’s 14-year-old son, Mustafa, had returned to 
the northern city after having fled to Syria and, later, to Salahadin Province following the 
fall of the regime. On July 22, Saddam’s sons were lodged with a former regime loyalist 
in Mosul. Their host, fearing for his life and interested in the reward money, approached 
members of the 101st Airborne Division and notified them about his “guests.” The 2d 
Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, commanded by Colonel Joseph Anderson, surrounded 
the house while special operations troops knocked on the door, were admitted by the 
owner, and entered the residence, only to be engaged immediately in a firefight with 
Saddam’s sons.91 After four of the Soldiers were wounded, the special operators with-
drew, and Anderson’s troops launched anti-tank missiles and a wall of small-arms fire at 
the house, quelling Uday and Qusay’s fire. The brigade found the bodies of Qusay, Uday, 
and Mustafa inside and confirmed their identities shortly thereafter.92
The death of Saddam’s sons appeared at first to deal a blow to the nascent insurgency. 
Reports suggested the two were leading a good portion of the former Ba’athists and dis-
enfranchised Sunnis who remained viable after the conclusion of Operation DESERT 
SCORPION. Although both Saddam and his deputy, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, remained at 
large, coalition leaders were confident they would soon be in U.S custody. CJTF-7 decided 
to reinforce their interim success against Saddam’s power base with Operation VICTORY 
BOUNTY at the end of July—a mop-up action intended to sweep up the remaining ves-
tiges of Ba’ath Party militia and Fedayeen in the Sunni Triangle. This operation was the 
last corps-level search-and-attack mission managed by CJTF-7.93 Nevertheless, the scale 
of both Operations PENINSULA STRIKE and DESERT SCORPION began to indicate that 
the gathering resistance to the coalition was larger than just Saddamist remnants and that 
the armed conflict in Iraq might, in fact, be far from over.
AMBASSADOR BREMER AND THE IRAQI INTERIM GOVERNMENT
As the CJTF-7 units continued their hunt for the remaining leaders of the former 
Iraqi Government, Bremer attempted to expand on the efforts of ORHA and Khalilzad 
to create a new government. Bremer hosted meetings with key Iraqi leaders to work 
toward establishing a national Iraqi Government comprised of expatriate leaders and 
appropriate local Iraqis. The pressure for a new government was intense. As early as 
mid-May, CJTF-7 reported that Iraqis at the municipal, provincial, and national levels 
continually “voiced concern with the pace of governmental reform and their desire to 
see Iraqis running Iraq as soon as possible.”94 In December 2002, U.S. policymakers met 
with Iraqi expatriate leaders at a conference in London, United Kingdom (UK). Bremer 
encountered the same group of expatriates soon after his arrival in Baghdad and was 
concerned that they were pushing the United States to establish an Iraqi Government 
run by exiles before local leaders could gain an advantage over them. On June 1, 2003, 
Bremer met with seven of these leading expatriate political figures (at the time known 
collectively as the G–7), including Ahmad Chalabi’s representative for the Iraqi National 
Congress, Ayad Allawi of the Iraq National Accord, Jalal Talabani of the PUK, Massoud 
Barzani of the KDP, Mohammed Baqr al-Hakim and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim’s Supreme 
Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Ibrahim al-Ja’afari of the Da’wa Party, and Nasir 
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Chaderji of the predominantly Sunni Muslim National Democrats. At the meeting, 
Bremer informed the G–7 that an interim authority—as stipulated by UN Security Coun-
cil Resolution 1483—would be established within 6 weeks, consisting of a 25 to 30-person 
political council of nonexpatriate Iraqis appointed by Bremer and the G–7 leaders. The 
political council, intended to be representative of Iraq’s population but without quotas 
for factions, would appoint a chief adviser to each ministry, and take up practical work 
on long-term issues like educational reform, business development, de-Ba’athification, 
and electoral laws and procedures.95
This plan created some significant difficulties for the CPA. First, because it was 
appointing the political council, it was easy for the Iraqis to hold the CPA—rather than 
the Iraqi leadership—accountable for errors in the selection and activities of the interim 
authority. Because the CPA was generally unaware of who the influential local Iraqis 
were, including tribal leaders, it ran the risk of appointing a group of people that, as one 
internal coalition memo put it, “looked like Chalabi and Friends,” an outcome that would 
likely be unacceptable to the Iraqi people. The CPA intended to mitigate that outcome by 
traveling to the various regions of Iraq and, with the assistance of CJTF-7, interviewing 
prospective nominees and other capable Iraqi leaders.96 Although CJTF-7 and its divi-
sions did indeed have better visibility on who were the more capable Iraqi leaders, it, too, 
lacked a common understanding of the Iraqi socio-political landscape and was vulnera-
ble to being manipulated by various factions competing with each other for power and 
territory.
The Raid on the Turkish Special Forces
The fact that some Iraqi groups could manipulate the coalition’s activities accounted 
for what became a serious international incident in July 2003. Although the 101st Air-
borne Division, 4th Infantry Division, and 173d Airborne Brigade were all aware that 
Turkish officials were working with the Iraqi Turkoman Front (ITF) in northern Iraq, they 
were unaware of the type and quantity of Turkish military units operating inside Iraq. 
CJSOTF-N and European Command (EUCOM) had both been tracking the presence of 
Turkish special operations forces in the region, but that information was not provided to 
other coalition units in the area. When Kurdish Assayaish intelligence officials in north-
ern Iraq claimed to the 173d Airborne Brigade that Turkish special operations forces were 
using the ITF office in Sulaymaniyah as a cover for a plot to assassinate Kirkuk’s mayor, 
Colonel William Mayville and the 173d Airborne Brigade received permission to raid the 
ITF’s Sulaymaniyah office on July 4. Once there, Mayville’s troops detained a number 
of armed men and discovered a large quantity of weapons at the scene without a clear 
purpose for their intended use.97 Handcuffed and hooded, the detainees were sent to 
Baghdad, where their captors quickly determined that they, in fact, were Turkish special 
operations troops. U.S. forces removed their restraints, provided them with food and 
water, and eventually released them to Turkish custody.98
The Turkish Government and public, however, did not respond well to the oper-
ation. Inflammatory stories emerged from the Turkish media that the detainees were 
shackled, beaten, and robbed. Turkish generals characterized the incident as the “worst 
crisis of confidence in the two countries’ more than 50-year NATO alliance,” and the 
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Erdogan government demanded an apology for the incident.99 Further disputes emerged 
over the equipment and weapons the 173d Airborne Brigade had seized. The debacle was 
eventually resolved by a joint Turkey-U.S. fact-finding team, which laid out the evidence 
and rectified discrepancies. U.S.-Turkish relations remained tenuous, putting the United 
States in a difficult position when Turkey later pressured the United States to target the 
Kurdistan Workers Party in northern Iraq.100 The incident was one of the first in Iraq in 
which a tactical event had significant strategic consequences.
Departure of the Marines, Arrival of a Multi-National Division
During July–August 2003, I MEF redeployed in its entirety to the United States and 
was replaced by a patchwork coalition division that became known as Multi-National 
Division–Central South (MND-CS). This division, incorporating military contingents 
from 19 countries under a Polish division headquarters, assumed responsibility for Kar-
bala, Babil, Wasit, Qadisiyah, and Najaf Provinces by the end of August 2003.101
U.S. leaders had long intended to put a coalition face on military operations in Iraq, 
and at the beginning of 2003, the State Department and representatives of DoD, Joint 
Staff, and CENTCOM worked with donor countries to piece together a coalition unit to 
insert into Iraq after the regime fell. Most countries that the United States approached 
were only interested in providing forces to conduct stability and support operations and 
did not want their militaries participating in the invasion.102
While the Marines had been reporting a deterioration of public order and an increase 
in small-scale attacks, their area, in general, appeared in July 2003 to be less hostile than 
northern or western Iraq. Most of the non-U.S. coalition contingents were only permitted 
by their governments to conduct stability operations and had much smaller numbers of 
troops and equipment than a U.S. Marine Expeditionary Force. Therefore, CENTCOM 
decided to have the polyglot coalition division take responsibility for the relatively quiet 
Shi’a provinces outside of the British sector.103 Furthermore, some countries had stand-
ing military relationships with each other and understood their military contributions 
depended on those preexisting partnerships. Denmark, for example, had a bilateral 
agreement with the United Kingdom and thus expected to continue that relationship in 
Iraq. The Balkans experience, too, encouraged the United States to organize the smaller 
contributing nations into a single area and retain U.S. exclusive control in other areas.104
When MND-CS began operating in southern Iraq, it contained just under 10,000 sol-
diers from 19 different contributor countries. Poland contributed 2,400 personnel spread 
across a division staff, an aviation battle group, an engineer detachment, support capabil-
ities, and 2 infantry battalions. The second-largest contributor was Ukraine, which sent a 
brigade-sized unit of 1,621 personnel, followed by a 1,300-man brigade from Spain, and a 
433-man engineer task force from Thailand. The rest of the member contributions ranged 
from 25 to 450 personnel with a variety of capabilities including light infantry, intelli-
gence, engineer, civil-military operations, transportation, and medical units.105
Putting all of the non-U.S. and non-UK coalition forces in the same unit and area of 
operations, however, presented serious challenges and inhibited MND-CS’s ability to 
conduct the wide range of missions in which it immediately found itself involved. The 
memoranda of understanding between the United States and the coalition countries were 
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unclear, and military participation by many of the countries was a politically sensitive 
subject.106 As a result, many MND-CS units needed to seek permission from their national 
capitals before executing MND-CS or CJTF-7 directives. The rules of engagement for each 
country, too, were different. Troops from Poland and Ukraine were authorized to con-
duct combat operations, but Denmark and Italy expected their troops to be used exclu-
sively in peacekeeping operations. Consequently, conducting division-level operations 
for MND-CS was nearly impossible, and CJTF-7 orders to kill or capture targets within 
the MND-CS area of operations fell outside some coalition countries’ guidelines. CJTF-7 
also had difficulty incorporating MND-CS into its corps-level operations. It was chal-
lenging, if not impossible, to share intelligence across all countries in the coalition, and 
MND-CS units were already short on intelligence assets. Many MND-CS contingents 
brought communications equipment that was not compatible with U.S. equipment, com-
plicating the already existing language barriers and other general communications prob-
lems. The MND-CS logistical systems were also not compatible with the U.S. logistical 
system, meaning that CJTF-7 often could not provide timely support to MND-CS. Finally, 
the Polish leadership in MND-CS frequently complained that it was not informed about 
CJTF-7’s ongoing special operations and intelligence collection operations in its sector.107
The steadily worsening security on the ground in summer of 2003 made MND-CS’s 
shortcomings a serious matter. The Polish division commander observed a significant 
amount of mission creep in his area of responsibility. Instead of the kind of stability 
operations most of the participating countries had assisted within Bosnia and elsewhere, 
MND-CS contingents found themselves with large-scale reconstruction and humani-
tarian assistance responsibilities as well as limited combat operations, but shortages in 
engineer, military police, military intelligence, transportation, and civil affairs assets 
constrained MND-CS’s ability to execute these activities. By summer’s end, Abizaid’s 
senior adviser at CENTCOM, Colonel Herbert Raymond “H. R.” McMaster, recognized 
the growing difficulties of coalition operations in Iraq and on September 11 outlined the 
pros and cons of internationalizing the military mission. McMaster proposed “assigning 
smaller groups of coalition forces throughout the country” to U.S. or UK contingents 
to relieve those troops of less lethal missions such as guarding infrastructure and basic 
policing “while retaining American forces in all sectors to do the harder jobs.” This move 
would potentially eliminate CJTF-7’s intelligence and communications gap in Iraq’s 
south and prevent political constraints and country caveats from affecting large sectors 
of CJTF-7’s area of operations.108 However, McMaster’s recommendations never came to 
fruition. The transition from I MEF to MND-CS thus substantially reduced the footprint 
of coalition forces while creating a significant drop-off in operations in southern Iraq.
The Decision to Extend Unit Deployments
In late June and early July 2003, Sanchez and Abizaid together recognized the need 
for U.S. ground forces to remain in Iraq longer than Franks had envisioned, and after 
consulting with Abizaid, Keane agreed. In late July, Keane announced that the 101st Air-
borne Division, 4th Infantry Division, and 1st Armored Division would remain in the 
country for a total of 12 months before redeploying, as would some smaller Army units 
serving in Iraq. In addition to reconstruction and counterinsurgency operations, these 
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forces would assist CPA with “developing the new Iraqi police force, provincial defense 
force, and national army.” Keane added that the next major unit rotations would take 
place in February–April 2004, and announced the intent to make the coalition force more 
international.109
The follow-on rotation had a significant contingent from the reserve component as 
well. Two National Guard Enhanced Separate Brigades—the 30th Infantry Brigade from 
North Carolina, and the 39th Infantry Brigade from Arkansas—would deploy to Iraq, 
augmented by the 27th Infantry Brigade from New York, and the 41st Infantry Brigade 
from Oregon. Unlike active duty units, these National Guard units were mobilized for 12 
months, but would only serve a portion of that year in Iraq, owing to the long predeploy-
ment training period. Keane added that engineers and other specialized personnel from 
the Navy and Air Force would join the Army forces to assist with reconstruction efforts. 
These forces were supported by additional contractors, thus reducing the total amount of 
military forces required in Iraq.110
These announcements underscored that the seriousness of the situation in Iraq was 
running counter to the coalition’s original assumptions and timelines and that U.S. troops 
would remain in Iraq much longer than the 6 to 9 months CENTCOM had planned. 
CJTF-7 and its U.S. divisions braced themselves for 9 additional months of working in 
their complex and dangerous environments instead of returning home to the parades 
they had expected to attend by fall 2003.
* * *
The summer of 2003 brought many transitions in military operations and policy in 
Iraq. Some of the transitions occurred because existing organizations required more 
capacity to conduct their missions. Other transitions occurred as a function of differences 
of opinion with the SECDEF, the redeployment of large numbers of forces, or routine 
institutional movements. Bremer’s transition with both Garner and Khalilzad was hasty, 
owing to Bremer’s desire to take over without the involvement of those who had been 
managing Iraqi reconstruction and governance before his arrival.111 Born of frustration 
with both McKiernan and Wallace, and an eagerness to reduce the profile of the Iraq 
conflict, Rumsfeld’s decision to replace Wallace immediately after the invasion put the 
Army’s most junior lieutenant general in command of an increasingly contentious the-
ater. High levels of command and staff turnover left many unit leadership teams without 
experience working with each other, as well as without extensive knowledge of Iraq. 
Additionally, with the exception of Abizaid, the operational- and strategic-level gen-
eral officers with the most resident expertise on Iraq and the emerging enemy picture 
and social dynamics departed the theater. This “brain drain” contributed to the loss of 
momentum in developing a strategy and campaign plan for postwar Iraq. The accom-
panying unit and individual turbulence resulted in haphazard coalition activities that 
dashed the hopes of many Iraqis for a quick transition to a stable, secure, and prosperous 
Iraq.
The senior leader transitions and gaps between commanders at the highest levels also 
created an internal power vacuum of sorts within the military. The virtual absence of 
a CENTCOM commander and a Chief of Staff of the Army during a critical period for 
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reestablishing control in Iraq made it difficult for the new CJTF-7 commander to convey 
the urgency of the Iraq situation to senior U.S. policymakers. Abizaid’s and Sanchez’s dif-
ficulties obtaining resources for Iraq were compounded by U.S. leaders’ focus on disen-
gagement and redeployment. Once Bush announced the end of major combat operations 
on May 1, the view of many U.S. officials in Washington was that the Iraq War was over. 
Meanwhile, armed groups and militias took advantage of the coalition’s flat-footedness 
to gain footholds in various parts of the country, while unchecked reprisals exacerbated 
Iraq’s preexisting ethno-religious rivalries and socio-political fault lines. The operational 
vacuum of summer 2003 provided foreign actors with the perfect opportunity to make 
Iraq a battleground between fundamentalist Islamists and the West.
At the same time, any momentum generated by CJTF-7 units at the local level was 
halted by CPA’s hastily implemented orders dismantling the Iraqi state institutions and 
military. These policies, based on an inappropriate analogy between Ba’athist Iraq and 
Nazi Germany, effectively ceded the initiative to the burgeoning violent resistance orga-
nizations and armed militias. Instead of toppling the regime and instituting a transitional 
government as envisioned in the invasion plans, the U.S. deep de-Ba’athification policy 
and decision to dissolve the entire Iraqi security apparatus effectively collapsed the edi-
fice of the Iraqi state, creating a national governance and security vacuum that would 
take another 6 to 7 years to refill. When combined with abortive reconstruction efforts 
and unmet popular expectations, these factors became major contributors to Iraq’s grad-
ual descent into full insurgency and civil war.
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CHAPTER 7
MUQAWAMA WA INTIQAAM (RESISTANCE AND REPRISALS),  
MAY-AUGUST 2003
As anti-coalition violence mounted in the summer of 2003, the leadership at U.S. 
Central Command (CENTCOM) and Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) believed the 
enemy they faced was rooted in a former Ba’athist Sunni resistance movement with some 
involvement from foreign terrorist organizations and the resurgence of Ansar al-Islam.1 
However, this description far oversimplified the nascent resistance organizations and 
militias building footholds in the vast swaths of Iraq’s uncontrolled territory. The sources 
of Iraq’s instability in the summer of 2003 were far more complex than the Ba’athist hold-
overs and foreign terrorist organizations to which CENTCOM and CJTF-7 attributed the 
violence. All three of Iraq’s primary ethno-religious groups—the Sunni Arabs, the Shi’a 
Arabs, and the Kurds—had preexisting armed militias or militant groups at their disposal 
with which to pursue their separate ambitions. After the regime fell, former Ba’athist 
leaders, the Badr Corps, the Kurds, Islamist terror groups, and some of Iraq’s neighbors 
entered the power vacuum to advance their own separate interests, many of which ran 
counter to the coalition’s objectives for Iraq and also gave rise to a bloody struggle for 
supremacy in post–Saddam Iraq.
THE SUNNIS: DISENFRANCHISED AND EXTREME
Although it was true that many Iraqi Sunnis resented the regime’s removal from 
power, some Sunnis had hoped the coalition would eventually come to recognize the 
value of maintaining Sunni prominence in the Iraqi Government. Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) Orders 1 and 2 obliterated that optimism and turned most Sunnis 
against the occupation force, lending popular support to the disenfranchised former Iraqi 
soldiers, Ba’ath Party officials, and Sunni tribes who were eager to expel the coalition 
presence. Throughout the summer of 2003, former Ba’athist resistance groups, led by 
Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri and a senior Ba’athist leader named Mohammed Yunis al-Ah-
mad, organized attacks against coalition targets in northern and western Iraq. At the 
same time, terrorist organizations, such as Ansar al Sunna and the Jordanian Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi’s Tawhid wal-Jihad (Monotheism and Holy War), focused on breaking up 
international support for the coalition by conducting attacks against coalition partners 
and the United Nations (UN). Sunni insurgents also began intimidating and assassinat-
ing officials of the Iraqi Interim Government.
Disenfranchising the Sunni Tribes
In addition to empowering Sunni Ba’athist loyalists, Saddam had also cultivated 
supportive Sunni Arab tribes and used them to shore up state institutions and consol-
idate power within the Ba’ath Party. He had doled out important government security 
posts, including the minister of defense, the military bureau, and the national security 
bureau to members of his own tribe, and he recruited members of the tribes he favored in 
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Anbar, Ninawa, and Salahadin for service in the Iraqi armed forces, thereby linking his 
regime’s defense interests with a vast tribal network. He had also allowed favored tribes 
to profit from illegal enterprises in their traditional tribal areas, many of which involved 
smuggling and black market activities, during the period of sanctions from 1991 to 2003. 
Saddam frequently allowed his preferred tribal leaders to administer justice and pun-
ishment to their tribesmen, and he doled out goods, services, and resources to tribes and 
tribal sheikhs in his favor.2
Not all of Iraq’s major tribes had prospered under Saddam’s patronage, however. In 
1995, Saddam executed an influential member of the Albu Nimr tribe of Ramadi, after 
which the tribe revolted against the regime and attacked government outposts in Anbar. 
The Albu Nimr were joined in their resistance by the Albu Fahad and the Albu Alwan 
tribes, whose members attempted to assassinate Uday Hussein in 1996. Saddam used 
his military forces and more loyal Anbari tribes to crush these revolts, but resentment of 
Saddam and the regime simmered. Therefore, some Anbari tribes were primed to view 
regime change favorably.3
At the time Saddam and the Ba’ath Party were removed from power, much of the Sunni 
areas of Iraq—Anbar, Salahadin, Ninawa, and parts of Tamim—were still untouched 
by the coalition presence. Having never encountered or fought directly with the coa-
lition, many Sunni tribal leaders believed they and their tribes had not lost the war or 
they attributed the loss to Saddam’s foolishness. As the coalition gradually injected more 
forces into the areas and accepted the surrender of the remaining Iraqi Army units in 
Anbar, many tribal leaders in Anbar waited for the coalition to approach them. Speaking 
with Sunni tribal and religious leaders in summer 2003, CJTF-7 officers dispatched by 
Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez were surprised by what they learned about Sunni 
tribal expectations. The general (and inaccurate) perception among Sunni tribal sheikhs, 
they observed, was that the Sunnis held a numerical majority in the country and were the 
most appropriate choice to run Iraq. The Shi’a, Sunnis believed, were not naturally capa-
ble of doing so. Sunni leaders viewed themselves as the natural allies of the coalition, as 
they shared a common enemy—Iran—and expected that the United States would enact 
a patronage system similar to the one they had enjoyed under Saddam. In exchange for 
a coalition decision to put the Iraqi Government in Sunni hands, these tribes intended to 
keep the Shi’a Iranians out of Iraq and split oil revenues with the United States and its 
coalition partners.4 Many Sunni leaders who had chosen not to fight against the invad-
ing coalition troops had assumed they would be rewarded with key positions in the new 
U.S.-backed interim government. They had not been regime insiders, many Sunnis rea-
soned, and thus expected to be included and even privileged in the post-Saddam order. 
As one prominent Sunni cleric, Ahmed Kubaysi, put it, Iraqi Sunnis had been caught 
between Saddam and the coalition. “[T]hey were between two fires,” Kubaysi told Al 
Arabiyah TV in 2004:
I used to refer to [Iraq] as that time as the Land of Two Fires rather than the Land of Two Rivers. 
They were between the fire of the occupation and the fire of Saddam. That’s why people hoped [the 
best] about the occupation, especially us Iraqis. Our view of America was that it was a country of 
freedoms, democracy and human rights. So people believed Iraq would be put on a new path and 
remain a state cleansed of the elements needing to be cleaned out. . . . That’s why the Iraqi Army 
did not fight in Baghdad.5
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The coalition’s failure to work with the Sunni tribes, combined with CPA’s outreach 
to Shi’a leaders, quickly disabused the Sunni sheikhs of Anbar of the notion that the 
United States had any intention of reestablishing their patronage. When Sunni tribal 
leaders realized that the United States intended to allow the Shi’a the majority share of 
Iraqi Interim Government and, in so doing, reduce the amount of Sunni political control 
and access to state resources, they quickly turned against the coalition. Even before the 
CPA’s actions, though, Anbari leaders, in particular, had already accumulated perceived 
grievances against the coalition. Some Anbari leaders later claimed to have agreed to a 
truce with U.S. troops in the early days of the invasion and that the entry of U.S. forces 
into Anbari cities after the fall of Baghdad was, in effect, an American violation of the 
truce.6 The April 28 riot in Fallujah that ended with U.S. Soldiers exchanging gunfire with 
militants (Iraqi sources claimed 17 locals were killed) had ostensibly begun as a protest 
against this perceived violation, although in hindsight, it is clear that the troops of the 
82d Airborne Division in Fallujah had no awareness of any supposed truce.7 Sunnis were 
also overconfident in their ability to defeat the Shi’a factions and the Kurds in battle, after 
which they expected that the United States would be forced to realize that it must work 
with them rather than the Shi’a to control Iraq. Sunni sheikhs were certain that their lay-
ered network of tribal ties, kinship, and proven ability in battle would eventually restore 
them to power. In the meantime, many began to join forces with other Sunni resistance 
and terrorist organizations to expel the coalition violently from the Sunni areas of Iraq.8
The Ba’ath in Exile
As General John P. Abizaid and, later, CJTF-7 Intelligence “Red Cell” observed, a 
significant portion of the resistance against the coalition in the summer of 2003 stemmed 
directly from the organized remnants of Saddam’s regime. After the regime fell, Sadd-
am’s deputy, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, escaped to Syria with a large amount of the Iraqi 
regime’s money and extensive contacts among former Ba’ath Party leaders, members of 
the Iraqi intelligence service, and Sunni and Sufi tribal and religious leaders with whom 
he had cultivated relationships during Saddam’s faith campaign of the 1990s. Douri’s 
influence under Saddam extended far beyond his official duties as the commander of 
Iraq’s northern military region. Like Saddam, Douri came from impoverished circum-
stances in the Tikrit region. In 1968, he and Saddam participated in the July 17 Revolu-
tion, and the two served together in the early intelligence component of the Ba’ath Party. 
As one of the most trusted members of Saddam’s inner circle after Saddam took the reins 
of power in 1979, Douri became the vice chairman of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command 
Council.9 During the 1990s, Douri operated a network that smuggled European luxury 
cars to Iraq through the Jordanian port of Aqaba, putting him in contact with mechanics, 
smugglers familiar with the cross-border region, and clandestine auto body shops, the 
kind of infrastructure that later was useful in deploying car bombs. Later, as commander 
of Iraq’s northern military zone, Douri controlled the territory that most of his loyalists 
regarded as home, including command of all the Republican Guard units stationed there. 
Douri would later use the money and connections from these networks to become one of 
the chief Iraqi resistance leaders in exile.10
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Because Coalition Forces Land Compo-
nent Command’s (CFLCC) northern offen-
sive had consisted of only a relatively small 
U.S. special operations force accompanying 
the Kurdish peshmerga, Douri was able to 
weather most of the invasion with his core 
supporters more or less intact; his power 
base only crumbled when Baghdad fell. The 
inability of the coalition’s light northern 
footprint to prevent the retreat of Republican 
Guard and Iraqi Army personnel south from 
the Green Line left many of these military 
unit headquarters basically intact in terms 
of the personnel who staffed them, many of 
whom remained loyal to Douri. As coalition 
forces were largely unaware of Douri’s per-
sonal connections, they made little effort to 
identify or dismantle his networks, which 
then went underground and awaited his 
orders.12
Once safely in Syria, Douri attempted to establish a quasi-legitimate government 
in exile. According to one former Syrian official, Douri proposed to Syrian President 
Bashar al-Assad in 2003 that the two rival Ba’athist groups merge their parties into a 
single organization that would wage a war of liberation against coalition forces in Iraq. 
Assad responded by moving instead to subordinate the deposed Iraqi Ba’athists to a pre-
viously obscure Iraqi branch of his own Syrian Ba’ath Party. Only the substantial funds 
that Douri had taken from Iraq’s coffers allowed him to operate with a measure of inde-
pendence thereafter.13
The Ba’athist Islamists: Jaysh Muhammad, Mohammed Yunis al-Ahmad, and Jaysh 
al-Islami
The earliest organized Ba’athist resistance to the coalition occupation emerged in 
the form of an organization called Jaysh Muhammad (Army of Muhammad). Saddam 
directed the founding and initial growth of the organization from his hiding spot in Ad 
Dawr in Salahadin, and the effort was organized in Anbar shortly thereafter as well. In 
its early days, Jaysh Muhammad may have benefited from a large amount of foreign 
currency reportedly taken from Iraq’s Central Bank in April 2003 by Uday Hussein for 
financing armed resistance against the coalition.14 The group planned to wage a guer-
rilla warfare campaign against the coalition to restore the Iraqi Ba’ath to power. Jaysh 
Muhammad initially consisted of a small cadre of low- and mid-level Ba’athist military 
personnel as well as tribesmen drawn from the regime’s core support base.15 Meetings 
in Ramadi in the spring and summer of 2003 resulted in a decision to divide the group 
into four major contingents or battalions. The Awda (Return) Battalion was comprised 
of Ba’ath Party civilian cadres from the Hizb al-Awda (Party of the Return), while the 
Source: Associated Press photo by  Jassim  
Mohammed (© 2012 The  Associated Press).
Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, Vice  
Chairman of the Iraqi Revolutionary 
Command Council.11
173
MUQAWAMA WA INTIQAAM (RESISTANCE AND REPRISALS), MAY-AUGUST 2003
Fedayeen Battalion was drawn from the Fedayeen Saddam; the Army Forces General 
Command Battalion from remnants of the Iraqi military; and the Mujahideen Battalion 
from foreign fighters who remained loyal to the Iraqi Ba’ath after the fall of the regime.16
The group’s access to existing Ba’ath Party networks, political leadership, and militias 
enabled it to grow rapidly and support thousands of former regime loyalists in Iraq and 
Syria.17 As Jaysh Muhammad grew, it maintained a disciplined cell structure and strict 
hierarchy modeled on the prewar Ba’ath Party. Like Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, the organi-
zation’s leadership brokered deals with the Syrian regime that allowed its members to 
purchase supplies in Syria and infiltrate fighters back and forth across the border with 
Iraq.18 Jaysh Muhammad simultaneously created a sophisticated propaganda machine. 
Through its connections to the al-Buraq media establishment, Al Fursan magazine, and 
the al-Zawra satellite channel run by the would-be mayor of Mosul, Mishan al-Jabouri, 
and other Iraqi and Arab media, Jaysh Muhammad enjoyed the most broad-based propa-
ganda efforts of any Sunni insurgent organization in Iraq.19 With plentiful resources at its 
disposal, Jaysh Muhammad eventually expanded its anti-coalition activities from Anbar 
to Ninawa, Salahadin, Tamim, Diyala, and Baghdad.20
One of Jaysh Muhammad’s top leaders was Mohammed Yunis al-Ahmad, a Moslawi 
who was almost unknown to the coalition but prominent in the Ba’ath Party. He had 
been head of the political guidance directorate of the Ba’ath Party under Saddam and, as 
of March 2000, reportedly served as Ba’ath Party leader in Salahadin, Tamim, and Sulay-
maniyah. After the invasion, Ahmad used his connections and supporters in the north-
ern provinces to expand his organization beyond Anbar, eventually organizing attacks 
against the coalition in Anbar and northern Iraq.21 From an early stage after Saddam’s 
fall, Ahmad became a rival of Douri for the succession to Saddam, and the competition 
became the source of future schisms within the former regime component of the Iraqi 
Sunni resistance movement.
The relationship between the Ba’ath Party apparatus and Iraq’s tribal elites under 
Saddam led to the formation of yet another Sunni resistance organization called Jaysh 
al-Islami (Islamic Army of Iraq). After the regime collapsed, a former Iraqi military intel-
ligence colonel named Mohammed Kazem al-Janabi founded the organization in an effort 
to carry out the Iraqi intelligence service’s final orders to continue fighting in the event 
coalition forces prevailed.22 The organization’s principal aim was to force the coalition to 
depart and to establish a Sunni-ruled government in Iraq guided by Sharia law.23 To that 
end, Jaysh al-Islami prosecuted a traditional guerrilla war first against the coalition mili-
tary and later the new Iraqi Army, the Iraqi police, and the Iraqi Government.24
Although Jaysh al-Islami accepted support from Douri’s budding resistance group, 
it had little interest in restoring the former regime outright.25 Its members were drawn 
primarily from the Janabi, Ubaydi, and Zobai tribes and saw themselves as the insti-
tutional continuation of the Iraqi military that was defeated in April 2003. Like Jaysh 
Muhammad, the Jaysh al-Islami leadership maintained a strict, military-style hierarchy 
and chain of command among its fighting groups. Jaysh al-Islami also developed a close 
relationship with the Fallujah-based Mujahideen Shura, or council, led by the Sufi sheikh 
Abdullah Janabi. Through Janabi’s shura, Jaysh al-Islami eventually tapped into a net-
work of extremist clergy and sympathetic donors in the Gulf, culminating in established 
contacts that included Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.26 Jaysh al-Islami also seems to have been 
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bolstered by an influx of Islamist fighters who had been organized by the Ba’athist regime 
before the fall of Baghdad. One senior Islamist militant who had been among the “Iraqi 
Afghans”—Islamist fighters who had traveled to Afghanistan to fight in the anti-Soviet 
jihad of the 1980s—said that he and other militants in the Ba’athist-sponsored Iraqi Quds 
Army continued an irregular resistance against U.S. troops after the fall of the regime and 
had eventually joined their fellow Islamist insurgents in Jaysh al-Islami.27
Mohammed Yunis al-Ahmad’s Jaysh Muhammad and Abdullah al-Janabi’s Jaysh 
al-Islami operated separately from one another, but they shared a common approach 
that would eventually permeate other, similar organizations in Iraq: the use of Islamic 
imagery and themes in describing their resistance movements. Islamist rhetoric would 
grow with time into a major component of these groups’ recruiting efforts, propaganda, 
and competition for resources as the conflict in Iraq’s Sunni heartlands escalated.
The Salafi Resistance
The rise in Salafi influence sparked by Saddam’s faith campaign in the 1990s contin-
ued as coalition forces prepared to invade Iraq in early 2003. Resistance to the invasion 
based on Islamic rather than nationalist principles became paramount in some sectors of 
society after the Islamic Research Center of al-Azhar University in Egypt issued a dec-
laration legitimizing violent attacks against the coalition forces as jihad, or holy war, in 
March.28 This development assisted Salafi militant group Ansar al-Islam as it worked to 
recover from the tactical defeat it suffered at the coalition’s hands in March and April. The 
group had lost its enclave in northern Iraq, its training camps, and many of its veteran 
fighters, but the coalition’s inability to close off escape routes from Kirkuk and Sulay-
maniyah into Salahadin and Diyala allowed surviving members of the organization to 
reach the Sunni Triangle and Iran, where they joined forces with al-Qaeda and other 
Islamist resistance groups. In short order, Ansar al-Islam established a network of safe 
houses and other logistics operations for foreign fighters inside Iraq.29 Ansar al-Islam 
members who escaped the coalition bombings in March and April were able to use that 
network to regroup and broaden their appeal to Iraqis beyond Kurdistan with assistance 
from Douri’s organization and from Zarqawi.30 Signs soon emerged that Ansar al-Islam 
had relationships with surviving pre-invasion Islamist foreign fighters numbering in the 
hundreds in Fallujah, Tikrit, Bayji, and Baghdad.31
In June 2003, members of Ansar al-Islam working for the organization’s military chief, 
Abu Abdullah al-Shafi, broke with group founder Mullah Krekar and initiated a strategy 
to expand Ansar al-Islam beyond its Kurdish roots into an umbrella organization that 
could unite Iraq’s Sunni Islamist groups. In Anbar Province, this new branch of Ansar 
al-Islam established ties to al-Qaeda, which influenced Ansar al-Islam to develop a cell-
based structure similar to al-Qaeda’s, each of which was organized into small units of 10 
to 15 members led by an emir or commander.32 As in al-Qaeda, only a small handful of 
people in the entire organization were aware of or connected to, multiple cells, making 
the organization more difficult to destroy.33 As the group’s membership grew, it reorga-
nized some of its members and cells into battalions consisting of both Iraqi nationals and 
foreign fighters from al-Qaeda seeking to battle the coalition presence inside Iraq.34
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The preferred method of attack for the reenergized Ansar al-Islam was suicide bomb-
ings. Shortly after the fall of the regime, Shafi issued a statement on the group’s website 
informing the world that “300 jihad martyrs” had “renewed their pledge to Allah . . . in 
order to be suicide bombers in the victory of Allah’s religion,” indicating that plans for 
suicide attacks were underway.35 Use of this particular technique marked a dramatic shift 
in Ansar al-Islam’s operations, as it had not previously used suicide bombings during its 
time in Iraqi Kurdistan. Ansar al-Islam’s new relationship and ideological affinity with 
al-Qaeda meant that its core ideology now accepted participants in suicide bombings as 
shahids, or martyrs, in a military campaign against the enemies of God. Unlike al-Qaeda, 
however, Ansar al-Islam did not immediately claim credit for the suicide attacks it per-
petrated, making it more difficult for the coalition to link attacks directly to the group.36
Not all Iraqi Salafis supported armed resistance groups like Ansar al-Islam, how-
ever. Mullah Nadhim Jabouri, a senior Iraqi Salafi from Dhuluiyah who later became a 
leader of the Islamic State of Iraq before joining the Awakening against his former fellow 
insurgents, later recounted that at the time of the 2003-invasion Iraq’s Salafi community 
was divided evenly into two camps. One camp believed that fighting the United States 
was futile, and another camp—led by Iraqi veterans of the Afghan and Chechen wars—
wanted to create a resistance movement modeled on the anti-Soviet jihad. Among those 
who counseled against resistance, senior clerics advised Salafis to wait and observe the 
coalition’s actions for 6 months before resisting, in hopes that the U.S.-sponsored post-
Saddam order would offer a greater role for Sunni clerics like themselves.37
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Tawhid wal-Jihad, and al-Qaeda Prepare to Fight in Iraq
Before becoming a militant icon, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had been a street thug resid-
ing in Zarqa, Jordan, frequently in and out of prison for a variety of offenses. During one 
of his internments, he encountered a charismatic cleric named Abu Mohammed al-Ma-
qdisi, with whom he founded the Sunni extremist network Tawhid wal-Jihad (“Mono-
theism and Holy War”). Maqdisi convinced Zarqawi to dedicate his life to jihad, and 
Zarqawi subsequently went to Afghanistan to join the mujahideen fighting there. In 
addition to working with al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden, Zarqawi developed a sepa-
rate network of militant Islamists across Syria, Jordan, and northern Iraq. Having estab-
lished himself in Ansar al-Islam’s territory after the United States toppled the Taliban in 
Afghanistan, Zarqawi remained affiliated with the Ansar al-Islam organization during 
and after the coalition invasion of Iraq. In addition to hating the Jordanian Government, 
Zarqawi was angry with the UN over its recognition of Israel and was especially angry 
that Jordan and the UN had supported the U.S. intervention in Iraq. He was also viru-
lently anti-Shi’a and, like some of the Sunni tribes, viewed Iraq’s Shi’a as the chief threat 
to Sunni power in Iraq and the wider region. In March 2003, Zarqawi and other members 
of Tawhid wal-Jihad began formulating a strategy to isolate and undermine the coalition 
occupation force and prevent Iraq’s Shi’a from governing the country. To that end, he 
prepared his organization to initiate mass casualty attacks against the coalition and the 
new Iraqi Shi’a establishment, aiming to ignite a civil war along sectarian lines. With 
assistance from two lieutenants—Abu Mohammed al-Lubnani and Abu Anas al-Shami—
he established a training camp in spring 2003 for foreign fighters in Rawah in Anbar that 
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was later destroyed by coalition troops during Operation DESERT SCORPION. After the 
training camp’s destruction, these three worked to expand Tawhid wal-Jihad’s support 
network across the Middle East and Europe.38 Zarqawi’s organization was also bolstered 
by absorbing many of the foreign fighters whom Saddam and his regime had invited into 
Iraq to join the resistance against the coalition in the weeks preceding the invasion. Some 
of these foreign fighters had been among the Fedayeen Saddam who defended the Bagh-
dad Airport against the 3d Infantry Division. Still, others were Syrians or Saudis who 
had been sheltered even before the invasion by tribal relatives in western and northern 
Iraq. Many had simply stayed in place around Baghdad after the regime’s fall and had 
gradually migrated into Zarqawi’s Tawhid wal-Jihad rather than return to their home 
countries.39
Meanwhile, al-Qaeda responded to the coalition invasion of Iraq by circulating pro-
paganda videos and preparing for militant resistance against the coalition. Iraqi sym-
pathizers in Fallujah allowed al-Qaeda to use the city as its base of operations for an 
anti-coalition insurgency campaign. Al-Qaeda reached out to Islamic nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO) for funding and invited Arab members of Ansar al-Islam and Sunni 
fighters from Baghdad to join its ranks as the coalition moved into Baghdad and north-
ern Iraq. On April 25, 2003, al-Qaeda declared jihad in Iraq, and in July established the 
Armed Group of al-Qaeda in Fallujah under a commander known as Abu Iyad. For most 
of 2003, al-Qaeda maintained only a small presence in Iraq focused mainly on indoctri-
nation, propaganda, and recruiting, as well as the development of smuggling networks 
to bring more foreign fighters into Iraq to wage 
war on the coalition.40 Even with a small footprint, 
however, al-Qaeda was capable of organizing and 
conducting effective attacks on the coalition and its 
partners.
Although improvised explosive devices (IED) 
were frustrating the coalition’s operations in the 
summer of 2003, the more problematic attacks were 
mass casualty suicide bombings. Foreign terrorists 
led by Zarqawi initiated a series of spectacular 
attacks against coalition and Shi’a targets begin-
ning in August 2003, with the intent of undermin-
ing international support for the coalition while 
intimidating and fracturing the Iraqi Shi’a religious 
leadership. The first attack occurred on August 7, 
2003, when a car bomb exploded outside the Jorda-
nian Embassy in Baghdad killing 17 and wounding 
40. On August 19, a massive truck bomb struck the 
newly established UN headquarters in Baghdad, 
killing 22 people, including Sergio Vieira de Mello, 
the UN special representative in Iraq.41 Nine days 
after killing the UN’s leader in Iraq, Zarqawi man-
aged to kill the most prominent Iraqi Shi’a politi-
cian. On August 28, a suicide car bomb driven by 
Source: Associated Press photo by Elizabeth 
Dalziel (© 2003 The Associated Press).
Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr  
al-Hakim, Supreme Council for  
Islamic Revolution in Iraq.42
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Zarqawi’s Jordanian father-in-law, Yassin al-Jarad, detonated outside of the Imam Ali 
Mosque in Najaf, killing SCIRI leader Mohammed Baqr al-Hakim and nearly 100 others.43 
These attacks heralded a grim pattern that Zarqawi would follow for nearly 3 years, 
during which time he would cause the coalition to fray and push Iraqis toward civil war.
THE COALITION PERSPECTIVE: GUERRILLA WARFARE AND INSURGENCY
The increase in the number of attacks as well as changing tactics against U.S. and 
coalition military targets in Iraq over the summer of 2003 was an enormous concern for 
CJTF-7 and CENTCOM and drew the attention of Washington as well. Attack numbers 
of 160 recorded incidents against coalition units in May increased to 300 in June, spiral-
ing toward 500 in July. The number of attacks gradually increased to over 600 per month 
through August 2004. More than 90 percent of these attacks occurred in Baghdad, Sala-
hadin, Anbar, Diyala, Ninawa, and Babil, areas with either Sunni majorities or a large 
Sunni minority. CJTF-7 determined after Operation DESERT SCORPION that the loca-
tion of the Iraqi-initiated attacks “shifted from the western Fallujah–Al Qa’im corridor 
to the Balad-Tikrit-Mosul axis, where the perpetrators may have concluded they could 
find residual Ba’athist elements, more receptive locals, and more vulnerable targets.”44 
The attackers in these areas used mostly guerrilla-type hit-and-run tactics such as oppor-
tunistic firefights, drive-by shootings, ambushes, rocket-propelled grenades, and sniper 
attacks against coalition military targets. Beginning in July, CJTF-7 also observed increas-
ing numbers of mortar attacks against military compounds, particularly those in Bagh-
dad, Tikrit, and Baqubah. The attacks had shifted from random targets to planned attacks 
against supply convoys, checkpoints, forward operating bases, and NGOs.45 In August, 
CJTF-7 became aware that some groups—it was unknown whether they were criminals, 
terrorists, or insurgents—were using organized kidnappings for ransom to finance their 
operations. Iraqis saw this last activity as a consequence of the coalition’s failure to fill the 
security vacuum left after removing the regime from power.46
Insurgents also began perfecting their use of roadside bombs, a weapon that proved 
increasingly effective against coalition convoys and softer targets. Due to the easy access 
of explosives, mines, mortars, tank rounds, and artillery shells in Iraq, as well as the low 
level of expertise required to construct these devices, IEDs rapidly became the insur-
gents’ preferred mode of attack against the coalition. IED attacks began sporadically in 
late April and increased steadily for the rest of the year, eventually averaging up to 20 
per day from August to December 2003.47 The casualty rate from these attacks was signifi-
cant: as of early 2004, IED attacks caused approximately 54 percent of coalition casualties.
As insurgent attacks mounted in the summer of 2003, political considerations inhib-
ited CENTCOM’s and CJTF-7’s ability for several months to characterize appropriately 
the enemy the coalition was facing in Iraq. On July 16, Abizaid publicly stated that U.S. 
forces in Iraq were facing a “classical guerrilla-type campaign.”48 Abizaid’s statement 
earned him the ire of Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald H. Rumsfeld, who had 
essentially fired Lieutenant General William Wallace for a similarly candid statement 
about the unexpected nature of the enemy during the invasion. Realizing that the naming 
of the enemy had become a politically charged topic in Washington, Abizaid attempted 
to remove some of the constraints on the verbiage used to describe sources of violence 
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and instability in Iraq. He followed up his public comments with two memoranda to 
Rumsfeld on July 25. In the first memorandum, Abizaid clarified the term “guerrilla cam-
paign” and argued that the composition, activities, and goals of the emerging armed 
groups in Iraq met the definition of an insurgency, “because portions of the enemy [con-
stituted] an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government 
(i.e., CPA/IGC) through the use of subversion and armed conflict.” He noted that the Iraq 
insurgency was not yet at the level of intensity that the U.S. military had encountered in 
Vietnam, but he advised Rumsfeld “we should not deny ourselves the ability to use the 
term insurgency in the future.” In the meantime, he recommended that the U.S. military 
conceive of the enemy in Iraq as employing a “terrorist strategy” and using “terrorist 
attacks and guerrilla warfare tactics.” Abizaid added that coalition operations against 
these actors should be considered “counterterrorist” and “counterguerrilla” activities.49
Abizaid’s second memorandum to Rumsfeld contained his estimate of the enemy 
in Iraq. Reviewing the results of recent offensive CJTF-7 operations in the Sunni Trian-
gle, Abizaid judged the “continuation of our offensive campaign against the Ba’athists 
and other adversaries” as the most urgent priority for the Iraq theater. The two primary 
sources of enemy activity, Abizaid noted, were loyalists of the former regime and radi-
calized Islamists who had found fertile recruiting grounds among a large pool of unem-
ployed and angry youth, especially in the Sunni heartland. These adaptable fighters and 
organizations, however, lacked regional or national command and control and were 
therefore limited to using guerrilla tactics and terrorism to build more popular support.50 
Abizaid also noted that the resistance had a political component, evidenced by names of 
insurgent elements like the Party of the Return (Hizb al-Awda), and he argued that the 
greater problem facing the coalition was the lack of economic opportunity and legitimate 
governance in Iraq:
[The] potential recruits are disaffected mainly because they perceive a lack of progress in economic 
development and political reform. They are facing loss of livelihood, are frustrated by a lack of 
security and basic services, have the perception that they are “losers” due to the termination of 
Saddam-era patronage and de-Ba’athification, have strong nationalist feelings, feel humiliated 
by the rapid coalition military victory over Iraqi armed forces and are suspicious of coalition 
motivations for liberating Iraq as well as coalition designs for the future.51
To combat these sources of instability and violence, Abizaid proposed a reorganiza-
tion of CPA which would extend its presence beyond Baghdad, a comprehensive strategic 
communications campaign, programs for economic development, the strengthening of 
political and judicial systems, and a campaign to gain international support for the recon-
struction effort.52 Abizaid believed the enemy in Iraq, as in Vietnam, was best described 
as a popular resistance organization attempting to overthrow what it considered an ille-
gitimate regime. Thus, without using the politically inflammatory word “insurgency,” 
Abizaid had essentially outlined the roots of an Iraqi insurgency and a coalition counter-
insurgency campaign.
Although Abizaid’s picture of the enemy was accurate in many respects for many 
areas of Iraq, it was missing a few key dimensions. First, Abizaid (and to an extent CJTF-
7) believed that the resistance he was facing was an organized movement that Saddam’s 
security forces had planned in the event of regime collapse.53 In actuality, the former 
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Ba’athist resistance was organized loosely at first, in spite of the emergency directive 
Saddam had issued shortly before the invasion. Second, CENTCOM and CJTF-7 assess-
ments did not place the Sunni-based resistance in the context of Iraq’s tribal system and 
culture or within the rise of Iraq’s conservative religious movements that had begun 
during Saddam’s faith campaign. Finally, the Abizaid memoranda did not mention the 
emergence of Shi’a militias and the extent to which Sunni resistance groups were orga-
nizing to fight against a potential Shi’a ascendancy and Iranian influence.
Despite its concurrence on general themes and trends, CJTF-7’s ability to conceptu-
alize the enemy forces lagged far behind CENTCOM’s. Many of the same analysts and 
operations staff members whose Cold War–era training and simulations prevented them 
from recognizing the role of the Fedayeen and other irregular forces during the invasion 
were also slow to recognize the activities of an insurgent force when V Corps found itself 
transformed into a theater headquarters overnight. Thus, they continued to try to explain 
the enemy in terms of large land forces and other paradigms that were poor fits for the 
intricate, interwoven networks of political militias, former military organizations, and 
tribal and religious affiliates that overlaid all of the hostile activity in Iraq. “One thing 
that always frustrated me was the idea that, unless you could lay out a military-style 
hierarchy of command and control, a bad organization didn’t exist,” recalled Col. Derek 
Harvey, an intelligence officer whom CENTCOM sent to assist CJTF-7 in the summer 
of 2003 and who ended up leading the command’s intelligence Red Cell.54 U.S. units 
were also accustomed to detecting enemy activities and intentions by monitoring large 
camps and military equipment or tracking al-Qaeda–type communications used by com-
paratively few foreign fighters in Iraq. They were not used to gathering information on 
the tribal and other informal networks that were emerging in the aftermath of regime 
collapse. At the tactical level, the human intelligence teams that were capable of collect-
ing information on those networks tended to lack the experience, analytical skills, and 
interpreters necessary for the task.55 It would take months of on-the-job training, and the 
introduction of additional personnel and systems focused on human intelligence, net-
work-based analysis, and cultural analysis before CJTF-7 would gain much traction in 
understanding the true source and nature of the resistance in Iraq.
THE SHI’A: DIVIDED WE STAND
Meanwhile, Iraq’s Shi’a factions fought mostly among themselves in the summer of 
2003, with some breaking off to attack the coalition military or to conduct reprisals against 
Iraq’s Sunni population. Although most were happy to see the Ba’athist regime go, they 
did not agree with the United States and the coalition about the future of Iraq. They had 
long viewed the U.S. decision not to intervene in the 1991 uprisings as a betrayal of the 
Shi’a population, and, despite some collaboration with the United States, many remained 
deeply suspicious of coalition motives for the invasion. Many Iraqi Shi’a leaders also had 
no intention of entrusting the security of their constituencies to the coalition military 
forces and saw regime collapse as an opportunity to exert Shi’a identity and majority con-
trol in Iraq. Efforts to achieve that objective led various Shi’a militias and armed groups to 
attack their Sunni competitors, coalition parties that obstructed those objectives, and each 
other. The Badr Corps remained the best organized of these armed groups, but Moqtada 
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Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM, also known to Westerners as the Mahdi Army) quickly rose 
to prominence as the largest—if not the most proficient—of the Shi’a militias.
Competition Within Iraq’s Shi’a Community
Saddam’s fall from power created a political vacuum that at least four major forces 
within Iraq’s majority Shi’a population vied to fill. The best organized of these forces 
was the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) led by Mohammed 
Baqr al-Hakim and his younger brother Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and its affiliated Badr 
Corps militia. Although SCIRI was well organized and funded, many Iraqis distrusted 
the party because of its ties to Iran and its improving relations with the United States. 
The Shi’a religious community, or hawza, in Najaf and Karbala had far more influence 
on Iraq’s Shi’a constituencies than any political party. However, led by the Grand Aya-
tollah Ali Sistani (who tended to espouse the “quietist” tradition of Shi’a clerisy rather 
than an activist one), their reaction to the change of government in Iraq and the confusion 
that ensued was cautious and hesitant. The third force consisted of educated Iraqi Shi’a 
expatriates like Ahmad Chalabi and Ayad Allawi who had led anti-Saddam opposition 
groups before the war. The fourth and final force was comprised of Shi’a religious fami-
lies and leaders, Moqtada Sadr among them, who had remained in Iraq during the 1980s 
and 1990s when they were suppressed under Saddam’s crackdown in southern Iraq.56
The murder of the young 
Ayatollah Abdul Majid al-Khoei 
by the Sadrists in Najaf in April 
2003 and Mohammed Baqr 
al-Hakim’s assassination by 
the Zarqawists in August exac-
erbated the divisions among 
the prominent Shi’a leaders of 
Iraq, especially between expatri-
ates and those who had stayed 
behind and suffered under 
Saddam. These killings ended 
any hopes that the intra-Shi’a 
competition for power could 
be addressed purely through 
a political process and demon-
strated that Shi’a leaders, too, 
could be targeted. SCIRI and the Sadrists began a low-level propaganda and arms race 
through their militias, while the Da’wa Party worked to gain ascendancy within the polit-
ical process. The Shi’a religious community did little to defuse tensions among these 
groups until violence erupted.58
SCIRI and Da’wa
SCIRI was not the only major Shi’a Islamist political party to oppose Ba’ath Party rule. 
The Islamic Call, or Da’wa Party, was Iraq’s oldest Shi’a Islamist party, forced outside 
Source: Photo published by Muslim Press.
Moqtada Sadr.57
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Iraq by a Ba’athist crackdown in 1979. From the Da’wa Party branch that fled to Iran, the 
Iranian regime had carved out a portion that became SCIRI in 1982 during the Iran-Iraq 
war. Iran supported both SCIRI and Da’wa against Iraq and its Western allies during that 
war, and Da’wa’s most effective militant strike was the bombing of the American and 
French embassies in Kuwait in 1983. For 2 decades, Da’wa remained suspicious of U.S. 
motivations and intentions and participated only reluctantly in discussions between the 
United States and Iraqi expatriate political parties in 2002–2003.59
Although the Iranian regime continued to provide some support to Da’wa after the 
Iran-Iraq war ended, most Iranian aid went to the SCIRI-organized anti–Saddam mili-
tia force, the Badr Corps, an organization initially formed during the Iran-Iraq war by 
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran (IRGC) from Iraqi prisoners of war.60 By 
May 2003, CJTF-7 was tracking the Badr Corps presence in Iraq but was largely unaware 
of Badr’s systematic reprisal attacks against former Ba’athists, which included targeted 
assassinations of Iraqi Air Force pilots.61 Soldiers of Major General Raymond T. Odierno’s 
4th Infantry Division also monitored some of Badr’s reprisals in Diyala and arrested mili-
tia members in a Badr headquarters in Baqubah. Odierno was confused and frustrated 
when orders came from CJTF-7 and the CPA to release members of the Badr Corps, not 
realizing that SCIRI leaders were already using their growing influence with the coalition 
to facilitate Badr activities.62
The Badr Corps had ample time to prepare for these attacks. Captured Iraqi and Ira-
nian documents later revealed that the Badr Corps had four geographic commands, or 
axes, inside Iraq that dated to at least 1999, and each of these commands had experience 
conducting operations against the regime and the Saddam-sponsored Iranian opposition 
group Mujahedin e Khalq. Iraqi intelligence officers believed Badr Corps outposts were 
spread throughout Iraq in hospitals, businesses, and NGOs, including the Red Crescent. 
The Baghdad-based axis of the Badr Corps, one of the group’s more powerful arms, was 
supervised from nearby Bakhtaran in Iran by Hamid A’atabi al-Sheibani, also known 
by the nom de guerre Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani. Sheibani’s group developed extensive 
smuggling routes for moving weapons, relief supplies, men, money, and propaganda 
from Iran into Iraq to resource Badr activities in Baghdad, Diyala, and Wasit. It is likely 
that Sheibani’s group was the arm of the Badr Corps with which Odierno’s 4th Infantry 
Division had difficulties in the summer of 2003.63 These smuggling networks and Iran’s 
involvement with Badr would later be instrumental in funneling lethal support such as 
explosively formed penetrators (EFP) into Iraq to be used against Iran’s enemies and the 
coalition military.
Despite being suspicious of U.S. intentions, SCIRI did not sanction attacks against 
coalition military targets in the summer of 2003 but was unable or unwilling to stop 
some portions of the Badr Corps from collaborating with Iran and attacking the coali-
tion. One senior Badr commander, Jamal Jafar Mohammed Ali, who went by the nom 
de guerre Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis or “the Engineer,” had participated in the Da’wa 
attacks on the U.S. and French embassies in 1983 along with Lebanese Hizballah, and 
he had no love for the United States.64 Muhandis and some senior Da’wa members were 
reportedly unhappy with SCIRI for participating in talks with the United States in 2002, 
and Muhandis allegedly resigned his leadership position in the Badr Corps, leaving the 
group under the control of Hadi al-Amiri.65 Muhandis would later be elected to the Iraqi 
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Parliament in 2005, before fleeing to Tehran once it was discovered that he was linked to 
attacks on the coalition.
SCIRI was weakened politically when Zarqawi’s operatives killed Mohammed Baqr 
al-Hakim in Najaf on August 29, leaving the organization with his younger brother, 
Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, as its leader. The assassination of the elder Hakim brother left 
the Shi’a political sphere more open to competitors like Da’wa, Chalabi’s Iraqi National 
Congress, Allawi’s Iraqi National Accord, and Moqtada Sadr.66 Competition particularly 
increased after Abdul Aziz al-Hakim alienated some of his would-be Iraqi constituency 
by declaring in August 2003 that Iraq should pay Iran $100 billion in reparations for the 
Iran-Iraq war—a hard pill for Iraqis to swallow, coming as it did from an Iranian-spon-
sored expatriate party.
Moqtada Sadr and Jaysh al-Mahdi
For a half-century before 2003, the Iraqi Shi’a religious community had been domi-
nated by three great families: the Sadrs, the Hakims, and the Khoeis. The rivalry among 
these families, each of whom enjoyed a large popular following, had occasionally spilled 
over into violence in the 1990s and would do so again after Saddam’s fall. Mohammed 
Baqr al-Hakim was viewed in the 1990s as the main Shi’a religious rival to Moqtada 
Sadr’s father, and this rivalry reignited as a violent struggle between SCIRI and Sadr in 
2003. Competition and conflict between the Hakims and Sadrists intensified after Hakim’s 
August 29 assassination. Shortly after the bombing that killed him, the Badr Corps sent 
black-clad militiamen ostensibly to guard the sacred Imam Ali shrine in Najaf, while the 
Najaf-based hawza and local tribes hastily pieced together groups of fighters to prevent 
SCIRI from taking control of the city. In the meantime, Sadr increased the size of his 
Mahdi Army militia and established a firm hold on Sadr City in Baghdad. He continued 
to build the Mahdi Army and eventually pushed its overt presence into Najaf.67
In public, Sadr attempted to maintain distance from both Iran and the U.S.-led coa-
lition to signal that he was unbound by foreign influence, a nationalist message that 
resonated with many Shi’a and compensated for the youthful Sadr’s lack of religious 
credentials.68 Unlike his deceased grandfather, father, uncles, and brothers, Sadr was not 
a prominent religious scholar or ayatollah. While this lack of religious education affected 
his ability to influence and gain the support of the hawza, it was not a problem for him in 
street-level politics.69 Privately, however, Sadr needed and eventually accepted support 
from the Iranian regime to achieve his political goals. Even though the main leaders of the 
Khoei and Hakim factions were removed from the equation, Sadr was far from politically 
dominant in Shi’a Iraq in August 2003, and had no specific strategy to gain power. How-
ever, he did receive support from some senior clerics associated with his family, such as 
Grand Ayatollah Kazim al-Haeri, an Iran-based Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps affil-
iate, who announced on April 7, 2003, that Sadr was his official representative in Iraq. In 
accordance with Haeri’s instructions, Sadr ordered his Iraqi Shi’a followers to fill vacant 
administrative and governance posts in the south and in Sadr City.70
Like SCIRI, Sadr needed a powerful militia at his disposal to protect his constituency’s 
interests. In April 2003, armed Sadr followers had provided security for the Arba’een pil-
grimage and engineered the assassination of Sadr’s political rival, Ayatollah Abdul Majid 
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al-Khoei. On July 18, a few days after the CPA formed the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC, 
[see Chapter 8]), Sadr gave a sermon in the Great Mosque in Kufa in which he branded 
the new Iraqi Government nonbelievers and claimed he was setting up a religious army 
called the Mahdi Army.71 Now calling themselves Jaysh al-Mahdi, members of this 
Sadr paramilitary club sought to enlarge the organization by incorporating members of 
the network established by Mohammed Sadiq Sadr in the 1990s. Jaysh al-Mahdi also 
absorbed some of the Shi’a soldiers of the Fedayeen Saddam who lacked employment 
after CPA Order 2 dissolved the Iraqi security organizations.72 Most of Jaysh al-Mahdi’s 
members, however, were the uneducated Shi’a males whom the Ba’ath had repressed. 
Although they were eager to exact revenge on former Ba’athist supporters and to escape 
poverty and political disenfranchisement, the militia was an amateur organization with 
no formal hierarchy. It was, in the words of one of its former leaders, “just groups of 
armed men.”73 Capable military leaders rapidly emerged from its ranks, however, and 
they began training companies and battalions in southern Iraq by the late summer of 
2003.74 In the meantime, Sadr used his Friday sermons at the Great Mosque in Kufa, his 
chosen headquarters, to mobilize his supporters and the Mahdi Army against the coali-
tion presence using protests, propaganda, and other disruptive activities.75
THE KURDS: AMBITIOUS FOR AUTONOMY
Far to the north, the Kurds had enjoyed the advantages of secure autonomy under the 
protection of the northern no-fly zone before 2003. They were hardly eager to give up that 
autonomy after Saddam’s fall. Kurdish leaders had ambitions to extend the geographic 
territory of their autonomous region to incorporate the population center of Mosul and, 
more importantly, the oil fields and financial independence possessing Kirkuk could 
afford them. Moreover, Kirkuk was intrinsically linked to Kurdish identity, and most 
Kurds could not envision a future Kurdistan that did not have Kirkuk as its capital.76
The Kurds already recognized that autonomy demanded patience and a strategy to 
avoid direct confrontation with their U.S. partners. Once the peshmerga and the Kurd-
ish intelligence organization (the Assayaish) entered Mosul and Kirkuk with American 
Soldiers in April 2003, they established offices under the auspices of the Kurdistan Dem-
ocratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), respectively, and encour-
aged a gradual migration of Kurds to those population centers. In Kirkuk, Kurds moved 
into homes recently vacated by Sunni Arabs who had either left of their own accord 
or were intimidated by reprisal attacks the peshmerga carried out against them.77 The 
Kurdish parties then wove themselves into the political and security apparatus of both 
cities, ensuring that Kurdish politicians held key government positions and that mem-
bers of the peshmerga and Assayaish joined the new Iraqi Army and police forces. At the 
national level, Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani used their positions within the Iraqi 
Interim Government and, eventually, Iraqi’s elected government, to press for Kurdish 
autonomy in northern Iraq.78
Like the Badr Corps, the Kurdish parties also carried out attacks against Iraq’s former 
Sunni ruling class in the spring and summer of 2003, though the degree of the repri-
sals was not apparent to the coalition at first. Although Combined Joint Special Oper-
ations Task Force-North (CJSOTF-N) personnel had observed Kurdish resettlement in 
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Kirkuk, they were either unaware of or min-
imized Kurdish reprisals against the former 
Ba’athists who had not fled the city as part of 
forced relocations after Saddam Hussein’s 
fall.79 The 101st Airborne Division, 173d Air-
borne Brigade, and 4th Infantry Division 
troops who moved into Mosul and Kirkuk 
had seen the Kurds as partners because of 
the Kurdish role in the invasion. They, like 
the CJSOTF-N Soldiers, did not realize the 
extent or implications of the ongoing Kurd-
ish reprisals.80 CJTF-7 senior intelligence 
officers observed signs that the KDP and 
PUK were “doing assassinations all the 
way down to Baghdad,” but they believed 
Sanchez considered Badr Corps and Kurd-
ish reprisals to be matters that would sort 
themselves out.81 Many coalition command-
ers thought the same and, in any case, were 
uninterested in angering their Kurdish part-
ners or creating more sources of conflict in 
an already troubled theater. For their part, 
the Kurds, in addition to serving their own 
self-interest, also believed they were assist-
ing the coalition with countering the former 
Ba’athist resistance to the point of detaining 
and, in some cases, killing former Ba’athists 
and bringing them to coalition leaders to show their dedication to the cause.83 Thus, the 
true extent of Kurdish attacks and intimidation against Iraq’s Sunni Arab population and 
the additional resentment it engendered remained largely invisible to CJTF-7.
INTERVENTIONS BY IRAQ’S NEIGHBORS
Turkey
Turkey’s strategic calculus in the wake of Saddam’s fall was dominated by the pros-
pect of Kurdish autonomy. As the coalition would soon discover, Turkey’s most press-
ing concern was that the Iraqi Kurds might gain independence, which, in turn, might 
encourage separatism among the large population of Turkish Kurds residing in south-
eastern Anatolia.84 Turkey was also worried that a Kurdish state would permanently sep-
arate Turkey from the communities of ethnic Turkomans in northern Iraq, leaving them 
stranded in a new Kurdish-dominated northern Iraq. More importantly, the Turks feared 
that Kurdish autonomy would create an alliance between the Kurdistan Workers Party 
(PKK) and the major Iraqi Kurdish parties, after which the KDP and the PUK might 
support renewed PKK attacks into Turkey. Therefore, CENTCOM believed that Turkey 
Source: DoD photo by Helene C. Stikkel  
(Released).
Jalal Talabani, Secretary General of the 
PUK, President of Iraq (2005-2014).82
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intended to mobilize opposition within Iraq to the Kurds’ bid for autonomy or indepen-
dence, especially to prevent the Kurds from controlling Kirkuk.85 This idea and Turkish 
intentions to maintain the integrity of Turkoman communities were evidenced by Tur-
key’s support for Iraqi Turkoman groups that sought to carve out enclaves for them-
selves in Kirkuk and other areas where Turkomans were a significant population. In the 
summer of 2003, Turkey began hosting paramilitary training for Turkomans in northern 
Iraq, a development that alarmed the Kurds.86 For Turkish leaders, the Iraqi Turkomans 
served as a useful tool, allowing Ankara to insert itself into Iraqi politics in order to pre-
vent the United States and the Iraqi factions from taking steps that might compromise 
Turkish interests.
CENTCOM also determined that Turkey would not be reassured by the presence of 
its American North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies in northern Iraq. That presence 
instead “made them nervous and suspicious that the United States intend[ed] to play the 
‘Kurdish Card’ against Turkey to force Ankara to do what it want[ed].” Furthermore, the 
Turkish Government and military had suspected since the 1990s that the United States 
had been planning to foster an independent Kurdish state, through which the United 
States could “threaten Turkey and dominate the Middle East.” “When the Turks look at 
the U.S.,” one prominent American scholar advising CENTCOM on Turkish perspectives 
noted, “they do not see an ally so much as the latest Great Power; and a Great Power by 
its nature seeks to increase its influence throughout a region and will do what it must.”87
Abizaid and his advisers judged that the Turkish Government and military meant 
to increase pressure on their American counterparts to target the PKK in northern Iraq, 
both as a means of testing where U.S. loyalties lay and eliminating a long-time Kurdish 
rebel enemy. Turkey intensified its demands for the United States to attack the PKK—
which had renamed itself the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK)—
after the July 4 incident involving American troops’ detention of Turkish special forces.88 
While U.S. officials agreed that the PKK could not be allowed to continue controlling 
segments of Iraq’s northern border in the long term, CENTCOM, CJTF-7, and 101st Air-
borne Division Commander Major General David H. Petraeus were against taking mil-
itary action against the PKK, given the scale of the other challenges the coalition faced 
in Iraq. Instead, CENTCOM offered to process PKK surrenders and facilitate as many 
voluntary returns as possible from the PKK-populated UN refugee camp in Makhmur in 
Ninawa Province.89 This answer was hardly satisfactory for Turkish leaders, who would 
continue to pressure the United States on this issue for years to come.
Syria
The Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad responded to the invasion of Iraq in the context 
of a broader regional struggle that pitted Assad against the United States and its allies. 
Assad’s posture during the Palestinian Intifada of 2000 made clear that he intended to 
continue his father’s, Hafez al-Assad, policy of support to anti-Israeli militant groups. 
Although Syria denounced the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks and assisted a Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) team in investigating al-Qaeda in 2002, Assad adopted a 
generally anti-Western stance. He was known to have a weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) program, and was in the process of developing closer ties with “axis of evil” 
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states Iran and Iraq when Saddam’s regime fell.90 In May 2002, U.S. Under Secretary of 
State John R. Bolton had labeled Syria one of the seven most worrisome state sponsors of 
terror, and American officials were unsurprised when Syria became one of the few Arab 
states in the region to oppose the invasion of Iraq openly and provided military assis-
tance to the Iraqi regime during the invasion itself. 91
Although the Assad regime continued to oppose the coalition military presence in 
Iraq, it had no desire in the summer of 2003 to provoke the United States openly. Pri-
vately, however, Assad sensed an opportunity to use the conflict in Iraq to undermine 
the United States and strengthen his regime’s leverage in the region. As a result, the 
Assad regime secretly allowed armed insurgent and terrorist organizations to operate 
from Syria so long as none of their attacks occurred within Syria’s borders, a strategy 
in keeping with that practiced by Hafez al-Assad. For most of the 1980s and 1990s, he 
hosted the armed opposition to each of his five neighboring governments.92 Even before 
the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, Bashar al-Assad and his regime encouraged Arab 
mujahideen to enter Iraq from Syrian territory in order to fight against coalition forces. 
One former Iraqi military officer who was assigned to work with Arab foreign fighters 
ahead of the 2003 invasion recalled that the fighters often brought with them personnel 
files compiled by Syrian regime officials.93 Similarly, the former Syrian governor of Deir 
ez Zour Province, Nawaf Faris, revealed in 2012 that after the 2003 invasion:
the regime in Syria began to feel danger, and began planning to disrupt the U.S. forces inside 
Iraq, so it formed an alliance with al-Qaeda. All Arabs and other foreigners were encouraged to 
go to Iraq via Syria, and the Syrian government facilitated their movements. As governor at the 
time, I was given verbal commandments that any civil servant that wanted to go would have 
his trip facilitated, and that his absence would not be noted. . . . Al-Qaeda would not carry out 
activities without knowledge of the regime. The Syrian government would like to use al-Qaeda as 
a bargaining chip with the West—to say: “it is either them or us.”94
In addition to the relationships he maintained with Iraqi resistance leaders like Izzat 
Ibrahim al-Douri and Mohammed Yunis al-Ahmad, Bashar al-Assad also allowed many 
former Iraqi regime leaders, military commanders, and intelligence service members to 
reside inside Syria.95 As the summer of 2003 waned, the United States became increas-
ingly frustrated with Syria’s refusal to turn over senior ranking Ba’athists residing in 
Syria and Assad’s seeming ambivalence about putting more security forces on his bor-
ders to stem the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq.
Assad also had more personal motives for sponsoring former Ba’ath Party members 
on Syrian soil. He wished to resolve the long-standing dispute over regional leadership 
of the Arab socialist Ba’ath Party that had raged between the Syrian and Iraqi Ba’ath 
Party branches since the late 1960s. Beginning in the 1970s, Syrian leader Hafez al-Assad 
and Saddam had both claimed that their regimes were the true leaders of the regional 
Ba’ath Party, and each had hosted a wing of the Ba’ath Party comprised of each oth-
er’s expatriate oppositionists. When Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri arrived on Bashar al-Assad’s 
doorstep in summer 2003 asking for Assad’s assistance in building an armed Iraqi Ba’ath 
organization in exile, Assad seized on the opportunity to assert authority over the Iraqi 
Ba’ath Party once and for all.96 A former adviser to Assad also intimated that Mohammed 
Yunis al-Ahmad’s rise to prominence might have originated as a Syrian initiative in the 
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interest of dividing and controlling the Iraqi Ba’ath Party. Assad reportedly sponsored 
Ahmad and approximately 100 of his followers as an artificial competitor wing to Douri’s 
much larger following, with Ahmad’s branch sustained by Syrian regime money.97 In any 
case, Assad allowed both organizations to gain substantial footholds inside Syria and 
created an easy path for men, money, and materials from a host of insurgent and terrorist 
organizations to transit between Syria and Iraq with comparative ease.
The Iranian Regime
Iran had a greater stake in the future of Iraq than any of Iraq’s other neighbors, and Ira-
nian regime leaders had long considered the survival of their Islamic republic to be inter-
twined with Iraq’s future. Although Iranian leaders were pleased with the disappearance 
of their number one enemy, Saddam, and his Sunni-dominated Ba’athist regime, it was 
unlikely that the United States would establish a new Iraqi Government friendly to Iran. 
While Iranian leaders hoped to see a Shi’a majority rule in Iraq, a Shi’a-led democratic 
government in Iraq might threaten the legitimacy of Iran’s clerical regime. Iranian leaders 
also had to consider that, absent Ba’athist repression, the Shi’a religious centers in Najaf 
and Karbala could become competitors to Iranian primacy in Shi’a Islam, as pilgrims and 
clerics moved far more freely to the Iraqi holy cities than they had been able to do under 
Saddam.98 Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s religious credentials were meager, 
and since he ruled via the principle of velayat e faqih—the belief that an Islamic govern-
ment should be ruled by its supreme clerical judge—the proximity of a non-authoritarian 
Islamic democracy supported by better-credentialed, Iraq-based religious leaders such as 
Grand Ayatollah Ali Husayni Sistani might show the Iranian people an alternative to the 
supreme leader’s Iranian Government.99
Iranian leaders were also likely concerned about the proximity of the American mil-
itary, now present on Iran’s western and eastern borders. To Iranian eyes, if the United 
States retained a close relationship with a democratic Iraq, the new Iraq might become an 
American platform for targeting the Iranian regime.100 To prevent the new Iraqi state from 
becoming too close to the United States, the Iranian regime embarked on a multifaceted 
strategy to bind a new, more federated Iraq closer to Iran while simultaneously forcing 
the United States to withdraw from the region. This strategy involved creating instability 
inside Iraq, placing the responsibility for the chaos on the United States and its Iraqi part-
ners, and ensuring pro-Iranian politicians dominated the new Iraqi Government. Once 
pro-Iranian Iraqi leaders were in place, Iran could then reduce the violence, and their 
Iraqi proxies could claim to be strong leaders who had brought peace and order.101 To 
that end, the Iranian regime would support multiple Shi’a political parties and Shi’a mili-
tias. The regime, through its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, already had close rela-
tionships with Da’wa and SCIRI and would support members of these parties in leading 
positions in Iraq’s transitional government. Iranian leaders also aimed to broaden their 
popular influence in Iraq, and, with this in mind, they reached out to the Sadrists through 
Grand Ayatollah Haeri in the spring of 2003, eventually arranging Sadr’s visit to Tehran 
later in the summer.102
Iran’s IRGC was well equipped to develop the emerging Iraqi Shi’a militias. Through 
its preexisting relationships with the Badr Corps and Lebanese Hizballah, the IRGC had 
created extensive support networks in Iraq and Lebanon and hoped to develop new 
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networks elsewhere. The IRGC’s Qods (Jerusalem) Force also had experience support-
ing militias in the Balkans, and its leader, Brigadier General Qassem Soleimani, had 
expanded the organization’s capabilities to include paramilitary, diplomatic, and intelli-
gence activities. The Ramazan Corps of the Qods Force was assigned to Iraq in the 1990s 
to work with resistance organizations against the Ba’athist regime and the Mujahedin e 
Khalq. The Qods Force used members of Lebanese Hizballah, the Badr Corps, and, later, 
Jaysh al-Mahdi to establish Iranian surrogate military cells throughout Iraq that could 
increase or reduce violent attacks against the coalition on order. The Iranian regime was 
careful not to implicate itself in these attacks, however, because, like the Assad regime, it 
had little desire to engage the United States in open warfare.103
* * *
Tribal disenfranchisement, Sunnis’ gradual return to their Islamic roots, and Syrian 
support for former Ba’ath Party leaders and terrorist organizations fueled Iraq’s Sunni 
insurgency, while terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda and Ansar al-Islam maneuvered 
their way into the same networks in Iraq’s Sunni heartland—a territory covered with only 
a thin coalition presence. CENTCOM and CJTF-7 understood that the bulk of the violence 
directed against them arose from a Sunni insurgency, but were constrained from labeling 
the activity as such and, in CJTF-7’s case, lacked the tools and intelligence experience 
to analyze and comprehend fully this environment. They also overlooked some other 
important contributors to Iraq’s increasingly unstable security situation. Because most 
of the attacks against CJTF-7 appeared to emanate from Sunni resistance and terrorist 
groups and because both CJTF-7 and CPA believed that the bulk of Iraq’s Shi’a remained 
sympathetic to and supportive of their coalition liberators, coalition leaders took the com-
paratively calm security situation in the majority Shi’a provinces for granted. Addition-
ally, the deteriorating security situation in Baghdad and northern Iraq made the coalition 
reluctant to open a second front by attempting to rein in Kurdish or Shi’a militias and 
armed groups. By the time CJTF-7 realized this mistake, the Badr Corps and Moqtada 
Sadr’s JAM militia had spent months extending their grasp on territory and stockpiling 
equipment and ammunition in preparation for war.104
More generally, the power vacuum created by the collapse of the Iraqi state had sent a 
bewildering array of factions rushing to fill the void. The coalition recognized the danger 
posed by the Sunni insurgency, and leaders like Abizaid began to analyze its implica-
tions, but coalition leaders were little aware of the strategic dangers posed by other fac-
tions. An impending Shi’a power struggle, the Arab-Kurd struggle in northern Iraq, and 
the destabilizing intent of each of Iraq’s interventionist neighbors were dynamics the 
coalition did not fully recognize in the first half-year after the invasion. As the months 
passed, these dangerous factors would combine to create a violent political conflict that 
the coalition was hard-pressed to contain.
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CHAPTER 8
MUDDLING THROUGH, AUGUST-OCTOBER 2003
As attacks mounted in the summer of 2003, so, too, did pressure from Washington, 
DC, on the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), 
and Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) to produce a strategy to stabilize the country, 
reduce the coalition military footprint, and transition the reins of government to Iraqi 
control quickly, with oversight from the United Nations (UN)-led international commu-
nity. Efforts to plan the new stabilization campaign and build capacity within the Iraqi 
Government and military were constrained by short time horizons, troop shortages, and 
unrealistic expectations of both the coalition and Iraqi leadership to manage an increas-
ingly complex and hazardous environment. These efforts were further hindered by Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi’s spectacular attacks against coalition partners and the new Iraqi Gov-
erning Council’s even more restrictive de-Ba’athification policy. The theater-wide focus 
on hunting down foreign fighters, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and former 
regime leaders masked the seriousness of the threat posed by intra-Shi’a fighting and the 
rise of Moqtada Sadr’s militia. As these threats gathered, CJTF-7 and the CPA struggled 
to launch the security, reconstruction, governance, and security assistance activities that 
were needed to stabilize the country.
DIFFICULTIES IN FORMULATING A NEW CAMPAIGN
Like many other American leaders, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Richard B. 
Myers was concerned by the 3 months of rising instability that followed the April top-
pling of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Seeking confirmation from U.S. leaders in Iraq that 
the military operations there nested within a viable broader strategy, Myers instructed 
General Tommy Franks, in early July 2003, to work with the CPA to produce an inte-
grated strategic campaign plan for stability and support operations in Iraq. He indicated 
that Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld had instructed Ambassador L. 
Paul Bremer along similar lines. Myers specified that Franks’s campaign plan should be 
ready to present to himself and Rumsfeld by July 23.1
Franks retired 4 days later, handing command of CENTCOM to General John Abi-
zaid without responding to Myers’s request, and the newly installed Abizaid did not 
take up the task of writing a military strategy for Iraq until August. Conversely, Bremer 
published a 57-page “Strategic Plan and Vision for Iraq,” laying out his vision of what 
the coalition needed to accomplish in security, essential services, economic growth, and 
governance on July 22. These four key areas were similar to those in Eclipse II and were 
soon adopted by CENTCOM, CJTF-7, and most of the multinational divisions (MNDs) 
under CJTF-7 command.2
The CPA’s strategic plan, however, was more a list of tasks than a strategy, with overly 
optimistic assessments of the current state of affairs. Most of the document focused on 
the need for future improvements in restoring essential services; much less emphasis 
was placed on security, the economy, and Iraqi governance. Apart from advocating an 
“unprecedented joint civilian and military planning process,” the document did not 
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mention the coalition military troops that would ultimately be responsible for executing 
those tasks.3 At CENTCOM, Abizaid’s approach was more organized, built around “five 
Is”—internationalization, Iraqization, improvement of intelligence, infrastructure con-
struction, and information and strategic communications—the areas Abizaid believed 
were essential for winning Phase IV of the Iraq campaign.4 In late August, the CENT-
COM commander pressed CJTF-7 and CPA to formulate a joint strategy under which, 
as international support and the numbers of capable Iraqi security forces increased, the 
United States and its partners could gradually withdraw their military forces into what 
he called “strategic overwatch.” In Abizaid’s plan, Iraqi security forces (supported by a 
deterrent force of two U.S. Army brigades, special operations units, and strategic air and 
maritime assets) would assume responsibility for Iraq’s internal and external security, 
and U.S. troop levels in Iraq and Kuwait would decrease from a high of 155,000 in the fall 
of 2003, to fewer than 30,000 by the end of 2004.5
While CJTF-7 began building its own plans based on CENTCOM’s, there were essen-
tial differences between Baghdad and Tampa. Unlike Abizaid, who advocated quickly 
putting the main effort in the hands of the future Iraqi Government and security forces, 
Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez intended first to establish security by conducting 
offensive operations against the remaining paramilitary forces in Iraq and hunting down 
former regime leaders on CENTCOM’s “Deck of Cards,” a focus that most CJTF-7 sub-
ordinate divisions shared. In addition, CJTF-7 complained to CENTCOM that the CPA 
turbulent turnover and its overly tight control of resources were limiting the coalition’s 
capacity to create capable Iraqi local governments and security forces in any case. The 
undermanned CPA staff worked on 90-day rotations that hampered any continuity of 
policy and relationships and prevented the organization’s leaders from developing an 
“accurate appreciation of the situation.”6 While CJTF-7 devoted its scarce resources to 
filling offices and providing staff for CPA and enabling important operations like the 
exchange of Iraq’s currency, CPA officials were reluctant to decentralize the sizable funds 
and other resources at their disposal down to the provincial level, creating a disconnect 
between the means and ends for the military units and governance teams charged with 
executing Bremer’s strategic plan.7 The situation was compounded by the fact that CJTF-
7’s future planning was frequently overtaken by events on the ground, so much so that 
the headquarters in its year of existence never completed a written campaign plan to 
synchronize the six divisions it was overseeing.8 This absence of operational guidance, 
combined with Sanchez’s tendency to endorse the various division’s initiatives in their 
disparate regions rather than tell them what to do, meant that his division command-
ers were left mostly to their own devices, managing their own areas, and coordinating 
laterally on enemy organizations or reconstruction projects that crossed coalition unit 
boundaries. Years later, General Raymond T. Odierno recalled that from his perspective 
as a division commander in 2003, he received no operational guidance and had no sense 
of unity of command or a theater-level effort synchronizing division operations across 
the country. As a result, Odierno noted, the 4th Infantry Division’s 2003–2004 rotation 
had been a year-long “movement to contact”—a scenario in which divisions found them-
selves reacting to events on the ground and unable to seize the initiative.9 For his part, 
Sanchez believed his place was at Bremer’s side for much of his command tour, leav-
ing his CJTF-7 deputy, Major General Walter Wojdakowski, to interact with the division 
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commanders—his peers in rank—on operational matters. Sanchez also had no authority 
to countermand Bremer’s orders and policies in writing, meaning that he was unable to 
issue written guidance on how units should manage the difficulties created by de-Ba’ath-
ification and the disbanding of the Iraqi security apparatus, or on the development of the 
Iraqi police and the new Iraqi Army. The result was that both operational and tactical 
commands spent the balance of 2003 reacting to near-term crises without placing their 
activities in the context of a longer campaign.10
The Iraqi Governing Council
On July 13, CPA Regulation 6 recognized a new 25-member Iraqi Governing Council 
as the principal body of the Iraqi interim administration, pending the establishment of an 
internationally recognized, representative government by the people of Iraq.11 Ambas-
sador Ryan C. Crocker, a senior U.S. diplomat, was responsible for organizing a council 
that would be acceptable to the Iraqi people, but he soon found that the leadership body 
and composition of the council were contentious issues. Having hoped the Iraqi Gov-
erning Council could quickly become the executive arm of the new Iraqi Government, 
Crocker and other U.S. officials were dismayed when the governing council’s members 
decided that each of the nine members of the executive council would take turns leading 
the group for 1 month, beginning with Ibrahim al-Ja’afari of the Da’wa Party in August 
2003.12
The creation of the Iraqi Governing Council was also problematic in that it immedi-
ately pitted expatriate elites against Iraqi leaders who had remained inside Iraq. Despite 
the fact that the 25 members were from diverse ethno-religious backgrounds, it was not 
nearly as representative as the CPA had envisioned; rather, it was heavily populated 
by expatriates and reflected its creators’ image of an Iraqi society rather than that of the 
Iraqi people. Two of the most prominent nonexpatriate Iraqi leaders were excluded. The 
coalition considered but decided against including Harith al-Dhari, the head of the Asso-
ciation of Muslim Scholars. Coalition leaders also considered including Moqtada Sadr (or 
one of his representatives) but decided to exclude him because of his role in the murder 
of Abdul Majid al-Khoei in April, after which the spurned Sadr denounced the Iraqi Gov-
erning Council as an illegitimate, foreign-imposed body. Additionally, as former Ba’ath 
Party members were barred from participating in the government by CPA Order 1 and 
the most prominent Sunni leaders were Ba’ath Party members, the council’s creation 
gave the Sunni community the sense that it was being pointedly marginalized. Sunnis in 
northern Iraq complained to Odierno and David Petraeus that they did not see the Iraqi 
Governing Council as legitimate because of its limited Sunni representation, and the gen-
erals reported to CJTF-7 that the popular perception of Sunni disenfranchisement was 
becoming a major problem for them. Odierno further warned that the ambivalent major-
ity of Sunnis in the north would “go to the other side” if the trend continued.13 Bremer 
pushed forward with plans to transition sovereignty to Iraqi authorities in spite of these 
problems and, on September 7, published a description of his planned “Seven Steps to 
Sovereignty” in The Washington Post. Bremer proposed that the Iraqi Governing Council 
should lead the writing of a new constitution, followed by elections, the subsequent dis-
solution of the CPA, and the transition to a normal diplomatic mission in Iraq led by the 
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State Department. These steps came as an unpleasant surprise to Iraqi leaders like Grand 
Ayatollah Ali Sistani, who wanted an elected, sovereign Iraqi Government in place to 
write the country’s new constitution. They also startled U.S. officials in Washington who 
were unprepared for Bremer’s public declaration of a transition process that most senior 
American leaders had not yet endorsed.14
THE RESISTANCE GAINS MOMENTUM
The Sadrist Challenge
As the summer of 2003 waned, Abizaid became increasingly concerned about sectari-
anism, Iraq’s Shi’a south, and Iranian regime influence in Iraq. On August 3, he outlined 
these issues to Rumsfeld and Myers, noting that “the most significant long-term threat 
is the sectarian nature of Iraqi society (i.e., ethnic, religious, and tribal factionalism),” 
and described “intra-Shi’a tensions between the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolu-
tion in Iraq (SCIRI), Da’wa, and Sadr” and Iranian efforts to delegitimize the coalition as 
major sources of instability. These thoughts, however, did not reach CJTF-7, and coalition 
military leaders inside Iraq were unprepared for what happened next.15
On August 13, 2003, Moqtada Sadr’s constituents staged a large demonstration in 
Sadr City after U.S. helicopters allegedly flew over a tower where the Sadrists were flying 
religious flags. Someone in the crowd fired a rocket-propelled grenade at 1st Armored 
Division Soldiers, killing one and wounding four.16 This incident, combined with evi-
dence that Sadr had had a hand in the Khoei killing in April, prompted Wolfowitz and 
Bremer to ask Sanchez to generate military options for seizing Sadr. Sanchez, however, 
pushed back on the idea. In a private e-mail to Abizaid on August 20, Sanchez itemized 
the pros and cons of detaining Sadr, noting that it was impossible to put an Iraqi face on 
the operation and that Sadr’s arrest, injury, or death could make a martyr of him and 
spark violence, creating a “chaotic period of instability that would divert resources and 
play right into the hands of former regime loyalists.”17 Sanchez also judged that Sadr 
himself posed no immediate threat because the young cleric’s ability to muster large 
numbers of people rapidly was unclear and since the hawza (Shi’a clerical seminary in 
Najaf) supposedly was already engaged in a campaign to contain and marginalize him.18 
The CJTF-7 commander was then preoccupied with the devastating suicide attack on the 
UN headquarters in Baghdad that had occurred the previous day and was disinclined to 
arrest Sadr and risk opening a second front with a militant Shi’a movement. Given the 
CJTF-7 commander’s opposition, coalition leaders tabled the matter, though it would 
return to the fore soon enough.
Zarqawi Seizes the Initiative
CJTF-7’s immediate concerns in early August 2003 did not revolve around a new cam-
paign plan or the long-term problem posed by Shi’a militants or the Iranian regime, but 
rather around the increasing numbers of attacks carried out by groups categorized as 
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former regime elements and other Sunni insurgent terrorist organizations. As CJTF-7 
struggled to stabilize Iraq with its multinational partners, Zarqawi moved forward with 
his strategy to fracture the coalition, isolate the United States from international support, 
and ultimately cause the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq. The initial wave of 
attacks began with the car bombing of the Jordanian Embassy on August 7, followed 
by the successive attacks against the UN headquarters and the assassination of SCIRI 
leader Mohammed Baqr al-Hakim at the end of the month.19 Although the UN vowed 
to continue its mission with a smaller number of people, CENTCOM became pessimistic 
about obtaining more international military donors for the mission in Iraq. “After the 
UN bombing, it seems unlikely that we will get the international forces we need for the 
next rotation,” wrote Abizaid’s advisers on August 27. “We should, therefore, bias our 
efforts in favor of Iraqization,” meaning that Zarqawi’s attacks had already altered the 
coalition.20
Hakim’s assassination marked Zarqawi’s first major attempt to provoke the Iraqi 
Shi’a parties into a violent confrontation against their Sunni enemies. Although Abizaid’s 
advisers believed that Hakim’s assassination could draw Sadr and SCIRI closer together 
in an anti-coalition alliance, the exact opposite scenario unfolded. The CPA and CJTF-7 
had bestowed much of their attention on SCIRI as one of the only pro-coalition Islamist 
Shi’a political parties to have national appeal, and this relationship strengthened after 
SCIRI gave the appearance of pacifying a large anti-coalition protest at Hakim’s funeral 
on September 2. Sanchez and other CJTF-7 leaders developed close ties with Hakim’s 
successor and Moqtada Sadr’s principal rival, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, to the point of 
having almost daily discussions with the new SCIRI leader. The perception that the coa-
lition favored the expatriate Hakim hardened Sadrist sentiment against both SCIRI and 
the coalition. Thus, Zarqawi’s Najaf attack had the unintended consequence of bringing 
SCIRI and the coalition closer together and turning the major Shi’a parties further against 
each other rather than immediately igniting a sectarian civil war.21
Troubles in the Sunni Triangle
In August and September, the 82d Airborne Division’s headquarters and its 3d Bri-
gade returned to Iraq to assume control of Anbar from the 3d Armored Cavalry Reg-
iment, which, in turn, moved to the task of securing Iraq’s western border. The 82d 
Airborne Division commander Major General Charles H. Swannack moved his division 
headquarters to Ramadi to interact more closely with the provincial governor and the 
province’s influential sheikhs, and he was augmented there by the 1st Brigade, 1st Infan-
try Division, and a National Guard battalion from Florida. The 82d also inherited a bat-
talion from the 10th Mountain Division in Iskandariyah in the eastern portion of the 
division’s area of operations.22
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Major General Charles H. Swannack (left). Source: DoD photo by  
Staff Sergeant Quinton Russ, USAF (Released).
Major General Charles H. Swannack, CG, 82d Airborne Division (2002-2004) and 
Ambassador Paul Bremer in Front of  
82d Airborne Headquarters, Ramadi.23
On September 12, 82d Airborne Division Soldiers on a nighttime patrol near a Jorda-
nian field hospital in Fallujah observed a police patrol chasing a BMW that had just fired 
on an Iraqi police station. The police patrol turned around when it realized it would not 
catch the BMW, but the Americans mistook the police for insurgents and opened fire, 
killing at least eight policemen and a Jordanian military officer who was with them. The 
82d Soldiers also damaged the hospital and wounded several other Jordanians in the 
area. This incident, which echoed the 82d Airborne Division’s deadly clash with a Fal-
lujah mob in April, came during a period in which Anbari sheikhs began to realize the 
coalition was not going to empower them, and it inflamed local emotions in areas that 
had quieted down after a restive summer. It also compounded Anbaris’ resentment over 
coalition raids and detentions.24
The September 12 Fallujah incident was also emblematic of the greater problem the 
U.S. divisions were having in balancing the winning of hearts and minds with the need 
to protect themselves among regions and societies they did not fully understand. The 
challenge of finding the true enemy actors, combined with mounting casualties and 
insufficient troop numbers, had the potential to prompt emotionally driven reactions 
rather than the precise operations necessary to reduce collateral damage and maintain 
the Iraqi citizens’ support. Wrestling with the potent insurgency in Saddam’s home ter-
ritory of Salahadin Province, the 4th Infantry Division began to receive criticism for its 
tactics, which groups, such as the International Red Cross, claimed were heavy-handed. 
The division was conducting neighborhood sweeps without actionable intelligence and 
arresting angry Iraqis who would join the insurgency after being released, the Red Cross 
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charged. From the division’s perspective, however, its clearing tactics were necessary in 
a region where support for Saddam and hostility toward the coalition had started out 
intense and had only increased. Lieutenant Colonel Steven D. Russell, one of Odierno’s 
battalion commanders in Tikrit, concluded Saddam’s hometown and the surrounding 
areas detested the Americans and would only respond to demonstrations of strength, 
an assessment many other commanders in Salahadin and Diyala Provinces came to 
share as insurgent attacks mounted. Unlike the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul, the 1st 
Armored Division in Baghdad, and the British 1st Armoured Division in Basrah, the 4th 
Infantry Division had no major urban centers in its area, which was dotted with small-to- 
medium-sized towns spread over a vast swath of land of 20,000 square kilometers. Insur-
gent attacks in the division’s area often took the form of indirect fire on the far-flung 
units’ operating bases, and the division thus used counterfire to respond more than other 
divisions did. By the end of his division’s tour, Odierno was controlling 13 counterfire 
radars, virtually as many as a standard U.S. Army corps, and covering as much territory 
as a corps would have been expected to cover before 2003.25
Regardless of the vast differences among the division headquarters, over time, most 
units came to the realization that after engagement with local leaders the nature and 
quality of their Soldier’s interactions with the Iraqis could make or break stability oper-
ations. In urban Ninawa, Petraeus restricted the use of artillery and artillery counterfire 
because of the potential for collateral damage, and also eschewed cordon and sweep 
operations—in which tactical units detained large numbers of military-aged males in a 
single operation—in favor of so-called cordon and knock operations, in which 101st Air-
borne Division Soldiers would knock on the doors of suspects’ residences and ask them 
to turn themselves in to the proper unit. One helpful innovation in division operations 
was the use of female Soldiers to search Iraqi women at checkpoints and to participate in 
search operations. After meeting with local tribal leaders and mukhtars, some command-
ers also began allowing sheikhs to keep women under house arrest or sending female 
Soldiers on cordon and knock operations in order to manage the female family members 
of detainees and female detainees as required. These efforts were crucial to protecting 
the Iraqi male notion of wasta, a combination of influence, honor, and clout. By them-
selves, these measures were not sufficient to impact positively on the entire theater. The 
September 12 incident in Fallujah alarmed Abizaid, who was already anxious about the 
coalition’s messaging to the Iraqi people. Abizaid believed that harsh tactics by coalition 
soldiers hurt the U.S. reputation in the Global War on Terrorism, and, after the Fallujah 
shootings, he spoke in person with Sanchez and the commanders of each U.S. division to 
admonish them about the danger of alienating the Iraqi population.26
Also concerned about alienating the Iraqi people, Sanchez subsequently made a delib-
erate decision to forgo large-scale offensive operations in favor of smaller, more precise 
operations, a step that added to the perception that CJTF-7 was abdicating its respon-
sibility to organize the mission at the operational level of war.27 Even so, CJTF-7 did 
organize some corps-level operations during fall 2003. On October 3, CJTF-7’s Opera-
tion CHAMBERLAIN aimed to disrupt foreign fighter networks and routes from Syria 
into Iraq. The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, moved from Fallujah to the Syrian border 
to oversee Iraqi-manned border points and to deny enemy infiltration from Syria, was 
joined by small contingents of other units, including the 101st Airborne Division, which 
cracked down on smugglers in the Sinjar area. The U.S. units were to prevent all non-Iraqi 
202
THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR
military-aged males (16–45 years old) from entering Iraq from Syria except those clearly 
engaged in legitimate commerce.28 Unfortunately, Operation CHAMBERLAIN was 
largely ineffective in sealing the border. “It was pointless to move forces out to the Syrian 
border because there were too many ways around it,” recalled Col. Derek J. Harvey, 
noting that CJTF-7 did not have the capability to “fully seal the border as it was already 
far understrength in the higher priority areas.”29 Operation CHAMBERLAIN was the 
first of many surges of coalition troops from the country’s center to its border with Syria, 
none of which had a lasting impact on the militant groups that used the border zone as 
a sanctuary.
Militant groups did not need to travel far to find the materials they needed to wreak 
havoc inside Iraq. The enormous amount of ammunition scattered across Iraq remained 
problematic for CJTF-7 because resistance organizations had easy access to small arms, 
rocket-propelled grenades, and artillery shells with which to attack coalition military 
targets, Iraqi civilian leaders, and infrastructure. By mid-September 2003, CJTF-7 units 
collectively identified more than 600,000 tons of ammunition in U.S.-only sectors, includ-
ing 102 large ammunition caches and 3,000 ammunition sites (requiring more than 10 
tractor-trailer loads to move) within the 4th Infantry Division’s territory alone. In Anbar, 
Soldiers of the 82d Airborne Division and 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment counted more 
than 90 ammunition depots in addition to the arms pre-dispersed throughout the prov-
ince. By September 8, 2003, Major General Martin Dempsey’s 1st Armored Division in 
Baghdad had cleared over 1,900 munitions caches. Odierno’s engineers expended all of 
their C4 explosives by September. He proposed letting a contract to assist with ammu-
nition disposal, after which CJTF-7 and the Army Corps of Engineers received funds to 
contract those missions and relieve U.S. Soldiers of the task.30
Brigadier General(P) Martin Dempsey (left), Ambassador Bremer (right).  
Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Reynaldo Ramon, USAF (Released).
Brigadier General(P) Martin Dempsey, CG, 1st Armored Division (2003-2004)  
Briefs Ambassador Bremer About Plans to Renovate the Iraqi Civil  
Defense Corps Academy.31
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More De-Ba’athification
Discontent in the Sunni Triangle deepened as the expanded Iraqi Governing Council 
released a new de-Ba’athification policy on September 20, calling for all level four and 
above Ba’ath Party members to be fired immediately—rendering any exceptions Bremer, 
Sanchez, or division commanders had previously made null and void. Bremer urged the 
governing council to introduce due process and case-by-case exemptions rather than the 
total exclusion of former Ba’athist leaders, to no avail. Despite the draconian nature of 
the Iraqi Governing Council’s measure, Bremer, perceiving himself bound to transition 
the reins of government to a sovereign Iraqi authority as quickly as possible, transferred 
full responsibility for de-Ba’athification to the council on November 4, 2003. The gov-
erning council promptly set up a de-Ba’athification committee led by Ahmad Chalabi’s 
nephew, Salem “Sam” Chalabi, a move that Sanchez later recalled, “might have been the 
worst possible choice, because, from the very beginning, Ahmad Chalabi was adamant 
that no Ba’athists would ever be allowed back into government service. And that’s one 
reason the whole de-Ba’athification order became a catastrophic failure.”32 Ahmad and 
Sam Chalabi wasted no time in exercising their new power, firing 28,000 teachers and 
hundreds of civil servants for alleged Ba’ath Party ties in November alone. Shocked by 
the committee’s aggressiveness, Bremer attempted to rein in Ahmad Chalabi through 
the Iraqi Governing Council behind closed doors but  was unsuccessful. Chalabi, at least, 
was unwilling to relinquish the opportunity to use his access to Ba’ath Party records to 
extort and blackmail former Ba’athists for financial and political gain.33 Speaking to Army 
historians years later, Bremer regretted his decision to hand control of the de-Ba’athifica-
tion effort to Chalabi and other Iraqi politicians, adding in retrospect that he should have 
given the portfolio to a panel of Iraqi judges instead.34
The Chalabis’ new wave of Ba’athist firings came as most coalition divisions had 
begun to manage the fallout from the earlier CPA Orders 1 and 2. The new firings, which 
extended to a large number of Iraqis who were already partnered or even employed 
by coalition units, threw the civil administration of Iraq’s Sunni provinces into disar-
ray again. The development worsened the Sunnis’ already intense fears that they were 
being cut out of Iraqi public life. It also left thousands unemployed without hope of being 
able to get new jobs, and therefore provided a host of new recruits for Sunni resistance 
groups. The division commanders with large Sunni populations in their areas (Petraeus, 
Odierno, Dempsey, and Swannack) argued strongly against the Iraqi Governing Coun-
cil’s new policy and the de-Ba’athification committee’s actions, with Petraeus sarcasti-
cally remarking to Chalabi that, if he insisted on permanently disenfranchising so many 
people, he might as well throw them all in jail. Unmoved, Chalabi retorted, “at least they 
can eat there.”35
With CJTF-7 forbidden to provide formal guidance on managing the fallout from the 
more restrictive de-Ba’athification policies, divisions were left to develop their own con-
sequence management strategies. In Anbar, Swannack and leaders in the 3d Armored 
Cavalry Regiment developed a relationship with a group of 20 former Sunni general 
officers living in the province. These officers, for a small sum, were assisting them with 
local projects and educating them on the needs and attitudes of the province and its citi-
zens, and whom Swannack was trying to get to command segments of the Ramadi police 
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and Anbari Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) battalions. After the 82d Airborne Divi-
sion could no longer formally pay these officers for their advice, Swannack established a 
“grey beard society” consisting of these “retired” officers that he could now continue to 
meet with and pay for their assistance building the new Iraqi security forces in Ramadi 
and Fallujah. The 101st Airborne Division created and funded a similar former Ba’athist 
advisory body in northern Iraq and used some legal loopholes to continue paying sala-
ries to former Ba’athists who were working in key administrative roles or as university 
professors.36 Other units affected by the additional Iraqi Governing Council de-Ba’athi-
fication requirements attempted continued engagement with former Ba’athists who had 
been helpful, but the damage was already becoming permanent in Sunni Iraq.
Challenges Determining the Makeup of the Insurgency
The brewing trouble with Iraq’s Sunni population was not necessarily reflected in 
CJTF-7’s operational priorities, which remained focused mainly on capturing the former 
regime leaders on the CENTCOM Deck of Cards list. There was progress to show on 
that line of effort. On August 21, 2003, 1 month after the operation that resulted in the 
deaths of Saddam’s sons Uday and Qusay in Mosul, special operations forces captured 
Ali Hassan al-Majid (Chemical Ali) north of Baghdad. Chemical Ali’s capture was hailed 
as a major success because coalition leaders believed that many Iraqi Shi’a were reluctant 
to cooperate openly with the coalition out of fear that he might continue from his hiding 
place the reprisals he carried out in 1991.37 
Number 27 on the Deck of Cards list, former Minister of Defense General Sultan 
Hashem fled to his family’s residence in Mosul after the regime collapse. Encouraged by 
the new Ninawa government leadership, who had had positive interactions with 101st 
Airborne Division leaders, members of Sultan Hashem’s family approached the 101st 
Airborne Division leadership through interlocutors claiming that Hashem was prepared 
to surrender to U.S. forces. The 101st Airborne Division subsequently drafted a surrender 
memorandum promising fair treatment, which it sent to Hashem through his family. He 
surrendered at a 101st Airborne Division compound on September 19. After Hashem was 
sent to Baghdad, however, the Iraqi Governing Council demanded that he be hanged, a 
request the coalition fought. Meanwhile, one of Hashem’s relatives, an influential leader 
in the Ta’ i confederation, wrote increasingly hostile papers advocating Hashem’s release, 
which had the unfortunate impact of leading the coalition to arrest him. This arrest out-
raged the Ta’ i tribe, adding to the brewing Sunni tribal resentment in Iraq.38
These significant captures did not take place quickly enough for Rumsfeld, who in 
early November wrote to Abizaid and Myers expressing his frustration with CENT-
COM’s inability to capture Saddam, his senior lieutenants, and Osama Bin Laden quickly. 
In response, Abizaid wrote to Myers on November 10:
This is really an incredible sort of communication. Is this some sort of historical I told you so? Is this 
to cover impending bad news? It is professionally insulting . . . can’t quite fathom why [Secretary 
Rumsfeld] doesn’t understand . . . we follow the Secretary’s orders and guidance without complaint 
or question. We accord him great respect. A little bit of respect in return would do wonders for 
teamwork in this fight.39
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In reality, this top-down focus on high-value targets was inhibiting CJTF-7 efforts to un-
derstand and seize the initiative against emerging terrorist and resistance organizations 
in Iraq. CJTF-7 was still employing a traditional top-down intelligence model in which it 
might push down intelligence and a list of targeted individuals, compounds, and orga-
nizations to its divisions. However, the operational command was not using intelligence 
generated by its divisions to synthesize a common operating picture of the security situa-
tion across Iraq. Sanchez’s intelligence director, Brigadier General Barbara Fast, attempt-
ed to fix the dearth of intelligence resources by asking the 900-man Iraq Survey Group 
for assistance. However, Major General Keith W. Dayton, the ISG leader, rebuffed her 
request.40
 
 
Source: DoD photo by Helene C. Stikkel (Released).
Major General Keith W. Dayton,  
Director of the Iraq Survey Group (2002-2004).41
Meanwhile, the theater-level intelligence assets that CJTF-7 did have access to tended 
to draw the commander’s attention toward foreign fighters who used technology to com-
municate instead of the former regime elements and tribal networks who communicated 
by word of mouth along complex, interconnected family lines.42 CJTF-7 overestimated 
the number and prominence of foreign fighters and foreign terrorist organizations while 
underestimating—and failing to target—the extensive tribal and nationalist influence of 
some of the former Ba’athist organizations. It also failed to detect the evolving alliances 
between tribes and Islamist terrorist organizations in the summer and early fall of 2003, 
all factors that were creating a broader Iraqi insurgency.
The coalition divisions also had difficulty understanding this new kind of enemy orga-
nization, and they developed their own independent assessments that were often biased 
and oversimplified. General Martin Dempsey saw his enemy in Baghdad as threefold: 
Fedayeen and other former regime paramilitary units that survived the invasion; crim-
inal activity; and Islamic extremists, with Ansar al-Islam chief among them. Since they 
viewed extremism as the greatest and most unpredictable threat, Dempsey and his 1st 
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Armored Division primarily focused their operations against Sunni Islamist extremists 
and terrorists and their associated networks moving in and out of Baghdad.43 In Anbar, 
meanwhile, Swannack recalled that his biggest headaches came from the networks of 
fighters that were blossoming in Fallujah, Habbaniyah, and Al Qa’im. Swannack and his 
command identified some of the key sheikhs involved, but like the 1st Armored Divi-
sion, they failed to make the connection between disaffected Sunni sheikhs and Islamists. 
Swannack instead complained that the people of Fallujah lived with a “16th-century 
mentality” and a tribal righteousness that was spawning strong tribal alliances against 
the 82d Airborne Division and 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment units in the province.44 
In the northern provinces, the 101st Airborne Division and 4th Infantry Division had 
a focus similar to that of the 1st Armored Division and the 82d, but the divisions’ close 
partnerships with the Kurds tended to fuel Sunni discontent as the Kurdish presence in 
local governments along and beyond the Green Line continued to expand with coalition 
help. In other words, the relationships that had been so useful during the invasion were 
not entirely productive in the post-invasion period.
Although he was not originally on the Deck of Cards, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi 
appeared at the top of tactical, operational, and strategic target lists beginning shortly 
after the August car bombings, marking a shift from the previous practice of including 
only leaders of the former regime on high-value target lists. As the coalition would later 
discover, the epicenter of the Sunni insurgent movement in August–October 2003 was in 
Anbar, where insurgents aimed to defeat the Iraqi police and control the border areas, 
both of which were necessary for insurgent groups to expand their operations. Police in 
Fallujah and Ramadi and in the border towns of Al Qa’im, Qusaybah, and Rutbah were 
attacked repeatedly. Qusaybah and Al Qa’im were also valuable to insurgents because of 
their location along the same smuggling routes that Saddam’s regime had used during 
the sanctions period, and the profits available from black market trade routes in the area 
led to the rise of a sizable former Ba’athist criminal syndicate from within the Sunni 
insurgency. The coalition did not yet realize that these activities provided resources and 
momentum for the various Sunni terrorist and resistance groups.45
However, the coalition did correctly assess that the Islamist terrorist groups in Iraq 
were becoming increasingly capable and dangerous. In the wake of the CPA and Iraqi 
Governing Council’s de-Ba’athification measures, groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and 
Zarqawi’s Tawhid wal-Jihad in Fallujah began recruiting directly from some of the 
former regime organizations that were blossoming in the province. Zarqawi’s rise―and 
his polarizing influence―also created schisms within the resurgent Ansar al-Islam. Many 
Ansar al-Islam members who had fled to Iran after the April 2003 battle against the coa-
lition ultimately left the group to join either Zarqawi or a new Ansar al-Islam splinter 
group, Ansar al Sunna. International support for the Iraq insurgency also gained more 
traction. During a summit of al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan in November 2003, Osama Bin 
Laden announced that al-Qaeda would begin providing $1.5 million per month to the 
Iraqi insurgency, and he subsequently ordered two associates, Hassan Ghul and Abdul 
Hadi al-Iraqi, to carry that message and a war plan for jihad in Iraq to Zarqawi and other 
like-minded militant leaders. In a stroke of good fortune, the U.S. military unexpectedly 
intercepted that correspondence in early 2004.46
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CJTF-7 AND THE CPA: A TROUBLED QUEST FOR STABILITY
From Caretaker Command to Four-Star Headquarters
When V Corps replaced the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) 
as the CJTF-7 in June 2003, Rumsfeld and Franks both believed that the smaller corps 
headquarters would be a sufficient caretaker command that could manage redeployment 
operations and a transition to Iraqi sovereignty. Abizaid’s July announcement that units 
on the ground would remain in country for 12 months effectively nullified those expec-
tations. As the security situation deteriorated, it became clear that the coalition presence 
would be required beyond March 2004 to ensure the transition to a capable Iraqi authority 
and security forces. On November 6, 2003, Rumsfeld announced that the nearly 100,000 
U.S. troops on the ground in Iraq would be succeeded by a second rotation of approxi-
mately 70,000–75,000 forces, including 20,000 Marines. The Department of Defense (DoD) 
later revealed that the second rotation would consist of a considerable number of Reserve 
and National Guard troops across all the services.47
From an early stage, both Abizaid and Sanchez concluded that the demands placed 
on CJTF-7 were too heavy for an operational headquarters. The military tasks involved 
in supporting the CPA and standing up a functioning Iraqi Government with capable 
security forces would require a fully staffed joint and international strategic headquarters 
commanded by a four-star general, they judged. Raising the profile of CJTF-7 to a four-
star command would also preclude Bremer’s wish to subordinate CJTF-7 to the CPA, an 
idea that Abizaid and his advisers opposed in the interests of protecting CJTF-7 and its 
small staff from being burdened with CENTCOM-level requirements and becoming a 
competitor organization for theater resources.48 In August, the two commanders, Abizaid 
and Sanchez, agreed to propose the establishment of two new headquarters in Iraq: a 
strategic Coalition Forces Command–Iraq (CFC-I) headquarters responsible for theater 
command and control, nation building, and oversight of the strategic campaign plan, 
and an operational-level Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC-I) focused on the operational- 
tactical fight. As for how to build those two commands out of the existing CJTF-7 man-
ning and staffing, Sanchez proposed that the U.S. III Corps based in Fort Hood, TX, serve 
as the foundation for the new MNC-I headquarters, and that the CFLCC and Third Army 
headquarters, then in Kuwait, provide the basis for the CFC-I. Abizaid discussed these 
proposals with CFLCC and Third Army Commander Lieutenant General David D. McK-
iernan, who would present the recommendations for both headquarters to the secretary 
of defense and the Joint Chiefs months later, in December 2003.49
The Troop Number Debate
As the scope of the mission in Iraq expanded in the late summer and fall of 2003, San-
chez and CJTF-7 sought CENTCOM and DoD approval for a troop increase to handle the 
growing military tasks in Iraq. One of the most significant resource limitations Rumsfeld 
imposed on the strategy for Iraq was in the number of troops, which became a politi-
cally charged topic in the summer of 2003. Even though CJTF-7 had requested additional 
forces for Iraq, and the Army had recommended increasing its total end strength to meet 
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the demands of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Rumsfeld was reluctant to commit 
additional forces to Iraq and disagreed with Army leaders that the service’s end strength 
was inadequate for the existing U.S. military commitments. The institutional Army, too, 
wanted forces returned home quickly to reset and prepare for Army transformation, a 
point U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) Commander General Larry R. Ellis made 
in response to General Sanchez’s requests for more forces.50
Instead, on September 16, Rumsfeld directed that the force in Iraq be cut from its 
existing 125,000 to under 100,000 by March 2004, essentially reducing the force by a divi-
sion’s worth of soldiers. The number of allied troops would also eventually have to be 
reduced from 35,000 to fewer than 25,000 by March. Rumsfeld’s insistence on reduced 
troop numbers for Iraq came at a time when the Reserve and National Guard personnel 
who had been mobilized since 9/11 were approaching their 2-year statutory mobilization 
limits, meaning that the Army was about to face critical shortages in intelligence, military 
police, civil affairs, psychological operations, and engineer personnel, many of which 
came from the reserve components.51 By the end of October 2003, Army leaders consid-
ered re-imposing stop-loss (a policy that blocked Soldiers from leaving active service) 
for the active component and using individual ready reserve Soldiers—reservists not 
assigned to any unit, who often had not performed military duties for years—to generate 
augmentees to man the joint headquarters in Iraq.52 Army leaders were also concerned 
about the unpreparedness for combat of reserve component units in light of the 507th 
Maintenance Company ambush in Nasiriyah during the invasion. They estimated that 
any mobilized reserve units would require 3 to 6 months of preparation before entering 
the theater, so that reserve units on a 12-month mobilization would likely only be able to 
serve in Iraq for a total of 6 months.53
“We can barely resource CENTCOM requirements under current conditions and our 
nation is unprepared for global contingencies,” wrote Abizaid’s advisers on October 1. 
“Many describe the current situation as over commitment, but we are really under-re-
sourced. We are committed in areas vital to U.S. national interests.”54 Because the public 
debates about these issues occurred simultaneously, many involved in them conflated 
the request for more troops in Iraq with the discussions about increasing the total Army 
end strength, and Abizaid found himself in the middle of arguments about whether his 
recommended force commitments would “break the Army.” Abizaid’s advisers had 
acknowledged this difficult predicament in a memorandum on August 27:
It is a strange situation when [Senator] Kay Bailey Hutchinson [R-Texas] is calling for an increase in 
Army end strength and the Secretary of Defense (whose options are limited by a shortage in land 
power) is resisting that call. The administration . . . is confusing the troops-in-Iraq issue with the 
debate over force structure and [Army] end strength. It is our sensing that the DoD is using you 
(i.e., “General Abizaid says we do not need more troops.”) to escape from confronting the grand 
strategic dilemma it faces due to a shortage of land power . . . the train wreck in Army readiness 
has already happened—we have simply not yet felt the full effects.55
An Army of Contractors
Rumsfeld’s cap on troop numbers for Iraq had the unintended consequence of bring-
ing more contractors into the theater of operations to compensate for shortfalls in military 
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capacity, greatly expanding the 1990s phenomenon of contracting out traditional military 
functions. American units in Iraq relied on civilian contractors to run military systems, 
assist with reconstruction, and provide logistical support. The greater numbers of con-
tractors on the battlefield brought important benefits but also created some significant 
drawbacks. On the one hand, contractors provided life support that military systems 
alone could not sustain and assisted with missions too large for the overly taxed coa-
lition soldiers to handle, such as the destruction of Iraq’s vast ammunition caches. On 
the other hand, as contracts flowed into Iraq, CPA and CJTF-7 had difficulty overseeing 
the influx. At CJTF-7, only 24 personnel were available to manage contracts for all of 
Iraq, a lack of sufficient oversight that reduced the contractors’ overall effectiveness.56 
For example, Sanchez and his U.S. division commanders complained to Abizaid that the 
Bechtel Company—which worked reconstruction-related projects for the coalition—was 
“wasting time and money on assessments and working on the wrong priorities such as 
schools instead of electricity,” and that reconstruction contracts were “weakly written,” 
with no one to ensure their contractual mandates were fulfilled. Other contracts were not 
appropriately resourced, requiring commanders to redirect scarce troops to support the 
contracts. The Vennell contract to provide trainers for the new Iraqi Army, for instance, 
lacked provisions for Vennell to transport and secure its contractors. As a result, CJTF-7 
divisions had to transport and secure the contractors.57
The Governance Support Teams
In August 2003, CPA followed up the previous month’s establishment of the Iraqi 
Governing Council in Baghdad by establishing small teams of governance capacity advis-
ers for each of Iraq’s 18 provinces. The purpose of these teams was to “bridge the gap 
between national government and the multitude of local governments within Iraq,” and 
to work with the U.S. Agency for International Development and coalition military units 
to execute CPA directives in each of the provinces. Each team was led by a CPA governor-
ate coordinator and was meant to have up to five governance specialists from the Depart-
ment of State or a similar organization capable of governance capacity building.58 Most 
“teams,” however, consisted of only one or two personnel at best, observed Emma Sky, 
the governance coordinator for Kirkuk, whose colleagues in other provinces included, 
among others, the Kurdish-American diplomat Herro Mustafa in Ninawa, the British 
writer Rory Stewart in Amarah, British official Marc Etherington in Kut, and American 
diplomats Michael Gfoeller and Henry Ensher in Hillah and Diwaniya, respectively.59
To support the governance teams, CJTF-7 directed the divisions to establish gover-
nance support teams to act as the military arm of each governorate team and ensure that 
CPA representatives and CJTF-7 units integrated their operations. Consisting of about 
14 Soldiers from the civil affairs branch and other combat support specialties, the gover-
nance support teams answered to the division commanders and were supposed to pro-
vide security, communications, and life support for CPA governorate teams until those 
teams became self-sustaining. Most of the divisions housed the governorate teams and 
governance support teams in their Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOC) and took 
instructions to support the governance support team program seriously. Abizaid also saw 
the concept as an opportunity to redeploy the overworked civil affairs units in the short 
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term so that they could refit for future operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.60 The gover-
norate teams, however, were often poorly manned by CPA representatives who rotated 
every 90 days, making it difficult for the coalition divisions to develop long-term relation-
ships or strategies with them. Fortunately, the governorate teams were not the divisions’ 
sole interface with local governments. Most division commanders interfaced directly 
with Iraqi provincial leadership through their established CMOCs or similar bodies to 
maintain active coalition involvement in building governance capacity. In Baghdad, for 
example, the 1st Armored Division helped organize Neighborhood Advisory Councils 
consisting of neighborhood leaders, or mukhtars, to identify the most urgent reconstruc-
tion and economic needs.61
One operation that leveraged cooperation between the governorate teams and the 
divisions was the exchange of the Iraqi dinar, the value of which had fluctuated wildly 
since the invasion because of counterfeited bills and the introduction of the U.S. dollar to 
local markets. The old Iraqi dinars also came only in two denominations (250 and 10,000) 
and had Saddam’s face on the front. CPA economic analysts worried that absent a cur-
rency exchange, the dinar and Iraq’s economy would collapse. Working with the CPA 
and the CJTF-7 division commanders, Wojdakowski developed a plan to collect the old 
dinars and replace them with the new bills, an operation that CJTF-7 intended to use as a 
rehearsal for introducing and collecting ballots at polling stations during Iraq’s eventual 
national elections. On October 15, helicopters of the new currency began arriving in the 
provinces, and, along with the governorate teams, the divisions and some of the bud-
ding Iraqi security forces and local governments began overseeing the distribution of the 
country’s new post-Saddam dinar.62
Difficulties With Tribal Outreach
Frustrated by the rising Sunni resistance to the coalition, some senior CJTF-7 offi-
cers proposed outreach to Iraq’s Sunni tribes as a means of blunting the growing insur-
gency, believing that absent opportunities to contribute constructively in post-Saddam 
Iraq, Sunni tribal leaders would pursue other options, including to work with anti-coali-
tion resistance organizations and criminal groups, to safeguard the prosperity and secu-
rity of their tribes. The Joint Staff, too, encouraged the CPA to consider engaging those 
tribes that appeared willing to cooperate with the coalition, a proposal on which Bremer 
was reluctant to act. The CPA’s policy stance toward the tribes made outreach difficult. 
Throughout the summer of 2003, Bremer and one of his senior assistants, Meghan O’Sul-
livan, had viewed Iraq’s tribes as an artifact of the past and were reluctant to incorporate 
tribal leaders into even advisory roles. In October, Bremer withdrew coalition support for 
a conference of southern Shi’a tribes arranged by Gfoeller, the regional coordinator for 
south-central Iraq, and endorsed by Iraq’s Shi’a and the coalition at a time when Moqtada 
Sadr’s militia was becoming a strategic problem.63
Despite CPA’s stance, in most areas, tribal outreach was already happening at the 
tactical level as a matter of course. By late summer 2003, most of CJTF-7’s divisions had 
developed connections to important local sheikhs and religious leaders in order to facil-
itate reconstruction, economic development, and governance. Recognizing the value in 
these relationships, CJTF-7 attempted to operationalize them at the corps level. On July 
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31, 2003, CJTF-7 notified the divisions that it intended to develop a comprehensive list of 
influential tribal leaders across Iraq that any unit could use to leverage in their stability 
operations, and also requested that divisions identify the tribal leaders in their areas who 
merited engagement at the national level. As part of its effort to develop a countrywide 
engagement plan, CJTF-7 collected information on tribes that was useful in securing crit-
ical infrastructure. The challenge for the divisions was in identifying the correct leaders 
and tribes. While coalition commanders acknowledged the importance of working with 
tribal leaders, they were often baffled by the complexity of Iraq’s tribal dynamics. “Life 
in the Arabian Peninsula is an intricate tapestry,” Dempsey commented, “and we have 
a very difficult time understanding that.” Dempsey’s troops complained that Iraqi tribal 
leaders constantly lied to them, not understanding that those leaders were often caught 
between their cultural requirement to protect and serve their tribes and what might be 
best for the country as a whole.64
Nevertheless, these limited tribal engagement efforts eventually persuaded Bremer 
that the CPA should have some medium through which to address the mounting tribal 
grievances and encourage more Sunnis to join the political process instead of the resis-
tance. In October, the CPA created the Office of Provincial Outreach, led by British dip-
lomat David Richmond and State Department official Ronald L. Schlicher, to coordinate 
Sunni tribal outreach. However, limited in its authorities to listening to grievances and 
assessing reparations for damages caused by coalition operations, the new office was 
insufficient for initiating tribal engagements that could reverse the trend toward political 
conflict and insurgency.65
Setbacks for the Internationalization Effort
As the CPA and CJTF-7 were branching into local governance in fall 2003, CENTCOM 
continued pursuing its dual main efforts of putting an Iraqi face on the campaign and 
internationalizing the U.S.-led military and reconstruction missions, matters that became 
increasingly difficult from the late summer onward. At the CENTCOM level, internation-
alization translated into engagements with regional and international players to donate 
more financial, humanitarian, and military resources to Iraq reconstruction. It also meant 
building capacity within the multinational forces already operating as part of Multi-Na-
tional Division–Central South (MND-CS) in the mid-Euphrates region, Multi-National 
Division–South East (MND-SE) in southern Iraq, and the small South Korean army force 
in Kurdistan known as Multi-National Division–Northeast (MND-NE). With support 
from CENTCOM, the State Department asked other countries in the Middle East to con-
tribute military and reconstruction resources to Iraq, and Bremer convinced the State 
Department and the Iraqi Governing Council to send Iraqi representatives to a donor 
conference in Madrid, Spain, on September 23 to ask for debt relief, donations, and other 
resources. In southern Iraq, CPA representative Sir Hilary Synnott successfully obtained 
22 additional country donor contributions for the region by explaining “how much more 
pleasant it would be if their staff worked in the south rather than the dangerous Sunni 
Triangle.”66
Despite these accomplishments and some success obtaining international debt 
relief for Iraq, internationalization, on the whole, was unsuccessful. Many Iraqis were 
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unenthusiastic about contributions from Arab countries and Turkey because they viewed 
the provision of aid from neighboring countries as a slight to Iraqi national pride. Coali-
tion Military Assistance Training Team Commander Major General Paul D. Eaton noted, 
for example, that the Iraqi police trainees he sent to the Jordan International Police Train-
ing Center had difficulty adjusting to being trained in a neighbor state that Iraqis had long 
considered a weak satellite of Iraq. The Iraqi Governing Council, meanwhile, judged that 
a Turkish military presence in northern Iraq would upset the delicate balance between 
Kurds and Arabs in the region.67
It was Zarqawi’s activities, however, that truly derailed international participation and 
buy-in for rebuilding Iraq. On September 22, Zarqawi’s organization bombed the remains 
of the headquarters of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) in Baghdad they 
had destroyed the previous month. Although the attack caused far less physical damage 
than the August 19 truck bomb, it proved to be a significant setback to CENTCOM’s 
internationalization campaign when UN Secretary General Kofi Annan announced fur-
ther reductions in UNAMI personnel. The attack also heralded a conscious shift in UN 
perception of what its role should be in Iraq. Shortly after Ansar al-Islam detonated a car 
bomb outside the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad on October 14, the UN Security Council 
passed Resolution 1511, authorizing the multinational force to continue operating in lieu 
of the UN-led mission in Iraq and requiring it to report on the progress being made.68
Slow Start for the Iraqi Security Forces
After Zarqawi’s activities imperiled internationalization efforts, the coalition moved 
its energies into the other priority Abizaid’s advisers had predicted was necessary—
Iraqization. A key component of Iraqization was the building of independent Iraqi secu-
rity forces. Abizaid intended for these forces to serve as a buffer between the coalition 
military and the Iraqi populace and, in so doing, to downplay the coalition’s role as an 
occupying force and mitigate the operational risk posed by shortfalls in U.S. and interna-
tional troop numbers.69 CENTCOM envisioned that the CPA, with assistance from CJTF-
7, would build a security infrastructure consisting of 3 divisions of a new Iraqi Army, 
between 22,000 and 40,000 Iraq Civil Defense Corps troops (akin to a national guard), 
75,000 provincial and national police, 50,000 facilities protection service members, and 
7,000 border guards by the end of 2004. Ambitious as that timetable was, by late October 
2003, DoD leaders considered increasing the overall size of the Iraqi security forces to 
200,000 and accelerating the transition of the security mission to Iraqi control by Sep-
tember 2004. Rumsfeld acknowledged that, in order to create larger numbers of troops 
more quickly, CENTCOM would require some additional resources, and he agreed to 
commit more U.S. troops for that purpose, though it was unclear from where the addi-
tional Iraqi recruits and U.S. trainers would come. De-Ba’athification policies prevented 
much of Iraq’s former military from participating, advising, or serving as leaders in the 
Iraqi security forces, and although CENTCOM proposed that the Army send teams from 
the training base at Fort Jackson, SC, to augment the contractors working for Eaton’s 
CMATT, large numbers of qualified trainers never arrived.70
Another factor inhibiting the development of the Iraqi security forces (ISF) was the lack 
of unity of command at all levels of security force development. At Bremer’s direction, 
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development of the new Iraqi Army and the Iraqi national police service was exclusively 
in the purview of the CPA with CJTF-7 effectively cut out of the process. Fortunately for 
Sanchez and his operational command, Eaton, whose monumental task was recruiting, 
vetting, and training 27 new Iraqi Army battalions in just over a year, made an effort 
to keep Sanchez apprised of his activities, and Sanchez, in turn, provided resources to 
the CMATT mission. Relations between CJTF-7 and the Civilian Police Assistance Train-
ing Team (CPATT), however, were not so cordial. When former New York Police Com-
missioner Bernard “Bernie” Kerik arrived in midsummer 2003 to take charge of CPATT 
and countrywide police development, one of his first actions was to prohibit CJTF-7 and 
its divisions from hiring any new police until the international police training center in 
Jordan became operational. This dismissed the fact that CJTF-7 units had already begun 
working with and training police recruits on their own.71
One of the outcomes of the dysfunction between Kerik and the coalition military units 
was that the Iraqi police, already suffering from corruption and questionable manning, 
became the most problematic of the Iraqi security services. The police forces suffered 
from disparate methods of training and equipping and nepotistic hiring practices, while 
the police rosters were filled with “ghost police,” who were on payroll but did not actu-
ally show up for work. In September 2003, CJTF-7 reported that more than 60,000 of the 
planned Iraqi police force of 77,000 were working, but only around 30,000 of those were 
actually policing. The rest of the “ghost police” were receiving pay, and these invisible 
police were only one symptom of a much larger problem. On September 16, Bremer cau-
tioned Abizaid and Rumsfeld that it would take at least a year to build a capable police 
force and advised those watching the numbers of police in briefings not to be fooled 
by those statistics.72 CENTCOM’s own concerns about the Iraqi police grew along with 
the size of the police force. On November 18, Abizaid’s advisers concluded that, with 
insufficient resources to support accelerating police development, the ineffectiveness 
of CPATT and its director, and CJTF-7’s lack of logistics to support the program, “it is 
increasingly clear that the [Iraqi Police Service] is a potential point of failure in Iraq.”73 
During a Thanksgiving visit to Iraq, Abizaid spoke with a battalion executive officer 
whose thoughts on the matter accorded with Abizaid’s misgivings about the status of the 
Iraqi police and tactical problems with the Iraqi security forces writ large.
The Iraqi police are broken to an almost indescribable degree. For the first few weeks of ‘joint 
patrols,’ we literally had to chase them down in the streets to get them to walk with us. I had to 
coerce an IP to get him to complete a foot patrol with me. The situation is slowly improving, but 
the police still have no radios, limited uniforms, not enough weapons, and no windows or doors 
in any of their police stations. We still have a long way to go before they’re ready to be partners in 
keeping the peace.74
Beyond the police, the overall Iraqi security forces development mission was suffer-
ing from a lack of consistency in terms of composition, resources, and organization. The 
Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) was an initiative that originated with the 101st Airborne 
Division as a means of leveraging unemployed former Iraqi security personnel and tribal 
militias to support the scarce U.S. military footprint on the ground. As different divisions 
adopted the ICDC concept, CJTF-7 attempted to support the endeavor, intending for the 
ICDC to assist the coalition military temporarily with internal security. The ICDC was 
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meant to eventually be disbanded, integrated into the new Iraqi Army, or form the basis 
for an Iraqi reserve or national guard force. Because Sanchez was blocked from overt 
involvement with the security force development mission, he gave little guidance about 
how each division should develop their ICDC battalions.75 As a result, unit approaches to 
ICDC and police development were mixed. CJTF-7 reported in December that the ICDC 
was “widely recognized by the Iraqi people” as a capable and effective force, but in actu-
ality, coalition units struggled to get weapons, uniforms, and vehicles for their ICDC 
battalions and police. Training and equipping across those forces was far from standard-
ized.76 Some commanders diverted their increasingly scarce Commanders’ Emergency 
Response Program (CERP) funds to the Iraqi security forces instead of to reconstruction 
projects, while others did not, leading to impressive police and ICDC training academies 
in a few regions that could not be duplicated across the country. Iraqi security leaders 
tended to give conflicting accounts of the types of equipment they “needed” for their 
forces—pistols in particular—but those requests, too, were only met for isolated units 
and not for the entire Iraqi forces.77 The training and equipping of the CJTF-7-led Iraqi 
security forces missions continued in a disparate fashion until the Iraqi forces generally 
failed in the large-scale violence that would come in spring 2004.
The recruiting mechanisms that CJTF-7 units used for the ICDC, Iraqi police, and some 
of the other security services created another problem. Coalition units often recruited 
tribes, militias, or families wholesale into specific units or branches of service, expecting 
that Iraqi nationalism would naturally tie them to the national interest. Unlike the new 
Iraqi Army, whose individual recruits came from all regions and sects of Iraq, CJTF-7 
divisions recruited the ICDC, Iraqi police, facilities protection service, and border police 
members locally and trained them in their native towns. This is similar to the U.S. Army 
National Guard—a practice based on the premise that home-based forces would have the 
greatest stake in the security of their local areas.78 The same was true for the local Iraqi 
police units created by the coalition divisions. Coalition officers eventually determined 
that many on the local police payroll were relatives of Iraqi Government officials and 
tribal leaders who used the police pay system as a means of providing incomes to their 
families and tribes. Over time, the tribal militias that the coalition divisions hired came 
to be absorbed into the border police and facilities protection services as part of the coa-
lition’s objectives to transfer Iraq’s borders and critical infrastructure to the control of the 
national government. When combined with CJTF-7’s inability to organize security force 
development at the operational level, local recruiting efforts meant that a significant por-
tion of the ICDC battalions, local police, border forces, and facilities protection services 
created by the divisions, though marginally capable, remained loyal to parochial rather 
than national interests.79
The Coalition’s Tactical Adaptations
Although there was scant synchronization of offensive operations at CJTF-7, each divi-
sion gradually developed what its leaders believed were effective methods to regain the 
initiative against enemy forces. In Baghdad, the 30,000 soldiers under Dempsey’s com-
mand sought to maintain security in a city of 5.6 million people spread across 94 military 
zones through aggressive traffic control points. Judging that it was not feasible for the 1st 
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Armored Division to sustain large numbers of presence patrols or traffic control points, 
Dempsey decided to shift from that defensive posture to precision operations against 
the Fedayeen, criminals, and extremist groups like Ansar al-Islam that he believed were 
disrupting the division’s efforts to restore security. Dempsey also had his units closely 
monitor the city’s mosques for harbingers of future unrest. Far to the west at the Syrian 
border, the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment experimented with techniques to interdict for-
eign fighter routes coming from Syria. Establishing a wide net to block ingress and egress 
routes at certain hours of darkness, the cavalrymen then conducted multiple cordon and 
search operations within that net, using the intelligence and documents acquired in those 
searches to build targeting packets for the next night’s operations, a technique the 82d 
Airborne Division adopted in the remainder of Anbar Province.80
The initial shortage of information about Iraqi society and locally based resistance 
groups, while problematic at the operational level, did not prevent the divisions from 
finding innovative methods of better understanding local adversaries. Although regula-
tions of the time prohibited personnel untrained in human intelligence from being human 
intelligence collectors, most divisions acknowledged that “every soldier was a sensor” 
and began to incorporate information from tactical patrols and chance engagements with 
Iraq’s citizens into their intelligence analysis. The divisions gradually expanded the use 
of smaller unmanned aerial vehicles and direction-finding platforms, resulting in more 
accurate targeting of hostile actors.81
The 1st Armored Division, 4th Infantry Division, and the 82d and 101st  Airborne Divi-
sions each began incorporating external units and agencies working within their battle 
space into their operations and targeting processes. In Baghdad, Dempsey created a tar-
geting board comprised of his own maneuver units, civil affairs, and information oper-
ations personnel along with other agency representatives to wage an undeclared “Battle 
of Baghdad” against former regime elements entering the city from rallying points in the 
Sunni Triangle.82 Farther north in the 4th Infantry Division sector, Odierno established 
a functional relationship with special operations and other national agencies to share 
intelligence and prepare joint operations against the high-value targets listed on CENT-
COM’s Deck of Cards.83 The close collaboration between the 4th Infantry Division and 
special operations forces allowed each to capitalize on the other’s strengths.84 In Anbar, 
Swannack likewise organized weekly meetings between his commanders and the special 
operations forces working in the province to determine joint targets and develop opera-
tions against them.85 In Ninawa in September 2003, Petraeus formed a Joint Inter-Agency 
Task Force (JIATF) to synchronize intelligence assets and deconflict disparate conven-
tional and unconventional operations against hostile forces in the 101st Airborne Divi-
sion’s area. The JIATF included representatives from CPA’s governorate teams, special 
operations forces, and interagency officials who were working in Mosul, including the 
Iraq Survey Group, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the intelligence community. 
JIATF-North’s (JIATF-N) work led to synchronized raids against a large number of tar-
gets, including some of the organizers of Mohammed Yunis al-Ahmad’s Hizb al-Awda.86
Rarely, however, did CJTF-7 synchronize the operations of these tactical, joint, and 
interagency organizations with its own offensive operations or synthesize the associated 
tactical information and intelligence across the division battle spaces. As a result, while 
the tactical units could judge that they were achieving some success in their respective 
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areas, seams along the division boundaries remained to offer opportunities for Sunni 
resistance organizations to organize large-scale attacks across the theater.87
As the 1st Armored Division would later describe in its after action review for its 
2003–2004 deployment, U.S. divisions found themselves conducting offensive and sta-
bility operations simultaneously, forcing them to adapt and integrate lethal and nonle-
thal effects into their targeting processes. Personnel and expertise shortages also forced 
division commanders to employ significant portions of their forces in nontraditional 
operations. In Baghdad, Dempsey found that he had to send maneuver Soldiers to sup-
port civil affairs missions and make maneuver commanders responsible for distributing 
CERP funds for reconstruction projects. A shortage of infantry Soldiers for patrolling and 
civil affairs Soldiers for reconstruction also led the 4th Infantry Division and the 82d Air-
borne Division to retrain their artillerymen and other Soldiers to conduct patrols and civil 
affairs operations. They also decentralized military police, intelligence, and other division 
support units across their maneuver brigades, which became a widespread practice.88
Although commanders in the 4th Infantry Division maintained separate targeting 
processes for lethal and nonlethal operations to avoid confusion, some units began inte-
grating the two into the same process to improve their understanding of complex envi-
ronments and deconflict the fine line between hostile and helpful behavior. In the 101st 
Airborne Division, an Integrated Effects Working Group merged representatives of the 
lethally focused JIATF-N with experts working on governance, reconstruction, and eco-
nomic development to determine the most useful ways of approaching problem areas 
in Ninawa and the Kurdish provinces. The 4th Infantry Division eventually moved to 
this same model and, by the end of their time in Iraq, had transitioned to a blend of 
operations that was 10 percent offensively focused and 90 percent focused on reconstruc-
tion. Another by-product of the blended targeting operations was that those working at 
CMOCs and other civil affairs–oriented units understood how to incorporate informa-
tion provided by grateful and concerned local citizens at their centers into the targeting 
of hostile activity, while those troops focused on offensive operations could also identify 
local grievances that were best resolved by nonlethal means. The result was that many 
units moved to a targeting model that not only identified whom to watch or capture, but 
also which local leaders to engage, where and what type of reconstruction projects were 
most needed, and how best to distribute resources across an array of missions.89
A common topic in these integrated targeting boards was the employment of the 
CERP, a tool that all the coalition divisions agreed was one of their most critical enablers 
in post-regime Iraq. CJTF-7 divisions all expanded the use of CERP funds beyond recon-
struction projects to microbusiness loans, food, salaries, and equipment for the Iraqi 
security forces under their control, as well as compensatory payments for the families 
of citizens who were wrongly detained or harmed during offensive operations. The 1st 
Armored Division spent a considerable amount of its CERP funds reopening national 
hospitals and clinics, building or renovating local government buildings, and support-
ing the national judiciary and legal system. The 82d Airborne Division used CERP to 
refurbish mosques during Ramadan in an effort to curb anti-coalition sentiment among 
Anbar’s population. The 101st Airborne Division used CERP to establish a Northern Iraq 
Office of Judicial Operations and an anticorruption office as well as the Eagle Village of 
Hope, which provided low-cost housing and job- skills training to underprivileged Iraqi 
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citizens. In Basrah, Major General Graeme Lamb in MND-SE was grateful to receive U.S. 
CERP support because the British Government did not provide sufficient funds to sup-
port his reconstruction efforts. Abizaid and Sanchez continued to press the CPA, which 
remained focused on large-scale reconstruction projects, to decentralize funding from the 
Iraqi ministries down to the provinces and get the additional CERP funds authorized in 
a new supplemental budget pushed down to the tactical level.90
The Sadrist Challenge Continues
Although Moqtada Sadr’s followers appeared more subdued after the unrest of 
August 2003, their resentment had simply been turned from a boil down to a simmer, 
and CPA’s apparent endorsement of the Sadrists’ main rivals, the Hakims and SCIRI, as 
part of the Iraqi Governing Council had only widened the rift between Sadr and the coa-
lition. The Sadrists grew further incensed when SCIRI began using its influence with the 
coalition to extend the reach of the Badr Corps militia. SCIRI leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim 
had lobbied CJTF-7 to use the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps as a vehicle to disband or absorb 
armed militias, including the Badr Corps, after Bremer declared all militias illegal. When 
Hakim offered that CJTF-7 could transform the Badr Corps battalions into ICDC battal-
ions in Najaf, Bremer countered in September with a proposal to integrate Badr Corps 
members into the ICDC as individuals―an offer Hakim accepted. For Iraqi observers, it 
appeared that Hakim had the ability to influence both the Iraqi Governing Council and 
the coalition leadership and that it might not be long before he could use the Badr Corps 
to attack Shi’a rivals as well as Sunni militants.91
Since the minor Sadrist uprising in Baghdad in August, Dempsey’s troops had 
observed Sadr’s men taking over administrative buildings and mosques responsible for 
overseeing the financial management of the holy Shi’a shrines. This convinced Dempsey 
that Sadr’s activities in Sadr City, Kadhimiyah, Karbala, and elsewhere were “less aimed 
at gaining political and religious influence and more at gaining financial influence” that 
would enable Sadr to grow his militia and expand his future power.92 Dempsey’s concerns 
were realized sooner than he anticipated. Shortly after denouncing the Iraqi Governing 
Council, Sadr announced that he would work with other similarly disgruntled parties 
to form an alternative governing council based in Sadr City. He then strengthened his 
position by sending Jaysh al-Mahdi militia to “guard” the Najaf hawza in early October, 
effectively putting the Shi’a religious leadership under his physical control and prompt-
ing Deputy SECDEF Paul Wolfowitz to again press for military options for detaining or 
killing Moqtada Sadr. On October 11, Abizaid briefed Wolfowitz that the coalition could 
seize Sadr within 3 to 4 days. It was a step Bremer strongly endorsed, but that Abizaid 
and Sanchez both opposed for the same reasons they had raised in August. The gen-
erals were ultimately successful in convincing first Wolfowitz and then Rumsfeld that 
cracking down on members of Sadr’s militia was more effective and less disruptive than 
capturing Sadr himself. A few days later, troops from the 1st Armored Division joined 
forces with the Polish division in MND-CS to forcibly expel the Sadrists from the shrine 
in Karbala, after which CJTF-7 installed handpicked replacements for the Sadrists on the 
council in Sadr City. After this confrontation, coalition officials observed that the Friday 
prayers led by the Sadrist firebrand cleric Abdul Hadi al-Daraji at the al-Ahrar Mosque 
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in Sadr City drew significantly fewer listeners than before the raids, from which the coa-
lition concluded that Sadr and his Mahdi Army lacked the power to counter the coalition. 
Dempsey and CJTF-7 judged that they had neutralized the Sadrist threat by showing the 
militia members that there was no sanctuary in the sacred shrines.93
By the end of October 2003, the British also seemed to have the situation in Basrah in 
hand, though their relative isolation from the rest of CJTF-7 prevented them from seeing 
the province’s connection to the greater Shi’a challenge. Nor did their American partners 
to the north keep them fully informed. Like the other multinational forces, the British ini-
tially could not access the secure internet the U.S. military used to distribute orders and 
reports, and CJTF-7 did not begin converting to an international network until late 2003. 
In the meantime, governance coordinator Synnott observed in November that MND-SE 
was not a British fiefdom, isolated from the forces at work in the rest of Iraq. In his estima-
tion, the Sadrist “infection” was spreading into the British sector from MND-CS, and he 
was unable to convince nervous clerics in Nasiriyah to speak out against Sadr. This was 
among the first indicators that the Sadrists were far from contained and, though tempo-
rarily off balance in Najaf, Karbala, and Baghdad, were quietly extending their grasp to 
Iraq’s largest southern population centers.94
* * *
Faced with shortages, increased hostility from Sunni resistance groups, terrorist 
attacks against the international presence, and an organizational energy drain because 
of supporting the understaffed CPA, CJTF-7 provided only scant operational guidance, 
leaving its divisions to operate independently, with few linkages across their division 
areas of operations. Disparate approaches to operations meant that some unit areas flour-
ished while others bore the brunt of the rising insurgency. Zarqawi and other insurgents 
took advantage of CJTF-7’s lack of synchronization, exploiting unit boundaries and blind 
spots to organize increasingly lethal attacks against the coalition military and its part-
ners. Far from being neutralized as CJTF-7 believed, Sadr and his militia had sustained 
only temporary setbacks, employing an operational pause to regroup in support of Sadr’s 
longer-term ambitions.95
As CENTCOM and coalition commanders were beginning to discover, the truly deci-
sive operation in Iraq was not the combat phase, but the stability phase that almost no 
one had prepared for and that neither senior civilian leaders nor senior U.S. commanders 
were prepared to allocate sufficient time or resources to complete properly.96 An increas-
ingly unstable, dangerous environment began draining international support for the 
Iraq effort, and, when combined with pressure from the Pentagon to redeploy the inva-
sion force quickly, the ambitious timelines proposed in new campaign plans from CPA, 
CENTCOM, and CJTF-7 to transfer responsibility to the Iraqi Government began to move 
from difficult to impossible.
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CHAPTER 9
DOWN THE SPIDER HOLE, OCTOBER-DECEMBER 2003
During the fall of 2003, the coalition found itself in a precarious situation whose dan-
gers it was slow to acknowledge. The haphazard security operations of that summer and 
fall generated thousands of Sunni prisoners the coalition had not been prepared to hold, 
leading to startling revelations about the state of detention operations. The Combined 
Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) began to realize that the former regime insurgency and the 
growing foreign insurgent elements were much stronger than coalition leaders had ini-
tially thought. Though tactical operations from October to December ultimately would 
lead to the capture of Saddam Hussein, they also would show that the insurgency was far 
more than just a rebellion intended to return Saddam and the former regime to power.
ABU GHRAIB AND THE EMERGING DETENTION PROBLEM
As the number of detainees in coalition custody approached 10,000 in the fall of 2003, 
CJTF-7 and its divisions struggled to manage this growing detainee population.1 Coa-
lition units had few reliable means to track detainees or an accurate way to determine 
their names and identities. Iraqis, including tribal sheikhs and Iraqi Governing Council 
members, complained of the difficulties in obtaining information on the whereabouts of 
their constituents’ relatives in the coalition’s custody. This situation bred resentment and 
undermined General John P. Abizaid’s August 2003 pledge to Iraqi leaders to “free inno-
cent detainees with help from the local leaders.”2
The coalition’s detention facilities proved unfit. The looting of the former regime’s 
internment facilities had left the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and CJTF-7 with 
an Iraqi prison infrastructure that was inadequate for the numbers and types of detainees 
captured by the coalition divisions. Both Ambassador L. Paul Bremer and Lieutenant 
General Ricardo Sanchez were reluctant to reopen the vacated Abu Ghraib prison, given 
its notorious role as a torture site under the former regime, but they had few options. A 
CPA report in the summer of 2003 concluded that Abu Ghraib was the only prison facility 
in condition for quick restoration to house maximum security inmates.3
Sanchez put the 800th Military Police Brigade, a U.S. Army Reserve unit commanded 
by Brigadier General Janis L. Karpinski, in charge of detention operations at Abu Ghraib, 
with Colonel Thomas M. Pappas and his 205th Military Intelligence Brigade responsi-
ble for leading interrogations and obtaining intelligence from the prisoners. However, 
the two brigades lacked personnel trained in detention and interrogation. The prob-
lem, immediately apparent, greatly slowed the vetting of detainees and the separation 
of those high in intelligence value from those whose information lost value over time. 
The military intelligence brigade had to stretch its small contingent of interrogators and 
interpreters to support Abu Ghraib while it continued with its primary task of providing 
intelligence to the corps headquarters.4
After 6 weeks as commander, Sanchez visited Abu Ghraib in August 2003 to get a 
better understanding of the burgeoning insurgency from the detainee population. What 
he saw alarmed him. Located in the middle of a former Republican Guard area with 
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a pro-Saddam population, the Abu 
Ghraib facility experienced almost 
daily mortar and rocket attacks. The 
military policemen, who also lacked 
combat experience or training, were 
ill-prepared to secure the facility on 
their own. Sanchez attributed the mil-
itary police brigade’s ineffectiveness 
to a lack of training and to Karpinski’s 
failed leadership. Although he decided 
not to relieve Karpinski in the absence of 
a replacement, Sanchez placed Pappas 
formally in charge of Abu Ghraib.5 His 
concerns also led him to try to consol-
idate detention operations in a series 
of fragmentary orders in late summer 
2003. Sanchez requested outside assis-
tance to advise him and his units on 
how to manage detainee operations.6 
In the meantime, the situation at Abu 
Ghraib worsened as the detainee popu-
lation grew. By October, the 7,000-man 
detainee population at Abu Ghraib out-
manned the 92 military police on duty 
there, by approximately a 75:1 ratio, compared to the 1:1 ratio used at the Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba, detention facility. To fill their personnel shortfalls, both brigades turned to 
contractors who often lacked training in military interrogation techniques, policy, and 
doctrine, a measure that had serious consequences.8
The Status of the Detainees
These detention problems were compounded by the coalition’s internal confusion 
about the legal disposition of those in CJTF-7 custody and how they should be handled in 
detention and interrogation. It was unclear, for instance, whether the Fedayeen and those 
detained after major combat operations ended were enemy prisoners of war (EPW) who, 
by law, should be treated under the provisions of the third Geneva Convention; civilian 
internees or detainees treated under the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention; or 
“unlawful enemy combatants,” a category that U.S. officials in Washington had ruled 
were not entitled to the protections guaranteed to EPWs under the Geneva Conventions.9 
Options for trying the detainees included courts martial, military commissions, and the 
Iraqi courts, each with its advantages and disadvantages. Courts martial generally were 
appropriate only for U.S. military personnel under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 
Military tribunals could result in a death penalty sentence—an outcome opposed by the 
United Kingdom and the international community. The Iraqi courts, in their infancy, 
proved inconsistent in 2003. Ultimately, it was determined that the prisoners CJTF-7 had 
in custody did not meet the criteria of enemy prisoners of war and that they should 
Source: U.S. Army photo (Released).
Brigadier General Janis L. Karpinski,  
Commanding General, 800th Military  
Police Brigade.7
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instead be treated as civilian internees covered under the statutes of the fourth Geneva 
Convention.  At the same time, it was decided that relatively few met the criteria for 
“unlawful combatants,” a category that President George W. Bush outlined in a February 
7, 2002, memorandum that instructed the U.S. military how to treat the al-Qaeda and Tal-
iban fighters on the battlefield in Afghanistan.10 The decision to categorize CJTF-7 prison-
ers as civilian internees gave those captured considerable legal protections, including a 
requirement for semi-annual reviews of their detention status. Like many decisions made 
in the first few months after the end of major combat operations, it became an unchanged 
precedent that had a profound impact on the conduct of the war.
The Abu Ghraib Abuses
The nebulous legal status of detainees created fertile ground for abuse and miscon-
duct. After September 11, 2001 (9/11), and the invasion of Afghanistan, the President 
approved a set of methods labeled “enhanced interrogation techniques” for use against 
“unlawful enemy combatants” that many believed were prohibited by the Geneva Con-
ventions.11 This decision opened the door for those interrogating “unlawful enemy com-
batants” to use a host of methods not listed in the Army’s field manual for intelligence 
interrogations, Field Manual 34–52. Confusing and inconsistent unit policies on inter-
rogation techniques resulted in methods involving “mild physical contact” that were 
outside the Geneva Conventions guidelines but used in order to obtain time-sensitive 
intelligence on terrorist activities. At an American detention facility in Bagram, Afghani-
stan, two Afghan detainees died in U.S. custody in a November 2002 incident that did not 
result in any changes until after the scandal at Abu Ghraib became public in 2004. Sanchez 
later would assert that the Army’s reluctance to acknowledge the Bagram abuses com-
mitted by Soldiers of the XVIII Airborne Corps prevented it and U.S. Central Command 
(CENTCOM) from rectifying the greater problems of legal interrogation procedures.12 
In the absence of specific guidance from the Army, CENTCOM, or CJTF-7, interrogators 
in Iraq during 2003 relied on Army FM 34–52 and on unauthorized techniques that had 
migrated from loosely supervised interrogations in Afghanistan. Elements of the 519th 
Military Intelligence Battalion, which had just come from Afghanistan, became respon-
sible for managing interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib in late July 2003. It prepared 
draft interrogation guidelines that closely resembled the standard operating procedures 
used by special operations forces in Afghanistan in 2003. Many of those techniques did 
not conform to the Geneva Conventions.13
At the CJTF-7 level, however, Sanchez and other senior leaders apparently were 
unaware of the Afghanistan connection and the Bagram incident. They only knew that 
their Soldiers struggled to manage interrogations of suspected Iraqi insurgents and 
foreign terrorists. In Mosul, the 101st Airborne Division reported it was investigating 
alleged detainee abuse by Soldiers from one of its intelligence companies, a development 
that revealed not just Soldier wrongdoing but also the greater problem of inadequate 
experienced personnel and infrastructure to support detention and interrogation oper-
ations. In the 4th Infantry Division’s area, Major General Raymond Odierno observed 
similar problems and, recognizing that he was unlikely to receive the resources needed 
to manage his large detainee population properly, began sending increasing numbers 
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of his division’s prisoners to Abu Ghraib, a facility the 4th Infantry Division presumed 
was more professionally run than the division’s local detention centers. Odierno and his 
division had little idea that the theater detention center in Baghdad was as fraught with 
problems as those run by the divisions.14
Sanchez’s request for outside assistance on detention operations was fulfilled when 
Major General Geoffrey D. Miller arrived on August 31 with a team from the detention 
facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to evaluate the strategic interrogation of detainees in 
Iraq. Miller’s team identified many problems with the detention facility at Abu Ghraib 
and received Sanchez’s approval to make on-the-spot adjustments to military police and 
military intelligence operations at the facility and to detainee segregation methods.15 But 
Miller’s primary focus concerned the effectiveness of interrogation operations. On Sep-
tember 9, he advised that CJTF-7 should train a dedicated guard force that was “actively 
engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation of internees.” In other words, 
he recommended that military police at Abu Ghraib should create an environment in 
support of military intelligence interrogations.16 After conferring with CENTCOM on 
October 12, Sanchez issued a new CJTF-7 policy, authorizing methods “only slightly 
stronger than those in FM 34–52.”17 However, different units interpreted the new policy 
differently. Pappas later stated that the policy was explained to his military intelligence 
brigade as “the things you can and can’t do with interrogations.” The 800th Military 
Police Brigade was not briefed on Sanchez’s new policy because it was not responsible 
for interrogations. This created additional confusion between the two commands at Abu 
Ghraib.18
Miller’s was not the only detention-related assistance CJTF-7 received. On October 13, 
Army provost marshal Major General Donald J. Ryder arrived in Iraq with a second team 
to inspect CJTF-7 internment practices. Ryder and his people found that deficiencies in 
manpower and training in the detention system in Iraq created the potential for human 
rights abuses, although he noted that “no military police units purposely [applied] inap-
propriate confinement practices.”19 On November 6, Ryder discussed his findings with 
Sanchez, including Ryder’s reservations about Karpinski’s ability to command and his 
proposals for new procedures for in-processing and managing detainees.20 Ryder also 
made recommendations about overall corrections systems management, legal processing 
for detainees, and plans to transition the theater detention facilities to an Iraqi-run correc-
tions system, all recommendations that CJTF-7 planned to adopt.21
Unfortunately, Ryder’s recommendations and Sanchez’s policy changes came too 
late. Between October 25 and November 6, 2003, at precisely the time the Ryder team 
was inspecting CJTF-7 detention facilities, Abu Ghraib became a site of prisoner abuse 
and maltreatment. Soldiers from the 372d Military Police Company, a reserve unit from 
Maryland, arrived at Abu Ghraib on October 13 and were assigned guard duty in the 
section housing Tier 1 detainees, those considered most dangerous. On October 25, just 
12 days into its deployment, the untrained and poorly supervised Soldiers dragged a 
prisoner around the cellblock on a cargo-strap leash while taking photos of the detainee 
and Private First Class Lynndie England.22 This behavior degenerated further when, on 
November 3, an Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) interrogator brought to 
the Tier 1 section a new prisoner suspected of involvement in the killing of five Amer-
icans and instructed 372d Military Police Company Sergeant Charles Graner to subject 
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the detainee to stressful treatment in order to 
soften his resistance to questioning. Graner 
shouted at the man while forcing him to 
stand hooded on an empty box for hours at a 
time.23 Joined by fellow military policemen, 
Sergeant Ivan “Chip” Frederick and Spe-
cialist Michael Smith, Graner attached the 
detainee to some loose electrical wires hang-
ing from a wall, telling him that if he moved 
he would be electrocuted.24 Other detainees 
were sodomized, stacked naked in human 
pyramids, beaten, and raped. None of the 
Soldiers knew that the photos of their acts of 
abuse from that week would surface months 
later and cause a worldwide uproar.
At the time, Sanchez, CJTF-7 intelli-
gence chief Brigadier General Barbara Fast, 
Karpinski, and Pappas were unaware of 
these abuses, which would not come to 
light until early 2004. However, Sanchez’s 
concerns increased on November 5, when 
an Iraqi detainee died at Abu Ghraib while 
being questioned by non-Department of Defense (DoD) U.S. interrogators—just 2 days 
after Graner’s as-yet-unknown abuse incident. The man had died from blows to the 
head in an incident that a DoD autopsy ruled a homicide.26 While Sanchez remained 
concerned about detention issues, he was convinced for the moment that other agencies 
were responsible for the worst abuses, not the soldiers under his command.
THE RAMADAN OFFENSIVE
The Insurgents Strike
During the fall of 2003, CJTF-7 leadership divided its attention among the seemingly 
disconnected though increasing incidents of violence around the country, the thorny 
problems of detention operations, and the planning required for the troop rotations 
and drawdowns scheduled for early 2004. These matters obscured indications of a con-
certed insurgent effort later dubbed the “Ramadan Offensive.”27 In what was to become 
an annual phenomenon for the U.S.-led coalition, insurgent attacks spiked significantly 
during the holy month of Ramadan in Iraq, which began October 26, 2003.
In early October 2003, at least three Sunni resistance groups formulated plans to attack 
the coalition during the holy month of Ramadan. Jaysh Muhammad had grown consid-
erably by filling its ranks with former Fedayeen members. It also developed a relation-
ship with a National Islamic Resistance front led by a former Iraqi colonel and Saddam’s 
half-brother, Sabawi Ibrahim al-Tikriti, the latter based in Syria. Tikriti and the former 
colonel made an agreement with Syrian leaders whereby members of the group could 
Source: U.S. Army photo by Scott Davis 
 (Released).
Brigadier General Barbara G. Fast, 
 CJTF-7 C-2 (2003-2004).25
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purchase supplies inside Syria at reduced prices, transit the Iraq-Syria border with ease, 
and receive direct support from Syria through the Syrian branch of the Ba’ath Party.28 
Jaysh Muhammad also had well-established cells in the Sunni areas of the Rashid and 
Karada districts of Baghdad, as well as Ramadi, Fallujah, and Baqubah, and was well- 
positioned to attack a variety of coalition military targets.29 The Ansar al-Islam offshoot, 
Ansar al Sunna, also prepared for attacks against two of its historical enemies, the Patri-
otic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Turkish military presence in Iraq, as well as against 
some other international players.30 Ansar al-Sunna acted quickly on its plans to attack 
Turkish interests, carrying out a suicide car bombing of the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad 
on October 14. This bombing caused no casualties other than the bomber.31 Finally, Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi intended to use both foreigners and Iraqis to initiate his own offensive 
against the coalition, Iraqi security forces, and coalition partners.
These resistance groups marked the Ramadan holiday with a series of attacks targeting 
the coalition military and the fledgling Iraqi security forces. They also attacked the loca-
tions hosting Deputy Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Paul Wolfowitz, who was making 
a visit to Iraq as Ramadan began. Shortly after Wolfowitz visited Tikrit on October 25, 
rocket-propelled grenade fire downed a Black Hawk helicopter, wounding five Sol-
diers. On October 26, a mortar attack killed one Soldier at an Abu Ghraib police station, 
a gunman assassinated a deputy mayor of Baghdad, and rockets struck the Rashid Hotel 
in Baghdad where Wolfowitz was staying.32 Although the deputy secretary emerged 
unhurt, the attack killed an American colonel and wounded 16 others.33 The next morn-
ing, a suicide bomber drove an explosives-laden ambulance into the headquarters of the 
International Red Crescent in Baghdad, killing 12. Five additional suicide car bombings 
against Iraqi police stations in Baghdad followed in the space of 45 minutes, killing 1 
American Soldier, 26 Iraqi civilians, and 8 Iraqi police officers.34 Police captured a sixth 
would-be suicide bomber, a Sudanese national.35 After a bloody 2 days of fighting with 
47 dead and 244 wounded, attack rates against the coalition and its supporters continued 
to rise for the rest of Ramadan, reaching a peak of 45 per day.36
Ramadan also brought increased targeting of coalition aircraft. On November 2, Sunni 
militants shot down a CH–47 Chinook helicopter west of Baghdad, killing 16 Soldiers 
and making it the deadliest single day for American troops since March 23, the most 
costly day of the invasion.37 The attack was most likely carried out by Albu Issa tribesmen 
retaliating against the coalition for arresting a senior Albu Issa leader, Sheikh Barakat, 
just days before. A few days later, insurgents shot down a Black Hawk helicopter near 
Tikrit, killing another six Soldiers. Shortly thereafter, a Black Hawk attempting to avoid 
enemy fire collided with another Black Hawk in Mosul, killing 17 Soldiers and bringing 
the number of American troops killed in the space of 2 weeks to more than 60.38
The Ramadan attacks also targeted U.S. coalition partners. On November 12, a sui-
cide car bomber dispatched by Zarqawi attacked the headquarters of the Italian military 
contingent in Nasiriyah, killing 19 Italian soldiers and 8 Iraqis. This attack was the dead-
liest against international troops since the beginning of the war and marked the Italian 
military’s single worst loss of life since World War II.39 During the rest of the month, 
insurgent attacks killed two Japanese diplomats near Tikrit, two Korean contractors, and 
one Colombian national. On November 29, Ansar al-Islam killed an additional seven 
Spanish intelligence agents in an ambush in Mahmudiyah.40 These attacks brought the 
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total number of coalition dead and wounded during the month of Ramadan to at least 
126 soldiers killed and more than 750 wounded, surpassing the death toll of the invasion 
and subsequent major combat operations to that date.41
In addition to causing hundreds of military casualties, the more than 1,000 insur-
gent attacks in November targeted Iraqi infrastructure, Iraqi security forces, and Iraqis 
believed to be cooperating with the coalition. Sanchez noted that, during the 32 days of 
Ramadan, insurgent attacks on Iraqis doubled, with a total of 74-recorded attacks against 
civilian or Iraqi Government officials and 84 attacks against the Iraqi security forces.42 
Among the Iraqis killed was Muhan Jabr al-Shuwaili, a judge from Najaf in charge of a 
commission investigating former members of Saddam’s regime. His death sparked pro-
tests by Iraqis demanding better security.43
A final bloody confrontation in the 4th Infantry Division’s area of operations marked 
the end of Ramadan. On November 30, more than 100 insurgents wearing Fedayeen 
Saddam uniforms ambushed 2 American convoys delivering new Iraqi currency to 
banks in Samarra. The 4th Infantry Division repelled the assaults, killing at least 54 of the 
attackers. But the message from the holy month of Ramadan was clear: Iraqi and foreign 
Sunni resistance groups were sufficiently resourced and organized for larger-scale opera-
tions against coalition targets, a far cry from the isolated “dead-enders” SECDEF Donald 
Rumsfeld and CJTF-7 had expected to eliminate.44
Response to the Ramadan Attacks
In Baghdad, Bremer cast the increased insurgent activity as “no strategic threat” to 
the CPA-led reconstruction operations and emphasized that the United States would not 
“cut and run” from the country.45 Outside Iraq, some analysts viewed the Ramadan offen-
sive as analogous to the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam, meant to convince Americans, 
their coalition partners, and Iraqis that the coalition was involved in a losing cause.46 In 
Washington, the administration responded to the deteriorating situation by announc-
ing the CPA’s mission would be sharply curtailed. On November 15, the United States 
announced that the transition of sovereignty to Iraqi control would occur at an acceler-
ated pace—in just over 7 months rather than the originally planned 2 to 3 years. The new 
timeline called for the selection of a transitional assembly that would elect a provisional 
government in June 2004, when Iraq would be granted sovereignty, and the CPA would 
dissolve. Before national elections, a set of principles of government would become Iraq’s 
basic laws and eventually lead to a new constitution.47 In addition to the perception of 
success, the administration hoped that the accelerated transfer of authority, power, and 
sovereignty to Iraq would reduce support for the insurgency.48
Beyond the United States, the late 2003 insurgent offensive had a significant impact 
on international involvement in the coalition campaign. The United Nations (UN) had 
already largely removed its footprint to Jordan. The November bombing of the Italian 
Carabinieri in Nasiriyah placed considerable pressure on Italian Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi, whose decision to contribute troops to Iraq was already controversial to the 
Italian public. Pressure mounted on other contingents, including the British, to avoid fur-
ther casualties because of the political consequences.49 The Ramadan attacks had begun 
the fraying of the coalition in Iraq, leaving the United States with the challenge of keeping 
it together.
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As insurgent attacks mounted during Ramadan, coalition commanders launched 
counterattacks of their own. “We are going to get pretty tough,” Sanchez told report-
ers on November 11.50 On the following day—the same day the Italian contingent in 
Nasiriyah was bombed—the 1st Armored Division launched a series of strikes to disrupt 
enemy operations in Baghdad. AC–130 Spectre gunships, artillery, and mortars targeted 
likely launch sites for insurgent mortar attacks, while 1st Armored Division units and 
Iraq Civil Defense Corps battalions set up additional checkpoints throughout Baghdad. 
To combat the increasing numbers of improvised explosive devices (IED), the division 
ordered Soldiers to shoot to kill anyone digging along roads after dark.51 The division 
also launched an operation to crack down on black marketeering and other criminal net-
works in Baghdad, activities Major General Martin Dempsey believed were contributing 
to the insurgency.52 The division’s military police also began detaining Iraqi police lead-
ers with links to former regime organizations.53
These operations extended beyond Baghdad. On December 10, after insurgents 
attacked Spanish troops traveling between Baghdad and Anbar, the 82d Airborne Divi-
sion undertook a series of 18 raids targeting those thought to be responsible. Further 
west, just before Christmas, the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment raided insurgent training 
camps in Rawah, capturing 11 high-value targets and a significant amount of weaponry 
and electronics.54 The 82d Airborne Division complemented these offensive operations 
with nonlethal activities, such as paying to refurbish almost half of Anbar’s 702 mosques 
during Ramadan.55
Meanwhile, in northern Iraq in late November and early December, the 101st Airborne 
Division conducted a series of operations culminating in a December 10 raid against 34 
simultaneous targets in Mosul, resulting in the detention of 54-suspected insurgents, 
including a former Fedayeen general.56 The 4th Infantry Division hunted former regime 
loyalists in Tikrit, Baqubah, Kirkuk, and Balad, destroyed insurgent safe houses, and 
captured over 600 suspected insurgents. Sanchez credited these activities with reduc-
ing attacks against coalition troops in the division’s area of operations.57 Because of the 
heightened insurgent activity during Ramadan, Odierno asked Sanchez for the use of the 
3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, en route from Kuwait to relieve the 101st Airborne Divi-
sion in Mosul. The brigade, the first Stryker-equipped unit employed in Iraq, conducted 
raids and patrols in Samarra and Balad, the suspected sources of the massive insurgent 
ambush that had occurred on November 30. Odierno used the Stryker brigade to launch 
another operation on December 17, targeting retired officers and prominent Ba’athists in 
Samarra. This sweep lasted nearly 2 weeks and resulted in the detention of 15 high-value 
targets and 111 other suspected insurgents, along with the discovery of 26 major weap-
ons caches.58
Although each coalition division believed its operations against hostile forces were 
precise and successful, it could only measure its effectiveness in terms of the numbers 
of people detained, and the number of weapons and ammunition seized. The divisions 
could not correlate their tactical operations to a reduction in violence and still lacked an 
accurate sense of the depth and nature of the various militant groups permeating their 
areas. Thus, their expansive clearing operations and raids were essentially movements to 
contact, symptomatic of units’ dearth of information about whom they were fighting, and 
they often equated to only temporary setbacks for the insurgent organizations.
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The Coalition’s Situational Awareness
The Ramadan attacks forced CENTCOM and CJTF-7 to reexamine their intelligence 
picture of enemy activity. Although Abizaid remained convinced that “unemployment 
was the primary source of strength for the insurgency,” foreign-led terrorist organizations 
were clearly becoming problematic as well.59 On October 28, 2 days into the Ramadan 
offensive, Abizaid briefed the Joint Chiefs on Iraq’s “enemy” force, which he estimated 
consisted of approximately 4,000 former regime loyalists, 2,000 members of Ansar al-Is-
lam, and an unknown number of foreign fighters, though he judged the number of for-
eign fighters cited elsewhere had been overstated.60
At CJTF-7, Red Cell leader Colonel Derek Harvey and other senior officers believed 
Abizaid was underestimating the insurgency’s strength. CJTF-7 units were reporting a 
higher level of enemy activity than Abizaid’s 6,000-plus insurgents could carry out, and 
U.S. troops had already detained more than 10,000-suspected insurgents in Abu Ghraib.61 
The insurgency’s networks were more complex than previous estimates appreciated, 
CJTF-7’s officers judged. There were extensive relationships among “the former denizens 
of Saddam’s regime, the jihadists sneaking into the country, the tribes who were sym-
pathetic to the brewing insurgency, and Zarqawi’s [organization],” Harvey concluded.62 
In a report entitled “Sunni Arab Resistance: Politics of the Gun,” Harvey detailed how 
Iraq’s highly militarized society, paramilitary organizations, and intelligence services 
established under Saddam’s regime had provided the foundation for a well-trained and 
organized insurgency. After the fall of the regime, an estimated 65,000 to 95,000 Special 
Republican Guard officers, intelligence officers, Fedayeen Saddam forces, Ba’ath Party 
militias, and their ilk had faded into the population in and around Baghdad.63 But even 
Harvey and his experts were unsure of who among these ready-made insurgents was 
running the insurgency’s operations, and CJTF-7 continued to scramble to find enemy 
leaders and operatives ahead of planned attacks. This former regime threat was matched 
by a metastasis of Salafi militant organizations. At the same time that CJTF-7 senior ana-
lysts were coming to recognize the role of the former regime in the insurgency, the com-
mand began receiving reports that Ansar al-Islam had returned from Iran in August 2003 
to set up operations in Mosul, Fallujah, and Ramadi, and to train in remote encamp-
ments in Anbar for future attacks on the coalition.64 In November 2003, a new group 
calling itself the Jaysh Ansar al Sunna announced its presence in Iraq via a fax sent to the 
Arab newspaper al-Quds al-Arabi. The group was at least inspired (if not directly linked 
to) al-Qaeda at the time of its formation and would quickly grow to prominence as an 
Iraqi-dominated terrorist organization, later to compete with Zarqawi’s Tawhid wal-Ji-
had to become the al-Qaeda franchise in Iraq.65 Eventually, CJTF-7 correctly determined 
that Ansar al Sunna was a subset of and a successor organization to Ansar al-Islam and 
that it had been responsible for some of the Ramadan attacks.
The coalition had underestimated insurgent strength in part because CJTF-7 had 
undercounted the number of insurgent attacks, recording perhaps as little as one-third of 
all of the hostile activities in the theater, Harvey and others concluded. Because CJTF-7 
and its units had no master system to incorporate reports from Iraqi forces, as well as 
civilian authorities, a number of insurgent attacks on Iraqi forces and even some terrorist 
strikes were omitted from the coalition’s count because U.S. troops had not witnessed the 
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attacks.66 IED events (roadside bombs, suicide bombs, and car bombs) especially were 
underreported, recorded in the coalition’s significant activities (sigacts) database only 
when an IED damaged a vehicle or wounded or killed soldiers. Following the CJTF-7 
reporting criteria, coalition troops were not recording those IEDs that were found before 
they detonated but caused no casualties. Upon realizing, a full 9 months into the war, that 
a large number of incidents had gone unreported, CJTF-7 instructed its units to report all 
incidents in which the coalition military or its Iraqi partners were attacked, even if the 
attacks resulted in no injuries or damage. CJTF-7 also standardized methods for report-
ing sigacts across the theater and established clearer criteria for what should be reported 
as significant.67 Under the revamped reporting system, the Iraq theater would appear far 
more violent than coalition leaders had understood.
The Counter-IED Fight
The Ramadan period also convinced coalition military leaders to take steps against 
what had become the Iraqi insurgency’s weapon of choice: the IED. CJTF-7 began count-
ing IED incidents in July and, over the next 5 months, the number of recorded IEDs went 
from 8 per month to a high of 95 effective IED attacks during Ramadan in November.68 
By September 2003, IEDs already accounted for more U.S. combat deaths than direct-fire 
weapons and indirect fire combined.69 To reduce IED-related casualties, unit command-
ers sought to improve the physical protection of their soldiers. U.S. forces in Iraq had few 
general-purpose vehicles with armor and even fewer vehicles equipped for counter-IED 
activities. Although DoD recognized that units needed more and better-armored vehi-
cles, acquiring and delivering those vehicles into the country would take some time. In 
the interim, units in Iraq improvised by adding so-called hillbilly armor to their vehicles, 
using steel, plywood, and other available materials to harden their soft-skinned vehicles. 
In late 2003, CENTCOM requested additional armored vehicles and add-on armored 
survivability kits. By November, “up-armored” High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled 
Vehicles (HMMWV) and add-on armor kits began pouring into theater.70 Because many 
IEDs were radio-controlled, CJTF-7 also requested and received some new equipment 
and systems capable of jamming some of the frequencies on which insurgents detonated 
their IEDs.71
The scale of the IED problem led Abizaid to propose to Rumsfeld and Myers in 
October 2003 that DoD should initiate a “Manhattan Project-like effort” to confront this 
“number-one killer of American troops.”72 In response, Army G–3 Lieutenant General 
Richard A. Cody created an IED task force under Brigadier General Joseph Votel that 
would eventually grow into the Joint IED Defeat Organization.73 Institutional develop-
ment of an IED task force, however, was bound to be a slow process. Concerned groups 
working explosive ordnance in Iraq began building their own local counter-IED task 
force. In Baghdad, special operations officers who had discovered disparate coalition 
units working on counter-IED measures succeeded in merging British, American, and 
Australian ordnance specialists and technicians into a Combined Explosives Exploitation 
Cell (CEXC [pronounced “sexy”]). Dubbed the “CSI of the Counter IED fight,” the CEXC 
surveyed post-blast sites to collect fingerprints, gather forensic evidence to link devices 
to individual bomb makers, and examine unique aspects of the devices’ deployment.74 
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CEXC also became the first consolidated organization to diagnose the composition of IED 
systems as well as indirect-fire weapons and relay pertinent information to field com-
manders. Evidence gathered by CEXC technicians, for example, led to the eventual cap-
ture of the insurgent cell that had rocketed Wolfowitz’s hotel in Baghdad on October 26.75
Across Iraq, each division developed its own local responses to the IED threat. In 
Baghdad, the 1st Armored Division attempted to counter IED use by increasing patrols 
along frequently trafficked routes to deter insurgents from placing IEDs along them.76 
The 4th Infantry Division units gradually built a sophisticated set of techniques directed 
at the networks that constructed IEDs, reasoning that “wherever there was an IED, there 
was a bomber, a bomb maker, a cache, and someone funding the operation.”77 Tactical 
commanders also began discussing counter-IED initiatives with each other, including 
information about different types of IEDs, techniques for emplacing them, and ways to 
defeat the devices. By December 2003, CJTF-7 had consolidated this input with infor-
mation from CEXC to create counter-IED smart cards showing pictures of IEDs along 
with the different firing mechanisms and recommended methods to defeat or bypass the 
devices.78 CJTF-7 also established an IED training cell and sent Center for Army Lessons 
Learned representatives to each division to assist with the counter-IED learning process.79
THE CAPTURE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN
Operation RED DAWN
The months-long manhunt for Iraq’s former Ba’athist leadership paid off at the 
beginning of December with the capture of Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri’s private secretary 
in the town of Hawijah. Although Douri himself was not captured, commanders in the 
4th Infantry Division sector believed the raid indicated they had made steady progress 
toward finding their most valuable target, whose capture, coalition leaders believed, 
could potentially break the insurgency: Saddam Hussein.80
The eventual capture of the former Iraqi President was the culmination of 6 months 
of intelligence-driven raids. Throughout the summer and fall of 2003, Soldiers of the 
1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, had formed an increasingly close partnership with 
the special operations forces (SOF) working in northern Iraq to bring their complemen-
tary capabilities together. Rumors about the former Iraqi dictator’s whereabouts multi-
plied to the point they were dubbed “Elvis sightings.” But Odierno and his 1st Brigade 
commander, Colonel James Hickey, both agreed Saddam hid somewhere in Salahadin 
Province.81
After months of fruitlessly trying to find Saddam by tracking down figures in the 
former regime’s formal structure, 4th Infantry Division leaders and their SOF partners 
realized they were hunting the wrong network. The key to sifting through the many pos-
sible leads was not in the Ba’athist regime’s formal apparatus, but, rather, in identifying 
the unofficial security apparatus protecting   Saddam, which consisted of less powerful 
figures who had long-standing tribal and family ties to Saddam. Beginning in July 2003, 
the 4th Infantry Division and its special operations partners began building a network 
link diagram focused on Saddam’s family and clan. Analyzing this informal network 
led to the capture of Brigadier General Daham Mahmedi, a man in indirect contact with 
238
THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR
Saddam through couriers whom coalition analysts had pinpointed by examining archi-
val news footage. When questioned, Mahmedi pointed coalition officials in the direction 
of Mohammed al-Muslit, a former bodyguard and relative of Saddam who was already 
in coalition custody but had been concealing his identity.82
Based on information from Muslit, Hickey and special operations leaders identified 
two farms on the eastern bank of the Tigris River near Ad Dawr as possible locations for 
Saddam. The area around the farms, which was actually within view of the 4th Infantry 
Division base in Tikrit, was covered with dense vegetation. The farms themselves were 
located in a riverside orchard where Saddam famously had swum the Tigris to escape 
capture after his failed attempt to assassinate Iraqi leader Abdul Karim Qassem in 1959. 
The ease with which Saddam might be able to escape again meant that the Soldiers on 
any raid to capture him would need to establish a tight cordon around the target sites. 
Additionally, Hickey and his special operations partners estimated that Saddam might 
be guarded by 20- or 30-armed individuals, potentially making capturing him alive even 
more challenging.83
The operation that Hickey and the special operations team leaders developed, code-
named RED DAWN, involved two of Hickey’s infantry battalions, the 299th Engineer 
Battalion, an aviation detachment, an artillery battalion, cavalry forces, and special 
operations teams (see Map 12). The plan called for the maneuver forces to provide an 
outer cordon on the eastern and western banks of the Tigris River while Apache heli-
copters covered them. A cavalry troop provided the inner cordon for the special opera-
tions teams, who, while supported by an armored car element, would assault the farms 
simultaneously.84
At 7:50 p.m. on December 13, the first assault team reported no enemy forces at the 
first farm. At the second farm, the arrival of U.S. Soldiers surprised two of Saddam’s 
assistants, who ran north hoping to draw the Soldiers away from the small, three-room 
farmhouse in which they resided. During their initial search of the farmhouse and sur-
rounding palm groves, the Soldiers found two AK47s and $750,000 in cash. A more thor-
ough search of the area with the assistance of Muslit led the Soldiers to a Styrofoam hatch 
that turned out to be the opening to a small subterranean chamber that coalition troops 
would later refer to as a “spider hole.”
Inside, the U.S. Soldiers found an angry-looking, unkempt man who, according to 
one of the battalion commanders on the scene, Lieutenant Colonel Steven D. Russell, 
“looked remarkably similar to John Brown of Civil War days.”85 “Who are you?” the Sol-
diers asked through an interpreter. The man responded, “I am Saddam Hussein, the duly 
elected President of Iraq. I am willing to negotiate.”86
Although it would take several hours to confirm Saddam’s identity scientifically, 
the 4th Infantry Division leaders were elated by the capture, as were Sanchez and then- 
President George W. Bush. On December 14, Bremer opened a briefing of the coalition’s 
leadership in Iraq to the press by announcing, “Ladies and gentlemen. We got him!”87
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Map 12. Operation RED DAWN, December 13, 2003.
In the Wake of Saddam’s Capture
Saddam’s December 13 capture brought the coalition a sense of euphoria and an 
impression that events were beginning to move in a positive direction. By the week before 
Christmas, CJTF-7 had observed a 39 percent decrease in the number of IED attacks, indi-
cating that the coalition might be making some headway in countering IEDs. In the vio-
lent upper Tigris region, Saddam’s capture was followed by the first period of real calm 
in the 4th Infantry Division’s area, leaving CPA and CJTF-7 with an optimistic outlook as 
2003 drew to its close. With Saddam and a sizable amount of his money now in custody, 
CJTF-7 believed that the former regime elements that had threatened Iraq’s stability were 
well on their way to being broken, though the Red Cell predicted that the impact only 
would be short term.88 At the same time, CJTF-7 units began using information from doc-
uments and other materials captured with Saddam to pursue what they believed were 
the last vestiges of the former Ba’athist resistance. As they did so, one of the key lessons 
that SOF and conventional leaders and analysts began to apply from Saddam’s capture 
was the importance of using information gained from detainee interrogations to help 
drive operations.
Despite the positive signs of the days following RED DAWN, Saddam’s capture did 
not stop some operations whose planning had most likely already been in progress. Just 
12 hours after Saddam’s capture, a car bomb exploded outside the police station in Kha-
lidiyah, and suicide bombers targeted Iraqi security forces again the following day in the 
northern outskirts of Baghdad. That same day, another car bomb destroyed the Ameriyah 
criminal investigations department. A second car bomb exploded shortly thereafter.89
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During a December 16 press briefing in Baghdad, Myers and Sanchez minimized these 
attacks and focused instead on the positive impact Saddam’s capture likely would have 
on the insurgency. Sanchez explained that the recent car bombs were probably planned 
for some time. Myers noted that those left for the coalition to fight consisted mainly of 
terrorists and remnants of the former regime.90
On December 19, the 1st Armored Division began Operation IRON GRIP, directed at 
some 14 enemy cells in Baghdad, leading to the detention of 2 leaders, 3 financiers, and 27 
fighters. Maneuver units also went after suspected mortar and rocket sites used to attack 
the Green Zone. Because the enemy responded with only nine ineffective rocket-pro-
pelled grenade attacks on Christmas Day, Dempsey and Sanchez believed the opera-
tion had been a success, and that the former regime units in Baghdad, at least, had been 
neutralized.91
In contrast to the optimism of his fellow commanders, Abizaid explained to the 
National Security Council on December 19–20 that the former regime elements would 
continue to disrupt stability operations by attacking infrastructure and intimidating the 
vulnerable Iraqi police, and that the potential for ethno-sectarian conflict remained. Abi-
zaid also mentioned that CJTF-7 divisions in the south continued to complain of Iranian 
influence, and one commander he met during his Thanksgiving trip to Iraq opined that 
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran was assisting the various Shi’a militias in 
that region of the country. Unemployment also remained a major problem and source of 
recruiting for the insurgency, the CENTCOM commander believed. To keep these pro-
spective threats in check, Abizaid requested additional CERP funds and advised that 
CPA or another entity should resume oversight of Ba’athist reconciliation by injecting 
more Sunnis into the political process, while further decentralizing development and 
intelligence assets down to Iraq’s provinces.92
In the wake of Saddam’s capture, the alliances of convenience between foreign terror-
ist organizations and foreign regime elements that Abizaid had feared also were coming 
to fruition. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s terrorist organization remained far from subdued. 
By mid-December, coalition officials noted that evidence was mounting that Zarqawi 
had been behind the major attacks against the UN, the Jordanian Embassy, and the Ital-
ian compound in Nasiriyah.93 On December 27, Zarqawi launched four near-simultane-
ous attacks in the Shi’a holy city of Karbala.94 Insurgents using car bombs, mortars, and 
machine guns targeted 2 coalition military bases located at the city’s university, as well 
as the local police station and the mayor’s office, leaving 13 dead and more than 170 
wounded, with the death toll including 6 coalition soldiers from the Bulgarian and Thai 
contingents stationed there. Among the wounded were 37 coalition soldiers, including 5 
Americans.95 Alarmed, Dempsey ordered his soldiers in Baghdad and the Iraqi police to 
increase security in the capital by raising additional razor wire fences and establishing 
checkpoints in key areas of the city ahead of the New Year’s holiday. “We will act appro-
priately to make sure that our soldiers and the Iraqi populace [are] protected against the 
potential attacks against us,” General Dempsey told reporters.96 Just hours later, a car 
bomb tore through Baghdad’s popular Nabil Restaurant, a spot frequented by Western-
ers and upper-middle-class Iraqis, killing eight and wounding dozens more.97 The blast 
was the worst in a series of bombings throughout the country that day, confirming the 
fears of some officials and military leaders that the real fighting in Iraq had only begun.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION: FROM INVASION TO INSURGENCY, 2002-2003
Military operations during the March and April 2003 invasion of Iraq resulted in 
172 coalition fatalities, almost 600 wounded, and nearly 5,000 Iraqi combatant deaths. 
The coalition military sustained an additional 408 killed and 2,000 wounded, detained 
over 10,000 suspected insurgents, and killed an additional 600 insurgents between the 
declared end of major combat operations on May 1, and the end of 2003. When combined 
with the scope and requirements of post-combat operations, the casualty numbers high-
lighted that Phase IV—and not Phase III—was the decisive phase of military operations 
in Iraq, but that the planning time, resources, and personnel allocated for Phase III far 
exceeded those for Phase IV. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and Combined 
Joint Task Force–7 (CJTF-7) were likewise poor substitutes for the capabilities of the col-
lapsed Iraqi state. The resultant void in state power during the summer of 2003 was 
eventually occupied by Sunni resistance organizations, Islamic terrorists, Shi’a militias, 
the Iranian regime, and Kurdish factions, all vying for autonomy and rule in Iraq, cir-
cumstances that effectively ceded the initiative from the coalition military forces to Iraq’s 
various insurgent groups for years to come.
As 2003 came to a close, the U.S. military found itself enmeshed in a long-term occu-
pation of Iraq it had not expected, for a variety of reasons. Then-President George W. 
Bush’s November 2001 order to plan military operations to forcibly remove Saddam 
Hussein from power and eliminate his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program 
surprised military leaders who were accustomed to more limited objectives. The new 
plans that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and its subordinate units developed for 
Iraq were emblematic of 1990s-era military doctrine and practice. Throughout the 1990s, 
the combat training centers and simulations that Army units used to replicate and pre-
pare for maneuver operations employed Cold War-era scenarios that pitted Army units 
against a peer or near-peer Soviet-style military formations and validated the use of deep 
aviation attacks as corps shaping operations. Those scenarios also taught maneuver units 
to avoid getting bogged down in Grozny-like urban combat and minimized the impor-
tance of any stability or peacekeeping activities that might take place at the conclusion of 
major combat.
The Army’s institutional bias in favor of Phase III, its distaste for stability and support 
operations, and its expectations based on successful operations in Afghanistan led its 
leaders to focus on the maneuver operations that would depose the Iraq regime and to 
give little consideration to the aftermath. The war plan that the invasion force executed 
in March 2003 focused on defeating Iraq’s Republican Guard, putting military pressure 
on Baghdad until the regime collapsed from within, and transitioning the administration 
of the country to the 2-months-old Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assis-
tance (ORHA) and an expatriate-led Iraqi Interim Government. The plans largely dis-
counted Saddam Hussein’s extensive paramilitary apparatus, tribal patronage system, 
and intra-Iraqi dynamics, all of which would play crucial roles in the ensuing instability 
and insurgency.
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The military intelligence community’s similar emphasis on adversaries’ conventional 
military forces resulted in an over-focus on Iraq’s Republican Guard and regular army 
and a discounting of the paramilitary forces that became the Ba’athist regime’s de facto 
main effort by the time of the invasion. U.S. intelligence also only touched the surface 
of Iraq’s complex social dynamics, resulting in flawed assessments about Iraqi military 
capabilities and inaccurate assumptions about how the Iraqi communities, tribes, and 
security apparatus would respond to the removal of the Ba’ath regime. The coalition’s 
analytical bias toward a familiar, hierarchical, Soviet-style enemy persisted well into the 
months following the Iraqi regime’s collapse, inhibiting a more fundamental understand-
ing of Iraq’s politics and human terrain. At the same time, CENTCOM, Coalition Forces 
Land Component Command (CFLCC), and V Corps, consumed by the requirements of 
planning for the invasion and working under the assumption that the Iraqi Army would 
be available to help secure and stabilize post-regime Iraq, did not prepare realistic plans 
for securing the country with their comparatively small ground force footprint.
Because of these factors, the invasion itself was an operational success but not a strate-
gic one. The presence of the Fedayeen and other paramilitary forces in southern Iraq sur-
prised the coalition military, who had expected to fight conventional Iraqi forces as they 
advanced on Baghdad. After some tactical setbacks negating the use of deep aviation 
attacks as corps shaping operations and highlighting the need to secure the coalition’s 
vulnerable lines of communications, CFLCC pressed forward. On April 9—just under 
3 weeks from the beginning of the invasion—CFLCC determined that any organized 
resistance in Baghdad had disappeared along with Saddam and his regime. The war, 
however, was far from over. Much of the country—including Anbar and Iraq’s northern 
provinces—remained unsecured, because the special operations forces who had made 
territorial advances in those areas lacked the capacity to hold that territory alone. Fur-
thermore, since the regime had collapsed far sooner than any of the military plans had 
envisioned, organizations designated to manage the transition between major combat 
operations and Phase IV were still in the process of organizing themselves and formu-
lating their plans. Even the effort to locate the Iraqi regime’s WMD, the very casus belli 
for the U.S.-led coalition, was treated almost as an afterthought, tasked to a U.S. Army 
organization that was unequipped to accomplish the mission and had to be replaced by 
the hastily formed, ad hoc Iraq Survey Group.
What the coalition had intended to be a surgical regime change quickly deteriorated 
into the general collapse of the Iraqi state, creating a power vacuum and a breakdown 
of law and order. In the absence of any authority that could govern or maintain order, 
Iraqis looted the public infrastructure and carried out reprisal attacks against their former 
Ba’athist masters. CFLCC ground units did not anticipate these developments and spent 
weeks reacting to contact instead of preparing an orderly changeover to a transitional 
civil authority. Although the coalition military eventually regained some measure of con-
trol in many urban areas, the damage was done. Iraqis who had expected the United 
States to reestablish order quickly and improve standards of life became disillusioned as 
the essentials of the Iraqi state evaporated, and Iraq’s social order began to break down.
In the midst of this turmoil, Lieutenant Generals David McKiernan and William Wal-
lace hewed out unit boundaries that made operational sense but were often misaligned 
with Iraq’s physical and human terrain. The new unit boundaries crossed mountain 
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ranges, rivers, tribal lines, and smuggling routes, creating seams that later would be 
exploited by the Sunni resistance organizations and Shi’a militias that emerged in the 
summer of 2003. When it became apparent that the invasion forces would not have Iraqi 
military and police forces at their disposal to restore order, McKiernan and Wallace made 
a deliberate decision to make Anbar and Iraq’s southern provinces—which appeared 
comparatively peaceful in the turbulent weeks following regime collapse—economy of 
force missions. After the Marines and the 3d Infantry Division redeployed from Iraq in 
the summer of 2003, these two critical regions were left to a small U.S. Army contingent 
and a polyglot multinational force respectively, neither of which had sufficient combat 
power to secure the territory and contain the unrest there.
In addition to the departure of the 3d Infantry Division and I Marine Expeditionary 
Force (I MEF), the summer of 2003 also saw the replacement of some of the more sea-
soned forces in Iraq with people who had far less experience with the country. At the 
policy level, Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner’s ORHA was summarily replaced by 
the even less resourced CPA under Ambassador L. Paul Bremer. At Secretary of Defense 
(SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld’s insistence, the CFLCC that had conducted the invasion 
returned to Kuwait, leaving the tactical V Corps headquarters to transform overnight 
into a theater command responsible for the entire country and led by the Army’s most 
junior lieutenant general. At the same time, institutionally driven changes of command 
and mandatory military moves left some units like the 1st Armored Division with entirely 
new leadership. When superimposed on the hastily assembled new Iraqi Governing 
Council, this turnover of key personnel and organizations effectively put a combination 
of novices and opportunists in charge of Iraq, with neither the expertise nor the resources 
needed to replace the collapsed Iraqi state.
Meanwhile, the CPA, CENTCOM, and CJTF-7 began moving forward with a new 
campaign to internationalize the Iraq effort and stand up new Iraqi security forces, with 
the goal of allowing the United States to reduce its footprint in Iraq dramatically to fewer 
than 30,000 troops by the end of 2004. This ambitious plan was thwarted by a number of 
factors. While it was clear that CJTF-7 needed more boots on the ground to accomplish 
all of its missions, Rumsfeld and the institutional Army were reluctant to provide them, 
given their perception that the war in Iraq was effectively over as of May 1, 2003. Much 
of the institutional Army also failed to recognize the urgency of the situation in Iraq and 
was eager for its units to redeploy, continue with the Army’s transformation program, 
and be available for other contingency operations. Sources of additional personnel, too, 
were scarce as U.S. Army Reserve tours came to a close and the time constraints associ-
ated with Reserve and National Guard tour lengths began to take their toll on the total 
force.
The coalition’s failure to understand the environment in Iraq had far-reaching con-
sequences that likewise held CENTCOM’s ambitious stabilization campaign goals in 
check. CPA Orders 1 and 2 thwarted stabilization plans by effectively removing the Iraqi 
civil servants and military personnel that CENTCOM had intended to use for stabili-
zation and reconstruction operations. The Sunni backlash to CPA Orders 1 and 2 was 
exacerbated by the seating of a new Shi’a-majority Iraqi Governing Council comprised 
largely of expatriates who were competitors for power against nonexpatriate factions. 
The foreign terrorist and former regime element organizations that had only tenuous 
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footholds in Iraq in April 2003 gradually gained traction as the coalition military forces 
failed to protect the population from crime, assassinations, and reprisal attacks; alienated 
Sunni parties and tribes; and appeared to enable the Kurdish parties to seize territories 
beyond the Green Line permanently. While CJTF-7 battled a mounting number of Sunni 
militant groups, intra-Shi’a rivalries exacerbated by Iranian-backed political parties and 
militias began to flare into violence. Principal among these intra-Shi’a battles was the 
power struggle between Abdul Aziz al-Hakim’s SCIRI and Badr militia on one side, and 
Moqtada Sadr and his Jaysh al-Mahdi on the other, with the latter becoming increasingly 
problematic for the coalition as the conflict intensified. CENTCOM and CJTF-7, however, 
were slow to respond to the Sadrist danger, and, in their anxiousness to avoid opening 
a second front against Iraq’s seemingly placid Shi’a population, decided to contain Sadr 
rather than confront him and his militia head on, a decision that has had far-reaching 
consequences for the United States ever since.
CJTF-7’s relatively hands-off approach to division operations, combined with varying 
force composition and the unique environments and human terrain in each division’s 
area of operations, led to a diverse application of both offensive and stability operations 
across the country. Divisions had great leeway to operate as they saw fit in their respec-
tive areas, with mixed results. Some were able to manage their diverse regions relatively 
effectively, while others essentially were left conducting continual movements to contact 
against unknown enemies on complex terrain. Some divisions were successful in orga-
nizing joint and interagency targeting mechanisms with special operations forces and 
humanitarian organizations that led to more precise operations against insurgents and 
more focused reconstruction efforts. Others benefited from the expanded use of the Com-
manders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds to rebuild local security forces, 
infrastructure, and governance structures and to find innovative ways to keep reconcil-
able former Ba’athists on the payroll and out of the insurgency.
The variation in the application of CJTF-7’s rules of engagement, however, was not 
so helpful, as some of the coalition’s more heavy-handed tactics began creating collat-
eral damage and political fallout detrimental to the stabilization campaign. Considering 
the rules for engagement for Iraq sufficient, General John Abizaid did not change them. 
He and Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez instead provided verbal guidance about 
avoiding mass sweeps of villages and treating those in their custody respectfully, but 
units’ interpretation of that guidance varied nearly as much as the physical and human 
geography of each area of operations. Meanwhile, the number of detainees in coalition 
custody continued to mount, and the Iraqi prisoner population—categorized deliberately 
as enemy combatants rather than prisoners of war—became a fertile recruiting ground 
for all insurgent groups in Iraq. The volume of detainees, combined with a lack of ade-
quately trained interrogators and prison guards, contributed to a dysfunctional detention 
system countrywide and the criminal abuses and deaths of Iraqi prisoners at the Abu 
Ghraib theater internment facility, particularly in the fall of 2003. The revelations about 
the Abu Ghraib abuses would fuel the Iraqi insurgency for the remainder of the coalition 
military’s time in Iraq and beyond.
In retrospect, these worsening problems of insecurity, insurgency, and political insta-
bility were symptoms of two larger problems: state collapse and civil war. A great many 
of the issues that the coalition had to face in the second half of 2003 were the relatively 
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predictable consequences of the collapse of the Iraqi state, which unfolded in patterns 
similar to other cases of state collapse such as those the United States and its allies had 
previously encountered in Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, and even Afghanistan. The behav-
ior of the Iraqi population in 2003 reflected the unsettling disappearance of a centralized 
state that for 4 decades had become the dominant force in almost all aspects of Iraqi life, 
atomizing most other institutions and leaving no civil society buffer between the indi-
vidual and the state. When the Ba’ath collapsed, and chaos ensued, nearly 30 million 
Iraqis began to revert to long-dormant sectarian, tribal, or ethnic identities in a quest for 
survival.
Above all, however, the developments of 2003 indicated that, in invading Iraq, col-
lapsing the Iraqi state, and leaving a power vacuum, the U.S.-led coalition had unleashed 
a civil war among the many Iraqi factions and created a maelstrom in which the regional 
powers were compelled to intervene in order to promote their proxies and expand or 
secure their interests. In hindsight, many of the steps that CJTF-7 and the CPA took to 
try to snuff out the budding insurgency and terrorist groups were doomed to failure, 
or even counterproductive, in the absence of a larger program of political stabilization. 
Aggressive security operations to stop insurgents and terrorist groups against the back-
drop of a vast power struggle in the country served in many cases only to drive the 
population toward extremist groups between both the Sunni and Shi’a communities. To 
some extent, these security operations were a red herring, distracting the coalition from 
the larger problems of a security vacuum for the population and a failure of governance, 
neither of which became the coalition’s main focus until 2007. At the same time, the U.S. 
decision in late 2003 to move quickly toward Iraqi self-governance and an accelerated 
election timeline in the name of political stabilization would actually have the opposite 
effect. This only heightened the stakes in the violent struggle for power, inflamed divi-
sions, and created a political process that only could be destabilizing in the midst of civil 
and regional war. These facts, however, would wait for years for the coalition to recog-
nize and act on them. In the meantime, Iraqis and coalition together would descend into 
large-scale insurgency and pass through the fire of a brutal sectarian civil war.
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CHAPTER 11
THE GATHERING STORM
For the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq, the dramatic capture of Saddam Hussein in Decem-
ber 2003 brought a short-lived euphoria and sense that the campaign to stabilize the 
country had moved into its endgame. For the first 3 months of 2004, the mood within 
Combined Joint Task Force–7 (CJTF-7) was cautiously optimistic, as many coalition offi-
cials assumed that without Saddam, the former regime’s “dead-enders” would see their 
cause of restoring Ba’athist power evaporate. Though Anbar remained restive and an 
insurgency still simmered in Sunni areas, senior coalition leaders believed that the over-
all security situation was improving enough that it might be possible to withdraw forces 
to a caretaker level within a year. To that end, CJTF-7 drew up plans that blended offen-
sive operations with stability and support operations and aimed to improve training for 
the Iraqi security forces. Because they believed their mission had likely turned a corner, 
coalition leaders instructed their units to begin to pull back from the Iraqi population cen-
ters to concentrate on large operating bases and begin to turn over security and political 
responsibility to the Iraqis.
Unfortunately, CJTF-7’s focus and positive mood did not match the actual situation. 
Despite Saddam’s capture, the Sunni insurgency, which mostly had not looked to him 
for operational leadership, had reached a state of maturity in which disparate groups 
could communicate, plan, and execute operations both geographically and across time 
as part of a greater strategy. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s Tawhid wal-Jihad, though not the 
strongest component in the vast Sunni insurgency, was gaining strength and formulating 
a campaign plan of its own that aimed to incite civil war. At the same time, the coalition 
cast about for options to address the increasingly troublesome Moqtada Sadr and his 
burgeoning militant following.
TURBULENCE WITHIN THE COALITION
Planning for the Handover in 2004
Zarqawi and Sadr were among numerous emerging threats whose severity most coa-
lition leaders did not sufficiently appreciate. As insurgents across the country grew in 
strength in the first weeks of 2004, the coalition continued with its planned replacement 
of nearly every brigade and division in the country by follow-on forces, some of which 
would arrive with expectations of a Balkans-style stabilization mission. With this view in 
mind, CJTF-7’s undermanned staff developed a draft campaign plan that melded contin-
ued offensive operations with stability and support operations, responsibility for which 
would be transferred in the not-too-distant future to the Iraqis or another competent 
force. The command’s draft mission statement, which in the course of events was never 
approved or published, reflected this bifurcated objective:
CJTF-7 conducts offensive operations to defeat remaining non-compliant forces and neutralize 
the destabilizing influences in the area of operations to create a secure environment in direct 
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support of the office of coalition provisional authority. Concurrently support the establishment 
of government and economic development to set the conditions for a transfer of operations to a 
designated follow-on military or civilian authorities.1
For CJTF-7 Commander Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the mission at the 
outset of 2004 was a continuation of the destruction of Saddam’s regime, and CJTF-7 offi-
cers still considered their units in Phase III operations. “[We had] shattered the enemy, 
changed the regime,” recalled CJTF-7’s lead planner, “[a]nd now what we needed to do 
was continue offensive operations, i.e., pursuit operations, of the remnants of the Iraqi 
army and the Saddam Fedayeen to complete their destruction and allow us to move 
forward.”2 At the same time, in areas where the destruction of these forces had been 
mostly accomplished, CJTF-7 considered that its units should be conducting stability and 
support operations and carrying out reconstruction efforts similar to those the Army had 
done in the Balkans.
The command’s focus on transitioning its mission to someone else included a process 
of withdrawing from areas of contact with the Iraqi population and turning over tactical 
security missions to Iraqi forces. “[T]he plan . . . is to work very aggressively to build 
Iraqi capacity by February or March, to turn over control and to pull out to base camps,” 
Sanchez told Iraqi politician Sharif Ali bin Hussein on December 28, 2003, adding that 
after the move “Quick Reaction Forces would be positioned to respond as necessary.”3 As 
early as January 4, 2004, CJTF-7 was working out procedures for coalition units to hand 
over the responsibility for security to the Iraqis and turn over regional or local political 
control as well. Initial assessments held that the Iraqi police, considered the linchpin of 
relinquishing coalition responsibility, would not be ready until October 2004, but the 
Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) could be ready sooner—potentially as early as March or 
April. On the ground, Sanchez’s guidance to withdraw from areas of contact translated 
into a decreasing coalition footprint and a shrinking number of forward operating bases. 
The 1st Armored Division in Multi-National Division–Baghdad (MND–B) was emblem-
atic of this effort. Having occupied 46 temporary forward operating bases as of May 2003, 
the division had reduced to just 26 in January 2004, of which its replacement, the 1st Cav-
alry Division, would occupy only 8.4
On February 10, Sanchez briefed visiting Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill, deputy 
assistant to the President and head of the Iraq Stabilization Group at the National Secu-
rity Council (NSC), on CJTF-7’s plans for coalition withdrawal from the cities. The CJTF-7 
commander revealed that “in Baghdad we are shutting down and pulling our forces out 
of the city. By the time that 1st Cavalry Division arrives, we will have pulled all of our 
forces to the perimeter, except 2 BCT which provides security for the Green Zone.”5 After 
the withdrawal, Sanchez explained, U.S. units would be concentrated on the southern 
outskirts of Baghdad, and any further need for them in the city would be worked out by 
coalition and Iraqi officials at Joint Coordination Centers.6
Sanchez’s plans to pull back from Iraqi population centers soon were copied at lower 
unit levels. While each coalition unit created a mission statement that blended its com-
mander’s priorities with guidance from higher headquarters, many CJTF-7 units wrote 
their missions to mirror closely Sanchez’s own. For example, the plan for the newly 
arrived 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, a Stryker Brigade Combat Team, encompassed 
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all of the key aspects of CJTF-7’s campaign plan, including to capture or kill remaining 
noncompliant forces, assist in the development of Iraqi forces, and transition responsibil-
ity for maintaining civil order to Iraqi security and police forces.7
The Decision for a Four-Star Headquarters
Despite CJTF-7 leaders’ confidence that they had begun to get their arms around 
the problem of stabilizing the country, the command’s difficulties in fall 2003 had con-
vinced senior Department of Defense (DoD) leaders that CJTF-7 needed to be replaced 
by a larger, more capable headquarters with a four-star commander. Meeting with Sec-
retary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Decem-
ber 2003, General John Abizaid and Coalition Forces Land Component Command 
(CFLCC) Commander Lieutenant General David McKiernan explained in detail that 
the single three-star headquarters of CJTF-7 was not sufficient to manage both the day-
to-day requirements of the operational fight and the heavy load of strategic and diplo-
matic responsibilities. Acknowledging the force of McKiernan’s arguments, Rumsfeld 
approved the change in principle, but had quietly instructed Chief of Staff of the Army 
General Peter J. Schoomaker after the meeting that, whatever new command the military 
devised for Iraq, McKiernan was not to be allowed to command it himself.8 Ignorant of 
Rumsfeld’s guidance, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and McKiernan’s Third Army 
first explored a course of action that entailed reactivating the Third Army as the CFLCC 
for Iraq and moving it to Baghdad  to become the strategic-level headquarters. This plan 
progressed far enough, in fact, that some of McKiernan’s staff deployed to Kuwait for a 
2-week conference in January 2004 to finalize their plans for reassuming the Iraq mission. 
During the exercise, however, Rumsfeld’s December guidance caught up to the planning 
process, and CENTCOM instead decided that the already deployed V Corps headquar-
ters that had formed the core of CJTF-7 would also form the core of the new four-star 
theater headquarters, initially to be named the “Coalition Forces Command.” Under this 
plan, Abizaid intended that Sanchez would be nominated for a fourth star and stay on as 
the strategic commander, with his headquarters to be filled in using individual augmen-
tees for its initial and follow-on rotations. When this new strategic headquarters stood 
up in May 2004, operational-level responsibilities would devolve to the newly deployed 
III Corps headquarters, commanded by Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, which had 
arrived in January. However, awkwardly in the interim, III Corps would merge with the 
CJTF-7 headquarters to replace individuals who were redeploying and to fill out more 
fully the skeleton CJTF-7 staff, which at that point still had not climbed above 60 per-
cent of its planned strength. As Sanchez became theater commander, Metz, who had 
commanded infantry units at all levels, would assume the role of Sanchez’s deputy for 
operations, running the day-to-day battle rhythm of the headquarters, allowing Sanchez 
to focus on working with the CPA, CENTCOM, and U.S. officials in Washington.9
Not even a year into the mission, it had become clear that saddling an augmented 
corps headquarters with both the operational and strategic levels of command had been a 
mistake. The V Corps that had formed the basis of CJTF-7 was a single service Army orga-
nization accustomed in practice and doctrine to managing high tactical and operational 
levels of war. Though Army corps headquarters with joint augmentation had been used 
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as short-term joint task force headquarters 
for less complex and smaller operations in 
the past—such as Operation JUST CAUSE in 
Panama and Operation UPHOLD DEMOC-
RACY in Haiti—the scope and complexity 
of the Iraq mission had proved to be too 
much for this model. Compared to previ-
ous operations, V Corps had been assigned 
more subordinate elements, a more complex 
mission, and more personnel, by roughly a 
five to tenfold order of magnitude.
A Cascade of Transitions
During the first 3 months of 2004, at the 
same time that DoD leaders planned for a 
change at the top of the coalition structure, 
nearly all of the coalition’s combat power 
was scheduled to rotate out of country, 
creating massive requirements for person-
nel (see Map 13). As CJTF-7 worked with 
the institutional Army to fill those require-
ments, Army leaders rejected the idea of 
using the year-long individual rotation 
policy, a model that many of the Army’s 
senior leaders had judged to be a contribut-
ing factor in the Army’s failure in Vietnam.11
As a result, in most areas of operations, 
divisions replaced divisions and brigades 
replaced brigades in a one-for-one unit 
swap. In Multi-National Division-North 
Central (MND-NC), covering Salahadin, Kirkuk, and Diyala provinces, Major General 
John Batiste and the 1st Infantry Division replaced Major General Raymond T. Odierno 
and the 4th Infantry Division in March. In MND-B, Major General Peter W. Chiarelli and 
the 1st Cavalry Division replaced Major General Martin E. Dempsey and the 1st Armored 
Division in March and April. Unlike later transitions, the units that arrived in early 2004 
tended to come as organic sets, bringing their assigned subordinate units with them. The 
1st Cavalry Division, for example, arrived with its three maneuver brigades and organic 
support resources from Fort Hood, TX, each with its own assigned subordinate battalions. 
In most cases, the arriving commanders and units had worked together as teams prior 
to deployment, a factor that facilitated the concept known as “mission command,” allow-
ing leaders to better assign missions in the heat of battle because senior leaders would 
know their subordinates’ strengths and weaknesses. The handover of Anbar Province 
was less smooth. 
Source: DoD photo by Lance Corporal Jordan F. 
Sherwood, USMC (Released).
Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, 
Commanding General, 
III Corps/MNC-I (2004-2005).10
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Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.
Map 13. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Planned 2004 Transitions, 
January-March 2004.
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The coalition presence there had been turbulent in the year since the invasion, with 
responsibility for the province passing from Combined Joint Special Operations Task 
Force-West (CJSOTF-W) to the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment and then to a headquar-
ters element from 82d Airborne Division with two subordinate brigades (3d Brigade, 82d 
Airborne Division, and 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division) in the space of 10 months.
In February and March, the ad hoc division organization in MNF-W gave way to 
I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), commanded by Lieutenant General James T. 
Conway. Deviating from standard procedure, the Marine element in Anbar had a three-
star commander but also maintained the two-star 1st Marine Division as an intermediate 
headquarters, with the 1st and 7th Marine Regimental Combat Teams as subordinate ele-
ments for the division. Marine leaders had also explored the advantages and disadvan-
tages of various rotational policies and decided that combat units and squadrons would 
rotate as organizations every 6 to 7 months, in contrast to the Army’s year-long rotations. 
Higher headquarters such as the I MEF and 1st Marine Division would deploy for a 
year but would rotate individual personnel every 6 or 7 months. Explaining the decision, 
Marine Corps Commandant General Michael W. Hagee stated that the 6 to 7-month rota-
tion would “permit much more flexibility in meeting global requirements while main-
taining unit cohesion.” Such a schedule would almost mirror the Marine Corps Unit 
Deployment Program, a rotational schedule established after the Vietnam war in which 
each unit followed a pattern that included a 6-month forward deployment followed by a 
year-long period at its home station.12
With three U.S. divisions assigned to Baghdad, Anbar, and the north-center region 
centered on Tikrit, respectively, CJTF-7 was left without enough incoming units in early 
2004 to replace the 101st Airborne Division with another division-sized unit. Believing 
that Mosul and the surrounding region had been rendered fundamentally more stable 
than the rest of central and northern Iraq by the year-long efforts of Major General David 
H. Petraeus and the 101st Airborne Division, CJTF-7 leaders decided Multi-National 
Division–Northwest (MND-NW) could be made an economy of force mission within the 
coalition. Accordingly, in February the 25,000 troops of the 101st Airborne Division were 
replaced by the ad hoc Task Force Olympia commanded by Brigadier General Carter 
F. Ham, with a reinforced Stryker brigade beneath him, making a total of 10,000 troops 
in the renamed Multi-National Brigade–Northwest (MNB-NW). When the changeover 
occurred, the significantly smaller Task Force Olympia took responsibility for a huge 
geographic area that included the provinces of Ninawa, Dahuk, and Erbil, even though 
almost all of their combat power resided in Ninawa Province. Sulaymaniyah Province, 
which had previously been part of the 101st Airborne Division’s area of responsibility, 
was handed off to MND-NC, in recognition of Task Force Olympia’s reduced combat 
power. Ham’s ad hoc headquarters had a total of just 80 people drawn from the Army’s I 
Corps, meaning it lacked many of the critical capabilities and depth that Petraeus’s divi-
sion had possessed. The new task force also lacked a military intelligence battalion with 
its internal analysis element and had only three colonels across the entire organization, 
including the Stryker brigade commander.13
In addition to being smaller, the second rotation of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM units 
reflected a sharp increase in the reserve component’s contribution, which constituted 32 
percent of total U.S. forces (37,209 of 118,043 troops), a higher percentage than during 
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the invasion. These reserve units generally provided combat support and combat service 
support and only in rare cases, such as that of the 39th Infantry Brigade of the Arkan-
sas National Guard in MND-B and the 30th Infantry Brigade from the North Carolina 
National Guard in MND-NC, were reserve units responsible for their own area of oper-
ations or battle space.14
By mid-March, with the majority of transitions complete except for in Baghdad, the 
number of troops in Iraq had dwindled to 95,000 Americans and 25,000 from various 
coalition countries—a total of 12 U.S. brigades and 2 loosely defined coalition divisions. 
Supporting these forces, on paper at least, would be 40,000 Iraqi soldiers in the ICDC, 4 
battalions of the new Iraqi Army, and 60,000 Iraqi police.15
Equipping the Second Rotation
In addition to a reduced overall troop level, the U.S. units arriving for the second 
rotation of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM were bringing with them less combat equipment 
than the invasion forces they were replacing. Sharing CJTF-7’s assumptions about an 
improving security situation, U.S. Army Forces Command and the Army writ large dis-
couraged the second rotation of divisions from deploying with their full complement of 
combat vehicles and weapons systems, which Army planners assumed was of marginal 
use in stability operations. In the most notable case, Chiarelli and the 1st Cavalry Divi-
sion were initially prohibited from bringing their tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles into 
Iraq. Only after adamantly protesting to McKiernan and obtaining his support for a full 
complement of armored vehicles, was Chiarelli able to secure permission to bring about 
a third of his division’s tanks and Bradleys to Baghdad. Other units found themselves 
forced to leave their artillery tubes behind, with their gunners dragooned into provi-
sional motorized infantrymen.16
Chiarelli’s difficulties reflected the fact that the Army’s centralized equipping plans 
had not caught up to the growing dangers on the ground. The need for protection against 
rising numbers of improvised explosive devices (IED) reflected this disconnect as well: in 
order to meet CJTF-7’s skyrocketing requirements for armored-wheeled vehicles, Army 
leaders decided to fund a mix of tested add-on armor kits and up-armored High Mobility 
Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV). Because the existing production lines were 
nowhere near capable of producing sufficient numbers of up-armored vehicles, a major-
ity of the program to increase protection for coalition forces involved add-on armor kits. 
By January 2004, the Army had developed a plan to provide add-on armor protection for 
8,400 HMMWVs, 2,700 Medium Tactical Vehicles, and 1,080 Heavy Expanded Mobility 
Tactical Trucks, an enormous amount compared to the mere 354 vehicles with add-on 
armor and 829 M1114 up-armored HMMWVs already on the ground in Iraq.17
The Special Operations Rotations
By late 2003, the special operations community recognized that the mission in Iraq 
was going to last far longer than originally anticipated—and create a severe resourcing 
problem. With the 5th and 10th Special Forces Groups rotating headquarters every 7 
months, nearly 40 percent of the Army’s Special Forces assets were already in Iraq. The 
5th Special Forces Group had deployed near-continuously since the September 11, 2001 
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(9/11) attacks, having taken part in the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. The 10th Spe-
cial Forces Group, meanwhile, was committed outside of its normal European Command 
operating area, which had required the cancelation of several European security cooper-
ation deployments and partnership exercises.18
This over-commitment led to discussion among special operations forces leaders 
about what a sustainable Army Special Forces rotational cycle should look like. An initial 
plan in fall 2003 had judged that a single Special Forces company was sufficient for the 
Iraq mission, but the worsening security situation obviated that plan, and instead, one 
composite battalion comprised of companies from both groups served as the Army Spe-
cial Forces footprint until January 2004. The still-deteriorating security situation and the 
near-insatiable need for local information that Special Forces provided soon made even 
that level of force insufficient, forcing a reevaluation of the long-term footprint. After the 
initial turbulence, the CJSOTF’s makeup was eventually settled at two Special Forces bat-
talions and a Navy Sea, Air, and Land Teams (SEAL) Special Warfare Task Unit—a force 
nearly nine times as large as the fall 2003 assessment deemed appropriate. That force 
level would remain the special operations forces commitment for most of the remainder 
of the war. After considerable debate and a proposal to stand up a provisional group 
headquarters based in Iraq, the institutional Special Forces headquarters determined that 
the CJSOTF headquarters would be provided in turn by the 5th and 10th Special Forces 
Groups every 6 or 7 months. The new single headquarters was named CJSOTF-Arabian 
Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP).19
THE MATURATION OF THE ENEMY
For many coalition leaders, the capture of Saddam on December 13, 2003, brought 
a sense that perhaps, finally, the Iraqi resistance would see the futility of its struggle to 
restore the old political order and choose to lay down its arms. However, this hope was 
illusory. By the beginning of 2004, the Sunni resistance was maturing into a traditional 
insurgency, with various organizations employing classic guerrilla strategies. The pro-
lific Sunni resistance was comprised of disparate groups: former regime elements, xeno-
phobic nationalists, members of the global jihadist network, and criminal opportunists. 
For most of these groups, the Syrian regime provided safe haven and external support by 
harboring former regime elements and facilitating the flow of foreign fighters, for whom 
Iraq had become a cause célèbre, attracting jihadists from across the Muslim world.
While the capture of Saddam did not create the much-hoped-for collapse of the resis-
tance, to a degree, it did spark an internal conflict among the Sunni resistance groups 
over whom would succeed Saddam as the leading symbol of opposition to the occu-
pation. This internal conflict occurred principally between what coalition analysts 
would call “former regime loyalists” who had wanted to restore Saddam’s regime to 
power and “former regime elements” who sought the broader goal of restoring Sunni 
primacy but were not committed to restoring Saddamist rule. After Saddam’s capture, 
the former regime elements clearly began to supersede the former regime loyalists, but 
more importantly, as Saddam’s capture dispelled the cult of personality surrounding 
him, many members of the Sunni resistance began to migrate from groups loyal to the 
old regime into religious extremist groups. Salafi militant groups, in particular, benefited 
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from the leadership vacuum left by Saddam’s capture. By early 2004, the influx of local 
Iraqi recruits to Salafi organizations had converted Tawhid wal-Jihad, for example, from 
a predominantly foreign terrorist organization to a group in which Iraqis constituted a 
majority of the rank and file.
Meanwhile, in Anbar Province, coalition officials judged that a plurality of the prov-
ince’s 57 insurgent groups had adopted Islamic rhetoric and policies.20 In addition to this 
shift from Ba’athism to Islamism within the insurgency, the eclipse of the old regime in late 
2003 created tensions between foreign insurgent leaders and local Iraqi insurgent leaders. 
In the view of many Iraqi insurgent commanders, the foreign fighters in Iraq should sub-
ordinate themselves to native resistance leaders, as the Arab mujahideen had done in the 
anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. Zarqawi in particular had discarded this Afghan model 
in Iraq. Though Zarqawi reportedly assured Iraqi insurgents in June 2003 that he merely 
wished to “assist his Iraqi brothers [to] win the fight against the occupation,” by late 
2003, the Jordanian was staking his claim to leadership of the entire insurgency.21 Senior 
Iraqi insurgent leader Mahmud Janabi later recounted that, in mid-November 2003, Iraqi 
insurgents in Fallujah had rejected Zarqawi’s demand that they should fall under his 
command, leading Zarqawi’s Jordanian lieutenant Abu Anas al-Shami to warn the Iraqis 
that “We [Tawhid wal-Jihad] will leave Iraq to some other land as long as you do not 
agree to form an armed group under the leadership of Zarqawi.”22
Nevertheless, this internal fracturing of the Sunni insurgency led to few outright acts 
of violence between the disparate groups in this early phase of the war, and the intra- 
insurgency tensions were more properly characterized as a competition for the moral 
and financial support that would accompany being perceived as the strongest resistance 
group. Despite their internal struggle, the groups generally worked toward the common 
goal of expelling the coalition. There was also considerable consensus among the groups 
about how to achieve this objective: blocking reconstruction efforts, isolating coalition 
forces from the population, separating pro-coalition Iraqi leaders from the population, 
reducing public confidence in the nascent Iraqi Government, and fracturing the multina-
tional coalition.
Coalition assessments in early 2004 tended to characterize the insurgency as discon-
nected, locally supported organizations without operational-level planning or objectives. 
These assessments missed the degree to which many of the former regime elements 
retained the military-style organization and planning they had possessed before the fall 
of Saddam. They also missed the degree to which jihadist networks nested their opera-
tional-level activities under the ideological and strategic umbrella of al-Qaeda. In fact, 
during November 2003, Osama Bin Laden had recognized the value of the Iraq conflict for 
his broader strategy and had begun providing $1.5 million a month to support the Iraqi 
insurgency. In order to determine which groups should be rewarded with this support, 
Bin Laden dispatched several al-Qaeda senior leaders, including Hassan Ghul and Abdul 
Hadi al-Iraqi, to Iraq to assess the various insurgent factions and identify a commander 
who could serve as Amir, or leader, of an Iraqi al-Qaeda franchise. As part of this process, 
the al-Qaeda men asked each insurgent leader to provide a war plan or strategy docu-
ment explaining how they would conduct operations in Iraq. Among the first candidates 
that al-Qaeda’s corporate recruiters vetted was Zarqawi, who was hiding in Fallujah.23
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Though the Sunni insurgency of early 2004 lacked a formal hierarchical structure 
or single operational-level “brain” that could issue orders to its subordinate elements, 
there was a surprising level of coordination among the various war councils that com-
prised what some coalition officials described as the Sunni Arab resistance, or Sunni Arab 
rejectionists.24 One of the most notable examples of these councils with operational reach 
beyond its local area was the Ramadi Shura Council headed by Mohammed Mahmoud 
Latif, a Sufi cleric whose objectives were to restore Sunnis to power in Iraq and increase 
Islamic religious influence in government. Some of the militant groups represented in 
the Ramadi Shura Council received financial support from family members of former 
regime leaders hiding in Syria and Jordan, such as Saddam’s daughter, Rana Saddam 
Hussein, and Sa’ad Tariq Aziz, the son of former Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. This cash 
flow enabled the insurgency in Ramadi to become more sophisticated and better coordi-
nated than in other locations.25 In addition, the Kharbit family, well known throughout 
Iraq for the fortune it had amassed as industrial-scale smugglers under Saddam, pro-
vided considerable funding for a variety of Ramadi-based insurgent organizations.26
One notable effect of the insurgency’s operations was the thwarting of the coalition’s 
hopes for quick reconstruction of the Iraqi state and economy. With its exposed elec-
trical grid and oil pipelines that stretched hundreds of miles, Iraq’s vulnerable critical 
infrastructure was among the first targets against which the Sunni resistance acted in 
a coordinated fashion. By the end of 2003, infrastructure attacks were so frequent that 
the Kellogg, Brown, & Root “Restore Iraqi Oil Project” was having difficulty keeping 
employees on the job due to the dangers. During the month of November 2003 alone, 5 
Kellogg, Brown, & Root employees were killed and 26 wounded in 18 separate attacks. 
Interrupting the flow of oil or electricity damaged the population’s trust in its new gov-
ernment and reduced the oil revenues the government had to fund development proj-
ects.27 Infrastructure attacks were also powerful signals of coalition ineffectiveness and 
lack of control. When Iraqis in Baghdad suffered random electricity brownouts, they 
tended to blame the coalition rather than their own increased energy consumption or 
insurgent attacks on the electrical grid.
Like the attacks against infrastructure, IEDs began to have a significant impact on 
coalition operations, as they became the weapon of choice among insurgents. Early IEDs 
were predominantly command-detonated explosives, controlled by a trigger connected 
by wire, radio link, or cell phone to the weapon. This method permitted insurgents to 
target their objectives selectively and allowed less tactically skilled insurgents to con-
duct attacks. As coalition casualties from IEDs rose, coalition leaders promulgated new 
force protection rules: only armored vehicles were allowed to leave forward operating 
bases, and personnel had to travel in larger convoys. To minimize their exposure to IEDs 
or ambushes, coalition convoys tended to travel at high speeds using extreme offensive 
driving techniques, a practice that riled Iraqi drivers and further reduced contact between 
coalition troops and the Iraqi population. As weapons, IEDs were asymmetric in every 
sense of the word: they turned the American and coalition strength of greater combat 
power into a liability and created a wedge between the coalition and the people.28
The insurgent tactic of hiding among the population made separating friendly Iraqis 
from enemy combatants challenging. IEDs also frustrated many soldiers and lead-
ers because the devices allowed insurgents to kill or maim coalition personnel nearly 
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anonymously and made the capture of the perpetrators difficult. A few soldiers and lead-
ers took out this frustration on Iraqis, as in the January 3, 2004, incident in which Sol-
diers from 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, an element of the 4th Infantry Division stationed in 
Samarra, ordered two Iraqi civilians to jump into the Tigris River as punishment for being 
out after curfew. After one of the two Iraqi men drowned, the Soldiers’ ethical failure was 
compounded when the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Sassaman, told 
the troops involved to lie about the incident to Army investigators. Frustrated by his 
unit’s casualties and disillusioned with how the war was being prosecuted, Sassaman 
had clashed with his brigade commander, Colonel Frederick S. Rudesheim, accusing him 
of appeasing Sunni insurgents. Sassaman had grown impatient with the challenge of 
differentiating between “good” and “bad” Iraqis and adopted punitive measures such as 
employing white phosphorous artillery shells to burn farmland used as insurgent firing 
positions and utilizing anti-tank missiles to destroy houses owned by suspected insur-
gents and smugglers. Punishing curfew violators by throwing them in a river and then 
crushing their truck under the treads of a Bradley fighting vehicle were in keeping with 
Sassaman’s view of how the war should be fought. Ultimately, Sassaman’s leadership 
failure was discovered, and he was reprimanded for impeding an investigation. The two 
Soldiers most directly involved in the January 3 drowning were convicted by a court mar-
tial and sentenced to short prison terms of 6 months and 45 days, respectively.29
The Sunni Insurgency Fractures the Coalition
In the first months of 2004, the Sunni Arab rejectionists continued their strategy of 
targeting what they perceived to be weaker coalition members in order to force them 
to withdraw from Iraq. The insurgents appeared to focus first on inflicting casualties 
on countries whose elected political leaders supported military operations in Iraq but 
whose populations opposed the war. Driving these coalition members out would not 
only reduce the coalition’s combat power but also spread the remaining forces more 
Source: U.S. Army photo courtesy 256th Brigade Combat Team, Louisiana  
Army National Guard (Released).
Improvised Explosive Devices.30
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thinly across the country. It would also reduce the number of countries in the coalition, 
a political bellwether that would affect the degree of international support for the mis-
sion. The aftermath of the November 12, 2003, attack against the Italian headquarters in 
Nasiriyah seemed to validate the insurgents’ approach, as the strike prompted the Italian 
Government to restrict its forces’ activities significantly. Major General Andrew Stewart, 
the British commander of Multi-National Division-South East (MND-SE) to whom the 
Italian contingent reported, observed that the Nasiriyah attack placed the Italian contin-
gent in a difficult political position. “I was told that the commander of the Italian brigade 
. . . in Nasiriyah received two telephone calls a week personally from [Prime Minister 
Silvio] Berlusconi,” Stewart wrote later. “Whether or not he did, he was under consider-
able political pressure not to lose another soldier because if he did Berlusconi’s premier-
ship would be under severe threat.”31 The attack contributed to the Italian Government’s 
eventual decision in March 2005 to withdraw its 3,000 troops, the fourth largest allied 
contingent in Iraq.32
Next to be targeted was Spain. On March 11, 2004, terrorists affiliated with al-Qaeda 
bombed the Atocha Train Station in Madrid, killing nearly 200 civilians. The group 
responsible billed the attack as a response to so-called Western injustices in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and promised more bloodshed if the injustices did not stop. The bombing 
had an immediate impact on the coalition, as it was at least partly responsible for the 
Spanish Government’s defeat in the country’s general election just 3 days later, as the 
terrorists clearly intended. The new antiwar Spanish Government hastily withdrew its 
1,300 personnel by the end of April 2004, just 7 weeks after the attacks, and Honduras and 
the Dominican Republic quickly followed suit with their nearly 700 combined personnel.
The sudden departure of the Spaniards and their partners created a brigade-sized gap 
in Multi-National Division-Central South (MND-CS). With MND-CS losing about a fifth 
of its personnel and one-third of its brigade combat teams, and its total strength dropping 
to about 6,000 troops, CJTF-7 had to fill the shortfall on a stopgap basis, first by the 2d 
Armored Cavalry Regiment and later by 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division. Searching 
for a long-term solution, CJTF-7 leaders tried to convince their British counterparts to 
expand the boundaries of MND-SE and assume control of the rump MND-CS as well 
as all nine of the southern Shi’a provinces. U.S. military leaders also asked the United 
Kingdom to deploy the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps under a North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization (NATO) flag to assume command and control of the expanded effort, a request 
that Prime Minister Tony Blair and his government mulled over for several months before 
rejecting it in summer 2004.33
In May, Sunni insurgents would try the same strategy again, this time targeting South 
Korea as that country prepared to deploy more than 3,000 additional troops to assist 
in security and reconstruction activities in the Kurdistan region. Insurgents believed to 
be from Zarqawi’s Tawhid wal-Jihad captured a South Korean contractor and threat-
ened to murder him if South Korea did not withdraw all its forces. Unlike the Spanish 
case, the South Korean Government continued its troop deployment, and Zarqawi’s men 
beheaded the Korean captive in late June.34
Despite their failure with the Koreans, the Sunni insurgents were clearly aiming to 
defeat a key component of the original American plan: that the United States would be 
able to internationalize the Iraqi mission and turn over a significant share of the security 
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responsibilities and reconstruction efforts to coalition partners, nongovernmental orga-
nizations, or international organizations like the United Nations (UN). Indeed, as of early 
2004, many V Corps staffers continued to work under the assumption that a NATO force 
would be arriving, perhaps even in 2004, to take charge of the entire mission from CJTF-7. 
The spate of insurgent attacks against these allies, as well as assaults against the UN and 
the Red Cross, ended all hope of such a handover and severely hampered reconstruction 
efforts across the country. By early 2004, Sunni insurgents were targeting international 
aid and reconstruction organizations, kidnapping aid workers and contractors, often 
brutally killing them in videotaped beheadings designed to scare away the engineers, 
technicians, and development experts who had volunteered to assist in Iraq’s rebuilding. 
While this campaign of intimidation spanned all of 2004 and beyond, during the month 
of April, insurgents carried out several high-profile kidnappings of Americans who were 
later brutally beheaded, including the contractor Nicholas Berg.35
Zarqawi Aims for Civil War
Within the broader Sunni insurgency that focused on thwarting and expelling the 
U.S.-led occupation force, a smaller insurgent strain was driven by an additional dark 
motive. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi believed the Shi’a majority was the most dangerous 
threat to Sunni interests in Iraq and the surrounding region, even more dangerous than 
the American occupation. In order to prevent what he expected to be a sectarian liquida-
tion of Sunnis by Iraq’s majority Shi’a, Zarqawi had decided he should provoke the Shi’a 
into a sectarian war, thereby forcing the mobilization of Iraq’s Sunni population as well 
as, more importantly, the global Sunni population.
In the third week of January 2004, Kurdish forces captured Hassan Ghul as he was 
returning to al-Qaeda senior leaders in Pakistan with a letter containing Zarqawi’s pro-
posed strategy calling for attacks on the Iraqi Shi’a to create a civil war. In his letter, 
Zarqawi identified the Shi’a as the true enemy of Salafi jihadists, representing a greater 
danger than coalition forces. “The unhurried observer and inquiring onlooker will realize 
that Shi’ism is the looming danger and the true challenge,” he wrote. As Zarqawi saw it, 
the Shi’a were “the insurmountable obstacle, the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious 
scorpion, the spying enemy, and the penetrating venom. They are the enemy. Beware of 
them. Fight them.”36 Stoking fears deeply held by many Sunnis, some of which would 
later be matched by reality, Zarqawi argued that “the Badr Brigade, which is the military 
wing of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution, has shed its Shi’a garb and put 
on the garb of the police and the army in its place.”37 The Shi’a in the Iraqi security forces 
would soon start to “liquidate the Sunnis under the pretext that they are the saboteurs, 
remnants of the Ba’ath, and terrorists spreading evil in the land,” Zarqawi predicted. The 
only way for the Sunnis to avoid being exterminated, Zarqawi argued, was to strike at the 
Shi’a as their main objective, before the coalition and Americans. As the Shi’a responded 
to this sectarian war, it would “awaken the inattentive Sunnis as they feel imminent 
danger and annihilating death,” after which the global Sunni community would rise up 
and come to the Iraqi Sunnis’ aid.38
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Source: Still photo taken from courtesy video of American Forces Network Iraq (Released).
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.39
Beyond his claims to be protecting the Sunni community, Zarqawi himself was driven 
by ideology and pure hatred of Shi’ism. Zarqawi preached that the Shi’a were religious 
idolaters who performed ceremonies and held beliefs that were heretical to his extremist 
version of Islam. In Zarqawi’s view, drawn from that of the medieval Sunni extremist 
philosopher Ibn Taymiyyah, the Shi’a were worse than Jews and Christians because they 
had seen the light of “true” Islam and had chosen instead to stray off what he believed 
was the straight path. For that “sin,” Zarqawi described the Shi’a as atheists several times 
in his letter.40 This extreme antipathy toward the Shi’a was put into practice and made 
clear in early 2004. In March, Zarqawi’s attempts to foment sectarian violence focused on 
the Shi’a religious day of Ashura, when a series of complex attacks in Karbala and Bagh-
dad killed nearly 200 Shi’a pilgrims and wounded another 500. While the Ashura attacks 
were the most spectacular among Zarqawi’s early efforts to inspire a civil war, a steady 
drumbeat of smaller sectarian killings and bombings would continue throughout 2004, 
building momentum toward the civil war that Zarqawi intended to start. 
Prophetically, the CJTF-7 Red Cell, which acted as an independent think tank for Gen-
eral Sanchez, identified the danger that Zarqawi posed, noting in a February assessment:
The assassination of Grand Ayatollah [Ali Husayni] Sistani or the destruction of a revered mosque, 
such as the Imam Ali mosque in Najaf, would send reverberations throughout the Shi’a world 
and direct Shi’a anger both at Sunni Arabs and the coalition. This could spark wide-scale Shi’a on 
Sunni violence in Iraq, particularly in areas where both communities are mixed such as Baghdad 
or Basrah, which could, in turn, lead to countrywide ethno-religious violence, causing Iraqi society 
to factionalize and shattering hope of national unity.41
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While the coalition used the captured Zarqawi letter as a part of an information opera-
tions campaign to try to discredit the Sunni insurgency, the January 2004 revelation that 
Tawhid wal-Jihad and its leader intended to plunge the country into a Sunni-Shi’a war 
had little impact on the coalition’s operational planning, even though the letter’s contents 
were well understood and its significance acknowledged by a number of senior coalition 
officials. The only coalition elements to recognize and act upon the scale of the danger 
were special operations forces, which, in February, made Zarqawi their primary focus. 
Even so, the evolution in their targeting would occur slowly, and 50 percent of their 
operations until July 2004 were prosecuted against targets unrelated to Zarqawi and his 
organization.
The coalition had been handed, by providence, the war strategy of one of its most 
dangerous opponents, but coalition operational commanders did not make preventing 
civil war a central part of their campaign plans. In retrospect, it was a strategically sig-
nificant missed opportunity—akin to Union General George McClellan’s failure to act on 
captured Confederate plans ahead of the Battle of Antietam.
Iranian Moves
As Zarqawi set in motion his strategy to provoke a civil war to restore Sunni ascen-
dancy in Iraq, the Iranian regime was making its own moves to solidify Shi’a control and 
ensure its long-term influence. Iraq’s borders with Iran were almost completely unse-
cured, and at a coalition meeting to address the problem on February 7, 2004, Ambas-
sador L. Paul Bremer noted that “we have no [border] policy; no capacity to enforce it 
even if we had a policy; [and] no Iraqi diplomatic system to support issuing visas.”42 The 
Iranian regime was exploiting this policy and enforcement vacuum, sending agents and 
businessmen into southern Iraq to garner influence and lay the groundwork for larger 
elements and capabilities to arrive. Some Iranian agents were detained, but these were 
likely only a small portion of those that had been sent. One indication of the scope of the 
problem came in the December 2003 release of 41 Iranian detainees from the Camp Bucca 
detention facility, including the CENTCOM-authorized release of 4 IRGC members cap-
tured in the late spring.43
The Iranian regime was using additional means to exert influence as well, includ-
ing flooding southern Iraq with Iranian immigrants, some of whom were buying up so 
much Iraqi property that their actions created a housing bubble that drove up property 
values significantly.44 Some coalition officials, such as Karbala Governorate Coordinator 
Ambassador John Berry, judged that the Iranians’ actions constituted the early phases of 
an insurgency. Iranian operatives had allegedly attempted to assassinate Iraqi political 
and security leaders, including the Karbala police chief, and were attempting to co-opt 
Iraqi interpreters working for the coalition. A January 2004 CJTF-7 report assessed that 
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods Force was directing the Badr Corps 
to assassinate former regime members across southern Iraq, amounting to a violent 
de-Ba’athification campaign that had killed at least 43.
The effort was so advanced that Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq 
(SCIRI) had begun collaborating with the Da’wa Party in its search for Ba’athists, even 
establishing a council that proposed and approved targets. The Iranians had also tried to 
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stack the Najaf provincial council with pro-Iranian SCIRI members through intimidation 
and threats. Finally, some coalition officials believed they detected an Iranian hand in the 
bombing of the Coalition Provisional Authority facility in Karbala in December 2003.45
The Iranian regime’s strategic purpose for these actions was debated extensively 
among CJTF-7, the CPA, and U.S. officials in Washington. Some argued the Iranian regime 
was simply acting in self-interest by injecting reconstruction funds and capital as a means 
of stabilizing southern Iraq and preventing the violence from spilling over the border. 
Others judged the Iranians were trying to gain control over southern Iraq without firing 
a shot via population transfers, financial support, civic aid projects, and propaganda. Still 
others perceived a malignant nature in Iranian actions. From Karbala, Berry reported to 
the CPA his assessment that:
all of the recent moves in recent weeks . . . are part and parcel of a master plan directed by Iran 
to create a sphere of influence in the Shi’ite heartland, starting with the two holy cities. . . . Iran is 
eager to split Iraq into three semi-autonomous zones, and wants to extend Iranian control in the 
south, which in addition to emasculating its old enemy (Iraq), would guarantee its dominion over 
the two holy cities (Najaf and Karbala), the income they derive from pilgrims (estimated between 
1.5 [and] 3 million people a year), and the prestige of having them back in the same orbit as Qom.46
Recommendations for how to respond to the Iranian regime’s actions were as dispa-
rate as the assessments of Iranian motives. Deputy SECDEF Paul Wolfowitz had long 
recommended that only the worst Iranian regime proxies, such as Moqtada Sadr and 
his militias, should be engaged by force, and that the coalition should co-opt other Irani-
an-associated groups, especially SCIRI. Others, such as CPA Najaf Governorate Coordi-
nator Richard G. Olson, argued that the situation in Najaf was “fundamentally unstable” 
and that the coalition should establish a monopoly of the legitimate use of force by both 
disarming the Badr Corps and eliminating the threat from Moqtada Sadr.47
Continued Escalations With Moqtada Sadr
The first 3 months of 2004 were marked by gradually mounting tensions between 
the coalition and Moqtada Sadr. In January, several incidents instigated by Sadr nearly 
escalated into combat. On January 11, an Iraqi policeman was kidnapped by members 
of Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi wearing masks and Iraqi police uniforms. He was taken to a 
shadow court and prison in Najaf where the Sadrists were torturing political opponents.48 
Incensed by the discovery of the extrajudicial prison and courts, Bremer wrote to Olson 
that “we cannot let this ‘court’ and ‘prison’ continue in operation,” and signaled his 
intent to eliminate them.49 Unfortunately, both the prison and court were located in close 
proximity to the Imam Ali shrine, which complicated the situation enough to preclude 
launching an immediate security operation.
As the CPA considered its options, Sadr accused the police responsible for the secu-
rity of the Imam Ali shrine of corruption and sent members of his militia to occupy part 
of the shrine. A crisis ensued, as Grand Ayatollah Sistani demanded that Sadr’s men 
immediately withdraw but refused to allow coalition forces to enter the shrine to help 
eject them. The situation spiraled rapidly up to the CPA and CJTF-7 level as both local 
police and the allied forces in MND-CS declined to act against Sadr’s fighters, and it was 
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defused only after difficult negotiations between SCIRI leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and 
Sadr that allowed the Badr Corps to take responsibility for the shrine’s security.50
Because of these and similar provocations by Moqtada Sadr and his forces, coalition 
leaders had vigorously debated the various actions that could be taken against Sadr and 
his organization. Among the issues driving the debate was the strong evidence linking 
Sadr and his men to the April 2003 murder of Ayatollah Abdul Majid al-Khoei. Sadrist 
leaders’ inflammatory public statements also threatened to undermine the democratic 
direction the CPA hoped Iraq would follow. CPA Regional Coordinator for South Cen-
tral Iraq Michael Gfoeller advised CPA officials in Baghdad on January 7 that “my recom-
mendation is unchanged from before with regard to Moqtada Sadr and his henchmen. I 
strongly recommend that they should be arrested under the extant warrants issued last 
summer . . . for the murder of Abdul Majid al-Khoei.”51
 Gfoeller itemized a long list of the Sadrists’ crimes and destabilizing incidents, con-
cluding that failure to act was undermining the coalition and causing serious fear among 
Sunnis of a future Shi’a theocracy running Iraq. With regard to the second and third 
order effects of an operation against Sadr, Gfoeller argued that:
should we finally take the necessary action, I would predict several days at most of unrest in 
Kufa, Najaf, Karbala, and Amarah. Other southern cities might be affected as well in addition to 
Sadr City of course. I nevertheless believe, given Sadr’s great unpopularity, that the unrest would 
involve a small percentage of the population and then [wind] down rather quickly.52
Bremer echoed this assessment in a January 18 message to Rumsfeld, noting, “Now 
is the time to take action in conjunction with Iraqi authorities to hold Sadr account- 
able. . . . Although Sadr’s arrest may provoke clashes with his supporters in the short 
run, we believe it will have an almost immediate, salutary impact on politics in southern 
Iraq.”53 A counterargument by those who were opposed to taking such action was that 
Sadr was not part of the Shi’a mainstream and that conducting operations against him 
would only likely empower him and raise his credibility.
These debates were not limited to coalition officials in Iraq, as key decision makers in 
Washington took up the question as well. David Gompert, the senior adviser for national 
security and defense in the CPA, proposed to Wolfowitz during the deputy secretary’s 
January visit to Iraq that the coalition should ally with the Badr Corps and ask them 
to arrest Sadr and eliminate his organization.54 Wolfowitz supported the proposal and 
introduced it at the national level, noting in a January 21 memo that, “while there is defi-
nitely some conflict between our goals and SCIRI’s, I think it is a mistake to overestimate 
the degree of conflict and in particular I think it’s a mistake to think that they are stalking 
horses for the Iranians.”55
The recommendation touched off a debate that included Abizaid and Sanchez and the 
CPA, with Sanchez the least supportive of the plan. Meanwhile, in a January letter to the 
SECDEF, DoD policy officials argued that Sadr was the weakest of the Shi’a opposition to 
the coalition and should be arrested by Iraq’s police to send a signal to other recalcitrants. 
As CJTF-7 reviewed its options in light of the policy proposal, Sanchez’s political adviser, 
Catherine Dale, reported that “Bremer’s guidance is to clarify that the coalition is not 
reluctant per se (to arrest Sadr); but note that the Iraqi police simply cannot carry out the 
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action.” She further noted that “we already have a ‘decision,’ (with regard to Sadr) to be 
prepared to execute, and we are looking for an opportunity.”56
For his part, Abizaid was deeply reluctant to act against Sadr and his movement, con-
cerned about the potential consequences of entering a fight against Iraqi Shi’a militants. 
In Abizaid’s view, it was important to maintain focus on al-Qaeda and its allies across 
the region, the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks. To go to war against the Shi’a, either 
generally or in the form of the Sadrists was, in Abizaid’s judgment, a senseless strategic 
distraction because al-Qaeda, the main U.S. enemy in the Global War on Terrorism, was 
a Salafi Sunni organization whose leaders hated the Shi’a even more intensely than they 
hated America. Concerned about the momentum building to take action against Sadr, 
Abizaid wrote Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers on January 
23, 2004, arguing:
We cannot afford to divert military and intelligence capacity against threats such as the PKK, MEK 
and types such as Sadr at this time. We must stay focused on what kills us. I remain perplexed 
at the constant concern, from Washington, as conveyed by the Joint Staff, on problems that are 
peripheral to success in Iraq.57
Clearly concerned, too, about the nature of the instructions he was receiving about killing 
or capturing Sadr, Abizaid added in his January 23 letter to Myers that “it would be best 
to communicate our orders in writing through you to avoid any misunderstandings on 
the desired way ahead. To the best of my knowledge no written orders have ever been 
received on this subject.”58 Myers replied with a formal cable 2 days later that resulted in 
CJTF-7 ordering the CJSOTF to draw up plans to capture Sadr and his senior lieutenants, 
naming the mission Operation STUART.59
THE STRUGGLE TO FORMULATE A LONG-TERM STRATEGY
In contrast to the insurgents’ and Zarqawi’s nihilistic but consistent strategies, and 
Iran’s calculated actions, the coalition in early 2004 had trouble formulating a coherent, 
countrywide strategy. Within CJTF-7 and the CPA, commanders and staffs struggled to 
formulate long-term plans given conflicting political guidance from Washington and an 
uncertain future for both organizations. At the same time, the CPA and CJTF-7 wrestled 
with the challenges created by being under-resourced organizations conducting missions 
and activities they had not expected to perform.
Seeking guidance from Wolfowitz, who was visiting Baghdad on February 1, Sanchez 
noted that “right now there is no Iraqi national security strategy. We need a long-term 
vision that will facilitate Iraq’s independence, and we need to communicate that vision to 
Iraqis.” A nonplussed Wolfowitz responded that “part of that vision is winning the damn 
war first. Writing nice papers while VBIEDS [vehicle-borne IEDs] are still going off is like 
Alice in Wonderland. . . . [T]here is a disconnect and, until we are further down the road, 
what we need most is short-term thinking.”60
Separate but related to the campaign plan were ongoing discussions on what to do 
with the Iraqi security forces. For Abizaid, Sanchez, and Rumsfeld, establishing capable 
security forces seemed to provide the clearest U.S. exit strategy. Rumsfeld, concerned by 
a lack of progress in regenerating the Iraqi security forces, ordered Major General Karl W. 
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Eikenberry to Iraq in January 2004 to report on ways to speed up the Iraqis’ development. 
Having just headed a similar training mission in Afghanistan, Eikenberry found that the 
CPA’s efforts were not effective for either the Iraqi Army or the police, and that progress 
in the police force, deemed critical for success in fighting the insurgency, was lagging 
far behind progress in the army. Eikenberry recommended that the new Iraqi Army be 
reduced in size as a cost-saving measure and, because in his view, “the planned rapid 
buildup puts at risk quality control.”61 Eikenberry also concluded that training should 
be standardized for the ICDC, which to that point had been decentralized and driven by 
the various multinational divisions because CJTF-7 and CENTCOM considered the ICDC 
as a reserve or National Guard-type force that was temporarily mobilized for the ongo-
ing national emergency. The report also recommended that all security force training be 
transferred from CPA’s control to CENTCOM and CJTF-7 to create unity of command. 
At the strategic level, Eikenberry endorsed CENTCOM’s plan to focus its main effort on 
the creation of Iraqi security forces, to which the coalition would gradually transition 
responsibility as a way to reduce coalition force presence. As Iraqi forces became more 
capable than they originally were, coalition forces would hand over local control and 
then regional and provincial control, theoretically receding into the background to pro-
vide strategic overwatch by July 2006.62
Rumsfeld seized on Eikenberry’s report, seeing it as a roadmap to restart the founder-
ing Iraqi security forces training mission under a new model. To highlight the importance 
of the training mission, Rumsfeld ordered CJTF-7 to “give the highest priority to stand-
ing up capable Iraqi security forces and transitioning responsibilities to them as soon as 
possible,” and directed Sanchez to change his command’s mission statement to reflect 
the heightened priority. The resulting updated CJTF-7 mission statement included the 
requirement to “organize, train, and equip credible and capable Iraqi security forces in 
order to accelerate the transition of security from coalition forces to Iraqi forces.”63 While 
Rumsfeld rejected Eikenberry’s suggestion to reduce the size of the new Iraqi Army, 
almost all of the general’s other recommendations were implemented. The Coalition Mil-
itary Assistance Training Team (CMATT) was wrested from the CPA and moved under 
CJTF-7, and a new sister organization, the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team 
(CPATT), was created under CJTF-7, thereby aligning resources with responsibilities. A 
new military headquarters, the Office of Security Cooperation, would be created under 
CJTF-7 to oversee the military and police training teams and supervise the security force 
assistance effort. Because Eikenberry had noted that the police were equipped primarily 
with pistols and outgunned by the insurgents, CJTF-7 started to make changes to police 
training and equipping that would effectively militarize much of the country’s police 
force.
The holding of elections and writing of a new Iraqi constitution were also critical 
topics that prompted debate among U.S. officials. Initially, officials in Washington and 
the CPA had preferred to have caucuses, selected by coalition authorities, choose Iraqi 
representatives to write a new Iraqi constitution. This option would give the coalition the 
maximum ability to steer the new Iraqi political process. In June 2003, however, Grand 
Ayatollah Sistani had issued a fatwa declaring that the new constitution should be writ-
ten by a constituent assembly directly elected by Iraqis. In December and January, Sis-
tani had insisted that elections should be held quickly and that the new government 
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that would accept sovereignty in 2004 
should be elected as well. As U.S. lead-
ers in Iraq and Washington searched 
for ways to preserve significant control 
over the process, SCIRI leader Abdul 
Aziz al-Hakim countered by requesting 
that the UN intercede, after which the 
veteran UN diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi 
arrived in Iraq to mediate. Brahimi for-
mulated a compromise under which 
an Iraqi Interim Government would be 
selected by the Iraqi Governing Council 
and serve until nationwide elections in 
January 2005 for an Iraqi Parliament that 
would form a transitional government. 
The transitional government would then 
draft a constitution, thereby meeting Sis-
tani’s requirements. Hakim and Sistani’s 
efforts were both intended to reshape the 
Iraqi political landscape. For decades, the 
Shi’a Islamist factions had been blocked 
from participation in Iraqi politics and 
the spoils that came from it, and they 
were not about to pass up the opportu-
nity to finally take the majority share of 
power.64
Abu Ghraib: The Failure of Detention 
Policies
On January 14, 2004, the problems of the struggling detention program finally became 
clear when Sanchez was informed of the illegal acts and violations of the Geneva Con-
ventions that U.S. guards had committed against Iraqi detainees at the Abu Ghraib com-
plex in October 2003. Sanchez was told that there were “pictures of naked prisoners, 
some of which are pornographic in nature. Others show the use of unmuzzled dogs and 
there are even pictures of [military police] posing with a dead body.”66 On January 19, 
2004, Sanchez requested that CENTCOM appoint a general officer to conduct an Army 
Regulation (AR) 15–6  investigation.67 Major General Antonio M. Taguba, the CFLCC 
deputy commander for support, was appointed on January 31 and provided findings and 
recommendations in a written report on March 9.
Taguba’s investigation revealed systemic problems and abuses worse than Sanchez 
had imagined. In gross disregard of the laws of land warfare, a group of Soldiers from the 
800th Military Police Brigade, an Army Reserve unit, had carried out numerous sadistic 
and perverse acts on detainees, including sodomizing them, stacking them naked, threat-
ening them with dogs and weapons, beating them, and depriving them of sleep. Among 
Source: UN photo by Mark Garten (Released).
UN Special Envoy to Iraq  
Lakhdar Brahimi.65
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his many findings, Taguba recommended the appointment of a single commander for 
all detainee operations in the theater and additional training for all those working with 
detainees. Taguba’s report also recommended that Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, 
commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade, should be relieved and reprimanded, 
along with a battalion commander and other leaders who had responsibility for Iraqi 
detainees.68 Colonel Thomas M. Pappas, commander of the 205th Military Intelligence 
Brigade, who had been given overall responsibility for the prison by Sanchez in fall 2003, 
was also deemed responsible for the debacle and recommended for reprimand. Eleven 
Soldiers from the 800th Military Police Brigade were eventually convicted of crimes com-
mitted at Abu Ghraib.
Within CJTF-7, Sanchez and his headquarters had done everything by the book once 
the activities at Abu Ghraib had been discovered in late 2003. However, no matter how 
thorough the investigation they ordered, and no matter how severely they punished those 
responsible, the fallout from the scandal would ultimately prove impossible to contain.
***
As March 2004 came to a close, the coalition’s struggle to find its way in terms of 
both strategy and countrywide plans was compounded by considerable turbulence 
among the coalition’s key leaders and units, most of which were transitioning into or 
out of the country. Despite these challenges, coalition leaders remained unrealistically 
hopeful that the entire effort could soon be made stable enough to be transferred to an 
external multinational actor such as the UN or NATO. Conversely, the forces opposing 
the coalition were developing long-term plans and beginning to execute them. Iran was 
well on its way to establishing a foothold in the Shi’a heartland, Zarqawi was initiating 
his plan to start a civil war, and the broader Sunni insurgency was coordinating well-
planned operations. As the first anniversary of the invasion passed, Iraq was primed for 
an explosion. The pent-up frustrations of Iraqis—some caused by unfulfilled hopes of 
what the invasion would bring, some by coalition actions, and some by a simple hope 
for a return to normal—had begun to act upon Iraqi politics and security like a virtual 
pressure cooker. In April 2004, nearly all of the challenges the coalition was facing would 
explode simultaneously.
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CHAPTER 12
THINGS FALL APART, APRIL 2004
As the transition month of March 2004 came to a close and the new units that had 
arrived for the second rotation of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM began to settle into their 
areas of operations, coalition leaders in Iraq viewed the situation with cautious optimism. 
Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez and Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) believed 
daily affairs had settled into a type of normality in which the coalition was progressing 
toward its campaign goals, albeit at a slower pace than Sanchez would have preferred. 
Insurgent groups continued to mount harassing attacks against coalition forces, especially 
in the northern and western provinces, but the fighting was usually brief and localized.
This relative tranquility was shattered in April 2004, when Iraq exploded with mass 
uprisings throughout the country, forcing CJTF-7 to fight a two-front war against broad 
Sunni and Shi’a insurgencies. With Sunni and Shi’a guerrilla leaders coordinating their 
rebellions in an effort to drive the coalition from Iraq, only the timely intervention of a 
departing U.S. division rescued the coalition from a strategic defeat. The uprising per-
manently changed the character of the conflict and set in motion political dynamics that 
broadened the war far beyond coalition leaders’ expectations.
AN UNEXPECTED TWO-FRONT WAR
Outbreak in Fallujah
The trouble began in Fallujah, which by early 2004 had become an insurgent strong-
hold and the most dangerous city in Iraq. Even before the invasion of Iraq, Fallujah was 
religiously conservative. Known as “The City of a Hundred Mosques,” it was home to 
both Sheikh Abdullah Janabi, leader of the insurgent Mujahideen Shura Council, and 
Harith al-Dhari, chairman of the pro-insurgent Association of Muslim Scholars.1 In the 
months after Saddam Hussein’s fall, the lack of border security allowed thousands of 
foreign fighters to enter Anbar from Syria and Jordan and make their way east through 
the Euphrates River Valley. The situation had not been helped by the haphazard rotation 
of coalition units through the city in the months after the invasion, which resulted in no 
fewer than six different units having responsibility for the town during the first year of 
the war.2
Ominous signs appeared just after the New Year. On January 2, 2005, insurgents 
shot down an OH–58 Kiowa helicopter over the city.3 Later the same day, 1st Battalion, 
505th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), with special operations support, discovered 
17-armed improvised explosive devices (IED) and 4 dump trucks worth of explosives 
and weapons in a Fallujah market.4 Shortly after the raid, insurgent fire brought down 
a UH–60 Black Hawk medevac, killing nine U.S. Soldiers.5 Two other helicopters were 
downed in quick succession. On February 12, during a visit by the U.S. Central Command 
(CENTCOM) commander, insurgents engaged General John Abizaid and Major General 
Charles Swannack’s convoy with rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and small-arms fire 
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as it approached the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps 
(ICDC) building in the city.6 Two days later, mil-
itants conducted bold, simultaneous daylight 
assaults on 3 Iraqi police stations, the ICDC base, 
and the mayor’s office, freeing 20 insurgent pris-
oners while killing 17 lightly armed police offi-
cers.7 Two of the dead attackers were Lebanese, 
highlighting the presence of foreign fighters in the 
city.8 During the March handover of Fallujah from 
the 82d Airborne Division to I Marine Expedition-
ary Force (I MEF), a mortar attack on the mayor’s 
office during a city council meeting killed 2 Iraqi 
civilians while wounding at least 19 Soldiers and 
Marines.9
On March 31, Sunni militants ambushed a 
Blackwater supply convoy that took a wrong 
turn into a Fallujah neighborhood, killing all four 
of the convoy’s Blackwater contractor guards. 
The militants mutilated the corpses, dragged 
them through the streets, and hung their burn-
ing remains from Fallujah’s iconic iron bridge 
over the Euphrates River. Captured on video, the 
grisly scene was viewed worldwide.
From Baghdad, Sanchez viewed the Blackwa-
ter incident as a tactical issue for the Marines in 
Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W) to handle, 
as CJTF-7 was focused on what he considered 
the more significant threat from Moqtada Sadr, 
a view with which MNF-W leaders agreed. One 
Marine assessment held that the contractors had been killed by Albu Issa tribesmen, 
the same tribe reportedly responsible for shooting down a coalition helicopter after its 
sheikh’s arrest the previous September.11 Lieutenant General James Conway, the I MEF 
commander, and Major General James Mattis, the 1st Marine Division commander, both 
recommended against a large-scale operational response to the Fallujah incident. The 
1st Marine Division had taken over from the 82d Airborne Division just 2 weeks earlier, 
and the Marine commanders wanted time to develop a better understanding of Fallu-
jah’s urban terrain before launching operations. In any case, Conway and Mattis recom-
mended a targeted approach using improved intelligence to find the perpetrators of the 
31 March killings, rather than an offensive against the entire city.
After hurried conferences with the Marine leadership, Sanchez and Abizaid sup-
ported the tactical commanders’ counsel against immediate action and brought those 
recommendations to Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld and the National 
Security Council principals.12 In meetings in Washington on April 1, Abizaid argued, “The 
Source: DoD photo by R. D. Ward  
(Released).
Lieutenant General  
James T. Conway,  
Commanding General, I MEF 
(2002-2006).10
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reality in Fallujah is that the incident is militarily 
insignificant,” but acknowledged that “Repeated 
play on the media has made the insurgents appear 
strong and the U.S. weak.”13 Abizaid quickly real-
ized that U.S. leaders wanted a stronger response 
than Abizaid and Sanchez had recommended. The 
prevailing mood in Washington was, “This ain’t 
Mogadishu. We’re not walking away,” Abizaid 
observed.14 Reflecting that mood, Rumsfeld made 
clear in separate meetings with CJTF-7 that “we 
must do more than get the perpetrators. . . . This is 
a good opportunity to push the Sunnis on the Iraqi 
Governing Council to step forward and condemn 
this attack. We will remember those who do not. It 
is time to choose—you are with us or against us.”15 
With U.S. leaders having disapproved the recom-
mendations of their tactical commanders, on April 
3, Sanchez ordered MNF-W to begin Operation 
VIGILANT RESOLVE to eliminate the insurgent 
safe haven in Fallujah and capture those respon-
sible for the Blackwater killings.16 When informed 
of the decision, a frustrated Mattis asked Conway 
to provide the order in writing and to do every-
thing possible to prevent the operation from being 
halted before the city had been cleared.18 With just 2 
Marine battalions in the Fallujah area, MNF-W needed additional forces to clear the city 
of 250,000 people. While Mattis ordered his units already near Fallujah to form a cordon 
around the city, Conway repositioned two battalions from western Anbar to join in an 
assault on the city that would begin 3 days later on April 6.19 As events transpired, these 
would be the only coalition forces sent to assist in Fallujah as the country was about to 
explode in a general insurrection.
The Sadrist Uprising
As Sanchez had indicated to his chain of command, CJTF-7’s principal concern enter-
ing the spring of 2004 was Moqtada Sadr and his militant followers. This judgment was 
shared by most U.S. leaders in Washington, who regarded the Sadrists as the most sig-
nificant threat to the planned transfer of sovereignty to an interim Iraqi Government in 
June. Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi militia was well entrenched in the Shi’a-majority south by the 
spring of 2004, having infiltrated local police and government, established Sharia courts, 
and formed smuggling and kidnapping rings.
Sanchez believed himself under pressure from senior U.S. leaders to ensure the timely 
transfer of sovereignty in order to give the U.S. administration a political success ahead of 
the November 2004 presidential election.20 As a result, CJTF-7 had made plans to destroy 
Sadr’s organization but awaited solid intelligence and the right opportunity to do so. 
Source: U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) photo 
by Sergeant Kevin R. Reed, USMC  
(Released).
Major General James N. Mattis,  
Commanding General,  
1st Marine Division.17
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In view of the high risk of moving against Sadr, Rumsfeld had reserved for himself the 
authority to order the plan’s execution.21
The opportunity to move against the Sadrists seemed to present itself in late March, 
when Sadr’s newspaper, Al Hawza, published an article comparing the Coalition Pro-
visional Authority (CPA) and Ambassador L. Paul Bremer to Saddam.22 In response, 
Bremer ordered CPA officials to close the newspaper, which had been inciting violence 
against the coalition effectively for several months. On March 28, coalition troops chained 
shut the newspaper’s office doors, prompting a protest by nearly 20,000 angry Sadrists 
who marched on the Green Zone in the days immediately following the closure. A small 
contingent of U.S. Soldiers guarding the Green Zone perimeter, intimidated by the size of 
the protest and threatened by thrown rocks and other objects, opened fire and killed two 
Iraqis, further inflaming tensions.23
Rather than attempt to de-escalate the situation with Sadr, Bremer and the coalition 
took steps that inadvertently led to the opening of a second front. In a predawn raid 
on April 3, the same day Sanchez ordered MNF-W to launch its operation against Fal-
lujah, Navy SEALs from the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) 
arrested Mustafa al-Yacoubi, one of Sadr’s deputies and a suspect in the murder of Aya-
tollah Abdul Majid al-Khoei.24 As with all other operations against Sadr’s inner circle, the 
raid required an execution order from Rumsfeld.25 While the coalition treated Yacoubi 
as any other detainee, televised images of Yacoubi in an orange prison outfit matching 
the detainee uniforms at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, incensed many Sadr supporters, who 
perceived the arrest as a direct challenge to their power in southern Iraq.26
Bremer and his staff had assumed the mission could be conducted without an impact 
on the upcoming battle in Fallujah. But the arrest of Yacoubi, coupled with the closing 
of Al Hawza and the shooting of Sadrist protesters, all on the eve of the Shi’a religious 
pilgrimage and commemoration of Arba’een, prompted a violent response from Sadr’s 
forces. The day after Yacoubi’s arrest, April 4, Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi launched a coordi-
nated offensive against coalition troops across central and southern Iraq. The first blow 
fell in Baghdad, where Major General Peter Chiarelli’s 1st Cavalry Division was in the 
process of relieving Major General Martin Dempsey’s 1st Armored Division. Sadr City, 
with more than two million Shi’a residents, was an overcrowded maze of slums in an 
area of just 13 kilometers, making it one of the most densely populated areas of the world. 
By comparison, Sadr City’s population exceeded that of Manhattan but was crammed 
into a third of the space.
The 1st Cavalry Division was ill-equipped for the Sadrist offensive in this dense urban 
terrain. Forced to leave much of its armored forces home at Fort Hood despite Chiarelli’s 
protests, the 1st Cavalry Division had dragooned most of its tank, mechanized infan-
try, engineer, and artillery units into motorized infantry equipped with armored High 
Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) to conduct daily operations and 
patrols.27 Chiarelli and the 1st Cavalry Division had come to Iraq prepared to carry out 
stability operations that would focus on basic services and living conditions for the Iraqi 
population as the best way to improve security conditions, the same approach U.S. units 
had employed in Haiti. To explain his strategy as simply as possible, Chiarelli used the 
acronym “SWET,” which stood for sewer, water, electricity, and trash, the sectors of the 
Iraqi infrastructure that were the principal focus of this effort. It was for this reason that a 
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platoon of the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, was escorting contracted sewage vacuum 
trucks through Sadr City on April 4, 2004, when it was ambushed and nearly overrun 
by scores of Jaysh al-Mahdi fighters. Barricading the streets with stoves, air condition-
ers, and other debris, the Sadrist fighters trapped the patrol’s wheeled vehicles inside 
Sadr City, requiring tank-led reinforcements to crash through the obstacles and escort the 
beleaguered troops to safety.28
The change in the operating environment that occurred on April 4 was dramatic. The 
previous unit in Sadr City, the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, had lost just one Soldier 
during its 9-month tenure there.29 On April 4, eight Soldiers from 1st Brigade, 1st Cav-
alry Division were killed or wounded from a single ambushed patrol, after which the 
brigade fought intense battles against Jaysh al-Mahdi for 80 consecutive days. The fight-
ing became so fierce that, by the morning of April 6, the 1st Armored Division already 
had reported killing 136 Sadrist militiamen in Baghdad.30 By April 12, that number had 
reached 247, nearly double the number of insurgents reported killed in all of MNF-W.31
The situation changed beyond Baghdad as well. Sadrist uprisings quickly spread 
through the southern cities, including Basrah, Amarah, Kut, and Karbala, where angry 
protests on April 4 in front of coalition government buildings turned violent overnight. 
Within hours of the Sadr City outbreak, Multi-National Division Baghdad (MND-B), 
Multinational Division Central-South (MND-CS), and Multinational Division Southeast 
(MND-SE) all faced an unexpected crisis forcing them to defend virtually every coalition 
outpost in the south against Sadrist attackers (see Map 14).
The Assault on Fallujah
As the multinational divisions in Baghdad and the south scrambled to repel the 
Sadrist attacks, Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W) began its attack on Fallujah. The 
Marines spent 48 hours preparing to assault Fallujah by establishing a series of check-
points in a loose cordon around the city.32 The shortage of forces in the Marine cordon 
allowed some senior insurgents to escape the city and flee to Hadithah, which proved to 
be a favored insurgent staging area due to its proximity to Lake Tharthar and its central 
location within Anbar.33 Given the hastiness of the operation, only two battalions from 
Regimental Combat Team 1 (2d Battalion, 1st Marines, and 1st Battalion, 5th Marines) 
were available for the actual assault, and they moved into positions near the city while 
the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion screened to the south. On April 6, I MEF commenced 
Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE. The Marine battalions began moving into Fallujah’s 
neighborhoods, where they quickly became engaged in bitter house-to-house fighting. 
They did so without significant armor support. Because of the haste to launch the opera-
tion and the lack of other available forces, only 10 M1 Abrams tanks were present in the 
attacking forces.34
Opposing the Marines were 500–1,000 insurgent fighters from disparate groups 
that could be grouped roughly into three categories: former regime elements and Hizb 
al-Awda, local Islamist groups allied with foreign fighters, and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s 
Tawhid wal-Jihad.35 While no single individual controlled the various Fallujah resistance 
groups, Sheikh Abdullah Janabi was able to coordinate most of their efforts.36 During the 
battle, mosques served as insurgent command and control centers, with the al-Hadra 
Mosque serving as the principal headquarters for Janabi and his allies.37
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Map 14. Uprisings in Iraq, March 31-April 14, 2004.
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Source: U.S. Marine Corps photo by Corporal Matthew J. Apprendi (Released).
Marines Take Cover in Front of a HMMWV During the  
Battle of Fallujah.38
The 2d Battalion, 1st Marines paired with the Iraqi 36th Commando Battalion and its 
special operations advisers moved into the northwest part of the city, while the 1st Bat-
talion, 5th Marines, attacked from the west in an attempted pincer movement.39 Empty 
vehicles blocked intersections and alleyways, making it difficult for coalition armor to 
support the infantry forces.40 But as Marine units from elsewhere in MNF-W began con-
centrating on Fallujah, the balance of combat power shifted, and the Marines began to 
make headway. On the second day of the attack, Colonel John Toolan, the RCT 1 com-
mander, received a third infantry battalion. A fourth infantry battalion arrived 2 days 
later.41
As the operation proceeded, most of the Iraqi soldiers sent to participate in the attack 
refused to fight. Many of the troops, only having received a few weeks of rudimentary 
training, simply were not ready for the rigors of combat. Others, having joined the New 
Iraqi Army or ICDC to protect Iraq against external attack, felt they had been misled 
when they were ordered to Fallujah. In a scenario replayed across the country in April, 
many refused orders or just deserted rather than fight fellow Iraqis. In a few cases, they 
defected to the insurgents.
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Mattis told his superiors, “Reporting and experience has indicated that all Iraqi civil 
security organizations, police, Iraqi Civil Defense Corps and Iraqi Border Force are gen-
erally riddled with corruption, a lack of will, and are widely infiltrated by anti-coalition 
forces,” adding that “in one case we have reporting [sic] that an entire unit located in 
Fallujah has deserted and gone over to the insurgent side.”42 The major exception to the 
collapse of Iraqi security forces at Fallujah was the 36th Commando Battalion, which had 
been trained and equipped by the CJSOTF. Paired with embedded Special Forces advis-
ers, the 36th Commando Battalion became the sole Iraqi unit to fight effectively in Fallu-
jah, where it was rushed from one engagement to another throughout the city, despite the 
death of its battalion commander as he led an assault.43
The Conflagration Spreads
As MNF-W repositioned its forces to support operations in Fallujah, insurgents else-
where in Anbar took the opportunity to go on the offensive, most likely to reduce pres-
sure from Fallujah and tie down potential coalition reinforcements. (See Map 14.) On 
April 6, Ramadi exploded in fighting and fell to Sunni insurgents, while across Anbar, 
insurgent ambushes tied up Marine units and disrupted their movement. In Ramadi, the 
thinly stretched 2d Battalion, 4th Marines lost 12 Marines on the first day of fighting and 
resorted to putting uniforms on cardboard cutouts in guard posts to conceal their short-
age of combat power.44 On the same day, the Qusaybah police force defected en masse 
to the insurgency and began fighting coalition forces that previously had been helping 
organize and train them.45 Pitched battles in the town were marked by massed attacks of 
more than 100 insurgents.
The situation in Ramadi and Qusaybah was being replicated everywhere as the coa-
lition suffered what III Corps Commander Lieutenant General Thomas Metz labeled a 
“strategic surprise” throughout Iraq.46 The trapped platoon in Sadr City was only one of 
hundreds of engagements fought on April 4–5. Allied units that had come to Iraq expect-
ing to contribute to a stability and support operation similar to a United Nations (UN) or 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mission in the Balkans were unprepared to 
face the insurgent onslaught. In Najaf, Iraqi security forces virtually disappeared over-
night as Jaysh al-Mahdi fighters besieged the CPA compound in the city. In Nasiriyah, 
the Italian CPA representative attempted to strike deals with Sadrist leaders to avoid 
fighting, but by April 5, Sadrist fighters ignored the agreements and seized territory and 
buildings. The Italian contingent in Nasiriyah partially withdrew under heavy fire until 
MND-SE British commander Major General Andrew Stewart pressed the Italian com-
mander to retake the city lest Stewart send a British brigade to do the job himself.47 The 
city of Kut fell wholesale, with Jaysh al-Mahdi members overrunning the television and 
radio stations, Iraqi Government buildings, and police stations as the Ukrainian military 
commander garrisoned his vehicles and refused to participate in the fighting.48 On the 
night of April 5, a U.S. AC–130 Spectre gunship narrowly repelled a Sadrist assault on 
the CPA office in Kut, but the CPA abandoned the office the following day when the 
Ukrainian contingent assigned to defend it withdrew to Camp Delta outside the city.49 
Without the stiff defense provided by military contractors from a company named Triple 
Canopy, the CPA compound likely would have been overrun.
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While some allied forces fought fiercely, most were overwhelmed by the unexpected 
spasm of violence. Constrained by each country’s national caveats and limitations on 
their operations, many allied military commanders on the ground in MND-CS refused 
to act against the uprising, revealing a significant flaw in the coalition’s disposition of 
forces: the territory where the Sadrist insurgency metastasized had been assigned to the 
coalition forces least-equipped and least-willing to deal with the problem. The carving 
out of the MND-CS area of responsibility thus had created an operational-level seam for 
the Shi’a insurgency to exploit.
Meanwhile, as the fighting raged in Sadr City, the south, and Fallujah, other parts 
of the country erupted in rebellion in what increasingly appeared to be a coordinated 
insurgent offensive. In the northern city of Samarra, a former Saddamist stronghold with 
a Sunni population of 200,000 and a major Shi’a shrine, Sunni insurgents overran the 
town as local Iraqi security units collapsed. The U.S. battalion responsible for the city had 
arrived just weeks earlier when Major General John Batiste’s 1st Infantry Division took 
over Multi-National Division-North Central (MND-NC) from Major General Raymond 
Odierno’s 4th Infantry Division in March. As the Iraqi forces melted away, the battalion 
lost awareness of what was going on in Samarra, a fact compounded by the placement of 
its garrison on the major highway 8 kilometers outside the city.50 The base “was a good 
location to monitor the [main supply route] but a poor location to monitor Samarra,” one 
officer recalled, and it forced the battalion to “commute” into the city with “only one way 
in and one way out of town.”51 In Samarra at least, the CJTF-7 policy of moving units out 
of Iraqi cities ultimately had ceded territory to the enemy. It would take a week for coali-
tion troops to fight their way back into the city, retaking it on April 11.
On April 7, the fighting spread farther north to the normally quiet Sunni city of Haw-
ijah, a Saddamist stronghold of 70,000 people 64 kilometers southwest of Kirkuk. Haw-
ijah was the responsibility of a light infantry battalion from 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry 
Division, and as in Samarra, the coalition troops were based outside the city in keeping 
with CJTF-7 strategy. Beset by hundreds of gunmen, the U.S. battalion repelled multiple 
assaults, eventually killing 35 attackers and capturing another 58. When the fighting was 
over, the coalition troops discovered the insurgents had planned to seize government 
buildings and Iraqi security forces bases and use their capture for propaganda.52
Meanwhile, on April 8, the insurrection spilled into Diyala Province northeast of 
Baghdad, where major fighting broke out in the provincial capital of Baqubah, as well as 
in Muqdadiyah and Khalis. Baqubah fell to insurgents, requiring a U.S. tank battalion, 
engineer battalion, and artillery battalion all pressed into service as infantry to retake the 
city.53
Guidance From Washington
In Washington, U.S. leaders considered how to manage the expanding crisis. Gather-
ing on April 7, the National Security Council principals were nearly unanimous in their 
determination to respond aggressively against the Sadrists, even as the attack against 
Fallujah continued. As Secretary of State Colin Powell saw it, it was time to “smash some-
body’s ass quickly.”54 Then-President George W. Bush concurred, judging that the Shi’a 
uprising was a “manhood test” for Moqtada Sadr in which the coalition could not afford 
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to let the young Shi’a leader gain the upper hand.55 The National Security Council’s con-
clusion was clear: an urgent counterattack against the Sadrist movement was needed. On 
the same day the National Security Council met, coalition officials in Baghdad declared 
Jaysh al-Mahdi “a hostile force,” a legal designation that allowed coalition forces to use 
deadly force against members of the organization even if they were not carrying out a 
hostile act or exhibiting hostile intent against coalition forces. Such a declaration, used 
previously against Saddam’s military before it disintegrated, contrasted significantly 
with the rules of engagement that applied to the remainder of the country: it meant that 
JAM fighters could be killed under nearly any condition other than surrendering. Mean-
while, U.S. leaders approved a plan to turn around the homeward bound 1st Armored 
Division and task it with preparing a division-level attack against the Sadrists.
Cutting Off the Coalition Supply Routes
With coalition units fully engaged in fighting throughout central and southern Iraq, 
both Shi’a and Sunni rebels appeared to realize they had seized the initiative, and they 
next sought to isolate the coalition units scrambling to mount a counterattack. On April 
8, insurgents attacked the main coalition supply routes running south from Baghdad, 
threatening to cut off the coalition divisions from their main logistics hub in Kuwait. 
Before April, the numerous coalition supply convoys had been harassed only sporadi-
cally, and most often by attackers using a single IED. In April, by contrast, Sunni and 
Shi’a insurgents mounted numerous complex attacks in which groups of 50–100 fighters 
attacked convoys with direct fire, IEDs, and RPGs. Insurgents with apparent military 
skills placed obstacles and mines on main supply routes to “canalize” convoys into more 
constricted areas where militants waited to ambush them.
Even more damaging were insurgent attacks against vital bridges. Insurgents 
destroyed 11 bridges during April, and along Highway 1, the main north-south high-
way that coalition troops knew as “Main Supply Route Tampa,” insurgents downed 5 
bridges in 1 day. Because only a limited number of bridges could support the passage of 
heavy armored vehicles over the twisting Tigris River, these attacks forced coalition units 
to take circuitous detours, often along dangerous canalized routes. The attackers also 
destroyed highway overpasses, which blocked wheeled vehicle patrols and logistics con-
voys, halting them in ambush kill zones. Insurgents hit the coalition’s logistics convoys 
hard: in a 10-day period along Route Tampa, attackers destroyed 88 trucks, killing 33 U.S. 
Soldiers and capturing one.56
When the 1st Cavalry Division’s normal southern route was cut, a U.S. convoy bring-
ing sorely needed fuel tankers and supply trucks from Balad to the division’s bases in 
Baghdad met with disaster on April 9 on the outskirts of Baghdad. Unfamiliar with the 
route and equipped with unarmored vehicles, the convoy and its escort, the 724th Trans-
portation Company, were ambushed near Abu Ghraib by what were most likely former 
Iraqi soldiers who had joined Jaysh al-Islami. The insurgents destroyed 18 of the con-
voy’s 26 vehicles and almost all of its fuel and supplies.57 Lacking proper communica-
tions equipment, the 724th Transportation Company was unable to call for help, and the 
first inkling nearby friendly units had of the convoy’s plight was multiple columns of 
black smoke on the horizon. Casualties stood at 7 killed, 12 wounded, and 4 missing, with 
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Specialist Keith Maupin and contractor Keith Hamill taken hostage. Hamill later escaped, 
but Maupin’s captors killed him, and his remains were found in 2008.
The attacks compounded CJTF-7’s already fragile just-in-time logistics practices in 
which units inside Iraq maintained few parts and supplies—relying instead upon on- 
demand deliveries from the central supply hub in Kuwait, a cost-savings method the 
Army had adopted during the drawdown of the 1990s. In Iraq, the insurgent offensive of 
April 2004 proved fatal to a just-in-time system that was already vulnerable to transpor-
tation disruptions, an austere communication network, and the frequent turbulence of 
unit moves and task-organization changes.58
Locked in exhausting battles with both Shi’a and Sunni insurgents, the coalition 
was using fuel and ammunition at an unprecedented rate. This, coupled with disrup-
tive attacks on convoys and supply routes, nearly resulted in a theater-wide logistics 
meltdown. On several bases, including the CPA headquarters in Baghdad, food supplies 
began to run out, and MNC-I Commander Metz watched his entire corps go “amber and 
black on fuel and ammunition.”59 Instead of seeing supplies arriving just in time, units 
often found they had to do without. After the battles of April, many units created their 
own bootleg supply stockages to guard against future crises.
The attacks against the coalition lines of communications were a clear sign that the 
Iraqi insurgent groups were coordinating among themselves at an operational level. They 
were doing so in support of two larger objectives: to block the coalition from reinforcing 
the southern provinces where the Sadrist uprising was in full swing, and to starve the coa-
lition logistically during a period of an extremely high operational tempo. The insurgent 
attacks were not carried out randomly, but rather were precise and coordinated. Most of 
the bridges targeted were those capable of carrying high-tonnage armored vehicles, and 
destroying them required reconnaissance and demolition experience. These operation-
al-level activities were not the work of a single, hierarchical insurgent command center, 
but reflected operational-level collaboration among various insurgent groups that could 
quickly share lessons learned and information on the routes coalition forces used. In other 
cases, opportunistic insurgent groups realized what was happening nationwide and took 
local advantage. In either case, the result was the same: the loosely defined insurgency 
had reacted to coalition action with decisive, operational-level effects.
The Fallujah Cease-Fire 
Back in Fallujah, Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE was colliding with regional pol-
itics. Within days of the Marines’ attack, high levels of collateral damage were seized 
upon by Arab media outlets, which sensationalized civilian casualties and in some cases 
misidentified fallen insurgents as civilians. Arabic media often used incendiary language 
designed to influence opinions in the Arab world, comparing coalition “occupiers” to the 
Israeli troops in Palestinian territories and describing Blackwater security contractors as 
“mercenaries.” Cable television channel Al Jazeera claimed 600 civilians had been killed 
and filled its broadcasts with images of dead children at the Fallujah hospital and other 
locations within the city.60 Al Jazeera’s broadcasts so stung U.S. national leaders that they 
considered withdrawing all U.S. forces—including CENTCOM’s forward headquar-
ters—from Qatar if its government did not do more to “bring Al Jazeera under control.”61
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With little time to prepare for the mission, MNF-W had not embedded Western jour-
nalists with I MEF forces, so that the critical ground of information operations was effec-
tively ceded to an insurgency that could distribute a one-sided message.62 Worse, the 
haste with which the operation was executed precluded the opportunity to evacuate the 
city of civilians properly, essentially ensuring that the insurgency had the opportunity to 
exploit footage of civilian casualties.
The ensuing situation created severe pressure on the already-fragile Iraqi and inter-
national support for the coalition. With some of its members threatening resignation, the 
Iraqi Governing Council demanded that CJTF-7 terminate the Fallujah operation. UN 
representative Lakhdar Brahimi also threatened to quit if the coalition did not halt the 
operation.
The concern that coalition actions in Fallujah could potentially disintegrate the Iraqi 
Governing Council permeated discussions between the CPA and CJTF-7; and, worries 
mounted about the catastrophic effect the battle could have on the planned transfer of 
sovereignty timeline. The possibility of such a disintegration was made more real by Iraqi 
Interior Minister Nuri Badran’s sudden resignation and Sunni politician Mohsen Abdul 
Hamid’s suspension of participation in the governing council. During a meeting the eve-
ning of April 8, Bremer worried that “the fragile governing framework of Iraq may be in 
some jeopardy . . . [if ] several major ‘jump ships’ follow Badran’s exit today, [it] could 
launch a veritable avalanche of resignations.”63 By the next morning, April 9, Bremer had 
come to support an Iraqi Governing Council proposal for a cease-fire and called Sanchez 
to discuss options of how one could be implemented. A senior CJTF-7 aide noted in a 
memo to Sanchez that, for Bremer, “holding together the IGC . . . is critically import-
ant. The follow-on, interim government plans depend on expanding the IGC, which you 
cannot do if you have no IGC left.”64
Having touched off a political firestorm and suffering a strategic communications 
defeat, the CPA and CJTF-7 announced a unilateral cease-fire in Fallujah later that day; 
just 3 days after combat operations had begun. The decision infuriated Mattis, commander 
of the 1st Marine Division, which was conducting Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE in 
Fallujah. When informed of the decision, he responded that it was “not time to get weak 
in the knees” and that “if you set out to take Vienna, you take Vienna.”65 Despite Mattis’s 
protests, MNF-W had no choice but to withdraw its units to the city’s edge keeping Fal-
lujah in a state of siege while the Iraqi factions began negotiations to defuse the crisis. By 
the time fighting subsided, 18 Marines  had been killed and another 96 wounded. I MEF 
estimated that 600–700 insurgents had been killed in the intense fighting, which included 
more than 150 air strikes.66
Expansion of the Fighting and Shi’a-Sunni Collaboration
Despite the Fallujah cease-fire, the fighting in the first week of the uprising seemed to 
intensify and expand to new areas each day. On April 9, insurgents ambushed a convoy 
carrying Brigadier General John Kelly, assistant commander of the 1st Marine Division, 
from Taqqadum Airfield to Iskandariyah to coordinate with Army units. After an intense 
battle, Kelly and his small detachment fought their way out of the assault with the assis-
tance of a quick reaction force from 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, bolstered by close air 
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support.67 On April 11, during efforts to rescue a trapped resupply convoy in Babil Prov-
ince south of Baghdad, Soldiers from the 2d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment 
leveled three houses with a 2,000-pound bomb, tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-
guided missiles, and mortars, all without question or request for a storyboard beforehand 
from any higher headquarters. This incident stood in marked contrast to the situation just 
days before when leaders considered the country stable enough that using small-arms 
fire often had prompted investigations of whether rules of engagement and proper esca-
lation of force procedures had been followed.68
In eastern Anbar, the coalition had lost control of the area from Ameriyah to the 
MND-B boundary. When combat operations were halted in Fallujah, MNF-W leaders 
reapportioned their overstretched forces to clear this eastern enclave of insurgents, an 
operation that lasted until early May and eventually allowed for the reopening of supply 
routes in the province. Elsewhere, western Anbar also witnessed mass uprisings as battles 
raged from Al Qa’im to Qusaybah and other cities along the Syrian border and Euphrates 
River. In one engagement on April 14 in the border town of Karabilah, Marine Corpo-
ral Jason Dunham led a squad responding to an ambush of his battalion commander’s 
convoy. The action devolved to hand-to-hand combat in which one insurgent released a 
grenade while wresting with Dunham, who immediately warned his Marines and placed 
his helmet over the grenade. Dunham, killed by the blast, received the Medal of Honor 
for his sacrifice.69
As the fighting spread across the Iraqi provinces, coalition leaders were alarmed to 
discover Sunni and Shi’a militants operating in tandem against coalition units. While the 
battle raged in Fallujah, Shi’a volunteers from Baghdad and the south made their way 
to the city to support the Sunni resistance fighters, and vice versa. Fallujah insurgents 
reportedly delivered weapons such as the shoulder-fired SA–7B surface-to-air missile to 
Sadrists in Baghdad.70 Insurgent propaganda highlighted this brotherhood of resistance 
against the coalition, such as an April 6 statement by the Sunni insurgent group Jihad 
Brigades to the Al Jazeera news channel that urged Sadr’s followers to continue resisting 
coalition forces.71 Sunni and Shi’a insurgent groups sometimes wrote joint statements, 
including one in which Jaysh al-Mahdi and Ansar al Fallujah Army warned Iraqi civil-
ians to avoid roads used by coalition supply convoys. 
Both Forces have decided to make the road of Al Usufiya, al Rashid District, Abu Dasher, Hora 
Rigab as a war zone against Jewish and Zionist forces. We will attack all the infidel vehicles that 
would use this road and these districts . . . we urge our patient people through this statement, to 
stay away from this area.72
Another declaration called for shopkeepers in Baghdad to close their shops from April 
15–23 because “your resistance brothers al Mujahideen from Ramadi, Khaledia, and Fal-
lujah will move the resistance fire to Baghdad and will support our brothers Mujahideen 
from Al Mahdi Army.”73 In the words of one coalition planner, “We had at that point 
managed the nearly impossible task of uniting the Sunnis and Shiites . . . against us.”74
294
THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR
The joint Sunni-Shi’a declarations showed that, for at least a short time, the Iraqi insur-
gency had gelled into a national resistance. In April 2004, the Sunni resistance in Anbar 
was led primarily by former regime elements alongside which Zarqawi’s Tawhid wal-Ji-
had played a relatively minor role. With Zarqawi not yet the dominant Sunni insurgent 
leader, Shi’a insurgents could rationalize working with Iraqi Sunni groups and Sunnis 
with Shi’as because they shared the common objective of expelling a foreign occupying 
force. Moqtada Sadr, in particular, temporarily embraced this collaboration with Sunni 
insurgents because it helped him stand out from other more traditional Shi’a leaders by 
emphasizing his nationalistic credentials.
But this cross-sectarian allegiance did not last long. Zarqawi soon exploited the vio-
lence in Fallujah in the media far more effectively than the former regime elements could, 
and the Sunni-Shi’a collaboration soon gave way to sectarian civil war.
THE COALITION COUNTERATTACK
The 1st Armored Division’s U-Turn
With the situation spiraling out of control in southern Iraq, Sanchez and CJTF-7 put in 
motion a plan to regain the initiative. As U.S. leaders had authorized him to do, Sanchez 
halted the redeployment of Dempsey’s 1st Armored Division, portions of which already 
had left Iraq to return to their home base. To address the burgeoning crisis, the division 
was also extended 90 days, resulting in a 15-month-long deployment.
The 1st Armored Division’s consequent U-turn was an extraordinary logistical feat. 
Almost 10 percent of the Soldiers in the division’s three brigades either already had 
returned to Germany or awaited flights home from Kuwait. Over half of the division’s 
combat vehicles had left Iraq, and the division’s helicopter fleet sat disassembled and 
shrink-wrapped for ocean transit home.75 Most division units had turned over their 
ammunition to their 1st Cavalry Division replacements. For the return to Iraq, they drew 
new stocks from a rapidly depleting theater reserve in Kuwait and at Logistics Support 
Area Anaconda in Balad. With their former headquarters and barracks occupied by new 
units, the division reverted to invasion mode, sleeping in vehicles and temporary shelters.
Brigade In Iraq In Kuwait Redeployed Percent Redeployed
1st BCT 2,960     9   53  2
2d BCT 2,964 174 205  7
4th BCT 1,501   41 167 11
Source: Briefing, CJTF-7, 1st Armored Division (AD) Extension Initial Mission  
Analysis Brief to CG, April 6, 2004.
Table 1. 1st Armored Division Personnel as of April 6, 2004.
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Source: Briefing, CJTF-7, 1st AD Extension Initial Mission Analysis Brief to CG, April 6, 2004.
Table 2. Location of 1st Armored Division Equipment as of April 6, 2004.
Some of the division’s units in Kuwait conducted forced road marches back to Bagh-
dad, exceeding the distance covered by much of the original invasion force. However, 
other 1st Armored Division units that had not begun their redeployment were available 
nearly immediately. In Baghdad, the division’s 2d Brigade, renamed Task Force Striker, 
pushed to Najaf on April 4, with only hours to prepare. Ordered to move next to Kut, 
where the CPA compound had fallen, and the situation was considered to be more pre-
carious, Striker quickly changed tack and began hasty planning and logistical refitting. 
On April 8, preparations were complete, and Task Force Striker with 112 combat vehi-
cles made the 277-kilometer road march from Najaf to Kut in 6 hours, fighting 3 times 
en route.76 As they approached Kut, they paired with AH–64 Apache helicopters and 
AC–130 gunships in an attack that destroyed the Sadr bureau headquarters and recap-
tured the CPA compound and Iraqi municipal buildings.
As Dempsey rallied his units, CJTF-7 also created a composite unit around Colonel 
Dana Pittard’s 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, comprised of elements of three dif-
ferent divisions including a light infantry battalion that just had been assigned to the 
short-handed Task Force Olympia in Ninawa Province.77 Disengaging from the fighting 
in Diyala Province, Pittard and his polyglot Task Force Duke embarked on a 40-hour, 
400-kilometers road march to Najaf, fighting through blown bridges and Sunni and Shi’a 
insurgent attacks en route.78 When the task force arrived on April 13, CJTF-7 directed it 
to establish a cordon around the city rather than begin clearing operations out of concern 
the Imam Ali Mosque, considered by some the holiest shrine in the Shi’a world, could be 
damaged in the fighting. Task Force Duke kept watch for several days, buying time for 
the 1st Armored Division to reassemble and complete its ongoing relief in place with the 
1st Cavalry Division.
By April 20, Dempsey’s 1st Armored Division had reassembled its brigades and taken 
responsibility for the area of Sadrist uprisings, allowing Task Force Duke and other units 
to return to their original areas of responsibility in MND-NC and MNF-W. Serving as the 
CJTF-7 reserve, Colonel Peter Mansoor’s 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, was directed 
to Najaf to prepare for an assault against Moqtada Sadr and his militia followers there 
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as well as in the other major shrine city of Karbala. With an additional division’s worth 
of U.S. combat power in the southern provinces, the balance began to shift back to the 
coalition.
Fighting and Negotiations With Sadr
As Dempsey’s brigades advanced on Sadr’s southern strongholds, the coalition also 
reached out politically to try to negotiate an end to the fighting. By mid-April, parallel 
efforts were underway to de-escalate the situation and to persuade Sadr to withdraw 
his fighters from Najaf. In Baghdad, Ambassador Robert Blackwill led an officially sanc-
tioned effort to negotiate with Sadr, but Iranian diplomats, Da’wa Party leaders, and 
southern tribal sheikhs all negotiated on their own with the Sadrists as well, muddling 
the picture. Even Sadr’s mother became involved, holding meetings to plead for mercy 
tearfully from the coalition and beg her son to end the confrontation.79 These negotiations 
made little progress. Fighting continued through May, and the Sadrists took heavy casu-
alties, including many mid-level leaders. Mansoor’s 1st Brigade retook most of Karbala 
by the second week of May, except for the Old City, where Jaysh al-Mahdi dug in and 
prepared for a Fallujah-like urban battle.80 With the noose tightening around Sadr and 
a coalition defeat or disruption of the planned transfer of sovereignty averted, Bremer 
ordered Sanchez to cease offensive operations and avoid a final confrontation with 
Moqtada Sadr himself.81 For his part, Sanchez believed the 1st Armored Division had 
sufficient intelligence to finish off Sadr and his militia and should be allowed to do so, but 
he halted the division’s impending attack on Karbala’s old city to alleviate coalition fears 
that the shrine of Imam Hussein, one of Shi’ism’s two holiest sites, might be damaged.82 
Unaware of these internal coalition directives, and seeing his fortunes shift from near 
victory to near defeat, Sadr decided to sue for peace. On June 16, he agreed to a cease-fire 
that finally brought the uprising to an end.
Many coalition leaders believed they had dealt Sadr a lasting defeat, but the decision 
to stop short of destroying his militia and killing or capturing Sadr himself had negative 
consequences. Sadr remained free, in defiance of the Iraqi arrest warrant for his alleged 
involvement in the Khoei murder the year before. His militia, which had teetered on the 
edge of disintegration by the end of the fighting, began to regroup and recruit replace-
ments for the heavy casualties his organization sustained. More broadly, many Iraqis 
who were used to Saddam’s brutality saw the American forces as weak-willed. Befud-
dlement reached the highest levels of secular and religious Iraqi leaders, including Grand 
Ayatollah Ali Husayni Sistani. In letters carried to U.S. authorities by governing council 
member Mowaffaq Rubaie during the uprising, Sistani expressed his confusion and frus-
tration over coalition policies, writing:
We do not know the reason for, or the utility of, negotiating with [Moqtada Sadr]. First, he does not 
want to dissolve the Mahdi Army. Second, he does not want to come before the judicial authorities. 
Third, these negotiations will make a hero out of him, inflate his importance, and prolong the tragedy 
that the holy cities are living. . . . We do not know exactly what you want. Over and over, we have 
seen the American forces advance and the Mahdi Army withdraw and even flee. But you do not 
complete your work. You withdraw before you complete or finish purging the cities of them. . . . It 
appears that there is a clear intention to keep the situation in abeyance as it is despite the continued 
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suffering of the people, the paralysis of business, and 
the paralysis of the schools and universities. Keeping 
the situation as it is will turn the people against 
 you. . . . We are for ending this issue and bringing peace 
in the holy cities. . . . These negotiations are grave and 
fruitless and will increase the suffering of the people.83
In a second letter, Sistani continued to signal his 
frustration, adding:
We want to state clearly that we are not against a 
peaceful settlement or negotiations that end the 
shedding of innocent people’s blood. . . . We are unable 
to tell you what to do because we cannot understand 
what you are doing or what you want to achieve. We 
do not understand how Moqtada is able to go from 
Najaf to Kufa under these conditions of combat and 
under your eyes and ears. . . . We are sure that Moqtada 
does not hold his word, that he will not dissolve the 
Mahdi Army, and that he will not turn himself over [to 
justice]. . . . We do not understand why Moqtada was 
left to grow and became what he is now. We said 
repeatedly, when he was kidnapping people into 
the Shari’a court and torturing them, that he must be 
stopped at that limit. This was eight months ago. Look at 
what he has now become.85
Sistani’s position reflected deep fissures within the Shi’a community that the coali-
tion’s strategy had not considered. CJTF-7 had halted combat against Moqtada Sadr’s 
militia out of concern that the fighting might turn the broader Shi’a community against 
the coalition—the same fear that Abizaid raised with U.S. leaders before April. Actually, 
CJTF-7’s decision not to finish off the Sadrists angered and confused mainstream Shi’a 
leaders who viewed Sadr as a menace. The April crisis had been a missed opportunity 
for the coalition to leverage these intra-Shi’a differences and solve the Sadr problem for 
the long term.
The Fallujah Brigade
The fight against the Sadrists was not the only incomplete action against the Iraqi 
insurgents of spring 2004. Around Fallujah, Conway and Mattis had been able to con-
solidate additional Marine battalions, as insurgent pressure in eastern Anbar had been 
relieved somewhat by the arrival of 1st Armored Division units in Babil and Karbala 
Provinces.86 That change, coupled with a nearly universal insurgent rejection of coalition 
demands issued after the April 9 cease-fire, led Sanchez and Abizaid to petition Rumsfeld 
and the President to resume offensive operations in Fallujah.87 In a principals committee 
meeting on April 21, Abizaid and Rumsfeld pushed to restart operations, with Abizaid 
noting that if the United States failed to stamp out the insurgency in Fallujah, “various 
opposition forces would see our inaction and become increasingly aggressive in Mosul, 
Source: Photo by Wikimedia contributor, 
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Baqubah, and other cities.”88 By contrast, Bremer advocated for “continuing the political 
approach, whittling down the element of resistance, and restricting them geographically 
within the city,” as well as bringing back Iraqi security forces.89 Bremer added that taking 
coalition military action “could potentially scuttle the whole political process,” a very 
real possibility given the Iraqi Governing Council’s and Brahimi’s ultimatums earlier 
in the month.90 Faced with these possibilities, President George W. Bush decided not to 
resume hostilities.
With the decision to terminate offensive operations, at least for the near term, 
cemented, the coalition opted to hand the city’s security over to a locally raised force, a 
course of action that resulted from cease-fire negotiations between the Iraqi Governing 
Council and local Fallujah leaders. On April 25, MNF-W withdrew from Fallujah, leaving 
behind the hastily organized Fallujah Brigade under Major General Jassim Mohammed 
Saleh, formerly an officer in Saddam’s Republican Guard. In return for U.S. weapons 
and equipment and a coalition withdrawal, the Fallujah Brigade leaders pledged to stop 
insurgent attacks and turn over those who had ambushed the Blackwater convoy.91 It was 
a promise that did not last long. The day after the brigade’s activation, fighting flared 
again, with 300 insurgents attempting to overrun a Marine platoon assigned to a forward 
observation point. During the battle, two special operators, Master Sergeant Donald Hol-
lenbaugh and Staff Sergeant Daniel Briggs, kept the attackers at bay for nearly 30 min-
utes, preventing the platoon’s destruction and allowing it to withdraw its wounded. For 
their actions, both received the Distinguished Service Cross.92 Such brazen violations of 
the cease-fire, as well as a Shi’a political backlash against the brigade’s Sunni leaders, led 
coalition leaders to remove its commander on May 2. Saleh’s removal technically left the 
brigade in the hands of his deputy, Colonel Mohammed Latif, a retired officer from Bagh-
dad who was unfamiliar with many of the unit’s men, but a week later Marines found 
Saleh still directing forces in the city.93
Under Saleh’s and Latif ’s command, the Fallujah Brigade failed to follow through 
on any of its commitments and stood by while insurgents regained control of the city.94 
With the coalition unable to vet the brigade’s members, many insurgents who had 
fought against the Marines in April joined its ranks. The degree to which the brigade was 
co-opted by the insurgency from its inception should have been clear when Latif and 
Saleh met with insurgent leader Sheikh Abdullah Janabi during the brigade’s formation, 
and Janabi forced the two commanders to accept 300–350 of his insurgent fighters into the 
new unit.95 Violence and intimidation against government officials returned, and Fallujah 
gradually reverted to its former state as an insurgent sanctuary.
THE FALLOUT FROM THE APRIL UPRISING
April and the Insurgency
April was a good month for the insurgency, which claimed to have won two vic-
tories over the coalition. Insurgent propaganda trumpeted the negotiated cease-fire in 
Fallujah and with Jaysh al-Mahdi as proof that the mighty American-led war machine 
could be fought to a standstill, dispelling perceptions of an omnipotent coalition that had 
destroyed Saddam’s military and occupied Iraq in a few weeks.
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April also changed the face of the insurgency. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who had been 
only one of the resistance leaders fighting the coalition in Fallujah, nevertheless capi-
talized on his involvement more than others because his group had more mature and 
better-funded propaganda cells.96 As the fight for Fallujah unfolded, Zarqawi quickly 
became the icon of the insurgency and began to draw additional funding and recruits 
that enabled him to eclipse many of the other, more nationalist Sunni insurgent groups.
More broadly, Sunni Arabs who remained on the fence between the coalition and the 
insurgency and who were fearful of losing their positions of power to Shi’a Iraqis also 
drew lessons from April. They took the April assault on Fallujah as a bellwether for what 
the coalition had in mind for them in the new Iraq. Ronald Schlicher, a U.S. diplomat 
who headed the CPA’s Office of Provincial Outreach, prophetically described the Sunnis’ 
sense of alienation in an April 11 memorandum to Bremer:
Fallujah is a microcosm of Sunni Arab Iraq, and of that community’s sense of alienation from the 
new Iraq. The impression that Sunnis have been shorn of all political power, of their livelihoods, 
and of their dignity is strong. . . . They are convinced that the new Iraq is an American-brokered 
deal between the Shi’a and the Kurds, specifically aimed at clipping Sunni Arab wings. . . . If the 
powerful sense of victimization continues or deepens, the last week in Fallujah is destined to be the 
prelude to many more tragedies.97
April had a significant impact on the Shi’a insurgency as well, propelling Moqtada 
Sadr to the forefront of the Iraqi resistance to the coalition. In May, a CJTF-7 poll of south-
ern provinces and Baghdad showed that 81 percent of those surveyed had a better opin-
ion of Sadr after the uprisings than before and that Sadr enjoyed greater popular support 
than any Shi’a leader except Sistani.98
Sadr and other insurgent leaders also had benefited from growing popular dissatis-
faction with the quality of everyday life. The explosion of violence in April was not just a 
response to proximate events like the Yacoubi arrest and the closing of Al Hawza, but also 
a reaction to the building pressure from a year under occupation. In a letter to Sanchez 
after the violence subsided, Mowaffaq Rubaie, Iraq’s national security adviser, described 
several undercurrent factors that had contributed to the outbreak, including the large 
number of dispossessed and unhappy Shi’a living in the slums of Sadr City, the ineffec-
tiveness and marginalization of the Iraqi Governing Council, ministerial inefficiency, and 
the continued presence of coalition troops. These factors and the lack of security, Rubaie 
judged, had created the perception among Iraqis that there had been little improvement 
in their daily lives.99 Rubaie’s undercurrent factors represented the pent-up frustration 
of Iraqis who had expected a better life after Saddam but saw the coalition as failing to 
deliver on its promises. Basic services such as electricity, water, and sewage stood in 
worse condition in 2004 than before the invasion. Postwar electrical production had fallen 
to only 2,500 megawatts from a prewar level of 4,300 megawatts, even though demand 
for electricity and other services had grown as consumerism replaced the Ba’ath’s subsi-
dized and controlled economy.100
A number of coalition leaders could sense the dangerous mismatch between expecta-
tions and reality. Walking through the markets of Basrah, for example, British MND-SE 
Commander Major General Andrew Stewart saw large numbers of Basrawis buying wash-
ing machines that required water, electricity, and sewage treatment that his command 
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could not provide for the city. “The biggest con-
cern I had,” Stewart recalled, “was the inability 
to meet the expectations of the Iraqi people.”101 
Having grown accustomed under the Ba’ath 
to free or cheap state-provided fuel, electricity, 
and water, the Iraqi public had expected the 
same from the coalition, but this was an expecta-
tion the coalition could not possibly meet. Sadr 
and others had harnessed the resulting Iraqi 
resentment and directed it violently toward the 
coalition.
The April Crisis and the Coalition
The April crisis signified confounded expec-
tations within the coalition as well. European 
contingents that had come to Iraq, expecting to 
assist the United States in stability operations 
and reconstruction similar to that in the Balkans, 
suddenly found themselves in intense combat. 
The seeming overnight change in conditions 
shocked the British and coalition allies in the south, many of whom viewed the April 
uprising as an unnecessary confrontation provoked by the United States. In the span of a 
week, British forces in Amarah went from patrolling in unarmored Land Rover vehicles 
and receiving friendly Iraqi greetings to being attacked by bricks, gunfire, and IEDs. “The 
attack that was done by American forces in the north, really kicked off the war with the 
Sadrists and it just, woosh, went up like a firestorm around about us,” one British officer 
remembered. “We were completely caught unawares.”103
Many coalition allies, especially the British, were under intense media and public pres-
sure at home where casualties among small troop contingents were felt acutely. Faced 
with a violent, unexpected insurgency, the British, Spanish, Italian, and Ukrainian troops 
in southern Iraq responded mainly by taking steps to minimize casualties, withdrawing 
to their bases and seeking to lessen tensions through negotiations. Several allied military 
commanders, including Stewart, believed their units did not have the resources to take 
on the militias at the time and wished to avoid civilian casualties in operations in urban 
areas.104
Not all allied units limited themselves to defensive measures, however, and some coa-
lition troops acquitted themselves with extraordinary distinction. After a Salvadoran unit 
in Najaf expended all of its ammunition, it fought in hand-to-hand combat against attack-
ing Jaysh al-Mahdi fighters, earning six of its members a rare nomination for the Bronze 
Star medal.105 The 1st Battalion of the Princess of Wales Royal Regiment in Amarah found 
itself in a protracted fight against Jaysh al-Mahdi that Stewart described as the “most 
concerted assault on a British battalion since Korea.” In one engagement in mid-May, the 
regiment counterattacked into Amarah with fixed bayonets, fighting through trenches to 
capture Jaysh al-Mahdi leaders and seize the militia’s weapons caches.106 The fighting in 
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Amarah brought the regiment a Victoria Cross, three Distinguished Service Orders, and 
seven Military Crosses over the span of the next several months.107
Despite examples of valor, U.S. leaders remained frustrated by their allies’ reticence 
to confront the Mahdi Army directly and believed the militia’s freedom of movement 
through most of the MND-CS and MND-SE provinces prolonged the crisis and enabled 
the Sadrists to escape the American encirclement around Najaf, Karbala, and Kut. Some 
U.S. leaders also believed their allies’ perceived weakness emboldened the Sadrists and 
invited intense attack on several coalition bases. These dynamics ruptured relations 
between U.S. leaders and the Spanish contingent in MND-CS, which already had floun-
dered after Spain’s Prime Minister-elect announced his forces would withdraw due to 
the Atocha train station bombing. The day of Mustafa al-Yacoubi’s capture, the Span-
ish deputy commander publicly called the arrest a mistake and recommended Yacoubi’s 
immediate release.108 On April 5, Spanish commander Brigadier General Fulgencio Coll 
began unilateral negotiations with Moqtada Sadr and appointed local Badr Corps leader 
Haji Hassan Abtal as the provisional governor of Najaf.109 These moves angered Bremer, 
who quickly instructed U.S. diplomat Michael Gfoeller that “under no circumstances is 
Coll to negotiate through any channels with Sadr. His actions have placed him beyond 
the pale. [Sadr] is a criminal and usurper and will be dealt with as such.”110 In a heated 
meeting in Najaf later that day with CPA official Philip Kosnett, Coll, and MND-CS Com-
mander Major General Mieczyslaw Bieniek pressed for a political solution to the problem 
and opined that military action against Sadr should wait until after the Arba’een pil-
grimage. The two commanders reported that the national leadership of their respective 
countries had not authorized offensive action, and Coll jokingly offered that the coali-
tion should “make love, not war” to resolve the disagreement with the Sadrists.111 The 
arrival of the U.S. combat units of Task Force Duke on April 13 rendered this disagree-
ment moot, effectively masking the larger differences between the United States and its 
MND-CS allies for the time being.
Tensions also boiled over between U.S. leaders in Baghdad and the British command 
in MND-SE. In Basrah, where Jaysh al-Mahdi took over the governor’s palace, Stewart 
initially ignored Bremer’s orders to retake the building, believing that the objective could 
be accomplished peacefully through negotiations.112 The CPA and CJTF-7 were frustrated 
by Stewart’s decision to seek local truces with the Mahdi Army when possible, rather 
than conduct offensive operations against them. Similar policies had served the British 
well in Northern Ireland, an experience that was deeply ingrained in their army. Regard-
less, an infuriated Bremer had requested through the British Embassy in Washington, 
DC, that Whitehall relieve Stewart of his command.113 Writing on April 11 to Metz, Stew-
art had attempted to defuse some of the American frustrations. “I fully recognize that our 
refusal to close down the OMS [Organization of the Martyr Sadr] offices and take overt 
aggressive action against Sadr Militia will appear from Baghdad to be both ineffective 
and apparently out of line with your intent,” Stewart conceded.114 But engaging local 
political and tribal leaders seemed the best way to maintain the consent of the people 
that he considered the operational center of gravity, the British commander explained. A 
political approach would also support the long-term objective of returning political and 
security control to the Iraqis, as it “produced an Iraqi solution to an Iraqi problem.” More-
over, British commanders found the CPA’s inclination to lash out broadly a misguided 
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one. “Going on to a general offensive without careful targeting and intelligence would 
be seen as us taking on the population,” Stewart argued. “We would quickly destroy all 
that we have achieved over the last year.”115 British leaders in London sided with Stewart, 
opting to leave him in place despite Bremer’s loss of confidence in him. “I was charged 
with not killing enough people,” Stewart later claimed. “The CPA asked for my removal, 
because Mr. Bremer’s policy was one of strong coercion: we must defeat Moqtada Sadr 
militarily.”116
But the difference in British and American approaches represented more than diver-
gent viewpoints on tactics; it reflected nearly diametric perspectives on the source of the 
problem, as well as its prescription. A letter from MND-SE headquarters to CJTF-7 on 
May 3 further explained the British opposition to taking a more forceful approach. “The 
violence [in Amarah and Maysan Province] has been linked to adherents of Moqtada al 
Sadr, but this assessment oversimplifies the situation,” the MND-SE chief of staff wrote, 
arguing that most of the violence was actually caused by opportunistic “violent criminals 
. . . who will rally to any ‘popular’ cause.”117 Sadr was merely the latest cause that the 
recalcitrants in Maysan had adopted, MND-SE leaders judged, and an overreaction to 
Jaysh al-Mahdi such as CJTF-7’s orders to MND-SE to “destroy the Mahdi Army in zone” 
would only serve to empower the Shi’a cleric.118
The disputes during the April crisis clarified British national policy for United King-
dom commanders in Iraq and also signaled a divergence in strategy between the United 
Kingdom and the United States that widened in the years to come. In the near term, 
the differences had significant operational consequences. The new security situation 
negated the American hope that the British might expand their area of responsibility and 
send additional troops to replace the departing Spanish brigade in MND-CS. U.S. forces 
needed to fill the void, stretching them even further.
Finally, the April uprisings highlighted U.S. difficulties in managing a coalition of 
allies driven by their own domestic criticism of the war, lower casualty tolerances, and 
a differing philosophy regarding conflict management. Balancing operational require-
ments and unity of effort against the need to keep allies in the coalition vexed senior U.S. 
leaders throughout the war.
***
April 2004 stood as the worst month of the war, to that point, for American losses, 
with a total of 137 servicemen killed—just 1 fewer than the number lost during the entire 
6-weeks invasion period of 2003. The outbreak of violence led to several immediate 
changes within the coalition, as senior leaders took steps to avoid a repetition of what 
some would refer to as Black April. Metz, the III Corps commander, believed the coali-
tion had lost the information fight during the month and dedicated significant energy to 
improving the coalition’s information operations capability.119 He and other leaders who 
had seen firsthand the results of an offensive launched without any political groundwork 
were determined not to repeat that error. I MEF commander Conway believed the same, 
noting, “Al Jazeera kicked our butts.”120 In addition, having barely avoided a second the-
ater-wide logistics meltdown as a result of cut lines of communications and attacks on 
convoys, the coalition significantly increased its fuel and ammunition stocks and tasked 
an entire brigade combat team to accompany convoys and secure major supply routes.
303
THINGS FALL APART, APRIL 2004
The difficulties experienced in April deflated coalition hopes that it would be able to 
maintain order in Iraq with the 12 brigades that originally had been planned for the 2004 
rotation. Faced with the prospect of an unmanageable situation after the 1st Armored 
Division’s extension ended, CJTF-7 requested immediate reinforcements, and the Army 
and Marine Corps reacted quickly. The 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, which had 
only redeployed from Afghanistan in December 2003, responded first, deploying to Iraq 
a mere 36 days after it was alerted. Indicative of the turbulence the Army was experi-
encing, the brigade had not expected to deploy for another year and had many of its 
subordinate units still committed to other overseas contingency operations. Augmented 
by a hodgepodge of units from across the Army, including troops from the opposing 
force battalion at the Joint Readiness Training Center, the brigade nevertheless joined 
MND-B by July.121 In Korea, the 2d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, was also notified that it 
would be making an unexpected, short-notice deployment to Iraq, arriving by August to 
plug gaps in MNF-W.122 Last, the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, CENTCOM’s theater 
reserve, was called forward to replace the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, which itself 
was helping to fill the gap in MND-CS caused by the departure of the Spanish brigade.
The April crisis also drove home the need for the coalition to maintain an operational 
reserve force. Had Sadr’s uprising taken place a month later, the 1st Armored Division 
would not have been available as a reserve to fill CJTF-7’s gaps in the south. Once the 
crisis passed, CJTF-7 assigned a Stryker battalion from 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, 
as a corps reserve on a rotating basis, a decision that, while necessary, rendered Task 
Force Olympia even further understrength for the securing of Mosul and Ninawa Prov-
ince. The rotational nature of the reserve battalion also interrupted Task Force Olympia’s 
geographic continuity because the Stryker battalions repeatedly had to take over one 
another’s battle space as each of them became the reserve in turn. CJTF-7 leaders decided 
to assign their reserve from Ninawa based on their perception that the province, which 
had remained quiet in April, had progressed further than other sectors, an assumption 
that was overturned spectacularly in the months to come. At CJTF-7, April ended San-
chez’s attempts to formulate a coherent campaign plan for the entire Iraq theater. CJTF-7’s 
understaffed, inexperienced planners already had struggled with the effort, and contin-
ually changing strategic guidance had delayed their final products. The distraction of 
the April crisis ended any hope of completing the process. It also upended U.S. plans to 
take action against Iranian meddling in Iraq, including a proposal to expel Iran’s charge’ 
d’affaires, a known Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps agent.123
By any measure, April 2004 was a major pivot point in the Iraq War, changing the 
conduct and character of the conflict. It strengthened the insurgency by providing both a 
justification for fighting and encouragement that the coalition could be beaten. It shocked 
and scarred many coalition leaders so much that they would regard similar crises very 
differently afterward. In retrospect, the coalition’s deliberate decision to pressure the 
Sadrists in the midst of a significant operational crisis in Fallujah was reckless. It ignited 
a second front across most of southern Iraq that nearly put the coalition into an irretriev-
able operational position. Had Dempsey’s 1st Armored Division not been available to 
counterattack, the coalition might not have recovered either operationally or politically 
from the likely consequent losses. Fear of opening a second front against the Shi’a was a 
legacy of April that would affect the coalition for the remainder of the war. 
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CHAPTER 13
THE CHANGING OF THE GUARD, AGAIN, SPRING-SUMMER 2004
The April 2004 uprisings emphatically dispelled the short-war assumption that had 
underpinned U.S. leaders’ thinking since before the invasion. The transfer of sovereignty 
to an interim Iraqi Government would proceed as planned, but leaders understood any 
military coalition turnover to an international peacekeeping and reconstruction force 
within months was unrealistic. The April crisis also proved that it would take longer than 
coalition leaders had expected to stabilize Iraq and suppress the militant groups that had 
gained a foothold. To execute the extended campaign, coalition leaders created new com-
mands to compensate for the shortcomings of the Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) 
theater command that U.S. leaders had come to judge as an under-resourced failure.
Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez’s command was replaced by several organiza-
tions better designed to handle the strategic and operational challenges of the war. To 
head the new commands, the United States appointed new leaders, including General 
George W. Casey, Jr. and Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, who supervised the 
coalition campaign in one capacity or another for the next 6 years. Similarly, a new U.S. 
Embassy team headed by Ambassador John D. Negroponte replaced Ambassador L. Paul 
Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), shifting control of the civilian 
side of the campaign from the Department of Defense (DoD) to the Department of State.
This new political-military team addressed the successes and failures of April and 
worked according to a new game plan. A new United Nations (UN) resolution prescribed 
a roadmap toward an elected Iraqi Government and a new constitutional order, while the 
coalition finally developed a campaign plan to govern its military activities for the first 
time since the invasion. The new coalition leaders also dramatically revised the effort to 
organize the Iraqi security forces, which largely had collapsed during the April insurrec-
tion, making them a centerpiece of the coalition campaign plan.
As the coalition recovered from the challenges of April, its leaders expressed hope 
that the rejuvenated coalition structure and new interim Iraqi Government of the summer 
of 2004 would bring lasting improvements in security and the functioning of the Iraqi 
state. However, as the coalition handed sovereign authority to its Iraqi allies, the new 
commands and their plans were tested by the Abu Ghraib scandal and by the Iraqi insur-
gents’ determination to stifle the nascent Iraqi Government.
THE FALLOUT OF ABU GHRAIB
Even before the initial violence of April had subsided, another event occurred that 
had consequences reaching far beyond the borders of Iraq. In late April, the Abu Ghraib 
prison scandal broke in the international media, starting with the television program 
60 Minutes II and The New Yorker magazine in the United States. In the United States, 
the scenes of abuse were seen as appalling and created a near-universal sense of out-
rage, resulting in a public relations disaster. Internationally, the scandal further tainted 
the public’s perception of the invasion of Iraq, which already had been damaged sig-
nificantly by the inability to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Support for the 
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war dropped precipitously. A Gallup poll showed that the percentage of Americans who 
believed that going to war in Iraq was a mistake jumped from 42 percent in January 2004, 
to 54 percent in June 2004.1
The backlash extended to the United Kingdom as well. Within 48 hours of the Abu 
Ghraib scandal, British forces in Multi-National Division-South East (MND-SE) were 
facing similar accusations when the Daily Mail published photos of alleged abuse.2 The 
pictures were proved to have been fakes 2 weeks later, but, by then, much of the damage 
to the British military’s reputation had been done, reinforcing the insurgency’s narrative 
of the coalition as brutal occupiers and further deflating British public support.3
Among America’s allies, the Abu Ghraib scandal was equally damaging, straining 
ties with coalition members who wanted to distance themselves from the humiliation. 
While not decisive in any ally’s decision to withdraw from the coalition, the scandal 
likely became a contributing factor for some nations’ withdrawals, as it weakened public 
support for the mission.
Within the Iraqi and Arabic media, the Abu Ghraib scandal dominated the news for 
months, providing opponents of the coalition many opportunities to condemn the U.S.-
led campaign. Mainstream media outlets such as the influential Al Jazeera television net-
work engaged in a near-daily denunciation of the coalition’s behavior, while tending 
to depict the Abu Ghraib scandal as, in the words of an Iraqi Al Jazeera interviewee, “a 
great crime committed against Iraqi mujahidin” who had been fighting “to liberate their 
homeland.”4 Print media followed suit, as with a Gulf Times editorial describing the scan-
dal as “a calamity that destroys the dubious claims to legitimacy that the White House 
advanced in support of the war and the occupation,” with U.S. troops having “refilled 
the cells and [taken] up where Saddam’s torturers left off.”5 In an attempt to conflate the 
coalition mission in Iraq with the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, many 
Middle Eastern media sources also began using the same vernacular for both situations, 
including “mujahideen,” “colonization,” and “occupation.”
The April uprisings and the indecisive coalition counterattacks that followed gave the 
insurgents and jihadists in Iraq confidence that they could defeat the United States, just as 
the mujahideen had defeated the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. At exactly the same time, 
the worldwide media coverage of detainee abuse by U.S. Soldiers at Abu Ghraib gave the 
same groups a highly effective recruitment tool and a powerful reason to fight the coali-
tion. Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal, a special operations leader, later reported, 
“In my experience, we found that nearly every first-time jihadist claimed Abu Ghraib 
first had jolted him to action.”6 The scandal created a cause for extremists to take up arms 
against the coalition, an effect evident to coalition troops at virtually all levels. On the day 
the Abu Ghraib story broke in the press, Major General James Mattis, commander of the 
1st Marine Division, saw a group of Marines watching the television coverage and asked 
what was happening. One 19-year-old lance corporal responded, “Some assholes have 
just lost the war for us.”7
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NEW COMMANDS, NEW MISSIONS
The Brahimi Mission and UNSCR 1546
One cause of the April outbreak had been the Iraqis’ loss of patience with the political 
uncertainty of the coalition mission, which had not defined the manner or timeline in 
which Iraqis would ultimately be allowed to choose a new government. In the spring of 
2004, the veteran Arab diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi arrived in Baghdad as a UN envoy to 
broker political talks among the Iraqi factions and the coalition. By June, the sides had 
agreed on a program for elections and a new Iraqi constitution. An interim Iraqi Gov-
ernment, appointed by the coalition, would serve until elections in January 2005 would 
yield an Iraqi transitional government, which, in turn, would draft the country’s new 
constitution.
Under the UN plan, the January 2005 election would be conducted on a nationwide 
basis in which national parties would vie for a proportional electoral share, rather than 
individual politicians competing for seats from which they were responsible to a local 
electorate. This decision had far-reaching consequences because the proportional system 
would favor larger, better-funded parties such as those receiving significant assistance 
from Iran, and it would amplify the impact of an election boycott by religious or ethnic 
groups.8 The nationwide proportional system also would facilitate the distribution of 
electoral spoils on ethno-sectarian lines.
On June 8, 2004, UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1546 codified the agree-
ment Brahimi brokered. Among its key provisions, the resolution established a timeline 
that required the “holding of direct democratic elections by 31 December 2004 if possible, 
and in no case later than 31 January 2005, to a Transitional National Assembly, which 
will, inter alia, have responsibility for forming a Transitional Government of Iraq and 
drafting a permanent constitution for Iraq leading to a constitutionally elected govern-
ment by 31 December 2005.”9 These dates became the principal guide for the coalition’s 
military and political activities for the next 19 months.
New Coalition Commands
During May and June 2004, new operational- and strategic-level coalition headquar-
ters replaced the deactivated CJTF-7. On May 15, the remnants of CJTF-7 were used to 
form Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF-I), the senior Iraq command, which was tasked 
with overseeing strategic and political-military matters. Three new subordinate com-
mands would split the operational functions that had overtaxed CJTF-7. As Secretary of 
Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld and senior military leaders had decided in late 2003, 
MNF-I would be a four-star-level headquarters with Sanchez as an interim commander. 
General John Abizaid had originally recommended that Sanchez should be promoted to 
command MNF-I. By spring 2004, however, the public and political backlash to the Abu 
Ghraib scandal led U.S. leaders to remove Sanchez from contention. The coalition’s mil-
itary crises in April 2004 only reinforced U.S. leaders’ impression that Sanchez and his 
command were not up to the task.
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The shift to a more robust theater headquarters had been in motion for several 
months. With Rumsfeld having rejected David McKiernan, and by default the Coalition 
Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), for command of the new MNF-I head-
quarters because of Rumsfeld’s disapproval of McKiernan’s performance in the invasion, 
only two principal options remained: Abizaid, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) 
commander, and Army Vice Chief of Staff General George Casey. By May, Rumsfeld had 
decided the Iraq theater command would go to Casey, and the underutilized CFLCC 
would remain in Kuwait, rather than returning to Baghdad, with McKiernan as its 
commander.10
Like its predecessor, CJTF-7, MNF-I was staffed by individual augmentees gathered 
by tasking orders sent out from the various services in the Pentagon rather than cre-
ated from an experienced, standing headquarters. In essence, Rumsfeld’s decision to 
reject McKiernan had the unintended consequence of preventing a standing headquar-
ters, CFLCC, with its trained personnel who had operated together through the invasion 
phase, from becoming the theater headquarters for Iraq.
Under MNF-I, a new three-star-level Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC-I) would focus 
on military operations as well as coordinating the various multinational divisions spread 
across the country. This much-needed change would relieve MNF-I from the pressure 
of tactical matters and allow the four-star headquarters to function at higher levels of 
war. U.S. military leaders decided to form MNC-I by splitting the already-deployed Lieu-
tenant General Thomas Metz and his III Corps headquarters from CJTF-7, even though 
III Corps just had gone through a difficult absorption into the CJTF-7 structure when 
it arrived in Baghdad in February. Now, 3 months later, III Corps would unwind that 
process, retrieve hundreds of its people from the CJTF-7 directorates, and return them to 
operational staff sections in MNC-I.
The process would exacerbate the challenges of staffing both organizations. It cre-
ated vacancies in the theater command just as the Pentagon determined that MNF-I and 
MNC-I together would require 2,081 people, more than 600 above the 1,408 that CJTF-7 
had been authorized but had not come close to filling during its short life.11 The signifi-
cant turbulence in both organizations prevented either from coalescing as a headquarters 
in the summer of 2004, thereby making it harder for the coalition to regain the initiative 
it had lost in April.
Alongside MNC-I, CENTCOM ordered the creation of another three-star command, 
the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC-I), to replace the Office 
of Security Cooperation and oversee the coalition’s rebuilding of the Iraqi armed forces, 
an effort that the battles of April 2004 proved had produced little.12 The new headquar-
ters, under the command of Lieutenant General Petraeus, just 4 months removed from 
his division command in Ninawa, faced the difficult task of consolidating a train-and-
equip mission that had been severely fragmented before MNSTC-I’s creation. Building 
the New Iraqi Army had been the responsibility of Major General Paul Eaton’s Coalition 
Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT), which worked for the CPA. At the same 
time, the responsibility for standing up the ICDC was decentralized to the various coali-
tion divisions. This devolution of responsibility had created differences in organization, 
training, and effectiveness of ICDC units across the country. Further complicating mat-
ters, the rebuilding of the Iraqi police services in the Ministry of the Interior had been 
placed under the State Department’s oversight, per federal law.
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MNSTC-I explicitly had been created to resolve such dysfunctions, but from its incep-
tion, it faced continuing challenges. Like CJTF-7 and MNF-I, the MNSTC-I headquarters 
again was created as an ad hoc organization. As Major General Karl Eikenberry had rec-
ommended in his special report to Rumsfeld, both CMATT and Civilian Police Assistance 
Training Team (CPATT) became subordinate headquarters under MNSTC-I, a move 
that created interagency friction with State Department officials who felt security force 
assistance and security cooperation should remain under their purview. As Petraeus 
formed his command, MNSTC-I had to work through tension over exactly where lines of 
decision-making authority and reporting would fall for the various components of its 
mission. For example, while the British initially had responsibility for mentoring and 
developing the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, the U.S. Embassy’s newly created Iraq Recon-
struction Management Office was responsible for doing the same for the Ministry of the 
Interior, but CPATT was responsible for developing police below the ministry level.14
Rounding out the changes at the headquarters level, Task Force 134 (TF 134) was 
created to supervise detention operations under the command of Major General Geof-
frey Miller, who had led the team looking into problems at Abu Ghraib a few months 
earlier. The new headquarters had been created in response to the Abu Ghraib scandal 
as well as in general recognition of the significant problems with the coalition’s deten-
tion operations. A lack of facilities had led to overcrowding at the three principal MNF-I 
General Babakir Zebari (left) Lieutenant General David Petraeus (center).  
Source: DoD photo by Jim Garamone (Released).
Iraqi Chief of Armed Forces General Babakir Zebari  
With Lieutenant General David Petraeus, CG, 
Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC-I).13
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detention facilities—Abu Ghraib, Camp Cropper at Victory Base, and Camp Bucca near 
Basrah, which, as of mid-June, held 5,411 detainees.15 Insurgents exploited the crowded, 
chaotic conditions to recruit within the detention centers, a problem evident not just to 
coalition officers but to Iraqi officials as well. Kurdish Regional Government Interior 
Minister Karim Sinjari warned coalition counterparts as early as March 2004 that jihadist 
insurgent cells had developed in several detention facilities with the goal of radicalizing 
otherwise moderate detainees. These jihadist cells segregated themselves from the rest of 
the prison population and cultivated recruits from among newly arrived prisoners, Sin-
jari explained. Upon their release, the new jihadi recruits were directed to insurgent cells 
on the outside where some became suicide bombers.16 Coalition officials had recognized 
these problems previously, but the unclear U.S. policy concerning the disposition of Iraqi 
detainees delayed longer-term remedies, as had the lack of an overarching command 
structure for detention operations. Miller was given responsibility to fix these problems, 
which grew daily with the never-ending influx of detainees, and to correct deficiencies 
recognized in the aftermath of the Abu Ghraib debacle.
Flaws in the New Command Structure
The new commands offered hope of covering operational matters better than CJTF-7 
had been able to do, but the new structure was not without serious flaws. Because each of 
the four new headquarters were ad hoc creations rather than existing organizations, the 
orders establishing them had to move through multiple layers of CENTCOM and DoD 
bureaucracy, delaying their manning. Not until September did MNF-I reach 75 percent 
strength, with two of the other commands lagging further behind.17 MNF-I also suffered 
from a dearth of quality, staffed by individual augmentees who often met the bare min-
imum qualifications for filling DoD taskings. The MNF-I plans section, responsible for 
the theater strategic level and operational levels of war, was symptomatic of the lack of 
qualified personnel. “My staff didn’t consist of War College graduates, SAMS graduates, 
or anybody else who would be trained as what an Army culture would accept as plan-
ners,” MNF-I plans chief Brigadier General Peter Palmer later remembered. He added, “I 
was given an Army lieutenant colonel reservist who had no planning background what-
soever . . . [and] a Romanian colonel whose English was pretty good but obviously knew 
nothing about any of this. I had an Air Force major space officer and an Australian navy 
officer, and none of them understood anything about planning processes.”18
The MNSTC-I headquarters suffered similar difficulties because of its improvised 
nature. Petraeus had asked DoD for an active duty division headquarters that had 
trained as a team to form the core of MNSTC-I, but with all of the active duty divisions 
and Special Forces Groups either deployed or just returned from Iraq or Afghanistan, 
DoD instead assigned the mission to the Army’s 98th Reserve Division for Institutional 
Training. The 98th was an imperfect choice, a Cold War-era creation filled with part-time 
drill sergeants whose mission was to increase basic training throughput in times of a 
national emergency.19 It was the first reserve training division ever used for an overseas 
combat mission.20 The 98th Reserve Division was itself an ad hoc organization, taking 
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nearly 20 percent of its personnel from 
four other reserve divisions in order 
to have enough troops to deploy.21 The 
resulting MNSTC-I headquarters was 
a slow-forming polyglot of active duty 
augmentees alongside the 98th Reserve 
Division, which itself did not arrive in 
Baghdad until October.22 Because of these 
challenges, Petraeus would later recall 
that his new headquarters took “a good 
4 to 6 months to get . . . to a basic level in 
terms of capability and functionality.”23
Like the other commands, CENT-
COM formed the detention command of 
TF-134 as an improvised organization, 
instead of assigning a brigade head-
quarters to the mission. As a result, the 
individual billets filled slowly. By Sep-
tember, the headquarters stood at a mere 
25 percent strength, with only 52 per-
sonnel assigned out of a required 226 to 
handle the problems that had led to the 
Abu Ghraib fiasco.25 At their inception, 
none of the new coalition commands met the needs of the Iraq mission. The complexities 
of the operation required a fully staffed, fully functioning headquarters made up of top-
notch personnel—a claim no command could make.
The Transfer of Sovereignty
On June 28, 2004, Bremer handed Iraq’s executive authority to the Iraqi Interim Gov-
ernment. The transfer had been scheduled for June 30, but U.S. leaders decided, without 
input from MNF-I, to advance the date quietly to avoid any insurgent attacks during the 
transfer. On the same day, Ayad Allawi was sworn in as Iraq’s interim Prime Minister, 
having been selected by his fellow Iraqi Governing Council members. Allawi was a sec-
ular Shi’a politician who had been a member of the Ba’ath Party in the 1960s and early 
1970s before conflicts with Saddam Hussein resulted in his fleeing to London, where he 
survived a Ba’athist assassination attempt and ultimately led the Iraqi National Accord, 
one of the main Iraqi opposition groups. After the collapse of the regime, he had returned 
to Iraq and served as defense minister on the Iraqi Governing Council. With Allawi sworn 
in, the CPA disbanded and Bremer departed Iraq the same day. In place of the CPA, a 
new U.S. Embassy opened, with veteran diplomat Negroponte as its first ambassador. 
The assignment was part of a long diplomatic career that had begun during the Vietnam 
war where Negroponte had seen a counterinsurgency campaign firsthand.
The transfer of sovereignty had a significant impact on the conduct of the war. On 
the one hand, U.S. and coalition leaders assumed the emergence of a sovereign Iraqi 
Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Ashley S. Brokop, 
U.S. Air Force (Released).
Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi.24
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Government would resolve many of the anti-occupation pressures coming from within 
Iraq. Coalition polling showed that 63 percent of 
Iraqis, indeed, did believe an interim Iraqi Gov-
ernment would improve conditions in the coun-
try.26 The Iraqi Governing Council also pressed 
the coalition to turn over as much responsibility 
as possible as soon as possible. Council mem-
bers demanded that the transfer of sovereignty 
should give the interim government, “absolute 
control of the administration of Iraq’s armed 
forces and security apparatus, absolute control 
of the management of Iraq’s national and natural 
resources, and full and complete management 
of Iraq’s development and aid budget.”27 Many 
coalition leaders believed that handing respon-
sibility to the Iraqis would bestow legitimacy on 
the new state, which in turn would dampen sup-
port for the insurgency. U.S. leaders also hoped 
the transfer would lessen international criticism 
of the Iraq mission.
In reality, however, transferring sovereignty 
imposed significant constraints on the coali-
tion’s mission while delivering fewer benefits 
than coalition leaders expected. After the trans-
fer, the coalition’s influence over Iraqi internal 
policy, as well as its own ability to conduct oper-
ations in Iraq, plummeted. The coalition voluntarily transferred authority over the Iraqi 
armed forces to the Ministry of Defense, meaning that the coalition ceded the power 
not just to appoint military officials, but also to fire incompetent, corrupt, and sectarian 
military and police commanders.29 The coalition also lost significant influence over the 
Iraqi budget, making it more difficult to prevent corruption in the doling out of the Iraqi 
Government’s vast reconstruction contracts. Finally, coalition units had less freedom to 
conduct unilateral operations or combined operations with the Iraqi security forces, espe-
cially against politically sensitive targets such as Jaysh al-Mahdi, a constraint that would 
blunt the coalition’s mission for the remainder of the war. Had the coalition been facing 
only a Sunni-based nationalistic insurgency, as CJTF-7 intelligence officers assessed, the 
transfer of sovereignty potentially could have achieved its intended effects. However, 
as the Shi’a and Sunni cooperation in expelling the coalition began to unravel into inter-
communal conflict, the transfer would accelerate the country’s descent into civil war. The 
Iraqi Interim Government’s state institutions were insufficient to prevent the sectarian 
conflict from escalating, and the governments that would follow would not themselves 
be neutral in the conflict. Few American military and political leaders foresaw these con-
sequences at the time, but Iraqi leaders recognized the significance of the coming changes. 
While meeting with Carol Haave, the deputy under secretary of defense for intelligence 
(counterintelligence and security), during a visit to Baghdad in the late spring, a group of 
Source: U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sergeant 
Jeremy M. Giacomino (Released).
Ambassador John Negroponte.28
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Iraqi leaders told their American visitor, “You Americans are going to hand us the keys 
to the car and believe that you are still going to get to drive it.”30
 
Source: DoD photo by Multi-National Force Iraq Public Affairs (Released).
General John Abizaid, Commanding General, CENTCOM, Congratulates General 
George Casey at the MNF-I Change-of-Command Ceremony.31
New Coalition Leadership
On July 1, General George Casey took command of MNF-I from Sanchez. Casey was 
the son of Major General George W. Casey, Sr., the former commander of the 1st Cav-
alry Division in Vietnam and one of the most senior American officers killed in that war. 
Casey had served as the director of the Joint Staff during the invasion of Iraq and had 
been appointed vice chief of staff of the Army before assuming command of MNF-I. 
More importantly, he had served as an assistant division commander of the 1st Armored 
Division in Bosnia, a personally formative assignment that had given him first-hand 
experience in leading a multinational peacekeeping effort in a shattered country. It also 
exposed him to the challenges and frustrations of pressing recalcitrant ethnic groups to 
set aside grievances and vengeance and focus on the future.
One incident had been seared into his memory, that of Bosnian Muslim refugees 
trying to return to their homes in the Bosnian Serb town of Dugi Dio. After a tense stand-
off and grueling negotiations, Casey had brokered an agreement that would enable the 
Muslims to return so long as they could prove ownership of property and give up their 
weapons. However, the agreement collapsed when weapons were found in the house of 
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the Bosnian Muslim deputy mayor.32 While Casey was disheartened, the episode yielded 
a lesson he carried with him for the rest of his career: American Soldiers, usually imbued 
with optimism and energy, had a tendency to try to do too much, Casey believed, includ-
ing trying to solve long-standing political disputes among warring factions. “We were 
so focused on getting what we saw as our job done that we . . . never let the Bosniacs, 
Croats, and Serbs do much,” he explained later.33 In Casey’s view, U.S. leaders constantly 
had to guard against their units’ tendency to fix problems that a host nation should fix for 
itself. Otherwise, the indigenous population would grow dependent upon the American 
Army’s assistance. Such solutions, Casey believed, would not last any longer than Amer-
icans had troops on the ground.
As Casey prepared to take command in Iraq, he met separately with the SECDEF, the 
President, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the CENTCOM commander. Of 
the 4, only Abizaid, the CENTCOM commander, gave written instructions. In a four-page 
letter that served as initial guidance and higher- headquarters intent, Abizaid outlined 10 
objectives for Casey and asked him to report on various elements of the mission. Of the 
objectives, the top three were: 1) Set conditions for successful Iraqi-led and supervised 
elections in the December 2004–January 2005 timeframe; 2) Protect key Iraqi leaders and 
set conditions for Iraqis to transition to this role; and, 3) Build loyal, well-trained, well-
equipped Iraqi security organizations.34 Casey dutifully would make these objectives key 
components of his campaign plan.
Abizaid deployed to Bosnia as a fellow assistant division commander in the 1st 
Armored Division with Casey and derived many of the same lessons from his Balkans 
experience. He, too, was concerned American Soldiers would attempt too much and 
create a dependency among the Iraqis. In addition, Abizaid emphasized to Casey that the 
coalition was operating on borrowed time in Iraq and that the goodwill of the Iraqi people 
would eventually run out. “From the beginning, [General Abizaid] did not believe the 
Iraqis would tolerate a long-term U.S. presence there,” Casey later recalled. “He was clear 
about that. A large armed foreign military presence was not going to be welcomed any 
place in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq.”35 This idea was at the center of Abizaid’s 
“antibody” theory about the Middle East, which held that U.S. forces in Iraq, no matter 
how benevolent, were equivalent to an infection that eventually would create “antibod-
ies” among the Iraqi population that would seek to eliminate the foreign presence.36 As a 
result, Abizaid believed the U.S. military presence should be reduced and withdrawn as 
soon as it was feasible, and more specifically, after restoring legitimacy to the Iraqi Gov-
ernment through elections and after building up viable security forces. These were the 
first and third priorities in his written instructions to Casey.37
Casey’s Bosnia lessons on the limits of U.S. military power and Abizaid’s antibody 
theory dovetailed closely with Casey’s guidance from Rumsfeld. Casey recalled later, 
“Secretary [Rumsfeld] was worried that, in our zeal to accomplish the mission, we would 
try to do everything ourselves and not allow the Iraqis to gain the experience they would 
need to ultimately take charge. He felt that this would only extend our time there, and 
he encouraged me to take this attitude into consideration in my planning.”38 Rumsfeld 
frequently had expressed this concern publicly, comparing turning over responsibility to 
the Iraqis with teaching a child to ride a bicycle. “They’re learning, and you’re running 
down the street holding onto the back of the bike seat,” he told reporters on March 19. 
“You know that if you take your hand off, they could fall, so you take a finger off and 
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then two fingers, and pretty soon you’re just barely touching it. [Leaving Iraq] will be like 
that.”39
Whether by fate or by design, the three principal architects of the strategy that would 
be employed in Iraq for the nearly 30 months all shared the same philosophical perspec-
tive on how the war should be prosecuted. There was no “odd man out” among them 
who had to be convinced of the merits of the strategy. All three were determined to apply 
the same remedy: restoring legitimacy to the Iraqi Government through elections and 
standing up the Iraqi security forces in order to allow the drawdown of U.S. forces as 
quickly as possible.
MNF-I and the U.S. Embassy
Casey’s arrival in Baghdad in June 2004 had a significant impact on MNF-I, reinvigo-
rating the headquarters that had grown demoralized and pessimistic because of the April 
uprisings. One general officer compared the situation inside CJTF-7 during spring 2004 to 
the collapse of the British Army at Dunkirk, when an overwhelmed British command had 
fallen behind unfolding events and sometimes issued orders for British units to proceed 
to locations the Germans already had taken. The general recalled:
When I went back to Baghdad and became part of that madness, CJTF-7 had begun to fall further 
and further behind the situation and the enemy’s decision-making loop, with CJTF-7 leaders 
telling themselves, ‘If only we could stop things for 24 hours, we could get a grip on this.’ Well, 
they couldn’t stop it. For the first time in my military career . . . I was looking around and there was 
a sense of hopelessness, [with] exhausted middle-aged men stumbling from meeting to meeting, 
and in every meeting at any one time, 20 percent of them would be asleep. . . . People often say 
that it’s very difficult to define what victory is now. Well, I know what losing looks like, and I was 
part of it.40
For many CJTF-7 leaders, Casey’s arrival brought a quick and welcome change. 
“When General Casey arrived, within 2 weeks he breathed new life into the organiza-
tion,” one senior operations officer remarked. “It reminded me of the description of Mat-
thew Ridgway taking over 8th Army [in Korea]. He just infused the organization with 
optimism, confidence, and a sense of direction. . . . Within six weeks we had produced a 
campaign plan.”41
In addition to the change in personality and perspective, Casey made crucial struc-
tural changes to bridge the schism that had characterized the relationship between San-
chez and Bremer, as well as between their respective organizations. The final days of 
CJTF-7 were degraded further by the abrupt departure of the CPA in May and June. 
“Ambassador [Francis] Ricciardone [a senior U.S. diplomat] was parachuted in to ‘make 
CPA go away,’ and so they did,” a CJTF-7 general officer remembered: 
Every night the bus would roll up, and the next morning in a meeting with the Iraqis, the CPA guy 
who had been the chair of that [section], he’d [have] gone overnight. Just gone. ‘Has anyone got the 
simultaneous translation headsets that were here last week?’ ‘No.’ ‘Have we got an interpreter for 
this meeting?’ ‘No.’ It was bizarre, like being in a Kafkaesque fantasy.42
To repair this severe disruption in civil-military operations, Casey’s MNF-I placed 
nearly 300 “gals and guys with guns,” as Casey put it, into the embassy to handle 
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political-military affairs and plans, a step Negroponte supported.43 Casey himself estab-
lished offices at both Camp Victory and the embassy in the Green Zone, more often work-
ing at his embassy office across from Negroponte’s office.44 The embassy and MNF-I also 
created joint teams to address day-to-day operations and long-term planning, as well 
as an interagency Red Team that provided alternative insights directly to Negroponte 
and Casey.45 To signal their collaborative approach, Casey and Negroponte issued a joint 
mission statement that applied to both their organizations, a dramatic change from the 
near-fratricidal working relations that often had hampered the CPA and CJTF-7.
THE TARGETING OF THE NEW IRAQI STATE
Accenting the challenges the new coalition leaders would face just as they took over, 
Sunni insurgents in Baghdad killed Ezzadine Salim, President of the Iraqi Governing 
Council, on May 17, a shocking assassination meant to intimidate the new Iraqi political 
class. Other assassinations followed, including the June 12 killing of Iraqi deputy foreign 
minister Bassam Salih Kubba, as well as the murder of Kamal al-Jarah, a senior Education 
Ministry official.46 On July 20, Issam Jassem Kadhem, a director general in the Ministry 
of Defense, was gunned down outside his home.47 After the spate of assassinations, the 
protection of the new Iraqi national leaders became a serious enough concern that many 
of them moved into the coalition-controlled Green Zone. Though safer, they were discon-
nected from the conditions experienced by the population they governed.
Despite the coalition protection, insurgent attacks on key leaders continued and 
spread to provincial leaders. On July 14, Ninawa Governor Osama Kashmoula, who had 
collaborated closely with the U.S. troops in his province, was assassinated as he drove 
from Mosul to Baghdad.48 Though Ninawa had been regarded as a relatively stable econ-
omy of force area during the rotation of U.S. forces in early 2004, the governor’s murder 
was an ominous sign that Sunni insurgents were seeking to undo the earlier successes of 
the 101st Airborne Division in the province. Likewise, in the seemingly stable province 
of Basrah, the interim provincial governor, Hazem al-Ainachi, was shot to death outside 
his home on July 20.49
These attacks represented a concerted effort by insurgents to undermine the legiti-
macy of the new Iraqi state. The establishment of the interim government and the trans-
fer of sovereignty resulted in a short-lived phase of optimism among some of the Sunni 
insurgent groups. They incorrectly assumed that both acts were precursors to a com-
plete coalition withdrawal that would be followed by Sunni insurgent victories that 
would return them to power.50 In July in the perennially restive Anbar Province, Tawhid 
wal-Jihad kidnapped the three sons of the provincial governor, Abdul Karim Burjis. In 
exchange for their release, Burjis resigned his position and released a videotaped state-
ment that he “repented” for having collaborated with the coalition. When the new gover-
nor arrived, the security situation throughout the province had deteriorated to the point 
that he stated, “The province has collapsed and we feel like hostages.”51 In the provincial 
capital of Ramadi, the insurgent body of the Ramadi Shura Council headed by Moham-
med Mahmoud Latif had grown to the point that it could launch attacks of as many as 50 
insurgents at a time, with reinforcements arriving by truck.52
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Alongside the targeted assassinations of Iraqi political leaders, Sunni insurgents con-
tinued their strategy of hampering the new Iraqi state by targeting its critical infrastruc-
ture. On June 11, insurgents blew up an oil pipeline between Kirkuk and a pumping 
station 50 kilometers to the northwest in Dibis that provided fuel for one of Iraq’s largest 
power stations, resulting in a 10 percent drop in nationwide electrical output.53 In July, 
Sunni insurgents continued their efforts to pressure smaller coalition members to with-
draw from Iraq. Using the same method attempted unsuccessfully against South Korea, 
insurgents captured a Filipino contractor and threatened to kill him unless the Philip-
pines’ small force left immediately, to which the Philippine Government agreed. While 
the departure of the 51 Filipino troops was militarily insignificant, it was a political blow 
to the coalition’s legitimacy, increasing the number of countries that had dropped out of 
the coalition to 5.54
THE EXPANSION OF THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES
The creation of MNSTC-I reflected the fact that a year after the invasion, U.S. leaders 
tacitly had acknowledged that disbanding the Iraqi Army had been a serious mistake, 
and the plan to replace it with three weak light-infantry divisions and a local civil defense 
corps had failed its first major test—the April uprisings. With the new military command 
under Petraeus, the coalition would try to repair the damage by building a much larger 
Iraqi armed force than the Pentagon had envisioned a year earlier. The UN had provided 
political cover for this change in UNSCR 1546, which declared that “the multinational 
force will also assist in building the capability of the Iraqi security forces and institutions, 
through a programme of recruitment, training, equipping, mentoring, and monitoring.”55
When MNSTC-I unfurled its guidon in June 2004, the state of the Iraqi forces was dire. 
With the exception of only a handful of units, the Iraqi Army and ICDC forces either had 
refused to fight during the April uprisings or had disappeared. The near-universal dis-
integration of the Iraqi security forces meant that Petraeus essentially was starting over, 
with the number of trained and equipped Iraqis frustratingly dropping to almost zero. 
The fiasco highlighted the flaw in the ICDC concept—most of the units that dissolved 
had been ordered to fight away from their home areas, something most ICDC soldiers 
explicitly had expected would not be required of them. Many Iraqi troops refused out-
right to fight fellow Iraqis. Others “simply wanted a job and did not feel morally obli-
gated to complete their enlistment if they were unhappy with the conditions of service or 
had a better opportunity.”56
Of the units that remained intact after spring 2004, many had problems with the 
basic tasks of paying their soldiers on time, feeding them, and ensuring they had fuel 
and ammunition.57 There also was almost no higher-level command and control of the 
local Iraqi units. No organization existed between the nascent Iraqi Army brigades and 
the new Iraqi Ground Forces Command, while the Ministry of Defense, dissolved by 
Bremer’s CPA Order 2 in 2003, had not been restored yet as a functioning organization.
Petraeus arrived in Baghdad in June 2004 with a charge from Rumsfeld to conduct 
a complete review of the Iraqi security forces and the plans for their development, after 
which Petraeus recommended specific roles and missions for the Iraqi forces and the size 
and structure needed to accomplish them. It was the first time since the invasion that the 
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coalition had taken the time to assess the Iraqi security sector in its entirety, and Petrae-
us’s review would lead to sweeping changes in the coalition’s plans for the Iraqi security 
forces. To begin with, both Petraeus and Casey judged the Iraqi security forces were far 
too small for the role it needed to play in securing the country ahead of the all-important 
elections of 2005. Therefore, they decided that all near-term effort should go toward cre-
ating as many infantry battalions as quickly as possible and getting them into the fight.58 
The initial goal was for these battalions to become proficient at the platoon level so they 
could provide the inner ring of security during the elections just 6 months away.
In setting goals for the size of the Iraqi security forces, Petraeus and Casey solicited 
recommendations from the multinational divisions about the security needs in their 
respective areas and considered historical counterinsurgency ratios of police and army 
forces to the population. While MNF-I and MNSTC-I originally held that a ratio of one 
policeman to 300 civilians was sufficient, after input from the multinational divisions, the 
ratio shifted to 1 policeman to 188 civilians, a change that would greatly expand the size 
of the Iraqi security forces.59 While the updated ratio would increase the size of the Iraqi 
police force significantly, it still fell far below the ratio most often deemed required for 
successful counterinsurgency operations, a ratio of 1 policeman to 50 civilians.60 Another 
consideration for expanding the force was the coalition’s sober recognition of the nega-
tive consequences of the CPA’s disbanding of the Iraqi Army. Enlarging the Iraqi security 
forces would create tens of thousands of Iraqi jobs, coalition leaders believed, thereby 
draining potential recruits from the insurgency.61
Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Matt Murphy (Released).
Iraqi Soldiers Head Out on a Mission in Samarra.62
The MNSTC-I review brought an end to the bifurcated efforts to build a separate 
army and civil defense corps. The Iraqi Army would continue as a national force meant 
to protect against external threats, but the term “New Iraqi Army” was dropped in favor 
of the simpler “Iraqi Army.” The change also served to reemphasize continuity with 
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the pre-2003 army, which was one of Iraq’s few respected institutions.63 The decentral-
ized ICDC effort, however, was abandoned, with control, recruiting, and funding for 
the remaining units pulled back to MNSTC-I, and those formations renamed the “Iraqi 
National Guard.” These new, centrally built national guard units essentially would 
replace the ICDC units destroyed in the spring uprising. Consolidating the ICDC effort 
also was meant to correct the major equipment shortages that ICDC units had suffered 
because of CMATT’s bureaucratic hurdles and contract challenges. By the time Petraeus 
issued his review report, the ICDC and national guard still wore captured, pre-2003 Iraqi 
Army uniforms, possessed just 1,800 of the 42,000 sets of body armor they required, and 
had almost no radios.64
Under Petraeus and Casey’s new plan, the Iraqi Army essentially would remain 
unchanged in size with a personnel strength of 27,000 spread across three divisions and 
27 battalions, though the CJSOTF was allowed to expand the 36th Commando Battalion 
into a full Iraqi Special Operations Forces brigade. However, the Iraqi National Guard 
would expand dramatically. Its initial size of 48,000 troops spread among 6 brigades and 
45 battalions would grow to 77,000 personnel across 6 divisions, 21 brigades, and 65 bat-
talions.65 The Iraqi Police Service would grow as well, from 90,000 local police and 16,000 
border police to 135,000 local police and 32,000 border police.66 Altogether, the new Iraqi 
security forces would work toward a strength of 271,000, as opposed to the 171,000 the 
CMATT and CPATT had planned to build under the CPA. In addition to this force, the 
plan would train nearly 5,000 special police spread across 2 special police regiments, 9 
public order battalions, and an emergency response unit.67 These police were designed, 
like the Italian Carabinieri and the French Gendarmes, to bridge the gap between local 
police forces that focused on local law enforcement and military units that eventually 
would focus on external threats. Plans also were developed to create a small air force and 
navy, and MNSTC-I staffers began forming a rudimentary Iraqi joint headquarters to 
coordinate and lead the different services.68
The Petraeus review substantively did not change plans for the Iraqi Army’s equip-
ment and weapon systems, which Pentagon planners had limited in 2003 to ensure that 
the Iraqi military would not be a threat to its neighbors. Under MNSTC-I, Iraqi Army 
units principally would remain motorized infantry forces equipped with unarmored 
pickup trucks—lightly armed, with few crew-served weapons, and nearly no RPGs or 
indirect fire weapons. MNF-I and MNSTC-I judged that NATO weapons were too main-
tenance-intensive for the Iraqi force, which would instead be armed with the former 
Soviet bloc weapons Iraqis were accustomed to using. Only one of the 30 army brigades 
would be a mechanized force equipped with Soviet BMP and MT-LB armored personnel 
carriers and T55 tanks.
Petraeus’s assessment also led Casey and MNF-I to reprogram $1.8 billion from long-
term electricity and water projects in the Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction fund to pay for 
the growth in the Iraqi security forces and improvement in its capabilities.69 The shifting 
of funds represented a clash of priorities between those coalition leaders who believed 
investment in the Iraqi security forces was the surest way of stabilizing the country and 
those who believed reconstruction and economic development should take precedence. 
The loss of reconstruction funds was a particularly hard blow for Major General Peter Chi-
arelli, commander of the 1st Cavalry Division and MND-B. He believed reconstruction 
326
THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR
had to be initiated first in order to create the jobs that served as the most effective route to 
long-term security, especially in the Iraqi capital. Robbing the reconstruction fund to pay 
for security forces was putting the cart before the horse, Chiarelli believed, and within 
the coalition command councils, he voiced strong opposition to Casey’s reprogram-
ming decision. However, with the approval of the U.S. Congress and the newly seated 
Iraqi Government, the transfers went ahead by the late summer. For the time being, the 
“reconstruction-first” advocates had lost the argument. This reprogramming was the first 
of more than $10 billion spent on the Iraqi security forces during Casey’s tenure.
MNSTC-I’s focus on generating combat units ahead of the 2005 elections meant that 
the Iraqis’ logistic capability had to wait, because creating organic logistics units in the 
Iraqi forces would slow the principal mission of standing up combat battalions.70 The 
sticker shock associated with the price tag of the Iraqi security forces also prompted Casey 
to fund only the minimum logistics capability required to transition security responsibil-
ity to the Iraqis.71 A final factor contributing to Casey’s decision was the belief that the 
overall Iraq mission was a relatively short-term one and that security conditions for the 
Iraqi security forces would naturally improve over time. Since coalition forces would 
be withdrawing and turning over responsibility to the Iraqis as soon as possible, MNF-I 
leaders assumed there would not be time to build institutional and operational logistics 
organizations.
Instead of their own logistics units, the Iraqis would have to rely on contractors for 
every aspect of their support functions, including combat resupply. Laundry, fuel, meals, 
and other basic functions all would have to be contracted with the local market, as the new 
Iraqi Army did not have cooks or fuel handlers. Even Iraqi unit mobility depended on 
civilian-contracted support because no Iraqi transportation corps would be established. 
The army also would not have a medical corps, meaning health care would have to be 
contracted with local Iraqi civilian facilities or in rare cases provided by U.S. facilities.72
The decision to expand the Iraqi security forces and its capabilities led to another sig-
nificant change in the coalition campaign: the pairing of American advisers directly with 
Iraqi units, a move that MNF-I and MNSTC-I hoped would prevent a recurrence of the 
Iraqi security forces’ April collapse. Advisory support teams (ASTs) would embed with 
each Iraqi battalion, brigade, and division to coach the Iraqi units as they conducted oper-
ations. At the battalion level, the ASTs consisted of one major, two captains, and seven 
noncommissioned officers.73 Under a new Iraqi Assistance Group, MNSTC-I eventually 
would establish 39 teams, with 31 coming from the 98th Reserve Division, though many 
of the initial ASTs were manned at only 50 percent strength.74
A NEW COALITION STRATEGY
Among Casey’s first steps upon arriving in Baghdad was to harness the energy of the 
MNF-I headquarters to produce a campaign plan that was approved by Washington and 
published to his major subordinate commanders in Iraq, something CJTF-7 had not man-
aged to do—though not through lack of trying. Constantly reacting to events and bedev-
iled by conflicting guidance from Washington, Sanchez and his command had instead 
relied on the original invasion plan, ordering changes through fragmentary orders as 
needed, but never giving the subordinate commands a common post-invasion game plan 
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that synchronized their activities across the country. Sanchez’s command had worked 
according to a bifurcated interim mission that called for units to continue offensive oper-
ations to root out elements of the former regime and at the same time to conduct stability 
and support operations.
Casey had something different in mind. Taking his lead from UNSCR 1546 and inter-
preting Bush’s intent from a speech at the U.S. Army War College in May, as well as 
a National Security Presidential Directive,75 Casey published a new campaign plan in 
August 2004, directing “in partnership with the Iraqi Government, MNF-I conducts full 
spectrum counter- insurgency operations to isolate and neutralize former regime extrem-
ists and foreign terrorists and organizes, trains and equips Iraqi security forces in order 
to create a security environment that permits the completion of UNSCR 1546.”76 Cen-
tral to the campaign, referenced by Casey’s requirement to complete the UN-mandated 
schedule, was the holding of free and fair elections. The elections themselves would con-
tribute to the desired end state, which was viewed as an “Iraq at peace with its neigh-
bors, with a representative government that respects human rights of all Iraqis, and with 
security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and deny Iraq as a safe haven for 
terrorists.”77 Casey’s goals essentially would remain unchanged throughout his tenure as 
MNF-I commander.
The August 2004 plan introduced several new components into the coalition cam-
paign. Casey had arrived in Iraq concerned that the coalition was overly kinetic in its 
actions, killing too many Iraqis in raids and accidentally at checkpoints, factors he sus-
pected were creating ill will toward the coalition. In an effort to reduce these casualties, 
Casey originally had written a mission stating only that MNF-I would “conduct coun-
terinsurgency operations.” Subordinate commanders, however, had pressed him to use 
the wording “full-spectrum operations” out of concern that “when you say counterin-
surgency, the troops think about chasing guys in pajamas around the jungle.”78 In any 
event, the new MNF-I mission statement marked the first time the coalition headquarters 
formally recognized counterinsurgency as a crucial component of its mission, in which 
reconstruction and development projects theoretically were considered as important as 
combat operations.
The second major component of the new mission, the construction of the Iraqi security 
forces, was supported by the creation of MNSTC-I and the restructuring of the Iraqi secu-
rity forces. Casey also specified that the Iraqi security forces were the coalition’s exit strat-
egy. Functioning Iraqi security forces units would allow coalition units to drawdown, a 
process Casey believed would have the positive by-product of reducing the number of 
antibodies created against the coalition presence.
Casey’s campaign plan included criteria that would justify sequentially transitioning 
three levels of control over security matters in various areas of the country to the Iraqis. 
“Iraqi local control” would be declared when “local security forces can respond to local 
incidents with coalition oversight and an operating judicial system can arraign, hold and 
try criminals in a timely manner,” a level Metz and MNC-I initially hoped the Iraqi secu-
rity forces could attain by October 1, 2004.79 Areas then could transition to “Iraqi regional 
control” when Iraqi security forces units could operate “under civil control within a prov-
ince [and] can maintain internal security and are capable of antiterrorism measures.”80 
Transition to the final level, “strategic overwatch,” would take place when Iraq could 
328
THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR
handle internal and external threats on its own, at which point coalition forces would 
largely withdraw from the country. The exact definition of these three states was debated 
and redefined for the remainder of the war.
Above all, the new campaign plan reflected the shared philosophical views of Rums-
feld, Abizaid, and Casey that foreign presence in the Arab world was counterproduc-
tive and that efforts had to be taken to prevent Iraqis from becoming too dependent on 
coalition forces. Casey’s staff included among its planning assumptions the dictum that 
foreign presence created natural resistance against itself. “Military/security forces can 
contribute to the counterinsurgency effort but cannot win it,” Casey’s Red Team had 
pronounced during July 2004 planning sessions. The team also concluded that, while an 
Iraqi Government “that enjoys legitimacy in the eyes of the majority” could temporarily 
overcome public opposition to foreign troops, “nonetheless, foreign forces will never be 
broadly welcomed in Iraq.”81
Casey’s August 2004 guidance to MNF-I operationalized these ideas, first and fore-
most, by stressing the need to reduce the coalition footprint by closing coalition bases and 
moving forces outside of populated areas in an effort to reduce friction with Iraqis. Clos-
ing coalition bases also would help with the dependency theory, U.S. leaders believed, 
because it would force Iraqis to become self-reliant as large coalition units moved farther 
away, onto what ultimately only would be nine coalition “exit bases.”82 The coalition 
would turn over the closed bases to the Iraqi security forces, reducing construction time-
lines and costs for the Iraqis. A detailed system, nicknamed “Iraqi BRAC” after the state-
side U.S. base realignment and closure process, arose to guide the process and to ensure 
that coalition units would refrain from expanding or improving any base not among the 
nine exit bases after the fall of 2005.83
Surveys conducted in Iraq at the time appeared to confirm the assumptions of the 
principal architects of the strategy. A summer 2004 poll conducted by MNF-I contrac-
tors in Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniya, and Baqubah found that 41 percent 
of respondents believed coalition forces should leave immediately, while 45 percent 
believed the coalition should leave after a permanent government was elected. Only 6 
percent felt that the coalition should stay as long as was necessary for stability. Further-
more, 55 percent of those Iraqis surveyed responded that if coalition forces left immedi-
ately, they would feel “more safe.”84 Similarly, many of Casey’s subordinates who had 
been in Iraq and fighting for months concurred with his plan’s philosophical basis. After 
Casey briefed his new campaign plan to his division commanders, Major General Martin 
Dempsey, the commander of the 1st Armored Division and the longest-deployed general 
officer in Iraq, wrote Casey to comment on the campaign plan’s primary premise.
There is definitely a point of descending consent on the near horizon beyond which we will not be 
welcome here no matter how much good we’re doing. We can push that point to the right if we 
reduce our footprint gradually and visibly. . . . After the elections, I advocate significant reduction 
in US forces in Iraq and suggest that they be apportioned functionally and not geographically. The 
functions requiring our presence include the train and equip function, protection from external 
threat [borders], and support of Iraqi Security Force against internal threat only as requested. As 
you know, I’ve lived in this time zone for 3 years. They [Iraqis] will not take responsibility for 
their problems—even if they have the capability to do so—while we are here doing it for them. I 
strongly recommend that we continue our effort to get out of Iraqi cities, and I encourage planners 
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to think out of the box in assigning responsibilities to forces in OIF-3 [third rotation of Operation 
IRAQI FREEDOM in January 2005] and beyond.85
This degree of support from Dempsey and other commanders reinforced Casey’s sense 
that he was pursuing the correct course of action and that the core philosophical beliefs 
that guided him were squarely on target for the Iraq mission.
Glimpses of the Future: Tribal Security and the Baghdad “Belts”
As Casey and other coalition commanders began to reduce their units’ presence in 
Iraqi cities and decrease contact with the Iraqi population, a handful of Iraqi leaders and 
coalition officers considered alternative approaches that would later come to dominate 
the campaign. During the spring and summer of 2004, CJSOTF forces under an irregular 
warfare advocate, Army Major Adam Such, began a limited program to engage and arm 
the Albu Nimr and Albu Issa tribes of Anbar Province. Concerned with the continuing 
threat in Fallujah and worsening security in the province, Mattis and his 1st Marine Divi-
sion endorsed Such’s efforts, providing materiel, funding—including pay for the Iraqi 
irregulars—and other operational support. However, once the promising tribal security 
initiative came to the attention of the CPA and U.S. Embassy, it skidded. U.S. officials in 
Baghdad considered the arming of tribal militias a regressive measure out of step with 
long-term U.S. objectives for a new nontribal Iraq.86 In the aftermath of the April uprising 
and the near-universal collapse of the ICDC, U.S. leaders in Baghdad had no desire for 
decentralized security efforts outside Iraqi state institutions. As a result, MNSTC-I, the 
CJSOTF, and MNF-W were prohibited from supporting the tribal irregulars other than 
with captured insurgent weapons and ammunition. The program effectively ceased when 
the CJSOTF and Marine leadership rotated out of Iraq in the summer of 2004, though it 
provided some tactical lessons that later were useful to coalition leaders in Anbar.
Meanwhile, as CJTF-7 prepared to deactivate in early summer 2004, Iraqi Defense 
Minister Ali Allawi offered coalition leaders a different idea for an Iraq campaign plan, 
albeit one that U.S. commanders at the time did not explore further. Allawi argued that 
Salafi jihadist organizations had fused with elements of Saddam’s regime in a Sunni 
insurgency calling itself “Al Muqawamma al Islammiya al Wattaniyya” or “Patriotic 
Islamic Resistance.” The jihadists, working together, exploited symbols of radical Islam 
to recruit and create religious fervor while the former Ba’athist regime elements provided 
structure, organization, and discipline. Referencing the captured Abu Musab al-Zarqawi 
letter that called for civil war, Allawi identified Baghdad as the objective of the Sunni 
insurgents’ strategy, under which they would:
. . . encircle Baghdad, not so much in the form of a classic siege, but rather through unopposed 
control over certain towns and districts around Baghdad. Again, this would not be in the form 
of actual physical control over territory. It can be simply a de facto acknowledgment by the 
inhabitants of these areas of the power of these groups, either by a willing acquiescence to their 
power or simply through fear.87
From these bases and safe havens located in the “belts” outside Baghdad, the Iraqi 
defense minister predicted, the Sunni insurgents would launch armed raids and forays 
into the capital to incite sectarian violence and destabilize the government. Military 
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control of the belts was crucial to any future campaign, Allawi concluded, although elec-
tions and a political process were needed to blunt the insurgent strategy as well.88 In 
other words, Iraq’s top defense official correctly had identified for his coalition counter-
parts the insurgency’s “Baghdad belts” strategy a full 30 months before coalition leaders 
would acknowledge it themselves, and almost 3 years before the belts became the center-
piece of the Petraeus-Odierno so-called surge campaign of 2007.
***
The summer of 2004 brought new leaders, new commands, and a new purpose to a 
U.S.-led coalition demoralized by the April uprisings and the Abu Ghraib scandal. Taking 
the helm, Casey brought coherence and hope. Under Casey’s new guidance, the coalition 
would focus on implementing the UN timeline for elections in 2005, while refocusing 
its efforts to establish expanded Iraqi security forces that U.S. leaders believed would 
be the coalition’s ticket out of Iraq. The Petraeus assessment of the Iraqi security forces, 
meanwhile, resulted in redesigned Iraqi armed forces, with training, organization, and 
equipping of both the police and army standardized, and the Iraqi National Guard and 
Iraqi Army merged into one force. At the same time, the turbulence of yet another transi-
tion of headquarters, added to challenges inherent in the transfer of sovereignty and the 
continuing evolution of the insurgency, would ensure that the new coalition command 
teams soon would be tested just as violently as CJTF-7 had been. As they raced to prepare 
for the elections of January 2005, the coalition divisions would find themselves fighting 
on multiple fronts once again.
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CHAPTER 14
FIGHTING TO THE ELECTIONS, AUGUST-DECEMBER 2004
From August to December 2004, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) would put Gen-
eral George Casey’s new campaign plan into effect. Driven by the United Nations’ elec-
tion timeline, the coalition would focus on eliminating insurgent sanctuaries in seven key 
cities so that voting could take place on schedule in January 2005—in Casey’s words, a 
“fight to the elections.” In Mosul, Tel Afar, north Babil, and Sadr City, the coalition and 
the Iraqi security forces would continue their ongoing efforts to stabilize the situation 
and remove the insurgent threat with localized operations. However, in three cities—
Samarra, Najaf, and Fallujah—Casey and other coalition leaders judged that major oper-
ations would be required to restore government control so that elections could proceed. 
Removing the insurgent threat in Najaf would require the coalition to continue the war 
against the Sadrists while securing the kind of Iraqi political support whose absence had 
thwarted the spring operation against Moqtada Sadr’s militants. Removing the insurgent 
threat to Samarra and eastern Anbar, meanwhile, would require similar efforts to finish 
the job that had come to such a ragged halt in April.
As these operations unfolded, Casey would find in Najaf a model for future combined 
coalition-Iraqi operations, but the planned assault on Sunni insurgents in Fallujah would 
quickly spill over into an unplanned fight for northern Iraq and demonstrate that the 
coalition was facing a thinking, operationally adaptive enemy.
OPERATIONS IN NAJAF
The proverbial ink was not dry on MNF-I’s campaign plan when the tenuous cease-
fire with Moqtada Sadr’s militia broke down, this time in the Shi’a shrine city of Najaf. 
After suffering heavy losses mainly in Baghdad and Karbala during the April 2004 upris-
ings and early summer, Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) had gravitated to Najaf and negotiated a 
truce that put the vitally important Imam Ali Mosque and the adjacent Wadi as-Salam 
cemetery off limits to coalition troops, essentially turning Najaf’s old city into a rebel safe 
haven.
For the coalition, the problems in Najaf were in the Multi-National Division– 
Central South (MND-CS) area of operations but were the tactical responsibility of the 
11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). The 11th MEU, U.S. Central Command’s (CENT-
COM) theater reserve, had arrived in the provinces of Najaf and Qadisiyah on July 21, 
2004, to help fill the gap left by the sudden withdrawal of Spanish troops following the 
Madrid, Spain, terrorist attacks of March 11, 2004. Taking the place of Task Force Dragon, 
a composite unit from the 1st Infantry Division, the 11th MEU was the fourth coalition 
unit in 4 months assigned to hold Najaf, and trouble was not long in coming for the 
newly arrived Marines. Shortly after reaching the city, the 11th MEU was immersed in 
fighting that began with a chance encounter between an American patrol and Sadrist 
fighters near Moqtada Sadr’s family home on August 2. Sadr’s men responded to the 
meeting engagement by attacking Najaf’s main police station on August 5, and an intense 
battle ensued that spread into the city’s previously off-limits cemetery. During 2 days of 
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fighting, Marines used tanks, attack helicopters, and fixed-wing close air support to gain 
the upper hand, including the dropping of 1,000-pound bombs and the nighttime use of 
AC-130 gunships. When the fighting subsided, coalition losses amounted to a downed 
UH-1N helicopter, 5 Marines killed, and 60 wounded, while JAM lost an estimated 350 
killed.1 The intensity of the August 5-6 battle convinced coalition officers that the sprawl-
ing Wadi as-Salam cemetery and the Imam Ali shrine complex had become insurgent 
operating bases too large for the 11th MEU to handle on its own.2
Although Casey and Lieutenant General Thomas Metz had planned to clear Najaf 
of insurgents before the January 2005 elections, they had not planned to sequence that 
shrine city first, having agreed with Prime Minister Ayad Allawi to begin with the less 
complicated problem of Samarra. However, with the Sadrists having already precipitated 
a battle in Najaf, the coalition commanders seized the opportunity to remove the JAM 
threat first. To reinforce the 11th MEU, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) dispatched 
an attack helicopter battalion and two Army battalions (1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regi-
ment, and 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment) from the 1st Cavalry Division in Baghdad 
to assist the Marines in clearing the cemetery and restoring order to Najaf. To clarify the 
chain of command for what would be a Marine-led operation on the ground, MNC-I 
gave Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W) temporary control of Najaf and Qadisiyah 
Provinces from the Polish-led MND-CS.3 While this change fixed the problem of work-
ing through MND-CS language barriers and political caveats, placing MNF-W over the 
coalition troops in Najaf slowed reporting between the city and Baghdad. This eventu-
ally led the frustrated MNC-I headquarters to communicate directly with the 11th MEU, 
especially on matters related to the politically important Imam Ali shrine.
The speed at which the reinforcing battalions left Baghdad—1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 
began moving to Najaf just 12 hours after being alerted—made for an impressive opera-
tional maneuver but created new problems. As the two battalions departed for Najaf, all 
but two of their Iraqi interpreters refused to go with them, leaving the two units with a 
sum total of five interpreters for the first 2 weeks of the battle, which severely hampered 
the units’ ability to communicate with Iraqi security forces and local Najafis.4 The rapid 
movement of the battalions also caused consternation in the 1st Cavalry Division head-
quarters, which MNC-I had tasked a short time before to designate a “working” corps 
reserve that was assigned battle space in the Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B) 
area but could deploy anywhere in the country within 96 hours. In practice, the activa-
tion of the working reserve left a sudden gap in the coalition’s Baghdad battle space that 
the 1st Cavalry Division had to scramble to fill. The situation became acute when, as had 
been the case in the April uprisings, the fighting in Najaf quickly spread across south-
ern Iraq and to Baghdad. Colonel Robert B. Abrams’s 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, 
which had fought the Sadrists in April, again faced off against JAM for 62 straight days.
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Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Ashley Brokop, U.S. Air Force (Released).
U.S. Soldiers Search the Najaf Cemetery for 
Weapons Caches, IEDs, and Sadrist Militiamen.5
Fighting Among the Tombstones
The fighting in Najaf drew the U.S. troops into an extraordinary urban battlefield the 
likes of which American forces have rarely experienced. According to Shi’a Muslims, 
any believer buried near the tomb of Imam Ali in Najaf is guaranteed to enter paradise, 
and, as a result, the Wadi as-Salam cemetery is the largest in the world. With over five 
million graves arrayed in a labyrinthine complex of multistory crypts and underground 
catacombs, the cemetery was effectively a city in its own right, one with political impli-
cations across the entire worldwide community of some 150 million Shi’a Muslims who 
considered it sacred ground.
After MNC-I’s reinforcements arrived, U.S. commanders in Najaf prepared to attack 
from north to south through the cemetery to end its use as a safe haven by thousands of 
JAM fighters occupying both it and the nearby Imam Ali shrine complex. On August 9, 
the attacking U.S. troops began making their way into the vast necropolis while forced 
to contend with a politically imposed exclusionary zone around the Imam Ali Mosque. 
Over the next 2 days, American troops fended off mortars, snipers, and improvised 
explosive devices (IED) throughout the forbidding terrain of elaborate crypts in summer 
temperatures that exceeded 125 degrees.6 With little respite at night, the oppressive heat 
sometimes caused the coalition troops’ sophisticated electronic systems to fail and, as 
one historian described it, “turned the armored vehicles into furnaces.”7 To combat the 
intense heat, some vehicle crews went into battle with bags of intravenous fluid flowing 
into their veins.8
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The dense collection of graves, crypts, and catacombs made for a complex three- 
dimensional battlefield. The threat from Sadrist and Iranian snipers inside the cemetery 
was serious enough to prompt coalition commanders to gather Navy Sea, Air, and Land 
Teams (SEAL) and Special Forces snipers from across the country, resulting in a produc-
tive teaming of special operators with Marine and 1st Cavalry Division snipers. Yet the 
tight urban environment also resulted in some close melees, as in one incident in which 
an insurgent scrambled onto a tank from 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, shot the tank’s com-
mander and loader, and then escaped into the graveyard.9
In this challenging environment, the majority of the Iraqi units accompanying the 
coalition attackers collapsed. The 405th Iraqi National Guard Battalion dissolved under 
stress, the 406th Iraqi National Guard Battalion disintegrated under fire, and the 404th 
Iraqi National Guard Battalion in Karbala became combat ineffective when half of its sol-
diers refused to deploy to Najaf.10 Some units of the new Iraqi Army performed passably 
in supporting combat operations, but only the 36th Commando Battalion, working with 
Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) advisers, managed to conduct 
high-intensity, kinetic combat operations. The battalion fought in the challenging urban 
environment and provided critical reconnaissance when a few of its native Najafi soldiers 
changed into civilian clothes and scouted Sadrist positions near the Imam Ali shrine.11 
With this intelligence in hand, the battalion prepared to assault and clear the shrine, if 
Iraqi and coalition leaders ordered them to do so.
Cease-Fire With the Sadrists
As the 11th MEU and the Army cavalry battalions made their way through the cem-
etery on August 11, the Iraqi Government began negotiations with the Sadrists that 
produced a series of sporadic cease-fires.12 Throughout more than a week of unproduc-
tive talks, the fighting continued, with coalition troops inflicting heavy losses on JAM 
and shrinking the militia’s foothold in the city while Moqtada Sadr and his spokesmen 
denounced the Iraqi Government as illegitimate and called for a general insurrection to 
expel the coalition.
By August 24, Sadr and his militia were practically surrounded in the area around 
the shrine, while the exclusionary zone around the mosque had shrunk to a mere 100 
meters. As the coalition troops prepared for a three-battalion assault on the remaining 
JAM fighters, Prime Minister Ayad Allawi pressed Casey to order coalition troops to 
attack into the shrine itself, where Sadr was reportedly sheltering. In Allawi’s view, the 
situation was at a decisive point. Although Grand Ayatollah Ali Husayni Sistani had 
been in London, United Kingdom, for medical treatment during the fighting, he was due 
back in Iraq within hours, and the Prime Minister anticipated that the returning Sistani 
would call for a cease-fire that would enable Sadr and his fighters to survive and fight 
again another day. Meeting with Casey and other coalition leaders in his residence on the 
evening of August 24, Allawi urged the MNF-I commander to agree to “finish the job” 
against Sadr while it was still possible and announced that he was ready to authorize 
Iraqi troops to attack the mosque with coalition support.13 A skeptical Casey, judging 
that Allawi and coalition diplomats were on the verge of ordering a disastrous military 
operation that could damage Shi’ism’s holiest structure, attempted to restrain the Prime 
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Minister’s inclinations. An operation in the shrine would require the attacking troops 
to develop extensive intelligence and use extraordinary discipline, Casey observed, and 
though the Iraqi commandos had demonstrated skill in less complex operations, Casey 
told Allawi, “they aren’t ready to do that yet.”14 To buy more time, Allawi suggested that 
Casey should close Iraq’s airspace and ports in order to block Sistani’s plane from land-
ing, but Casey demurred by observing that, since Iraq was sovereign, any such decision 
needed to come from Allawi’s government.15
 One factor staying Casey’s hand was that he believed he simply did not have suffi-
cient awareness of the situation in Najaf to assess the coalition’s options. To gain clarity 
on the situation on the ground, Casey decided on the night of August 24 to dispatch 
Metz to the shrine city to provide a personal assessment. On August 25, Metz reported 
that with the mosque surrounded, capturing Sadr was possible, but risky and likely to 
involve high casualties. However, the dilemma was quickly overcome by events. To Alla-
wi’s frustration, before he could persuade Casey to order coalition forces to support an 
assault into the mosque to capture Sadr, Sistani landed in Basrah and began brokering a 
cease-fire. On August 26, Sistani’s efforts yielded an agreement for Sadr and his men to 
withdraw peacefully from the shrine.
Unlike Allawi, Casey harbored no regrets about Sadr’s escape from Najaf. As the days 
passed, Casey came to doubt that Sadr had actually been in the shrine on August 24 and 
25 because some delayed reports claimed the insurgent leader had slipped through the 
coalition’s tightening noose a few days earlier. Despite this second major confrontation 
with JAM, Casey judged that the Sunni insurgent groups were still a greater threat to 
Iraq’s long-term stability. “I didn’t see [JAM] as the chief threat,” he recalled later. “In 
August in Najaf there was kind of a countrywide uprising. But I would say that was more 
of a . . . tactical threat. By that I mean it was a lot of violence in a short period of time, 
but it never threatened to undermine the whole mission. The main threat was the former 
regime insurgency.”16 To Casey’s point, Moqtada Sadr and his militia had indeed been 
dealt a serious blow—Sadr had been forced to slink out of Najaf with the shrine and city 
back in government hands. His forces had also been devastated, with an estimated 1,500 
of his fighters killed. The coalition, meanwhile, had lost seven Marines and three Soldiers 
killed.17 Sadr’s uprising had also alienated Najaf’s local leaders by disturbing the pilgrim-
age and religious tourist trade on which the city depended, and as a result, the political 
balance in Najaf shifted toward Sadr’s principal rivals, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and his 
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).
For many coalition and Iraqi observers, the negotiated cease-fire and Sadr’s escape 
were an ominous development, leaving intact an organization that still posed a threat 
to the coalition’s end state of a representative and U.S.-allied Iraqi Government. In the 
aftermath of the battle, Lieutenant Colonel Myles Miyamasu, the commander of 1st Bat-
talion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, put it succinctly: “[with Sadr] it’s not over. It’s just going 
to be different.”18
Casey and the “Najaf Model”
For Casey, the battle in Najaf was a model for how future combat operations should 
be conducted, and he attempted to copy it elsewhere several times during his command 
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tenure. The “Najaf model” had three main ingredients: Iraqi security forces collaborat-
ing with coalition advisers in the military domain, supportive Iraqi Government leaders 
providing political top cover to legitimize coalition combat operations, and economic 
reconstruction following closely on the heels of military operations.19
In political terms, Casey considered confronting Moqtada Sadr in Najaf a significant 
political achievement in that it had united the nascent Iraqi Government against an insur-
gent menace for the first time. “Strategically [Najaf] was important to us because we 
needed a vehicle that would cause the Allawi government to come together and have a 
success,” Casey recalled later.20 Unlike the April battle in Fallujah, the Najaf battle had 
seen the Iraqi Government announce its support of coalition military actions, very differ-
ent from the Iraqi Governing Council’s threats to resign during the April 2004 fighting. 
While some of this was the result of Allawi’s personal involvement, it was also a sign of 
the political spadework Casey and Ambassador John Negroponte had done to ensure 
Iraqi leaders would not blanch when the inevitable collateral damage occurred. Casey 
observed later, “One of the lessons learned from the first Fallujah [was] that you’ve got 
to keep the Iraqi political leadership behind the military operations or you have a lot of 
military effort for nothing.”21
Casey also concluded that the Najaf operation had validated the idea that reconstruc-
tion would show Iraqis that after the fighting stopped the coalition had their best interests 
in mind, thereby mitigating the antibody effect of coalition forces and buying additional 
time for training the Iraqi security forces. The sooner reconstruction could begin after the 
guns fell silent the better, Casey judged, and, ideally, plans for reconstruction would be 
made in parallel with plans for combat operations. By mid-November 2004, the coalition 
had started 226 projects in Najaf valued at over $50 million.22 The 11th MEU alone distrib-
uted almost $45 million in condolence payments and damage compensation claims while 
starting construction of 8 new schools and repairing 24 more.23
The experience at Najaf also convinced Casey that successful combat operations 
required the meaningful involvement of Iraqi troops in order to put an Iraqi face on the 
conflict. Casey believed Iraqi troops were indispensable in politically sensitive operations 
such as entry into insurgent-held mosques and the capture of insurgent-allied political 
figures. Iraqis also provided situational awareness and local intelligence that coalition 
units could not hope to acquire on their own. To these ends, Casey judged that Najaf 
had shown that Iraqi units could perform well when paired with coalition advisers. “We 
had with [the Iraqi security forces] the early version of transition teams,” Casey recalled. 
“What we found was [the Iraqi units] do okay when we’re with them. That became kind 
of a lesson that was going to expand into the transition strategy.”24 This premise would 
later become a bedrock of MNF-I’s campaign plan as the headquarters reassessed the 
situation following the January 2005 elections.
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Source: DoD photo by Sergeant First Class Matthew Jones (Released).
Iraqi Special Operations Forces From the 36th Commando Battalion 
Run Toward a Black Hawk During a Joint Training Exercise.25
The Iraqi 36th Commando Battalion
Not all of the lessons the coalition drew from Najaf were valid. Most significantly, the 
Iraqi security forces’ performance in Najaf had been somewhat overstated. In fact, most of 
the Iraqi Army units engaged in Najaf had performed poorly under fire or disintegrated 
outright, even when paired with Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq’s 
(MNSTC-I) adviser support teams. The 36th Commando Battalion, the single Iraqi unit 
that had fought well enough to justify Casey’s impressions of the security forces, was 
not representative of the rest of the new Iraqi Army. In late 2004, most Iraqi units were 
close to ethnically homogeneous, either mostly Shi’a, Kurd, or Sunni, despite MNSTC-
I’s intent to promote ethnic mixing. By contrast, from its inception in the hands of the 
CJSOTF, the 36th Commando Battalion was an Iraqi unit unlike any other. The battal-
ion had originally been authorized by CENTCOM Commander General John Abizaid in 
response to complaints from five of Iraq’s largest political parties that wanted a greater 
share in reestablishing security, and the CJSOTF had received the mission to build and 
mentor it.26 Recognizing the potential danger of ethnically homogeneous units, CJSOTF 
leaders rigorously enforced a heterogeneous composition that roughly matched Iraq’s 
demographics. The Kurdish Democratic Party provided approximately 28 percent of the 
manpower for the unit; Ahmad Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress, 22 percent; the Patri-
otic Union of Kurdistan, 21 percent; Allawi’s Iraqi National Congress, 15 percent; and 
SCIRI, 15 percent.27 The battalion had a Sunni-Shi’a and Arab-Kurd mix at every level, 
resulting in an organization whose members, in the words of one coalition adviser, “sort 
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of policed each other and kept each other honest.”28 As the diverse members of the 36th 
Commando Battalion had fought shoulder to shoulder in 2004, they had forged a unit 
identity that was Iraqi rather than ethno-sectarian, a factor that helped overcome Iraqi 
soldiers’ inherent reluctance to deploy outside their home area. It also helped overcome 
the reticence common in other units to fighting and killing fellow countrymen, especially 
those of the same ethno-religious group.
Beyond its ethnic makeup, the 36th Commando Battalion was distinguished from the 
rest of the Iraqi Army in its assessment and selection process. Recruits who did not meet 
tough standards were sent home. Only 389 of 508 Iraqis in the first group of applicants 
completed the training, and a similar selection percentage persisted as the unit expanded 
over time and became part of a larger Iraqi Special Operations Forces Brigade.29 Coalition 
leaders also allowed the CJSOTF to equip the 36th Commando Battalion differently from 
the remainder of the Iraqi Army by allowing the battalion to use North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) weapons and equipment, to include M4 rifles, body armor, sniper 
rifles, and U.S. night-vision devices.30 While training and equipping the commandos with 
NATO equipment took time and occurred gradually, it was a decision that would both 
enhance the unit’s capabilities and magnify its differences from other Iraqi Army units.
Even beyond the June 2004 transfer of sovereignty, the 36th Commando Battalion’s 
CJSOTF advisers retained key authorities over their protégés, including making hiring 
and firing decisions and controlling the unit’s pay, factors that reduced the problem of 
corruption that plagued many other Iraqi units.31 Unlike most other Iraqi units, the bat-
talion’s advisors were paired with them throughout the organization’s entire history, 
from initial training through employment on the battlefield—a matching that continued 
across multiple American rotations. Over time the 36th Commando Battalion developed 
such skilled combat capabilities that some coalition advisers declared the only way to tell 
the Iraqi commandos from their CJSOTF counterparts was that the Americans tended 
to be taller. The 36th Commando Battalion’s abilities and will to fight in Najaf had been 
impressively atypical, hardly a performance on which to make broad assumptions about 
the future role of the Iraqi security forces in the campaign to secure and stabilize the 
country.
Operations in Samarra
After Najaf, the coalition commands turned their attention to the insurgent strong-
hold in Samarra, another of the seven cities the coalition judged to be crucial to conduct-
ing successful elections. The city’s situation was a volatile one, especially because it held 
one of Shi’a Islam’s four holiest shrines, the al-Askariyah Mosque, where the remains of 
the 10th and 11th Shi’a imams were buried and the point from which most Shi’a Muslims 
believe the 12th imam disappeared from the earth. However, Samarra was also a Sun-
ni-majority city and former Ba’athist stronghold of 340,000 people that, by fall 2004, had 
fallen into insurgent hands. The sectarian issues involved and the town’s relative prox-
imity to Baghdad meant that its position as an insurgent base was a threat to the January 
elections. Casey also judged that Samarra, like Najaf, was another “strategic opportunity 
for the [Iraqi Interim Government] to have success against insurgents and terrorists in a 
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Sunni area,” all of which pointed toward a large-scale coalition operation to secure the 
city before 2004 was over.32
Though the 1st Infantry Division had retaken the city in the April uprisings, Samarra’s 
security situation had deteriorated as Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) withdrew 
U.S. units from Iraqi cities in May and June. In June 2004, just 2 months after the division 
had cleared Samarra, the city council president had been intimidated into resigning, the 
city’s police force had defected, and the local Iraqi National Guard battalion commander 
had deserted, leaving his unit to disintegrate.33 By fall 2004, only one CJSOTF operational 
detachment alpha (ODA) was stationed inside the city, with one battalion from the 1st 
Infantry Division garrisoned a 30-minute drive away, meaning the city was under neither 
coalition or government control.
Recognizing that the city needed to be retaken, Major General John Batiste’s 1st Infan-
try Division conducted shaping operations from July through September in preparation 
for a large-scale assault. The shaping operations were designed to wear down insurgent 
forces by luring them into battle and thus enabling the coalition to understand better the 
insurgent networks. The division also received, at the last minute, six Iraqi Army and 
police battalions to lend additional legitimacy to its operations.
By the time the shaping operations had matured, the task of taking the city itself had 
become much simpler. On October 1, 2004, the division launched Operation BATON 
ROUGE, a 2-day clearing of the city by six U.S. battalions under its 2d Brigade Combat 
Team. In those 2 days of combat against a well-prepared enemy, the brigade combat 
team killed 127 insurgents and captured 128 more, while losing 1 Soldier killed and 8 
wounded.34 The long preparatory phase allowed the coalition troops to spare the city 
from significant destruction, and, as a result, civilian casualties were minimal. At the 
MNF-I level, Samarra seemed to validate the lessons of the Najaf model, especially in 
terms of the Iraqi role. Two of the six Iraqi battalions assigned to the operation fought 
fiercely. A Special Police Commando Battalion and the 36th Commando Battalion, sup-
ported by MNSTC-I and CJSOTF advisers, respectively, performed tasks that would 
have been politically sensitive for coalition troops, including clearing a hospital used by 
insurgents and forcibly entering the insurgent-held al-Askariyah Mosque. As soon as the 
heaviest fighting concluded, the 1st Infantry Division initiated 22 reconstruction projects 
valued at $10 million to help garner popular support.35 Unfortunately, obtaining long-
term support and funding for reconstruction proved elusive, as future Shi’a-dominated 
Iraqi Governments were slow to provide national-level assistance to the Sunni-majority 
city.
At the tactical level, however, Samarra yielded some lessons that were contrary to 
MNF-I’s plans. The 1st Infantry Division had learned that keeping cities secure required 
U.S. troops living in the city, not commuting to their area of operations from distant 
bases. Having been forced to cope with the results of what happened when no coalition 
forces were based in the city, after the battle the division moved forces back into Samarra 
and reopened outposts inside the city’s confines.36
344
THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR
THE SECOND BATTLE OF FALLUJAH, NOVEMBER 2004
Fallujah in Insurgent Hands
Buoyed by the success of combined operations in Najaf and Samarra, the coalition 
next focused on insurgent-held Fallujah, the city Casey had selected to be the last strong-
hold cleared before the elections because he believed it would be the most difficult.37 
Since the first battle of Fallujah in April 2004, the city had become a magnet for both Iraqi 
Sunni insurgents who wanted to join the resistance against the United States and foreign 
militants who sought to join what they considered a worldwide jihad. By the late summer 
of 2004, the Fallujah Brigade that had been left to secure the city in April had become 
a visible failure, with its various portions either ineffective or joining the insurgency. 
Ironically, the coalition-created Fallujah Brigade was effectively replaced by the Fallujah 
Resistance Brigade, a loose insurgent confederation directed by a Fallujah Mujahideen 
Shura Council comprised of leaders from 39 different insurgent organizations.38 While no 
one leader controlled the council, Sheikh Abdullah Janabi, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and 
Fallujah native Omar Hadid were its dominant personalities. The council also enjoyed 
the support of prominent cleric Harith al-Dhari and his Association of Muslim Scholars, 
which considered itself the political wing of the Sunni insurgency.
Despite their operational collaboration, the loose confederation of Fallujah insurgents 
at times broke down in power struggles and disagreements over strategy and religious 
orthodoxy. Within Tawhid wal-Jihad, Omar Hadid, a Fallujah electrician who had risen 
to prominence as a battlefield commander, often clashed with the Jordanian Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi. Other conflicts among the various groups at times escalated into violence. 
When the Albu Issa tribe attempted in July to set up a new Jordanian-trained police force 
in its tribal area, Sheikh Abdullah Janabi’s men kidnapped the nephew of the Albu Issa 
sheikh as punishment, after which the Albu Issa tried, but failed, to assassinate Janabi.39 
Also in July, a dispute between the more pragmatic Janabi, who believed in limiting 
insurgent attacks to avoid a large-scale coalition response, and Zarqawi, who believed 
in striking the coalition whenever possible, devolved into fighting, with Janabi issuing a 
fatwa ordering the killing of Zarqawi’s local emir.40 Demonstrating how quickly alliances 
shifted, in August, Janabi’s group cooperated with Zarqawi’s Tawhid wal-Jihad to cap-
ture the compounds of the 505th and 506th Iraqi National Guard battalions near Fallujah. 
After defeating the two garrisons, the attacking insurgents tortured and killed several 
Iraqi National Guard leaders and converted the National Guard bases into insurgent 
headquarters. The executions of the National Guard leaders, who were members of the 
Albu Mar’ai tribe, led that tribe to change sides and support the coalition, demanding 
vengeance for the killings.40 By September, the temporary alliance between Janabi and 
Tawhid wal-Jihad had broken down again, with Janabi openly critical of the group’s 
more brutal methods and implementation of extreme religious standards.
As Zarqawi’s Tawhid wal-Jihad gradually made Fallujah its headquarters, foreign 
fighters flocked to the city, swelling the number of insurgents there to as many as 4,000. 
Fallujans made up about 50 percent of this number, other Anbaris roughly 30 percent, 
and foreign fighters 20 percent.42 The rise of Tawhid wal-Jihad and other Salafi groups, as 
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well as the influx of foreign fighters, radicalized the insurgency in the city and led to the 
imposition of Sharia law and basic functions of an Islamic state in many neighborhoods. 
Religious police began patrolling the streets to promote virtue and punish vice; religious 
judges were appointed to rule over Sharia courts; and public punishments and executions 
became commonplace.43 In the words of Luay Ali Hussein, a Shi’a civilian from Fallujah:
Foreign fighters began to drift into the city as things got tenser, Yemenis, Saudis, Moroccans, 
Palestinians, Syrians, Lebanese . . . thousands of them. They took over the whole city. . . . The 
foreigners were uneducated and had weird ideas about religion, like they had been brainwashed 
by fanatics. They forbid smoking, for example. Anyone caught with a cigarette would have his 
fingers chopped off. They would not allow vegetable sellers to display cucumbers and tomatoes 
next to each other, because they considered that too erotic . . . they would put underwear on sheep. 
They apparently thought it was against Islam to allow a female animal to expose her genitals.44
Implementing Zarqawi’s sectarian agenda, the jihadists began to intimidate and kill 
Shi’a civilians in Fallujah. “I never had any troubles being a Shi’a in Fallujah during all 
my years there,” Luay Ali Hussein explained later. “And in the early days of the resis-
tance, Iraqi Shi’a and Sunnis were working together just fine. But as the foreigners began 
to take over, Shi’a like me were pushed to the side . . . [and] eventually threatened by 
these outsiders.”45 After Sunni jihadists executed several of his Shi’a friends, Hussein fled 
to Baghdad and joined JAM, never to return to Fallujah. By September, the I MEF staff 
headquartered just outside Fallujah had clearly recognized this metastasis and character-
ized the city as “a safe haven for foreign fighters, terrorists, and insurgents, a cancer on 
the rest of Anbar Province.”46
The Politics of the Fallujah Operation
Mindful that political pressure had halted the April 2004 assault on Fallujah, coalition 
leaders in late 2004 were determined to lay a better political groundwork with their Iraqi 
Government counterparts ahead of the November operation. Paired with Negroponte, 
Casey began working to persuade Allawi of the need to retake the city. “[We have to] 
start together, stay together, finish together,” Casey recalled telling Allawi. “If we start 
this, you’ve got to commit to me that you’ll have the political support to finish it.”47 As 
part of his end of the bargain, Allawi delivered a series of emergency decrees to facilitate 
operations in Fallujah, including a mid-September edict that disbanded the Fallujah Bri-
gade and the city’s police force to simplify the identification of enemy fighters and avoid 
the optic of coalition forces fighting men in Iraqi Government uniforms.48 On November 
7, just before combat operations began, Allawi declared 60 days of emergency rule and a 
traffic ban in the city, as well as the closure of the borders with Syria and Jordan to make 
the arrival of insurgent reinforcements or the escape of insurgent leaders more difficult.49 
The Prime Minister also went on Iraqi television and radio to explain the government’s 
actions.50
Scarred by the information operations failures of the first Battle of Fallujah in April, 
when the media had depicted the fight against insurgents in the city in highly charged 
terms, Metz and other senior leaders made information operations a key component of 
the pending mission. Reporters were embedded with almost all key ground units to facil-
itate reporting that could discredit false insurgent claims of coalition war crimes. Allawi 
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also recognized the importance of the battle of perceptions, and observed to Casey that 
there was “a risk of the impression being given of an impending ‘U.S. invasion’ of Fallu-
jah rather than a combined Iraqi/MNF(I) operation.”51 To counter this idea, Allawi and 
Casey agreed that Arabic media reporters should embed with Iraqi units taking part in 
the operation and an Iraqi general should serve as spokesperson for the operation and be 
the primary conduit to Arabic media outlets.52
One target, in particular, would require special information operations handling. Fal-
lujah’s hospital had been a rich source of insurgent propaganda during the April battle, 
when, as MNC-I Commander Metz explained:
the enemy would use [the hospital] as a safe haven every time we would strike the insurgency. They 
would claim all these atrocities and go to the hospital, and like Baghdad Bob [the Iraqi Minister of 
Information during the invasion], there was Dr. Bob that would just tell of all the atrocities which 
we knew were not true because we could watch the strikes with UAVs and watch the one or two 
people that were taken to the hospital instead of thirty.53
Mindful of the hospital’s importance, coalition commanders developed early plans for 
the 36th Commando Battalion, supported by CJSOTF advisers, to seize the hospital 
during the opening phase of the operation and prevent its use once again by insurgent 
propagandists.
“AL FAJR” in Fallujah
Originally named PHANTOM FURY, the operation to retake Fallujah was renamed 
AL FAJR, Arabic for “new dawn,” at Prime Minister Allawi’s suggestion to emphasize 
that it was a combined Iraqi-coalition operation. In Casey’s conception, the operation was 
meant to secure the approaches to Baghdad and prevent car bomb factories and insur-
gent cells from sabotaging the election in the capital just a few weeks away.
By the time detailed operational planning for AL FAJR began, the senior Marine lead-
ership of MNF-W had changed, with Major General Richard F. Natonski replacing Major 
General James Mattis as commander of the 1st Marine Division and Lieutenant Gen-
eral John F. Sattler replacing Lieutenant General James T. Conway as commander of I 
MEF and MNF-W. Natonski nested his intent for the operation within that of MNC-I: 
to eliminate the insurgent sanctuary, set the conditions for local control, and secure the 
approaches to Baghdad.54 However, Sattler’s greatest concern, as well as the concern of 
MNC-I officers who had been scarred by the premature termination of the first Fallujah 
battle, was in generating sufficient combat power and resources for the operation. Con-
cluding that the upcoming operation would require more than Regimental Combat Team 
(RCT) 1, already assigned to the Fallujah area, Sattler ordered Regimental Combat Team 
7, originally assigned the stretch of the Euphrates Valley from the town of Hit to the 
Syrian border, to consolidate on Fallujah. Meanwhile, at the operational level, Metz and 
MNC-I ordered significant reinforcements to move to eastern Anbar. Mindful that the 
insurgents had cut the coalition’s supply lines in April, MNC-I assigned 2d Brigade, 1st 
Cavalry Division, to MNF-W to protect rear areas and lines of communications around 
Fallujah. MNC-I also committed the corps reserve, a Stryker battalion from Mosul, to 
assist 2d Brigade in establishing a cordon around Fallujah, freeing Natonski and his 
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Marines of the task of protecting their rear area as they focused on the city.55 MNC-I and 
MNF-W also built a massive stockpile of supplies near Fallujah to avoid the logistical 
pressure that had come near to breaking the coalition in April. The stockpiling amounted 
to a rejection of the coalition’s normal Walmart-style “just in time” logistics delivery, but 
as Natonski observed, “Walmart doesn’t have to contend with ambushes or improvised 
explosive devices.”56
Source: U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Corporal Ben Flores, Combat Camera (Released).
Lieutenant General John F. Sattler, Commanding General, I MEF, 
Speaks With Iraqi Army Soldiers at Camp Habbaniyah.57
Other units were drawn from elsewhere in Iraq and outside the theater. The 2d Bat-
talion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, a battalion from the 1st Cavalry Division that had fought 
alongside the Marines during the battle of Najaf, was attached to Regimental Combat 
Team 7, while 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry Regiment, from the 1st Infantry Division in 
MND-NC was attached to RCT 1. The two Army battalions would provide much-needed 
armor capability that had been absent from the April battle, and a battalion of Army field 
artillery would provide additional fire support. In a rare move, British leaders deployed 
the United Kingdom’s Black Watch Battle Group (a battalion task force) from Dhi Qar 
Province to the eastern portion of MNF-W’s sector in north Babil, freeing the RCT 1 units 
there to join the Fallujah battle. However, in a demonstration of the challenges of coali-
tion warfare, moving the battle group required Prime Minister Tony Blair’s approval in a 
process that took nearly 3 weeks.58
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Source: U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Corporal Daniel J. Klein (Released).
Major General Richard F. Natonski, Commanding General, 
 1st Marine Division.59
Also joining MNF-W in Fallujah was the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, CENT-
COM’s theater reserve that had been reconstituted after the commitment of the 11th MEU 
to Najaf. The 24th MEU’s deployment was a short-notice alert that sent it to Iraq by aircraft 
and cargo ships rather than the normal mode of amphibious assault ships. The additional 
Marines went to north Babil Province to allow RCT 1 to concentrate its forces further on 
Fallujah.60 A third MEU, the Okinawa-based 31st, which served as the theater reserve for 
the Pacific Command area of operations, was ordered to deploy rapidly to Iraq to provide 
additional reinforcements for the operation.61 Altogether, the three MEUs provided over 
6,000 additional Marines to MNF-I, more than a full strength Army brigade combat team. 
Finally, six Iraqi battalions assembled to participate in the operation, two of which, the 
36th Commando Battalion and a battalion from the Special Police Commando Brigade, 
had been involved in almost every coalition combat action in 2004.
The operation unfolded in three phases marked by far more deliberate preparations 
than had occurred in April. The first consisted of shaping actions, including air strikes 
and psychological and information operations to confuse the entrenched insurgents 
and kill key leaders. Special operations forces played a key role in this phase, driven, in 
part, by their recognition of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s rise to the top of the insurgency. 
Political anxieties within coalition headquarters and the Iraqi Government, still raw 
from April’s truncated operation, led to a prohibition on ground assault missions into 
the city, so the special operators turned to precision manned and unmanned air strikes 
instead. Obtaining approval for these missions was difficult, as fear of civilian casualties 
led to approval levels that ranged from the MNF-I headquarters to Secretary of Defense 
(SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld, and often targets disappeared before they could be struck. 
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To speed up the approval process, special operators found an innovative way to mini-
mize collateral damage by pairing a Joint Direct Attack Munition guidance system with 
the smallest bomb in the U.S. Air Force inventory and using a completely vertical angle of 
attack to drop the bomb. The result was a weapon that could flatten a single house with 
little damage to nearby buildings. With these changes made, approval authority was del-
egated to special operations forces for most missions, and they worked with the MNF-W 
headquarters to identify and strike key targets that would help in the coming battle.
Information operations also played a critical role in the first phase of the operation as 
the coalition sought to prevent scenes of civilian suffering that were prevalent during the 
April battle. Warned by leaflets and broadcasts of the impending assault on their town, 
the vast majority of Fallujah’s civilian population fled. With the city mostly empty of 
civilians, MNF-W began the second phase of the operation, isolating Fallujah by seizing 
the peninsula, western bridges, and the city’s hospital, while jamming communications 
within the town and cutting off its electricity.62
On the evening of November 8, Marines and Soldiers began the third phase, the actual 
assault of the city, with RCTs 1 and 7 attacking abreast from north to south supported by 
the Army’s 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, and 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry Regiment. 
Concerned that the railroad tracks and high berms on the north side of the city would 
be a barrier to armored vehicles, the assault force breached them, using a combination 
of combat engineers and close air support that included dropping 2,000-pound guided 
bombs, after  which the lead elements entered the outskirts of the city early on the morn-
ing of November 9 (see Map 15).
Coalition analysts had estimated in October that 4,500 hard-core fighters were waiting 
in the city, against which MNF-I had gathered nearly 18,000 Soldiers, Marines, and spe-
cial operators.63 As the coalition troops moved into the city, they faced a well-entrenched 
enemy that had emplaced hundreds of IEDs to disrupt the assault, forcing the attackers 
to move slowly from house to house and block to block in urban fighting reminiscent of 
the Battle of Hue during the Vietnam war. The toll on tactical leaders was high. The 2d 
Battalion, 2d Infantry, lost its command sergeant major, while the company commander 
and executive officer for Company A were both killed, leaving its first sergeant in tem-
porary command. In a show of special operations and conventional force collaboration, 
SEALs integrated their forces with Marine battalions to add momentum to the advance, 
a combination that proved highly successful with SEAL snipers achieving 66 confirmed 
kills during the battle.64
Against this onslaught, the insurgents mounted a fluid defense, organized in small 
groups of three to six men equipped with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades. The 
insurgents originally planned to reposition their forces elsewhere in Anbar and north 
Babil before the battle to be able to open a second front as the coalition began its assault. 
However, the numerous coalition troops dedicated to the cordon around Fallujah trapped 
the insurgents inside the city.65 The strength of the cordon and the speed at which it 
appeared surprised the insurgent leaders, who had expected a weak perimeter around 
the city similar to the one the coalition had emplaced during the April battle. Yet, while 
the cordon prevented the opening of a second front, it was not airtight, and Zarqawi, 
Janabi, and several other Mujahideen Shura Council leaders escaped on November 8.
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Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.
Map 15. Operation AL FAJR:  Second Battle of Al Fallujah, November 2004.
As the main effort of the coalition assault, RCT 1 and 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, attacked 
the western portion of the city, which included the densely packed Jolan district; while 
RCT 7 and 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry, mounted a supporting strike in the eastern portion. 
With their M1 tanks and M2 Bradley fighting vehicles, the Army battalions proved to be 
much quicker at clearing terrain than the Marine commanders had expected, arriving at 
Highway 10, the city’s main east-west road, which coalition planners had named Phase 
Line Fran, by 2200 on November 9.66 The rapid advance led MNF-W to scrap its initial 
plan for RCT 7 to pivot west to clear the area south of Highway 10 alone, while RCT 1 
consolidated north of the highway.67 Instead, on November 11, RCT 1 continued clearing 
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south, shoulder to shoulder with RCT 7. As the insurgents’ operating space contracted, 
their fighting cells grew in size, sometimes reaching 50 fighters, many of whom chose 
to fight to the death rather than flee.68 Meanwhile, though MNF-W had hoped that the 
rebuilt Iraqi Army units would independently mop up insurgents that had remained 
behind in the northern part of the city, the Iraqi units proved unequal to that task, forc-
ing each RCT to leave a full Marine battalion north of the highway to do the job.69 By 
November 13, MNF-W had crushed virtually all organized resistance, but fighting would 
continue for weeks as small cells of insurgents who had remained behind were gradually 
rooted out in sustained search and attack missions.
The Fall of Mosul
As the assault on Fallujah proceeded, the coalition was unexpectedly spared the 
worldwide attention that had undermined the April 2004 operation. The sudden death 
of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat on November 11 dominated the Arabic-language 
airwaves and distracted the Arab world and much of the international media from the 
events in Fallujah. Perceiving that the coalition had been given a window of opportu-
nity in information operations, Casey pressed Sattler to take advantage by accelerating 
the operation, telling the MNF-W commander, “we’ve got to get this over before they 
put Yasser in the ground.”70 Despite the relative dearth of international attention, how-
ever, the battle in Fallujah was sending shockwaves through Iraq and, as it had done in 
April, spilling over into fighting elsewhere. In Hadithah, soon after RCT 7 had left its area 
of operations, insurgents seized control and executed the town’s police force on a local 
soccer field, sending a warning to tribes in Anbar that cooperating with U.S. troops was 
cause for severe punishment.71
The most significant spillover was hundreds of kilometers away in Ninawa Province. 
On November 10, fewer than 48 hours after U.S. troops began their assault on Fallujah, 
fighters from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s organization and other Sunni insurgent groups 
mounted a coordinated attack on Mosul, taking advantage of the coalition’s economy of 
force posture there. The attack led to the shocking collapse of Mosul’s government secu-
rity forces within 24 hours.
Though the fall of Mosul happened quickly, it had been months in the making. In 
the time since Brigadier General Carter F. Ham’s Task Force Olympia had replaced then 
Major General David H. Petraeus’s much larger 101st Airborne Division in early 2004, 
Sunni insurgents had realized that Ninawa Province was an economy of force area for 
the coalition and had begun to flow on the path of least resistance toward Mosul. Facing 
insurgent threats, Ninawa’s police forces became reluctant to investigate the insurgent 
activity. Mosul University, to which the United States had contributed $3 million, fell 
under the control of fundamentalist Sunnis who imposed gender segregation and banned 
coalition force visits. Intimidation hollowed out Iraqi Army units, with one Iraqi National 
Guard battalion experiencing 100 percent turnover in 2 months due to soldiers being 
absent without leave, and another battalion losing its commander when he resigned 
under threat.72 By midsummer 2004, Zarqawi’s fighters, Ansar al-Islam, and other insur-
gent groups had taken control of the strategic city of Tel Afar, about 80 kilometers west 
of Mosul astride the main highway to Syria.
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As Tel Afar became a staging base for foreign fighters entering from Syria, Task Force 
Olympia had mounted an operation to retake the city of 200,000 people. In September 
2004’s Operation BLACK TYPHOON, the 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division (Stryker), 
cleared Tel Afar in a difficult battle resembling the April 2004 operation in Fallujah. The 
intense fighting resulted in 102 insurgent deaths, the destruction of a portion of the city, 
and the exodus of almost half of the population.73 The level of destruction stoked interna-
tional and local discontent, with the Turkish Government accusing U.S. forces of killing 
58 Turkoman civilians during the operation.74 Despite the operation’s costs, once it had 
ended, the thinly stretched U.S. brigade had withdrawn from the city to a base 10 kilome-
ters away, allowing Zarqawi’s jihadists and other insurgents to reestablish themselves.
By mid-October, Ham recognized that his command was in grave danger. On October 
18, he sent an urgent warning to Metz, the MNC-I commander, that Mosul could fall to 
insurgents at any moment if the coalition did not take immediate action.75 However, with 
all available forces committed to Fallujah, including CENTCOM’s theater reserve, Metz 
had no troops to provide. On October 29, Ham again signaled his concerns, this time 
briefing Casey that “the point of collapse is very near. . . . Mosul, the leading city in the 
north, is in jeopardy of being lost to Anti-Iraqi Forces’ control due to neglect by the Iraqi 
Interim Government.”76
Thus the Sunni insurgents’ assault on Mosul on November 10 had been neither a 
hasty target of opportunity nor entirely unexpected. As AL FAJR’s lengthy shaping 
operations unfolded and coalition troops massed around Fallujah, Zarqawi and other 
insurgent commanders had exploited the light coalition footprint in Mosul to deliver a 
counterpunch and relieve pressure from their fellow insurgents in Fallujah. Interroga-
tions later revealed that the insurgents had decided to focus on Mosul out of a belief that 
“they couldn’t stop things in Baghdad or disrupt the election significantly, because there 
were seven or eight brigades in Baghdad [but] there was [only] one brigade up north.”77
On November 10, the Sunni insurgents quickly overran much of Mosul and recap-
tured Tel Afar, ransacking and burning government buildings and seizing five of Mosul’s 
Tigris River bridges. Mosul’s security forces, which the coalition had been training for 
nearly a year, disintegrated as insurgents moved from one police station to the next, 
demanding the surrender of the police at each station, and seizing their weapons and 
equipment. After only 2 days of fighting, an active insurgent force of 400-500 with a sup-
port base of 2,000-2,500 had driven 80 percent of the city’s 4,000 police officers from their 
posts, leaving about 35 stations unmanned or destroyed.78 Following reports that some 
of the police officers had supported the insurgents’ assault, the Iraqi Government fired 
Mosul’s police chief, Brigadier General Mohammed Barhawi.79 Ham later recalled, “We 
did in fact lose control.”80
The fall of Mosul forced MNC-I to scramble to turn back the insurgent counterattack. 
Responding with operational-level maneuver again to reposition his scarce resources, 
Metz directed his corps reserve, the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry Regiment (Stryker), to 
leave the cordon around Fallujah and return to Mosul—from which it had come just 
days before—within 72 hours.81 After this move, however, MNC-I did not reconstitute its 
corps reserve because there was not an uncommitted maneuver unit in the entire theater. 
With no other coalition units immediately available, commanders instead committed two 
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of the Iraqi Interior Ministry’s Special Police Commando Battalions, paramilitary units 
with a mission similar to that of the Italian Carabinieri.
The battle to retake Mosul would last nearly a week. Given the initial confusion, the 
two U.S. battalions in Mosul, 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment, and 3d Battalion, 21st 
Infantry Regiment, first had to determine which police stations had fallen and which 
were still held by the Iraqi security forces.82 By November 13, the two units had gained 
a better understanding of the insurgent situation and began conducting battalion-level 
clearing operations, with 1st Battalion in west Mosul, and 3d Battalion in east Mosul as 
the commandos helped recapture police stations throughout the city.83 Equipped as light 
infantry, the Iraqi police commandos rode into battle in unarmored pickup trucks pro-
vided by MNSTC-I and quickly ran into trouble in west Mosul. On their way to rescue 
Iraqi police trapped in the Four West police station on November 14, a quick reaction 
force of Iraqi commandos and their U.S. adviser, Colonel James H. Coffman, were encir-
cled and almost overrun. Nearly out of ammunition and surrounded by 60 wounded 
and dead Iraqi commandos,84 Coffman rallied the Iraqis to beat back several attacks until 
U.S. Strykers arrived, actions for which Coffman would receive the Distinguished Ser-
vice Cross.85 Four Americans died during the battles to clear the city, compared to 71 
insurgents confirmed killed.86 While insurgents no longer controlled the terrain outright, 
intermittent fighting would continue in Mosul through the end of December 2004.
The Marez Dining Facility Bombing and the Combat Outpost Tampa Attack
To restore sufficient order in Mosul to allow the January 2005 elections to proceed 
there, MNC-I committed three additional infantry battalions to MNB-NW, one each from 
the 82d Airborne Division, the 25th Infantry Division, and the Oregon National Guard.87 
After the elections, the units would return to their parent brigade combat teams and 
render Ninawa Province an economy of force once again. Recognizing that this force 
would not be a long-term solution to the challenges of Mosul, Casey requested addi-
tional special operations forces for Ninawa Province. To meet Casey’s request, the special 
operations task force in Iraq grew in size, with the new elements going directly to Mosul. 
There they established a collaborative relationship with the conventional force leaders in 
MNB-NW as had been done in MNF-W. However, the clearing of the city and the arrival 
of the reinforcing troops did not render the Sunni insurgents of Mosul impotent. On 
December 21, an Ansar al Sunna suicide bomber wearing an Iraqi military uniform blew 
himself up in the dining facility at Forward Operating Base Marez, the largest coalition 
base in Mosul. The bombing killed 21, including 14 American Soldiers, and wounded 75, 
making it the most deadly single attack on U.S. troops since the invasion.88
The following week brought another large insurgent attack. In the wake of the Iraqi 
security forces’ collapse in Mosul, 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry, Commander Lieutenant 
Colonel Erik Kurilla, decided to reverse course on MNF-I’s directives to consolidate forces 
and instead established platoon-sized combat outposts throughout west Mosul.89 Regain-
ing footholds in the insurgent-dominated territory was not easy. The battalion fought 
multiple battles during December, culminating in a December 29 assault on Combat 
Outpost Tampa in which a suicide bomber rammed a dump truck filled with artillery 
shells into the base entry point, followed by an assault force of at least 50 insurgents. The 
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outpost’s relief force was ambushed, but after the arrival of close air support and addi-
tional forces, the American troops beat back the attack. During the fighting, the battalion 
suffered 1 Soldier killed and 20 wounded. Kurilla’s men would be awarded 3 Silver Stars 
and 11 Bronze Stars for valor.90
After the December 2004 fighting, insurgent strength in Mosul waned considerably, 
leaving the insurgency incapable of complex attacks within the city limits for most of 
the following year. Nevertheless, the Marez bombing, in particular, had lasting conse-
quences. That the Marez attacker penetrated U.S. facilities in the guise of an Iraqi soldier 
had the undoubtedly intended effect of driving a wedge between American troops and 
their Iraqi security forces counterparts in Mosul. As one officer in the 1st Brigade, 25th 
Infantry Division (Stryker), described it, the attack “caused many U.S. Soldiers to distrust 
the ISF, and by default become less interested in training them, escorting them around 
the battlefield, and integrating them into their mission planning.”91 This newfound mis-
trust led to less interaction between the Iraqi security forces and coalition units, which 
in turn began a downward spiral for some of Mosul’s Iraqi units. “On the flip side,” the 
same officer continued:
. . . the 11th IRA [Iraqi Regular Army Battalion] soldiers felt this distrust from their U.S. counterparts, 
felt the reality of fanatical violence hit extremely close to home, and they began to debate whether 
or not they were truly dedicated to the cause for which they were fighting and dying. Many IRA 
soldiers departed on leave and never returned. Many simply deserted under the cover of darkness. 
. . . By the second week of January 2005, the 11th IRA had only two officers and twenty-one soldiers 
remaining.92
The aftereffects of the highly publicized Marez bombing were felt throughout the 
country. The attack led local coalition commanders in many places to restrict Iraqis’ 
access to coalition facilities, including some that had previously been shared. As a result, 
Iraqi security forces members on many shared bases were no longer allowed to eat in 
the same dining facilities as their coalition counterparts, and units in many areas found 
themselves unable to adhere to the old adage that good military advisers must be willing 
to eat, sleep, and fight alongside the soldiers they are advising.
Sunset of AL FAJR
Back in Fallujah, the elimination of Iraq’s worst insurgent safe haven had come at a 
relatively high cost for U.S. troops, with 57 Marines and 6 Soldiers killed and more than 
600 American troops wounded.93 The original estimate of insurgent strength had been 
relatively accurate, as MNF-I detained 2,052 insurgents during the battle and killed an 
estimated 2,175.94 As a testament to the intensity of the fighting, the November Battle of 
Fallujah, by itself, accounted for a quarter of all insurgents killed by coalition forces in 
2004.95 Information gleaned from captured insurgents yielded surprising insights into 
the insurgency in Anbar. Contrary to coalition officials’ expectations, nearly 60 percent 
of the detainees were married, and a similar percentage had former military experience. 
Most were young, with 62 percent under the age of 30. Also surprisingly, only 7 percent 
claimed to be unemployed, meaning that economic dislocation was not a prime moti-
vator. One-third of those captured were from Ramadi, one-quarter from Fallujah itself, 
and only 6 percent from Baghdad. These characteristics painted a picture of disaffected 
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Sunnis who supported the insurgency part-time principally for political, ideological, or 
religious reasons and only secondarily as a way to supplement their incomes and support 
their families.96 In essence, the data reconfirmed MNF-I’s firmly held belief that they had 
a “Sunni problem.”
At AL FAJR’s end, the coalition found itself in possession of a city full of rubble. The 
level of insurgent resistance throughout the operation meant there was significantly more 
collateral damage in Fallujah than had been the case in Najaf or Samarra. The assaulting 
coalition troops had used 386 close air support strikes and more than 14,000 indirect fire 
rounds against targets around the city.97 More than 60 of the town’s 200 mosques and 
20 percent of its residences were destroyed, with many more homes damaged.98 Four 
months after the operation, only 30 percent of the city’s population had returned.99 As 
coalition and Iraqi troops searched buildings and neighborhoods in the battle’s after-
math, the stunning degree to which Fallujah had become an insurgent sanctuary became 
clear.100 In addition to insurgent fighting positions and bunkers, U.S. troops found 568 
large weapons caches, 24 bomb factories, and 13 command and control nodes spread 
throughout the city. They also discovered torture chambers and sophisticated audio-vi-
sual production facilities used to create insurgent propaganda.101 Insurgents had used 
47 mosques as fighting positions, and, though this action invalidated the mosques’ pro-
tected status under the laws of warfare, jihadist propaganda had highlighted mosque 
damage in inflammatory media releases picked up by some regional media outlets.
The Battle of Fallujah had a significant impact on the insurgency’s leadership. During 
the fighting, coalition troops killed Omar Hadid, Zarqawi’s operations chief—and rival—
who had remained behind in Fallujah to lead the fight. Hadid’s death eliminated Zarqa-
wi’s only native Iraqi competitor for the leadership of Tawhid wal-Jihad, and Zarqawi 
chose to assume Hadid’s duties personally to cement his control over the organization. 
With many other Sunni insurgent groups weakened decisively by their losses in Fallujah, 
Zarqawi and Tawhid wal-Jihad moved to the forefront of the Sunni resistance, a position 
they would not cede for the remainder of the war. Those insurgents who survived the 
battle and managed to slip through the cordon around the city resettled in areas where 
they perceived the coalition was weak, including Ramadi, the Triangle of Death in north 
Babil, Hadithah, and Al Qa’im and other border areas.102 With the influx of fighters from 
Fallujah, Hadithah deteriorated so quickly that by early 2005, insurgents had set up a 
camp to recruit and train replacements for fighters killed in AL FAJR.103
Despite Fallujah’s yearlong history as key insurgent terrain, coalition leaders did not 
leave a large footprint of U.S. forces in the city to take part in holding and reconstructing 
it. Almost as quickly as additional combat power had surged in for AL FAJR, it surged 
back out. All of 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, departed Fallujah less than 1 month 
after the operation concluded, while RCT 7, which had left vast tracts of western Anbar 
uncovered for the battle, returned to its original battle space. The quick reduction of U.S. 
combat power led some of the remaining tactical leaders in Fallujah to fear that the coali-
tion’s gains in the city might be short-lived. Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey R. Chessani, RCT 
1’s operations officer, encapsulated this concern when he wrote to his commander, Col-
onel Michael Shupp, that it was premature to think the insurgency in Fallujah had been 
destroyed:
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Why would higher headquarters want to create a vacuum like this after successfully crushing an 
insurgency that has been a thorn for more than a year? I understand there are other fish to fry in 
Iraq, that we are not the only show. What I do not understand is why higher headquarters would 
not want to ensure there was some semblance of stability in Fallujah before they walked away from 
Fallujah. . . . They are going to walk away thinking they did their part and the smoldering heap of 
rubble that is Fallujah is going to start sparking again because higher headquarters failed to follow 
through with the resources we needed to smother the embers. Then they are going to ask us why 
we let the embers become a fire again.104
The drawdown of combat power in the city, Chessani concluded, amounted to “snatch-
ing defeat from the jaws of victory.”105 However, with just 18 U.S. combat brigades in 
the country and plans to downgrade the number to 13 by March 2005, MNC-I had few 
good options.106 Massing two additional brigades’ worth of combat power in Fallujah 
had already incurred significant operational risk by exposing other areas to insurgent 
counterattack, as the fall of Mosul had illustrated. Chessani was right, and the situation 
in eastern Anbar would see another deterioration in 2005-2006 that would eventually 
require additional clearing operations, but being right mattered little in the absence of 
sufficient troops.
Lessons From the Insurgent Sanctuary Cities
For coalition commanders, the planned operations in Najaf, Samarra, and Fallujah, 
and the unexpected one in Mosul yielded a number of lessons, both good and bad. After 
an initial year of tension between special operators and conventional units over uncoordi-
nated special operations raids and territorial responsibility, Operation AL FAJR brought 
a significant advance in collaboration between the two. Special operations commanders 
attached liaison officers to conventional units and began weekly synchronization meet-
ings with conventional commanders. Discarding past practices, special operations com-
manders decided that maintaining the trust of conventional battle-space owners was 
more important than the results of any single special operations force (SOF) mission, and 
for the first time, SOF commanders began to forgo missions based on battle-space owner 
preference. The relationship between SOF and conventional forces was far from perfect, 
but it had begun moving toward the highly efficient working relationships that would 
prevail later in the war and in Afghanistan.
In tactical terms, Fallujah had also shown the value of armor and mechanized forces 
in urban combat. The Marine infantry units assaulting Fallujah had benefited from the 
support of the tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles in the accompanying Army mecha-
nized battalions, especially during the initial entry into the city and in breaching obstacles 
thereafter.107 The initial MNF-W plan had called for the mechanized battalions simply to 
cordon the city, but as their value became apparent, the Army units played a key role in 
clearing the city.108 The importance of heavy forces in urban environments was an unex-
pected lesson that was validated repeatedly throughout the war. 
In other areas, the coalition’s approaches had not worked as well. While Iraqi troops 
fared better in November than they had in the first Battle of Fallujah, when many had 
refused even to deploy to the city, their combat contributions in Operation AL FAJR were 
once again not as significant as coalition leaders had hoped. With the exception of the 
36th Commando Battalion that cleared insurgent strongpoints in mosques and assaulted 
357
FIGHTING TO THE ELECTIONS, AUGUST-DECEMBER 2004
high-value targets, the remainder of the Iraqi units were used in supporting activities 
such as following behind the American units to conduct searches and process detainees. 
Though MNF-I hailed the Iraqi troops’ contribution, Natonski judged after the battle that 
the Iraqi units were far from standing on their own:
[T]hey [had] no means to communicate from a battalion to a brigade or from a battalion down to a 
company in any distance. Their vehicles, although the units that came down to Fallujah had trucks 
with some armoring on it, . . . are ill equipped. Ultimately to be successful, as an independent 
unit they need to have command and control and be able to exercise as a staff, but they also need 
combat service support. . . . The Iraqi security forces are dependent on us for food and water, 
ammunition and supplies and even health [care].109
Finally, when put to the test, the practice of using a “working operational reserve” 
had simply amounted to creating a risky gap in one area of operations to fill a hole in 
another. MNC-I’s after action review of the Najaf battle noted that “the concept of a 
‘working reserve’ does not provide for rapid employment. The operational reserve can 
deploy faster than 96 hours if it is not committed to missions, but this adds risk to the 
stability of Baghdad.”110 This was a lesson that was repeatedly relearned over the next 2 
years as “working” operational reserves were called on to support emergencies, leaving 
the terrain that they normally covered at risk.
***
The fall 2004 operations in Najaf, Samarra, and Fallujah cleared Shi’a and Sunni mil-
itants from the major insurgent sanctuaries that had threatened to derail the critical Jan-
uary 2005 elections. By December 2004, coalition leaders were generally confident that 
the impending voting could take place, an issue that had been in serious doubt when 
Casey took command the previous summer. Coalition troops had shown that even the 
best-entrenched insurgent groups could not hold terrain in the face of a concerted coali-
tion offensive and that the coalition commanders had greatly improved the integration of 
the most effective Iraqi security forces units into coalition operations. MNF-I had shown 
it could blunt insurgent propaganda and had managed to build a partnership with Iraqi 
political leaders in vital security decision-making. Together these factors exorcised some 
of the demons of April 2004.
Even so, the battles against the insurgent cities had been incomplete, and “the fight to 
the elections” had highlighted some of the coalition’s military limits. Moqtada Sadr and 
his forces had lived to fight another day, while the Sunni insurgency, sensing the coming 
blow on Fallujah, had been able to shift its forces operationally and overrun Mosul, argu-
ably Iraq’s most important Sunni city. The battle in Fallujah had revealed that the coali-
tion’s combat power was spread thin, with no buffer and no real operational reserve. It 
would now be in the hands of Iraqi voters and political parties to determine whether the 
fall’s costly fighting could be parlayed into lasting stability.
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CHAPTER 15
TRANSFORMATION IN A TIME OF WAR, JANUARY-APRIL 2005
By the end of December 2004, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) had successfully 
cleared what its leaders saw as the largest hurdle to the holding of elections on the United 
Nations (UN) timeline. Despite the setback in Mosul, the coalition had neutralized the 
insurgent safe havens, allowing the voting to take place on time with few disruptions. 
The aftermath of the elections was steeped with change. The interim government of Ayad 
Allawi would transition into a lame-duck caretaker as the major political factions entered 
into an intense competition over the premiership.
At the same time, another near-complete rotation of MNF-I’s forces would bring new 
frictions inside the coalition. The Army’s continuation of its planned transformation 
resulted in the deployment to Iraq of National Guard and Reserve forces to an unprece-
dented degree—far beyond the limited operational reserve role for which they had been 
prepared. The coalition also developed a new campaign plan that transformed the mis-
sion in Iraq, changing its focus from defeating the insurgency to the setting of conditions 
for transitioning responsibility to the Iraqi security forces (ISF) and Iraqi Government. In 
the process, MNF-I refocused many coalition units on an advisory mission, a role the U.S. 
military had largely not performed since the Vietnam war.
As coalition forces were transforming, so, too, was the insurgency. Shi’a resistance 
groups, bloodied by nearly a year of costly failed uprisings, were dramatically chang-
ing their organization and operating modes. The Sunni insurgency, reeling from losses 
during the November battles in Fallujah and elsewhere, was also evolving into a new 
threat as Islamist extremist organizations eclipsed militant groups associated with the 
former regime.
All three of these principal groups—coalition, Shi’a insurgency, and Sunni insur-
gency—were responding to the same rapidly changing operating environment, as well as 
to the tempestuous waxing and waning of Iraqi public opinion, with each group attempt-
ing to adapt to the changing conditions faster than its foes.
THE JANUARY 2005 TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS
Securing the Elections
As the elections approached, General George W. Casey, Jr., judged that more combat 
forces would be required to overcome what he expected would be an intense insurgent 
effort to thwart the voting and deal the coalition a decisive political defeat. The poten-
tial threats were great enough that some coalition leaders were concerned the elections 
might not actually occur. MNC-I Commander Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, for 
example, believed that “if there was ever really a time, like the Tet of 1968, the enemy 
would expend all tactical resources for a strategic win, it would [be to] . . . crash the elec-
tion.”1 Casey believed that coalition forces were “operating in a window of vulnerability” 
because of the feebleness of the ISF, Iraq’s economy, and its weak governmental capacity 
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and that terrorists and insurgents would seek to take advantage of that window.2 As a 
result, in late October 2004, Casey requested extensions to the year-long deployment of 
nearly 6,500 Soldiers: a 2-month extension for the entire 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Divi-
sion, in Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B) and a 2-week extension for elements 
of the 1st Infantry Division in Multi-National Division-North Central (MND-NC).3 In 
early December, the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, in MND-NC and Multi-National 
Force-West’s (MNF-W) 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) in Najaf also received 
2-month extensions, increasing the number of extended troops to over 15,000. Along with 
the extended units, two parachute infantry battalions from the division-ready brigade 
of the 82d Airborne Division deployed to Iraq in early December for a 4-month period 
spanning the elections.
The decision to expand the footprint of American Soldiers, which ran counter to the 
core concepts of the campaign plan, was a difficult one for Casey, who worried that the 
additional deployments might cause the Iraqis to question the legitimacy of the Iraqi 
Interim Government. Given the threat to the political process, however, he ultimately 
decided it was a risk worth taking.4 These decisions brought the number of U.S. forces in 
Iraq to over 150,000, the highest level since the invasion.5
The election itself was a complex logistical problem, with more than 6,000 polling sta-
tions and 14 million eligible voters to protect.6 On top of the challenge of such large raw 
numbers, all deliveries of ballots and voting equipment had to be coordinated with mul-
tiple election monitoring organizations to ensure the transparency and legitimacy of the 
vote. The delivery of ballots and equipment left no room for error because a shortage or 
compromise of ballots on election day could have strategic implications. Election support 
activities were sometimes costly. As part of these efforts to secure polling sites, ballots, 
and the overall electoral process, a Marine CH-53 Super Stallion crashed in a sandstorm 
on January 25, killing 31 in what became the coalition’s single largest casualty-producing 
event of the war. The loss of six other Americans in separate incidents on the same day 
also made it the deadliest day for U.S. troops since the start of the war.7
In advance of the elections, both the coalition and the Iraqi authorities took extra 
measures for security. MNC-I directed subordinate units to increase their operations in 
order to kill or capture insurgents who posed a threat to the voting. Information that coa-
lition troops in normal times would not have acted on because of its quality now gener-
ated operations to take as many potential threats off the street as possible and throw the 
insurgency off balance. At the same time, Iraqi Interior Minister Falah Naqib put in place 
tough security measures that included a nighttime curfew, a ban on carrying weapons, 
and driving restrictions that made swaths of the country off limits for vehicles. Iraq’s bor-
ders were also closed on January 29 as an additional measure to prevent foreign fighters 
from infiltrating and disrupting the elections. General Babakir Zebari, the chief of staff 
of the Iraqi Joint Forces, suspended leave for all Iraqi forces from January 25 through 
the elections, a measure that significantly increased the number of Iraqi troops available 
for election security. Because Iraqi soldiers traditionally took 1 week of home leave each 
month, one-quarter of the Iraqi forces would have been off duty on election day without 
Zebari’s order.8
To ensure the physical security of elections and showcase the effectiveness of the ISF, 
two rings of security would surround voting sites. An outer ring of coalition forces would 
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stop any larger-scale attacks, while an inner ring within sight of the actual polling sta-
tions would be comprised exclusively of ISF, thereby putting an Iraqi face on the security 
band that Iraqis would see.
These preparations were for good reasons. In the final weeks leading up to the elec-
tion, Sunni insurgents made concerted efforts to intimidate voters into not participating 
and derail the overall process. On December 30, Ansar al Sunna, the Islamic Army in 
Iraq, and the Mujahideen Army jointly warned Iraqis they faced death as apostates if 
they participated in the elections, after which the entire 700-person electoral commission 
in embattled Mosul promptly resigned.9 The insurgents also continued their attacks on 
political leaders and infrastructure as a way to undermine the legitimacy of the new Iraqi 
Government and derail the electoral process. On January 4, insurgents assassinated the 
governor of Baghdad Province, Ali al-Haidari, the most senior Iraqi official killed in over 
6 months.10 On January 7, insurgents caused a brief nationwide power blackout by attack-
ing transmission lines in Tikrit and the Bayji power plant.11 On January 23, Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi joined the insurgent chorus, calling candidates “demi-idols” and declaring 
those who voted to be kuffar, or apostates, who could be legally killed without penalty. 
Zarqawi also claimed that the elections were a coalition conspiracy to bring the Shi’a to 
power.12 On January 27, the eve of the elections, insurgents blew up a school chosen to be 
a polling station in Baghdad and posted a video of the execution of a candidate on Prime 
Minister Ayad Allawi’s electoral list.13
The Decision Not to Delay the Elections
The biggest threat to successful elections came not from the insurgency, but from 
the political process itself. As election day approached, various Sunni politicians and 
political factions, including Iraqi Interim President Ghazi al-Yawar, approached MNF-I, 
requesting the election be postponed so they could mobilize additional Sunni participa-
tion. Fearing the possibility of a boycott, Sunni leaders had come to realize that the most 
significant pitfall of Iraq’s election was the nationwide single district, single list system. If 
Sunni Arabs boycotted the vote, the single district meant a national Parliament would be 
formed anyway, and Sunnis would be effectively excluded from the process of construct-
ing the new Iraqi constitution, a result with potentially permanent consequences. “This 
election has a unique role of drafting a constitution,” Yawar told reporters. “How can 
you draft a constitution unless all ethnicities, sects, religions, and political ideologies are 
included?”14 By late November, with fighting in Anbar and Ninawa still ongoing, 15 Iraqi 
political parties from across the Sunni Arab and Kurdish political groupings had formally 
requested an election delay. Those urging delay included Interim Prime Minister Allawi, 
who worried that the devastation that had been wrought on Fallujah during Operation 
AL FAJR, a mere 6 weeks before the elections, would deter Sunnis from participating.15
Despite Allawi’s and the Sunnis’ requests, U.S. leaders decided to move ahead with 
the elections as scheduled. In a joint letter to Allawi on November 29, Casey and Ambas-
sador John Negroponte stressed that “a decision to delay the election will unavoidably 
be understood by everyone as military success for the insurgency and a counterbalance 
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to the success of the battle for Fallujah. In other words, having announced that we were 
battling to provide room and space for the election we will in essence be saying that that 
effort has failed, at least for the moment.”16 Postponing the election would also have been 
difficult to sell to Grand Ayatollah Sistani and other Shi’a leaders who were clamoring for 
elections they expected would cement a Shi’a political majority. The letter also noted that 
asking for additional extensions for forces whose deployment had already been extended 
for the elections was extremely difficult. During one MNF-I meeting, Casey had dryly 
opined that an extension should not be granted in hopes that political conditions would 
improve because “rarely does anything in this country get better with time.”17
The Vote and the Boycott
On January 30, election day, many of the senior coalition leaders held their breath 
as polling sites opened, unsure that Iraqis would show up to vote. Ahead of the elec-
tions, several estimates from the intelligence community had predicted that the elections 
simply were not going to be able to happen.18 But despite 108 reported attacks on election 
day against polling stations, roughly 8.5 million Iraqis had voted, a 58 percent turnout.19 
The decision to generate Iraqi troops rapidly to secure the voting paid off. Having been 
trained to the standard that had been decided upon in MNF-I and MNSTC-I’s summer 
2004 baseline review, the Iraqi Army successfully functioned as platoons and held the 
inner cordon around polling sites. Deterred by the Iraqi forces and blunted by Casey’s 
and Metz’s plans, insurgent groups were simply unable to prevent the vote. For the 
American troops who witnessed the voting, the Iraqi population’s bravery in the face 
of insurgent threats was astonishing, as was their determination. Because of the bans on 
driving, many Iraqis walked for miles for the opportunity to vote in their country’s first 
democratically held election in decades.
To a degree, MNF-I’s broader strategy of fighting to the elections had succeeded, and 
at the operational level, the Sunni insurgency was reeling from the loss of its Fallujah 
sanctuary and thousands of fighters. During December 2004, insurgent attacks in Anbar 
fell precipitously to 50 percent of what they had been before Operation AL FAJR, and 
insurgents were unable to mount attacks that would effectively shut down the election.20 
The bans on driving and the national curfew were especially effective, and the attacks 
the Ramadi Shura Council had planned to launch into Baghdad, as well as plans to use 
car bombs against voters in Fallujah, simply could not take place as a result.21
For American Soldiers, the sight of millions of Iraqis voting in the first free elections 
in 54 years was a wonderful, feel-good moment akin to an earlier generation’s liberation 
of Europe. One brigade commander in Baghdad later described the event as “the single 
most professionally inspirational day of my life.”22 The elections produced nearly unbri-
dled optimism among many in the coalition that the campaign plan had been the correct 
path to follow—that the elections had, as coalition leaders described it, “locked in irre-
versible momentum” that gave the Iraqis “an alternative to the insurgency.”23 
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Source: U.S. Marine Corps photo by Staff Sergeant Jim Goodwin (Released).
Iraqi Police Display Their Ink-Stained Fingers to Show That  
They Voted During the Election.24 
In terms of creating a new government, however, the January elections were inconclu-
sive. Allawi’s Iraqi National Accord had clearly lost, garnering only 40 seats representing 
14 percent of the vote, but among the winners, there was no consensus on who would 
replace him as Prime Minister. The United Iraqi Alliance, a Shi’a Islamist grouping that 
had secured the endorsement of Grand Ayatollah Sistani, had clearly won, with 140 
seats and 58 percent of the popular vote, but the group was far from monolithic.25 It was 
an amalgam of various Shi’a Islamist factions: Sistani supporters, the Da’wa Party, the 
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), a handful of smaller parties, 
and even Sadrists who had joined the political process despite Moqtada Sadr’s calls for a 
boycott. Because seating a president and Prime Minister required a two-thirds majority 
of the seats in the National Assembly, the United Iraqi Alliance needed to caucus with 
the coalition of Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Alliance, which had earned 75 seats and 
26 percent of the vote.26 As a result of the fragile alliances within and among the various 
parties that had to be formed, a full 4 months would pass before the parties would agree 
on a new Prime Minister and cabinet. The long negotiation created a significant loss in 
political momentum for the Iraqi Government and an extended lame-duck period for 
Allawi, who, by the time his coalition lost the elections, had governed for just 7 months.
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As Allawi, Interim President Ghazi al-Yawar, and other Sunni leaders had expected, 
millions of Sunni Arabs boycotted the election. Casey’s strategy of clearing seven key 
insurgent-dominated cities had allowed the elections to take place, but they had not cre-
ated an environment that encouraged Sunnis to vote. In Ninawa, voter turnout was only 
17 percent, most of whom were Kurdish voters.27 In all of Sunni-majority Anbar, only 
16,682 Iraqis voted, about 2 percent of registered voters.28 Sunnis boycotted for a variety 
of reasons, some, in a bizarre example of how conspiracy theories can trump reality in 
the Middle East, entered the election period convinced that Sunni Arabs were actually 
a demographic majority in Iraq, and that Saddam Hussein had perpetuated a myth of 
the Shi’a majority as a bogeyman to instill fear among Sunnis and create a rationale for 
his rule.29 Even if they did not vote, many Sunnis believed they would so outnumber the 
Shi’a that the elections would be discredited by their absence, and the Sunnis would then 
naturally win any ensuing sectarian conflict. Others were swayed by calls from insurgent 
leaders for a boycott or were driven off by insurgent threats and intimidation. Still others, 
particularly tribal leaders in Anbar, supported the boycott because they feared elections 
would upend their traditional standing and influence.30
In the weeks after the election, the extent of the Sunnis’ miscalculation became clear. 
Their boycott guaranteed the election spoils would go to Shi’a Islamist and Kurdish 
nationalist parties whose aims were antithetical to those of the Sunnis. Of 275 seats in the 
transitional national assembly that would write their country’s constitution and shep-
herd the country toward independence, Sunni Arabs earned only 16 seats, a dramatic 
underrepresentation.31 Estimated by the UN and the coalition to be roughly 20 percent of 
Iraq’s population, Sunni Arabs would hold just 5 percent of the seats in the assembly. By 
comparison, Turkomans earned 13 seats and Christians earned three seats, even though 
both groups combined made up about 5 percent of Iraq’s population.
When combined with the abuse of mainly Sunni Arab detainees in Abu Ghraib Prison, 
the perceived destruction of Sunni Arab Fallujah just 2 months earlier and intense oper-
ations by coalition special operations forces, Sunnis viewed the election outcome as evi-
dence that the coalition had embarked on an anti-Sunni project. Thus, for many Sunnis, 
instead of a unifying moment for the Iraqi nation, the election was a justification to con-
tinue fighting. As a result, the election outcome had helped sow the seeds for future sec-
tarian conflict, and a core element of MNF-I’s end state for the coalition campaign—that 
the Iraqi Government should be representative of its population—had been thwarted.
On February 3, just 4 days after the elections, Negroponte sent Casey a September 1967 
clipping from The New York Times. In the celebratory post-election atmosphere, the article 
was a caution. “U.S. Encouraged by Vietnam Vote,” the Times headline read. “Officials 
cite 83 percent turnout despite Vietcong terror. United States officials were surprised and 
heartened today at the size of turnout in South Vietnam’s presidential election despite a 
Vietcong terrorist campaign to disrupt the voting.”32 Negroponte’s warning was simple 
and prophetic: there was much work still to be done because successful elections alone 
were no guarantee of democracy and stability.
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Source: DoD photo by R. D. Ward (Released).
General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army (2003-2007).33
The Operational Consequences of Force Transformation
With the stress of the election concluded, U.S. commanders deemed it safe for unit 
redeployments to resume, and U.S. forces began another massive unit rotation. While the 
yearly rotations generally created friction and a loss in momentum, the rotations of 2005 
created particular turbulence because they were the first that involved transformed, or 
modular, units. Because of the late 2003 decision by Chief of Staff of the Army General 
Peter J. Schoomaker to follow through with Army transformation during wartime, the 
institutional Army underwent sweeping change, as did the units it provided for Iraq and 
other operating theaters. Originally begun in the late 1990s, transformation had aimed to 
make the Army leaner, more rapidly deployable, and equipped with the most modern 
technology. However, it was an operationally disruptive process. Even in 1999, a much 
quieter operational period than 2004, Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera had described 
transformation as “changing the wheels while driving at 70 miles an hour.”34
At the center of the transformation was the creation of modular brigade combat teams 
with six battalions of different types, instead of three maneuver battalions of the same 
branch that existed in untransformed, or legacy, brigades. Modularization would stream-
line differences among brigades, and the Army would move from an inventory of 17 
different types of brigades to only 3.35 This change was meant to create flexible units that 
could deploy more rapidly, with all necessary supporting elements already contained 
within the organization. The increased deployability was intended to enable the Army to 
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respond more quickly to conventional threats such as North Korea or to react to contin-
gency operations such as in the Balkans, Panama, and Somalia.
A product of the revolution in military affairs, the modular units would theoreti-
cally enhance their combat power through new weapons systems, better connectivity, 
and improved situational awareness, all of which would supposedly allow for a reduc-
tion in each brigade’s manpower. The transformed brigade combat teams retained only 
two maneuver battalions, but added a smaller reconnaissance, surveillance, and target 
acquisition (RSTA) squadron to replace the third maneuver battalion that legacy brigades 
had. The RSTA squadron had only about half the personnel of a maneuver battalion. It 
was lightly armed, based on the assumption that the unit would not have to fight to gain 
information or use scouts to make contact with the enemy, but would instead detect the 
enemy through sensors deployed by higher-level units.37 This assumption was severely 
tested in Iraq, and the reduction in personnel would prove to be a significant limitation 
in manpower-intensive counterinsurgency operations. The transformed brigades would 
also have their own field artillery battalion, a support battalion, and a special troops bat-
talion that contained military intelligence, engineer, and signal personnel.
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Division headquarters were transformed as well, stripped of many assets that were 
pushed down to the brigade combat teams. The traditional divisional artillery headquar-
ters, military intelligence battalion, and divisional engineer battalion were dissolved. 
Having suffered more casualties from friendly than enemy air power since the end of 
the Korean war, the Army liquidated most air defense units at the division level. While 
pushing intelligence assets down to brigades was helpful in the counterinsurgency fight, 
it would also create challenges: the division headquarters responsible for tracking events 
and synthesizing the enemy picture across multiple brigades in their battle space would 
no longer have some of the assets they had once used for this purpose.
With the notional personnel excess trimmed from brigade combat teams and divisions, 
the Army intended to use the personnel “savings” to grow additional brigades, adding 
one brigade combat team per division. In a sense, the transformational changes were a 
shell game in that the Army’s configuration would change, but its overall strength would 
not. Transformation was also a race against time to meet the demands of the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, measured in brigade combat teams. As the Army transformed more 
divisions, the number of brigade combat teams in the Army inventory would increase. In 
2004, transformation added three brigades to the Army’s roster for potential deployment. 
By the end of 2005, three more were added, and in 2006 another four, for a total of 10 new 
deployable brigade combat teams in 3 years.39
Stresses on the Force
In 2004, as military planners selected the replacement units for the 2005-2006 mass 
rotation of forces as well as the emergency deployment of forces prompted by the April 
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uprisings, the Army only had 34 combat arms brigades in its active component and 39 
in the reserve component.40 Nearly every active unit in the Army had already deployed 
once, and Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald H. Rumsfeld was extremely reluctant 
to approve unit extensions beyond the yearlong standard.41 The Iraq theater requirement 
was 15 brigades; the Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) requirement was two bri-
gades. The combined missions in Kosovo and Bosnia took another brigade combat team; 
and for the standing mission to deter North Korea, the Army preferred to maintain two 
brigade combat teams on the peninsula. The requirements were heavy enough that in 
January 2004, Rumsfeld, who was loath to increase the size of the Army, had agreed to 
use emergency authorities granted by Congress to temporarily exceed the Army end 
strength by 30,000.42
In this context, the Army faced a quandary. Army leaders wanted to continue to trans-
form, but the transformation process would require taking brigades offline from deploy-
ments in order to reorganize them, equip them with new weapons and sensors, and train 
them. Because the Army had run low on available active duty brigades for the 2005 rota-
tion, it had to either postpone transformation or reach deep into the Army inventory 
to deploy active duty and National Guard brigades that did not usually deploy. The 
Army selected the second option, choosing to continue transformation with the hope that 
its perceived long-term advantages would outweigh short-term risks of deploying less 
experienced Guard and active duty brigades. 
Among active brigades, the Army decided to deploy a brigade from the 2d Infantry 
Division in South Korea that had not deployed outside the peninsula since the end of 
the Korean war and had served as a strategic deterrent to North Korea for more than a 
half-century. The 2d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, was typically manned by Soldiers on 
a 1-year tour without their families. Signifying the level of turbulence and change the 
Army was experiencing, during 2004, all Army personnel in Korea were given the option 
to extend for an additional year in exchange for a bonus payment. Nearly 8,000 personnel 
had taken the bonus, including many in the 2d Brigade.43 Thus, when the brigade was 
notified that it would deploy to Iraq for an additional year, it meant that some Soldiers 
would live apart from their families for nearly 3 years.44 
Another unusual brigade-size unit that would deploy to Iraq in 2005 was the 11th 
Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), which served as the opposing force (OPFOR) at the 
Army’s National Training Center in California. When the regiment received its deploy-
ment order, it had significant equipment shortages because its principal mission was to 
operate replicas of Soviet-style weapons in war games against U.S. units, a fact that regi-
mental leaders had trouble making staffers at higher echelons understand.
I had more OPFOR surrogate vehicles than I had [M1] tanks, Bradleys, M4 [rifles], you name it, 
and as we began the process of getting ready to deploy the regiment, I had staffers at Headquarters 
DA [Department of the Army] and FORSCOM [U.S. Army Forces Command], when we would 
send requests for equipment, say, ‘Why are you guys calling us? . . . You guys already have all this 
stuff.’45 
While both the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 2d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, 
were technically capable of deploying in the event of contingencies, few had expected 
such a situation would ever arise.
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By 2005, the Army’s rotation policies were having other important effects on the active 
force as well. In 2005, the Army continued to use brigade combat teams as its primary 
means of measuring “dwell time” between deployments to ensure that repeated rota-
tions did not exhaust units and personnel, but this method did not accurately capture the 
strain on individual Soldiers. Since Army policy required that deploying brigade combat 
teams should have a full complement of personnel, all too often Soldiers returning from 
one deployment were transferred to an organization that was about to begin another, and 
would thus find themselves back in Iraq mere months after they had left. This challenge 
was especially true in low-density specialties such as interrogators, Arabic linguists, 
unmanned aerial vehicle personnel, and military police, among others.
Army leaders did not make these decisions capriciously, but because they were the 
least bad of the available options given the capped end strength of the Army. Units had 
to deploy with sufficient combat power to ensure they could accomplish their mission, 
and sacrifices had to be made. For this reason, on June 3, 2004, the Army issued a stop-
loss order preventing Soldiers in units deploying within 90 days from retiring or leaving 
the service.46 The same month, the Army announced that it would involuntarily recall to 
active service up to 5,600 members of the Individual Ready Reserve to help fill critical 
specialties and requirements.47 
Committing the National Guard
Recognizing the Army’s dilemma in managing transformation and combat deploy-
ments simultaneously—the very kind of issue for which Casey had once been respon-
sible as the Army’s vice chief of staff—Casey accepted the Army’s plan to deploy eight 
National Guard brigades for the 2005-2006 MNF-I rotations. “We had to use the National 
Guard Brigades [in 2005] so that the next iteration of brigades that came in [would be] 
fully modularly converted,” Casey later recalled. “[It gave] the regular Army the breath-
ing space to convert the modular brigades so that when they came over they were more 
capable than the ones that had been there.”48 
The concept of using National Guard brigades as part of a limited operational reserve 
had been part of a national military strategy for decades. After the Vietnam war, then-
Chief of Staff of the Army General Creighton Abrams established a Total Force concept 
that moved large numbers of the Army’s combat service support units into the Army 
Reserve and National Guard, thereby ensuring that any large-scale military commitment 
would require a national mobilization of the reserve component. Likewise, the National 
Guard would also contribute combat units to the Total Force in the form of round-out 
brigades that were assigned to mobilize and deploy with active duty divisions, thereby 
bringing those divisions up to full strength. However, when the concept of round-out bri-
gades was tested during the mobilization of Army forces for Operation DESERT STORM, 
it failed, with none of the three activated round-out brigades receiving a certification that 
they were ready for combat.49 
With the end of the Cold War bringing a reduction in the Army’s active component 
from 18 divisions to 10, correcting the flaws of the round-out system became crucial. In 
its place, the Army established a new program that created 15 enhanced separate bri-
gades (ESB) in the National Guard. These brigades were the Guard’s highest priority 
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combat units, receiving additional resources, training, and personnel to make them ready 
to deploy to a combat zone within 90 days of mobilization.50 Nearly all of the National 
Guard brigades that deployed to Iraq in 2005 and 2006 would come from this pool of 
enhanced separate brigades. Even though enhanced Guard brigades were an important 
component of the U.S. national security strategy, conventional wisdom held that they 
would be used similarly to their round-out predecessors, with a brigade or two deploy-
ing at a time to fill operational requirements. There had been little expectation that they 
would be deployed en masse, eight brigades in 1 year.
This decision to deploy nearly three divisions’ worth of National Guard brigades 
during the same rotation would have a substantial operational impact. By March 2005, 
there were 69,147 Guardsmen in Iraq, making up nearly half of MNF-I’s total strength.51 
With transformation in progress among the Army’s active division headquarters, the 42d 
Infantry Division from the New York National Guard was activated to serve as an MND 
headquarters, becoming the first National Guard division to deploy into combat since 
the Korean war and the first to command regular Army brigades.52 To help synchronize 
the division’s efforts as it assumed battle space in Iraq, the Army assigned an active duty 
brigadier general as one of the assistant division commanders and sprinkled active duty 
personnel throughout the division’s staff.53 
Casey left most of the complex political and tactical issues associated with where to 
assign the National Guard brigades to the MNC-I commander, though he did monitor 
their locations. “[W]e put them in places that were not necessarily the highest risk places,” 
he recalled later. “Good commanders put their good guys in the tough spots and the less 
good guys in the other spots. In my mind I knew that I was not going to get quite the 
capability out of [the National Guard units] as I got out of some of the others, but I did 
not think it was going to be a lot different.”54 
Major General Peter Chiarelli, the MND-B commander who would see his 2d Brigade 
replaced by the 256th Brigade from the Louisiana National Guard at the end of 2004, 
saw a similar gap. He assessed that the incoming Guard brigade was “less capable based 
on force structure and equipment” and was 6 months away from being as well trained 
as an active duty brigade.55 Metz, meanwhile, recalled that, for his tenure as MNC-I 
commander:
(Major) General John Batiste (of the 1st Infantry Division) . . . put the 30th Separate Brigade (North 
Carolina National Guard), in a province that wasn’t as tough of a province, but nonetheless needed 
those troops to task. . . . General Chiarelli (of the 1st Cavalry Division) didn’t have the option in 
Baghdad. He had to give a part of the city to the 39th Brigade out of Arkansas, and they just had to 
step up to the plate. Were they as good as the Blackjack Brigade (2d BCT, 1st Cavalry Division) on 
day 1? Probably not. Were they as good when they left? Probably so.56 
Several of the National Guard brigades were not assigned their own area of operations, 
but instead had their subunits detached to augment other brigades or were assigned the-
ater security missions. In only one case among the 2005 unit rotations did Casey become 
directly involved in emplacing a National Guard brigade. When MNC-I assigned the 2d 
Brigade, 28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania National Guard, to the insurgent strong-
hold of Ramadi, a skeptical Casey advised MNC-I to change the decision. “I went back 
. . . probably two or three times . . . and said you really have to figure a different place for 
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the [2d BCT, 28th Infantry Division] Brigade. Putting them in Ramadi is not setting them 
up for success,” he recounted.57 Regimental Combat Team (RCT) 8, a Marine unit whose 
battle space was adjacent to the area of operations that 2d Brigade, 28th Infantry Division, 
Pennsylvania National Guard, would be assuming, shared Casey’s concerns that Ramadi 
might be beyond the abilities of the National Guard unit. “[The] 2/28 IN (Pennsylvania 
ARNG [Army National Guard]) is going to one of our worst areas, replacing 2/2 BCT, 
one of the Army’s best units,” RCT 8 leaders reported to MNF-I counterparts, adding that 
the assignment was “a recipe for disaster.”58 
One difference in capabilities between National Guard brigades and their regu-
lar Army counterparts was that, despite the ESB initiative, many National Guard units 
lacked the same modern equipment. While the Army had fielded the upgraded Family 
of Medium Tactical Vehicles in the 1990s, the workhorse vehicle of the National Guard 
wheeled fleet remained the antiquated “deuce and a half,” or 2½-ton truck, a vehicle so 
old that the last one had rolled off the production line in 1977.59 An even more significant 
disparity was the National Guard units’ shortage of armored vehicles, a problem that had 
bedeviled the coalition from the start of the war. By December 2004, the Army only had 
69 percent of the armored or hardened vehicles that it needed in Iraq, and for National 
Guard units the shortfall was even more acute.60 
The issue of insufficient armor protection for many of the deploying National Guard 
units came to a head when Rumsfeld visited National Guard Soldiers in Kuwait who 
were preparing to move into Iraq. During an December 8, 2004, meeting at which the 
SECDEF took questions from Soldiers, Specialist Thomas Wilson of the Tennessee 
National Guard’s 278th Regimental Combat Team complained that members of his unit 
had to “scrounge through local landfills for pieces of rusty scrap metal and bulletproof 
glass—what they called hillbilly armor—to bolt on to their trucks for protection against 
roadside bombs in Iraq.”61 The situation was so dire that Lieutenant Colonel John Zim-
merman, the 278th Regimental Combat Team’s staff judge advocate, noted that 95 per-
cent of the unit’s trucks had insufficient armor and that the regiment had been provided 
70 tons of steel plates to bolt or weld on in order to compensate. To these complaints the 
SECDEF responded, “You go to war with the army you have, not the army you might 
want or wish to have at a later time.”62 
The Unit Exodus of 2005
After the January elections, the new coalition units began to arrive in Iraq and assume 
responsibility for battle space. III Corps, which formed the MNC-I headquarters, was 
replaced by XVIII Airborne Corps from Fort Bragg, NC, and III Corps Commander Metz 
handed command of MNC-I to XVIII Airborne Corps Commander Lieutenant General 
John R. Vines on February 10. Vines was an infantry officer who had spent almost his 
entire career in Airborne or Ranger units and had parachuted into Panama during the 
1989 invasion. More importantly, he had commanded all U.S. and coalition forces in 
Afghanistan in 2003.
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Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.
Map 16. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: 2004-2005 Transitions, January-March 2005.
In mid-February, Multi-National Brigade–Northwest’s (MNB-NW) headquarters, 
Task Force Olympia, made up of personnel from I Corps, was replaced by Task Force 
Freedom, comprised of personnel from the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Task Force 
Olympia’s only major maneuver element, the 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division (Stryker), 
had been replaced by the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Stryker), in mid-October 
2004. Some of the original mistakes in the creation of Task Force Olympia were cor-
rected during this transition. While the amount of combat power was not increased, 
and MNB-NW remained an economy of force operation, the task force commander was 
upgraded to a two-star position and filled by Major General David M. Rodriguez. The 
shortage of headquarters personnel was also addressed by the addition of nearly 150 Sol-
diers, including 50 military intelligence specialists to help piece together the intelligence 
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picture across Ninawa Province. Unfortunately, 
since the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was 
a regimental headquarters performing the 
functions of a division headquarters, almost 
all of the additional personnel were individual 
augmentees pulled from units across Iraq and 
across the Army, some without the requisite 
position specialty or experience (see Map 16).63 
In MND-NC, the 1st Infantry Division was 
replaced by Major General Joseph J. Taluto’s 
42d Infantry Division, the National Guard unit 
from New York. The 42d Infantry Division 
itself was a patchwork, with two active duty 
brigades from the 3d Infantry Division as well 
as the 278th Regimental Combat Team from the 
Tennessee National Guard and the 116th Cav-
alry Brigade from the Idaho National Guard.
The Marines in MNF-W rotated later than 
the Army forces, mostly in March. I MEF and 
Lieutenant General John F. Sattler handed over 
responsibility to Major General Stephen John-
son, deputy commander of II MEF. With the 
MNC-I commander as a three-star general, the 
Marine Corps had decided to make the senior 
Marine in Iraq equal in rank to the other MNDs.65 The Marines considered consolidat-
ing the MEF and Marine Division headquarters but ultimately decided to retain the two 
organizations. Below the MEF headquarters, now identified as II MEF (Forward), Major 
General Richard A. Huck’s 2d Marine Division replaced Major General Richard F. Naton-
ski’s 1st Marine Division. The 2d Marine Division brought with it two regimental combat 
teams from Camp Lejeune, RCT 2 and RCT 8, to replace RCT 1 and RCT 7, respectively.
In Baghdad, the 1st Cavalry Division was replaced by the 3d Infantry Division under 
Major General William “Fuzzy” Webster. Webster’s division was assigned one less bri-
gade combat team than the 1st Cavalry Division, but nearly double the territory, since 
MND-B’s area expanded to include part of the area formerly controlled by the Spanish 
brigade in Multi-National Division–Central South (MND-CS).66
The Sgrena Incident
In Multi-National Division-Southeast (MND-SE), a single incident prompted the final 
withdrawal of the Italian contingent and the creation of another brigade-sized hole in the 
fragile southern sector. On March 4, 2005, agents from the Italian Military Intelligence 
Service obtained the release of Giuliana Sgrena, an Italian journalist who had been kid-
napped by insurgents and held for ransom for a month. In the immediate aftermath of 
her release, the Italian agents transporting her to the Baghdad airport came upon a traf-
fic control point manned by troops of 1st Battalion, 69th Infantry, a New York National 
Guard unit. The Italians had not coordinated their mission and route with MNF-I or any 
Source: U.S. Army photo by Sergeant Michael 
J. Carden, Multi-National Corps Iraq  
Public Affairs (Released).
Lieutenant General John R. Vines, 
Commanding General,  
XVIII Airborne Corps/MNC-I.64
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other coalition elements, and as the vehicle carrying Sgrena sped toward the checkpoint, 
the New York Soldiers on duty gave warnings from a spotlight and a green laser.67 Fear-
ing the Italians’ vehicle was a car bomb when it did not react to the warnings, the Amer-
ican Soldiers fired at the vehicle, wounding Sgrena and one Italian agent while killing 
another, Major General Nicola Calipari.
Coming after the 2003 Nasiriyah bombing that had killed 19 Italians, the Sgrena 
shooting caused the collapse of Italian popular support for the Iraq mission. Less than 
2 weeks after the incident, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi announced that Italy 
would withdraw its 3,000 soldiers, the fourth largest coalition contingent at the time.68 
The Netherlands, Poland, and Ukraine, facing similar domestic pressure, also announced 
they would leave the coalition.
Arrival of the Transformed Units
As the units of the third rotation of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) arrived in Iraq 
in early 2005, the 3d Infantry Division typified the challenges of transforming the Army 
in the midst of war. Having redeployed to Fort Stewart, GA, in September 2003 after 
being the main effort of the invasion force, the division was chosen to return to Iraq as 
part of the troop rotation that would occur in early 2005. Because its equipment had been 
left in Iraq in 2003 to be reused by the units replacing it, the division had arrived home 
with only 10 percent of its reportable equipment, much of which had to be sent to main-
tenance depots to be refurbished. This shortage made training difficult and forced unit 
leaders to become creative to prepare the division for war a second time. “We had to go 
back to doing . . . something from the 1920s, establishing pools of equipment that would 
be handed off from company to company as they went out to train,” Webster recalled.69 
One unit even used golf carts from the Fort Stewart golf course to practice mounted 
maneuver and convoy operations because they had no combat vehicles.
At the same time, the division faced these training challenges, Army leaders decided 
to make it the first “modular division” and instructed Webster to reorganize his units. 
“Figure out how to find four or five brigades out of the three that you have now,” Chief of 
Staff of the Army General Schoomaker told Webster, adding that the new brigades should 
be “sustainable by themselves and capable of plugging in and deploying with any divi-
sion headquarters.”70 The smaller modular brigades were outfitted with new technology 
designed to improve their tracking of both friendly and enemy forces, along with new 
equipment designed to make the brigades more capable than legacy brigades. As Web-
ster realigned battalions to grow the additional brigade, he was only able to apportion to 
each brigade two maneuver battalions, but Schoomaker believed the loss of the third bat-
talion could be mitigated by the improved capability of each brigade. Schoomaker also 
assumed that if two maneuver battalions were insufficient in a brigade combat team’s 
area of operations, the theater commander could take a battalion from elsewhere in the-
ater and strengthen the main effort.71 Unfortunately, this assumption ran headlong into 
the widespread shortage of forces that already existed across Iraq, and maneuver com-
manders across the country were feeling starved of combat power.
When the 3d Infantry Division deployed to Iraq, the concept of brigade modularity 
was tested immediately. MNC-I assigned two of the division’s brigades to the 42d Infantry 
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Division in MND-NC, while the 3d Infantry Division, assigned to MND-B, would retain 
two of its own brigades, but receive the 256th Brigade of the Louisiana National Guard; 
the 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division; the 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division; and later 
the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment. The “plug-and-play” nature of the modularized, or 
transformed, brigade combat teams created additional challenges. Often the division 
headquarters had not worked or trained with the brigades assigned to them in Iraq. For 
many units, the critical component of mission command, that commanders should be 
intimately familiar with their subordinate leaders and vice versa, was simply not in place.
As legacy brigades were replaced by transformed brigades and vice versa, operational 
leaders began to observe important differences in capability. Because of their diminished 
manpower, transformed brigades that replaced legacy brigades often had difficulties cov-
ering the same battle space. The RSTA squadrons created the most problems. As Webster 
realized in Baghdad, they were:
too light and too small for the kind of fight we were in. They were not capable of independently 
gathering reconnaissance and surveillance information for us and they were not capable of 
conducting security operations by themselves. So, it caused us to change. In the case of each 
brigade, we had to change the size of the piece of ground that we gave them and the number of 
tasks that we gave them had to be reduced because the recon and surveillance organizations were 
smaller than the battalions or squadrons that they replaced.72
To add to the newly arriving brigade combat teams’ challenges, many were broken 
up as they arrived, with some of their battalions detached to perform different missions. 
The idea that brigades were modular and interchangeable began to extend in practice to 
battalions, which Army leaders had not intended to be plug-and-play organizations that 
could be assigned to different brigade headquarters without any impact on their effective-
ness. The 11th ACR illustrated this new trend, as its subordinate battalions were chopped 
away from the regiment to perform three different missions in Iraq. The regimental head-
quarters served as the backbone of MNB-NW, replacing Task Force Olympia, but the 
regiment’s 1st Squadron was assigned to the 3d Infantry Division in Baghdad, and the 2d 
Squadron rounded out the Mississippi National Guard’s 155th Brigade Combat Team in 
north Babil. The breaking up of unit cohesion and the familiarity of unit leaders created 
significant problems with retention, casualty notification, and the process of ordering 
replacements, as well as with other more subjective measures of performance.73
As the transformed brigade combat teams were broken up and their battalions reas-
signed to other brigades to meet the needs of the battlefield, transformed battalions with 
their enhanced connectivity and command-and-control capabilities were often teamed 
with legacy units that did not have the additional technology and situational awareness, 
effectively negating some of the transformational capabilities. The transformed brigades, 
likewise, suffered growing pains as some commanders who had spent their careers in 
armor or infantry units now had an organic artillery battalion and other support units 
they were responsible for training in peacetime and employing during wartime.
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Table 3. Comparison of Legacy, Transformed, and Stryker BCTs.74 
Over time, many MND commanders came to favor the legacy brigade combat teams 
for their manpower instead of the transformed brigades. Stryker brigades were simi-
larly in high demand because they had three maneuver battalions, like legacy brigades, 
but also an additional RSTA squadron, giving them a total of 757 more Soldiers than a 
transformed brigade. The Stryker 
brigades also had other enhanced 
capabilities, such as better situ-
ational awareness, more human 
intelligence specialists, and addi-
tional unmanned aerial vehicles. 
Stryker vehicles earned respect 
because they were survivable, 
quiet, and fast, with tremendous 
tactical and operational maneu-
verability. Strykers could main-
tain a speed of 60 miles an hour, 
and some Strykers traveled more 
than 88,000 kilometers in a year-
long deployment.75 At the tactical 
level, the Strykers carried an entire 
squad of infantry, 11 Soldiers, far 
more than in Bradley Fighting 
Vehicles and up-armored High 
Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled 
Vehicles (HMMWV).76 In terms 
of both troop strength and capa-
bility, in the manpower-intensive 
counterinsurgency fight, Stryker 
brigades received almost universal 
acclaim.
Table 3—comParison of legacy, Transformed, and sTryker bcTs
 
Legacy 
Mechanized 
Infantry BCT
Transformed 
Infantry 
BCT
Stryker 
BCT
Difference  
Between Stryker 
& Transformed 
BCT
Difference  
Between Legacy & 
Transformed BCT
Total (with HHC, BSTB, 
and BSB) 4,321 3,496 4,253 757 825
Maneuver Bn Total 2,171 1,392 2,082 690 779
RSTA SQD NA 402 416 14 NA
FA Bn 734 296 400 104 438
Battle Space Owning 
Forces (Maneuver, RSTA, 
and FA Bns)
2,905 2,090 2,898 808 815
 Source: Fort Knox Supplemental Manual (FKSM) 71–8, Armor/Cavalry Reference Data, Brigade Combat Team, pp. 11, 68, 122,  
accessed 18 March 2015, http://addons.ofcra.org/Documents_OFCRA/FKSM-71-8-Brigade-Combat-Teams_may%202011.pdf.
Source: U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sergeant  
James L. Harper Jr. (Released).
U.S. Army Soldiers Conduct a Patrol in a Stryker 
Combat Vehicle in Mosul.77 
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Chart 3. Organization of a Stryker Brigade Combat Team.78 
“IRAQIZATION”
The Transition Strategy
The newly arrived forces were called on to implement a revised campaign plan. Even 
before the January election outcome was known, MNF-I had conducted a campaign pro-
cess review that, coupled with a counterinsurgency study conducted in September-Oc-
tober 2004, reinforced the lessons of Najaf: that building the expertise of the ISF was the 
most critical ingredient in successful counterinsurgency operations. Improving host-na-
tion capability was so important, the fall 2004 study had concluded, that “no great power 
had ever succeeded in a counterinsurgency without a capable indigenous partner.”79 
Accordingly, in April 2005, Casey’s headquarters published an updated plan that aimed 
to suppress the insurgency through coalition combat operations that bought time and 
space for a new main effort: training and equipping the ISF so that the counterinsur-
gency campaign could be transitioned to their responsibility. While Casey’s August 2004 
mission statement had focused equally on conducting full-spectrum counterinsurgency 
operations and on training and equipping the ISF, the new April 2005 mission statement 
read:
In partnership with the Iraqi Transitional Government [ITG], MNF-I progressively transitions the 
counterinsurgency campaign to the ITG and Iraqi Security Forces, while aggressively executing 
counterinsurgency operations to create a security environment that permits the completion of the 
UNSCR [United Nations Security Council Resolution] 1546 process and the sustainment of political 
and economic development.80 
While the mission statement changed significantly, with a new focus on transition, the 
end state of MNF-I’s campaign remained unchanged: “Iraq at peace with its neighbors 
and an ally in the War on Terror, with a representative government that respects the 
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human rights of all Iraqis, and security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and 
to deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists.”81 
To underscore this change in strategy, Casey emphasized to his BCT commanders 
that their mission was “to help the Iraqis win, not to win it for the Iraqis.” He also warned 
against creating Iraqi dependency on the coalition, noting that “the longer the coalition 
leads the fight, the more dependent the ISF [Iraqi security forces] becomes.”82 These state-
ments echoed the same concerns he had expressed when he took command, lessons he 
had drawn from his tenure in Bosnia.
The Military Transition Teams
The updated campaign plan would unfold in four phases. During phase one, MNF-I 
would deploy roughly 250 transition teams of military advisers to improve the quality of 
the Iraqi Army units and some national police units. The teams, which MNF-I considered 
to be its main effort, had originally been named assistance teams but were renamed tran-
sition teams when Rumsfeld balked at the name, noting that the term assistance could 
imply long-term dependence.83 A small effort of 15 teams would also be assigned to work 
with the Iraqi border forces that fell under the Interior Ministry’s Department of Border 
Enforcement. Allawi had rejected pairing transition teams with local police because of 
sovereignty concerns, so within the Ministry of the Interior, there would only be transi-
tion teams with the Special Police Forces (Commandos, Public Order Brigades, and Spe-
cial Mechanized Brigades) and the Border Police.
In early December 2004, MNF-I began the process of requesting personnel for the 
transition teams from the joint staff and service chiefs. Knowing that it would take the 
services time to notify personnel of the new assignments and prepare them for deploy-
ment, MNF-I ordered each multinational division in Iraq to create internal transition 
teams out of its on-station units to support Iraqi Army units in their sectors, a step Casey 
believed would speed up the transition process by at least 6 months. In what could be 
a record-breaking speed for clearing infamous Pentagon bureaucratic hurdles, the pro-
posal for the externally sourced transition teams went from concept to troops on the 
ground in a mere 6 months. However, the ease with which the program cleared the Pen-
tagon bureaucracy masked some significant disagreements about the design of the teams. 
MNF-I planners had originally envisioned teams of 20 troops each that would embed 
within Iraqi units down to the company level, the echelon at which planners believed 
the advisers could best affect the Iraqis’ fighting ability.84 This initial plan would mean 
a personnel requirement of 5,000 noncommissioned officers and field grade officers, a 
figure that dismayed the joint services in the Pentagon who would have to strip many 
stateside units of their mid-level leaders to meet the requirement. Casey also had judged 
that teams of 20 U.S. troops would be unwieldy and would impinge on Iraqi sovereignty, 
and approved a team size of 10 advisers instead, for a total personnel requirement of 
2,500. Because of the force protection risks involved, he also balked at embedding down 
to the company level and, instead, authorized embedding the advisers at Iraqi division, 
brigade, and battalion levels.85 
Casey’s decision did not sit well with the planners responsible for organizing the tran-
sition teams, who tried to dissuade him by arguing that “[the] lack of embedded support 
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at the company level is counter to lessons from successful COIN operations [and] counter 
to current U.S./UK practice with other indigenous armies.”86 To collect enough man-
power to restore the company-level advisers, they proposed eliminating division-level 
advisers and pairing transition teams with only a portion of the ISF, but Casey was not 
swayed by this argument.87 
Another debate arose over whether the U.S. military should use individual aug-
mentees or standing units to form the advisory teams. As chief of staff of the Army, 
Schoomaker disagreed with the concept of creating small advisory teams of individual 
replacements. He believed the advisory mission should be given to standing brigades 
and battalions whose commanders would be accountable for its success. Cognizant of the 
drawbacks of the Vietnam-era individual replacement system, Schoomaker was reluc-
tant to deploy individuals rather than cohesive units. He also feared that individuals 
deployed as advisers would be lost in the personnel system and forced into back-to-back 
deployments, causing them to burn out faster.88 
By contrast, Casey and MNF-I believed many Army units were already struggling 
to adapt to the counterinsurgency environment in Iraq and could not be expected to 
train the ISF as well. In addition, as he had concluded from his Bosnia experience, Casey 
believed most U.S. units would be too hands-on in an advisory role, inclined to do too 
much of the work rather than developing the Iraqis to do it for themselves. These prob-
lems would be minimized if the advisory teams were composed of individuals that Casey 
and MNF-I could train and shape in Iraq. He and MNF-I thus insisted on individuals, and 
Schoomaker and the Army eventually acceded.89 The military transition teams (MiTT), 
therefore, would be ad hoc organizations made up of individuals from across the Army 
and other services.
The notion of sending senior noncommissioned officers and field grade officers to 
work in small teams outside the Army organizational structure to live with Iraqi forces 
in order to train them was revolutionary for the institutional Army in the post-Vietnam 
era. In an effort to sell the newly transformed strategy and “bill” for additional forces 
to the secretary of defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General John Abizaid 
explained that:
as we follow [General Casey’s] vision to shift our main effort to clearly concentrate on ISF 
development, we will also need to face cultural change for our own Armed Forces. We’ll need 
people living with small Iraqi units and police outposts in isolated and exposed places. Managing 
such risk will be difficult, especially as the enemy adapts. . . . We must stay focused on a strategy 
for Iraqi success. Iraqization.90 
The newness of the MiTT mission meant there was no existing training system for 
the advisers, and there was noticeable institutional friction in setting up the preparatory 
training for the initial teams. “The Army couldn’t get it set up fast enough to have a pro-
ductive thing back here in the States, so we had to do it ourselves,” Casey told military 
historians in 2008.91 To that end, Casey ordered MNF-I to create a 2-week training pro-
gram in Iraq, called the Phoenix Academy, to train the advisers in their specialized tasks. 
The program was ready by late April, before the first external MiTTs began arriving.
The MiTT mission also highlighted a long-running challenge that had bedeviled MNF-I 
since the start of the war: obtaining sufficient Arabic linguists to serve as interpreters. 
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Even before the transition teams were stood up, MNF-I had been unable to meet the insa-
tiable need for Category 1 interpreters—Iraqi nationals or other non-U.S. citizens who 
handled most tactical interactions—and the command was nearly 1,500 linguists short, 
resulting in a 64 percent fill of the critical requirement.92 Because of their need to work 
closely with the ISF, the transition teams would require an additional 1,200 linguists.93 As 
a result, MNF-I’s main effort, the development of the ISF, would be initially hobbled by a 
severe shortage of interpreters.
Debate Over the Role of Special Operations Forces
The Army and MNF-I debates over the construct and sourcing of the transition teams 
also extended to special operations forces. Many in both MNF-I and the institutional 
Army argued that the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Arabian Peninsula 
(CJSOTF-AP) and Army Special Forces operators, long regarded as the premier force in 
conducting foreign internal defense and training partner militaries, should do more to 
help fill the onerous burden of the transition teams. Accordingly, MNF-I requested addi-
tional special forces units through U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and the Penta-
gon, but the Joint Staff disapproved the request after U.S. Special Operations Command 
and U.S. Army Special Operations Command objected on practical and philosophical 
grounds.
From a practical standpoint, there simply were not enough Special Forces troops in 
the Army to meet Casey’s requirement of partnering with roughly 250 Iraqi battalions. 
Each Special Forces Group notionally had 54 Operational Detachment Alphas (ODAs) 
of 12 men, each of which by doctrine could train a host-nation battalion when at full 
strength. However, by 2005, some groups had so few personnel that they had shuttered 
some ODAs and combined others in order to constitute fully manned teams. Two Special 
Forces Groups were already committed to back-to-back rotations in Iraq, with another 
two committed to Afghanistan, and the final group had a sizable commitment in the 
form of the JSOTF in the Philippines. Mathematically, fulfilling Casey’s transition team 
requirement for a single year-long rotation required committing four of the five Special 
Forces Groups to Iraq, without regard to Afghanistan or any other missions across the 
geographic combatant commands. Even so, partly as a result of the acrimony involved 
in the rejection of MNF-I’s request, a compromise was reached that agreed to a one-time 
surge of SOF advisers, and the number of Special Forces battalions deployed increased 
from two to three for a period of 7 months. These advisers deployed to train the Iraqi 
Army in Ninawa Province and Mosul, where the Iraqi Army had all but collapsed in 
November 2004, and where Casey would soon be making a push to reestablish control of 
Iraq’s western border.94 
The decision to reject a larger special operations commitment, as well as the CJSOTF-
AP’s rejection of a larger role in training the ISF, also reflected a philosophical dis-
agreement over the proper role of special operations forces in Iraq. One element of the 
disagreement centered on how best to train the ISF. The MNSTC-I and MNF-I model, 
in the opinion of CJSOTF-AP leaders, compromised quality to stress quantity, based on 
the premise that counterinsurgency required a certain numeric troop-to-population ratio 
to be successful. Many in the CJSOTF-AP believed that the emphasis on achieving high 
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numbers of Iraqis trained, without emphasizing the quality of training, paralleled the 
misguided use of body counts in Vietnam. As one CJSOTF-AP commander explained:
It was the reverse of the body count. It [was] not the number of guys who we’re killing; it [was] the 
number of guys you [were] training. Just like a body count, that does not really tell you whether 
you are obtaining your strategic or operational goals. The training body count, how many guys 
are in [the] Iraqi Security Forces, does not tell you anything about your strategic or operational 
objectives and how well you are doing towards [achieving] them.95 
Others who evaluated MNSTC-I’s programs shared these concerns. Retired General Gary 
F. Luck and his Iraq Security Assessment Team visited Iraq to review MNF-I’s campaign 
plan and strategy to develop the ISF in January 2005. They advised MNF-I to “shift focus 
to quality of ISF versus quantity (individually and collectively),” noting that one of the 
most important keys to success for the Iraqi military was the will to win.96 
The disagreement over how to build the ISF ran deeper than a simple debate of quan-
tity versus quality. CJSOTF-AP leaders believed they had developed a successful model 
in the 36th Commando Battalion and the Iraqi Counterterrorism Force—including forced 
ethnic mixing, a rigorous selection process, better equipment, long-term partnership, 
and the ability to pick unit leaders—and did not want to dilute it. In the view of MNF-I 
and MNSTC-I leaders, however, the 36th Commando model could never produce a force 
large enough to secure the entire country. Instead, MNF-I and MNSTC-I had pressed the 
CJSOTF-AP to change the mission of its ODAs and focus on increasing the throughput 
for basic training as a way to accelerate ISF growth, believing the CJSOTF-AP’s model to 
be too slow.97 But because the CJSOTF-AP was merely under MNC-I’s tactical control, 
MNF-I could not change the CJSOTF-AP’s base mission, and the organizations simply 
agreed to disagree on how best to train the ISF.98 
There were other reasons that the CJSOTF-AP turned down the expanded mission. 
With CJSOTF-AP commanders changing roughly every 7 months, maintaining consis-
tency in the organization’s direction was difficult. The changes in commanders brought 
not only personality differences, but also divergences in the ethos of the two Special Forces 
Groups that formed the CJSOTF-AP. As units rotated, foreign internal defense (FID) fell 
in and out of favor, often eclipsed by direct-action missions that provided more immedi-
ate and tangible—albeit fleeting—results. Some CJSOTF-AP commanders believed that 
they were contributing more by conducting tactical direct-action missions to kill or cap-
ture high-value individuals on MNF-I’s target list and considered conducting FID with 
the Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) Brigade simply an extension of that kill-cap-
ture mission. Similarly, some of the CJSOTF-AP’s principal partners, the multinational 
divisions that owned battle space, were eager to see the products of its human intelli-
gence network and the results of its direct-action missions and did not have patience for 
the time-consuming efforts required to improve the ISF. The effect the CJSOTF-AP might 
have had on the Iraqi forces was watered down by some CJSOTF-AP commanders, who 
believed their ODAs should not train Iraqi units larger than platoon size, despite the doc-
trinal standard that an ODA could train an indigenous battalion.
Because SOF leaders had decided not to forward deploy a general officer in Iraq 
as part of a higher headquarters for the CJSOTF-AP, the disconnects and divergences 
between the two SOF groups and among different leaders were never adjudicated. This 
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mistake also hurt the CJSOTF-AP’s ability to deliver advice and situational awareness to 
MNC-I and MNF-I. With a rare responsibility that geographically stretched across the 
entire country, including areas where no American forces were present, such as MND-CS 
and the Korean-led MND-NE, the CJSOTF-AP had a unique perspective on Iraq. Unfor-
tunately, with no general officer assigned, the CJSOTF-AP commanders were unable to 
attend many of the MNF-I level meetings whose attendance was limited to the general 
officer corps.
The absence of a SOF general officer and a higher echelon headquarters also ham-
pered unity of effort among the various SOF entities deployed to Iraq, and at times con-
siderable friction developed among them because of overlap in missions, targets, and 
terrain. This deep familial conflict laid bare the fact that SOF units would reconcile and 
achieve synergy with conventional forces before reconciling among their own disparate 
elements. In interviews conducted after the war, 10 CJSOTF-AP commanders—every one 
questioned—lamented that there should have been a higher SOF headquarters in Iraq, 
led by a SOF general.99 
Reduction of the Coalition “Footprint”
During phases two through four of the campaign plan, the coalition would progres-
sively transfer responsibility for security operations and territory to the Iraqis. Each trans-
fer was meant to be conditions-based, dependent on the rated performance of the ISF. In 
phase two, “Transition to Provincial Iraqi Security Control,” ISF would take the lead in 
planning, directing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations, while coalition units 
would shift to a supporting role and decrease their presence and footprint. The plan’s 
ambitious goal was to reach this stage for all of Iraq by November 30, 2005.100 Abizaid and 
Casey relayed this plan to have Iraqi forces in the lead of the counterinsurgency fight by 
the end of the year to Allawi in the days after the election, but the generals would even-
tually have to renegotiate the plan months later with a new Prime Minister and a shifting 
security situation.
In phase three, “Transition to National Iraqi Security Governance,” provinces would 
return to provincial Iraqi control, in which provincial leaders and ministers in the national 
government would take responsibility for Iraqi security. Because Allawi had refused to 
allow MiTTs to collaborate with local police, coalition leaders anticipated this transition 
would not take place before mid-2006.101 In the final phase, “Iraqi Security Self-Reliance,” 
the relationship between the Iraqi Government and the coalition would evolve into a 
more typical security relationship between allied states, with embassies serving as the 
main coalition presence. In this phase, coalition forces would move to “strategic over-
watch” outside of Iraq but were prepared to return if needed.
At the same time that MNF-I published its new campaign plan, it also published a 
contingency plan that established procedures for what the coalition would do as the 
Iraqis reached each successive stage of the transition. One element of the contingency 
plan addressed coalition basing, with the goal of reducing the footprint from phase to 
phase. Although the plan was based on Iraqi performance, it set a baseline for coalition 
base closures by phase. Of the 108 bases operating as of April 2005, some 7 to 10 were to 
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be closed during phase one, 46 to 49 during phase two, and 45 to 51 during phase three, 
leaving only 4 long-term bases at Al Asad, Talill, Balad, and Erbil.102 
Another element of these procedures involved determining the size of the coalition 
troop presence in Iraq over time. In June and September 2005, Casey and MNF-I would 
use assessments of the ISF to make decisions on whether to reduce the force structure 
for the January 2006 rotation of forces. This would “take the form of early departures 
from theater, a diversion of inbound forces to fill the requirement for a strategic reserve 
brigade in Kuwait, or the decision to retain forces in CONUS [continental United States] 
on prepare to deploy orders.”103 The contingency plan sanguinely predicted that these 
assessments would allow for a reduction to 12 U.S. brigades and 4 allied brigades on the 
ground in 2006. MNF-I would then conduct another assessment after the December 2005 
parliamentary elections, but Casey’s headquarters expected that conditions would likely 
improve enough that, by mid-2006, the coalition presence could be reduced through 
early withdrawals to just nine U.S. brigades and two allied brigades. The next assess-
ment would be conducted in June 2006, by which time Casey and his officers expected 
the situation to be stable enough to require only six U.S. brigades and two allied brigades 
in the early 2007 rotations.104 
As U.S. combat power decreased along these lines, Abizaid and Casey hoped to rep-
licate the model used in Bosnia and Kosovo, with a multinational organization assuming 
responsibility for the mission from the Americans. In a January 15, 2005, memorandum, 
Abizaid described this preferred end state as the transitioning of:
MNF-I to ISFOR [Iraq Stabilization Force], [with a] UN or international mandate with fixed end 
date; force size fixed at 50,000 inside Iraq led by a non U.S. commander, U.S. contribution limited to 
no more than 20% of the force; is separate and distinct from training effort led by U.S. Commanders 
under MAC-I [Military Assistance Command-Iraq] authorities . . . the idea here is to, speed 
Iraqization, de-Americanize the effort, rejuvenate international effort, let Iraqis get out front.105 
The impetus to hand off the mission to another foreign entity resulted in coalition 
attempts to garner support for either a NATO mission or a Muslim force led by Jordan’s 
King Abdullah. These efforts were ultimately unsuccessful because neither NATO nor 
the Arab states viewed the mission with the same degree of optimism that the United 
States did in the wake of the January elections.106 
Casey’s confidence in predictions that a rapid growth in ISF capabilities would lead 
to a rapid drawdown in combat power was not shared by all in the coalition. When the 
newly arrived XVIII Airborne Corps, serving as the MNC-I headquarters, was asked in 
February 2005 to comment on the planned timetable, its staff responded that “early 2006 
[is] too early to off ramp BCTs. This capability will not be likely until we get into National 
Control. This is due to the requirement to provide direct support and general support to 
the ISF . . . C4I [command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence], logis-
tics, joint fires and effects, QRF [Quick Reaction Force], force protection, reconstruction, 
etc.”107 MNC-I’s input reflected its leaders’ concerns that “decisions in MNF proposal to 
off ramp are tied to phase and time and NOT conditions,” and added that any off-ramps 
should begin at battalion level and below, once the right conditions existed.108 
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The Transition Readiness Assessment
While MNF-I would reject the recommendation to begin off-ramps at the battalion 
level and ultimately discount worries that 2006 was too early to off-ramp forces, it imme-
diately acted on MNC-I’s recommendation to develop a conditions-based assessment 
that would help determine when coalition forces could withdraw. In spring 2005 the 
coalition commands created a system for the soon-to-arrive MiTT advisers to evaluate the 
Iraqi units they advised with a view to using the data to inform the coalition’s decisions 
on troop withdrawals. The new Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) would assign 
each Iraqi unit an overall rating from 1 (fully capable of planning, executing, and sustain-
ing independent counterinsurgency operations) to 4 (describing a unit that was still being 
formed and incapable of conducting counterinsurgency operations).109 These overall rat-
ings were determined by a series of 15 questions, on each of which an Iraqi unit would 
be rated in descending order of proficiency as green, amber, red, or black. The responses 
to the questions would then be entered into algorithms that would ultimately produce 
the overall TRA rating that would serve as an important element in decisions to off-ramp 
brigades and close coalition bases.
The TRA metrics were a product of significant collaboration among MNC-I, MNSTC-I, 
the Joint Staff, and Casey. They were designed to be “simple for the Iraqis to understand 
and simple for the commanders on the ground to come up with the assessment,” as one 
MNSTC-I officer recalled. “Ultimately, you want to know, can you turn battlespace over 
to this [Iraqi] unit?”110 Implicit within the assessment system, however, was the under-
standing that even a TRA 1 unit would not be fully ready to operate independently with-
out the coalition’s logistical, fire support, and medical evacuation assistance. However, 
a TRA 1 rating meant to MNF-I planners that U.S. units could begin to disengage large 
American combat units from an Iraqi unit’s area and turn over battle space.
The 15 questions that calculated the TRA rating were divided into six major group-
ings: personnel, command and control, training, sustainment/logistics, equipment, and 
leadership. Almost all of the questions were quantitative. For example, all three of the 
questions under “equipment” and three of the four questions under “personnel” assessed 
only whether an Iraqi unit had the equipment and personnel it was authorized. There 
was little subjectivity to the assessment, and little ability for coalition advisers to note, 
for example, whether an Iraqi unit was proficient in using the equipment it had on hand. 
No rating in the assessment explored the important subjective questions of sectarianism, 
willingness to fight, and unit cohesiveness. Only one of the 15 questions addressed train-
ing, and it assessed the percentage of mission essential tasks on which a unit was profi-
cient.111 Coalition advisers could include a subjective narrative with the assessment, but 
it did not contribute to the overall calculation of TRA ratings, nor did it override the TRA 
rating that derived from the calculations of objective data.
Some tactical-level coalition leaders later found the selection of TRA metrics and their 
overly objective nature problematic. Major Stephen Campbell, a British officer in MND-
SE, explained:
The measures of effects [effectiveness] were coming down from Coalition, from the force up in 
Baghdad, were things that were irrelevant . . . like, ‘Is the Iraqi Security Forces fully manned?’ I’m 
like, ‘Yes, it’s full manned, it’s fully manned with militiamen.’ The historical record will be quite 
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entertaining on this . . . because you’re going to find a bunch of categories that are color-coded 
green for good to go. Yet, the text boxes that go with them is going to say something horrific like, 
‘The Iraqi Security Forces in MND-Southeast are completely dominated by Shi’a militias. They 
sponsor attacks on the local population and against the occupation. They are sponsored by Iran. 
We have no control over them. Assessment, green.’ I was allowed to write what I wanted to in the 
box as long as the thing was green, because by their criteria it was green.112 
Nevertheless, the overall rating was a critical component of the campaign plan because, 
in Casey’s words, it was used to make “judgments about when we might transition areas 
to the Iraqi Army and, ultimately, provinces back to the Iraqis.”113 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE INSURGENCY
The Shi’a Militias and Iran
At the same time that the U.S. Army was under-
going its transformation, Shi’a insurgent groups 
were undergoing their own transformation after 
1 1/2 years of combat. The Shi’a militant groups, 
Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) in particular, had taken sig-
nificant casualties in the April and summer 2004 
fighting, killing off many of the less capable lead-
ers and fighters. After absorbing these heavy losses, 
those JAM leaders that remained concluded that to 
use the same tactics and engage the coalition in open 
warfare would be to invite extinction. The surviving 
leaders decided that external assistance was needed 
to fight effectively against the coalition.
In what must have been a difficult decision for 
such an independent-minded leader, Moqtada Sadr 
acceded to his subordinates’ recommendation to 
reach out to the Iranian regime for additional assis-
tance. Qais al-Khazali, one of Sadr’s top lieutenants, 
later explained to coalition officials that “after the 
fall of Najaf in August of 2004, he and others in the 
Sadrist movement were unhappy with the way JAM 
fought and the way Muqtada as Sadr conducted 
his military leadership. Khazali and his followers 
decided to fight in a more disciplined manner with 
better units, and they reached out to Qasem Suleimani for help.”115 As commander of the 
Qods Force, the subset of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps responsible for covert 
operations in Iraq and other Middle Eastern countries, Qassem Soleimani welcomed the 
request for assistance because it gave the Iranian regime additional options to destabilize 
the American and coalition effort beyond its covert support for SCIRI, the Badr Corps, 
and Da’wa.116 One British intelligence officer who served in MND-SE and witnessed the 
Source: Photo by Meghdad Madadi,  
Tasnim News Agency.
Qais al-Khazali.114 
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JAM transformation later described why the Iraqi milita sought Iran’s support, and how 
that support transformed it.
They’d [JAM] realized that fighting us in the streets with the rifles and RPGs [rocket-propelled  
grenades] was a good way of not ever receiving your pension, because we’d just kill them. They 
couldn’t take us on openly like that . . . [so] they went over to the Iranians, and the Iranians had 
done this work in Lebanon with Hezbollah before in the 1980s, so they basically take their manuals 
from that particular conflict and use it in this context. They got sophisticated IED technology that 
was above what our countermeasures could defeat. They came back [with] different structure, 
covert, cellular, insurgency, closer to terrorism in its tactics than an open insurgency.117 
The Qods Force established a comprehensive training program for these new cellular 
organizations, which would soon be known as Special Groups. The training took place 
mainly in camps in Iran, with additional training sometimes held in Syria and Leba-
non. Some of the training was conducted by Lebanese Hizballah members, who were 
well respected by their eager Iraqi students because of their experience fighting Israel 
and their ability to speak Arabic, unlike the Farsi-speaking Iranian trainers who had to 
instruct through interpreters.118 
The April and summer 2004 fighting also transformed the Sadrist insurgency by cre-
ating fissures in an organization that had been previously relatively unified. Khazali’s 
initiative to reach out to Iran had political overtones. Deeply frustrated by what he and 
other Sadr lieutenants saw as Moqtada Sadr’s erratic and often incompetent leadership, 
Khazali likely hoped that the overtures toward Iran would give him an opportunity to 
become the rightful leader of JAM or possibly create his own organization.119 Khazali’s 
resentment of Sadr dated to the 1990s, when Khazali had been a highly regarded pupil of 
Sadr’s ayatollah father, and it is likely he considered himself more qualified to lead the 
Sadrist movement than Moqtada Sadr, his former classmate in the elder Sadr’s clerical 
school. Over time, these tensions would begin to splinter the movement.
For the Iranian regime, the volatile Sadr movement could serve as an effective cover 
for the actions of the Badr Corps, which some coalition leaders believed to be a force of 
stability, in contrast to Jaysh al-Mahdi. In reality, the Badr Corps was often just as brutal 
as JAM, but conducted itself more covertly, focusing on operations to exact revenge on 
Sunni leaders and manipulate the new Iraqi Government. Rather than launching overt 
militant operations, Badr leaders were content to work their way quietly down an assas-
sination list of prominent Sunnis, coordinating their actions with SCIRI to achieve polit-
ical effects.120 
For the next year, as the Shi’a groups underwent their Iranian training and prepared 
for the next round of conflict, the situation in MND-SE and Baghdad was deceptively 
quiet. The Shi’a militants’ overt activities were limited, but the Shi’a groups were active 
in pursuing their goals, nonetheless. While some MNF-I leaders believed the coalition 
had defeated the Sadrists and other Shi’a insurgents in 2004, in reality, 2005 was the calm 
before the storm. The Iranian regime, happy to expand its influence in Iraqi politics, was 
seizing a new opportunity to keep the United States off balance.
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The Ascendancy of al-Qaeda in Iraq
Sunni insurgent groups also underwent a significant change after suffering heavy 
losses in the battles in Fallujah, Mosul, and other Sunni cities. The insurgents associated 
with the former regime had been hit particularly hard, and in their weakness lost their 
leading place in an insurgency they themselves had begun. As though to illustrate this 
change, in April the Syrian regime handed over to coalition custody Saddam Hussein’s 
half-brother, Sabawi Ibrahim al-Tikriti, who had been a leader of foreign regime elements 
operating from Syria.121 
The defeat of insurgent elements in Fallujah led to a geographic restructuring of the 
insurgency. After the battle, insurgent groups dispersed across the country, reconsolidat-
ing in Baghdad, north Babil, and the Ramadi-Fallujah and Al Qa’im-Hadithah corridors 
in Anbar. Fallujah had become terrain the insurgents could no longer access, at least for 
the near term. Many of the surviving groups were forced to go underground, and they 
spent the beginning months of 2005 trying to reestablish their organization and infra-
structure in Anbar as a temporary lull settled across the province.122 
A large force of insurgents also displaced to the Lake Tharthar region due to its 
remoteness from coalition forces. The depth of insurgent operations in the area became 
apparent on March 23, 2005, when a rare coalition foray into the insurgent sanctuary to 
raid a training camp resulted in the largest engagement since AL FAJR. During a day-
long battle that involved air support, Iraqi Special Police Commandos, and elements of 
MND-NC, 85 insurgents were killed, as well as seven Iraqi Police Commandos.123 
The most significant change within the Sunni insurgency, though, came when Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi’s group, Tawhid wal-Jihad, evolved from an independent jihadist 
group into a part of al-Qaeda in late 2004 and early 2005. While the battles of the summer 
and fall, when the coalition “fought to the elections,” were effective in buying space and 
time for the election to occur, they also created a fertile breeding ground for the Sunni 
religious militants. The battles that destroyed swaths of the Sunni cities of Samarra, Tel 
Afar, Mosul, and Fallujah had destroyed much of the local and regional economies as 
well, leaving large segments of the Sunni population as refugees or impoverished. Recon-
struction funds, promised by the coalition and Iraqi leadership, became mired in the Iraqi 
Government’s bureaucracy and sectarianism. In this economic void, Zarqawi’s group 
was able to use its deeper pockets to hire young men away from other, more secular 
or nationalist groups.124 With the collapse of many Sunni resistance groups associated 
with former regime elements, many of the rank-and-file members switched loyalties and 
joined Zarqawi. The switch altered the demographics of his organization so that in Anbar 
most of his fighters were men who had served as military or security personnel under 
Saddam.125 
Some of these former regime members brought with them the wealth and economic 
connections they had accumulated under Saddam, such as Sheikh Ghazi Sami Abbas, 
a Fallujah businessman who had become one of the five richest men in Iraq and who 
helped shelter Saddam’s wife and daughters after the fall of Baghdad.126 Other sources 
of Zarqawi’s money included smuggling, extortion from Iraqi civilians, and kidnappings 
and robberies.127 Zarqawi also received considerable external financial support in 2005 
from al-Qaeda’s senior leaders, who recognized Iraq’s central place in the global jihad.128 
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With these finances, Zarqawi’s organization was essentially able to outbid to the Iraqi 
Government and the coalition for foot soldiers. While a low-ranking member of the Iraqi 
Army or police was paid roughly $150 per month, Zarqawi could pay $100 to $200 for 
a single small arms, mortar, or IED attack, and even paid civilians $10 a day to spy on 
coalition forces.129 
In October 2004, Zarqawi himself swore allegiance to Osama Bin Laden and changed 
the name of his organization to Qa’idat al Jihad fi Bilad ar Rafidain, or al-Qaeda in the 
Land of Two Rivers (Iraq), to reflect the new commitment.130 To coalition forces, Zarqa-
wi’s renamed organization became known simply as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). By January, 
Bin Laden rewarded Zarqawi’s pledge of fealty by naming him emir, or commander (lit-
erally “prince”), of al-Qaeda forces in Iraq.131 The swearing of allegiance was the result of 
extensive negotiations between the two groups and the realization of the mutual benefits 
a merger would bring. For Zarqawi’s group, association with al-Qaeda brought brand 
recognition, an important factor in seeking financial donations and new recruits. Cou-
pled with Zarqawi’s efforts to capitalize on the post-Fallujah weakness of former regime 
elements, the merger ensconced Zarqawi at the top of the insurgency.132 For Bin Laden 
and al-Qaeda, Zarqawi’s group was instantly the most active and most violent branch of 
its global franchise, and by the end of 2004, Bin Laden had concluded that Iraq should 
be the central campaign in his broader war against the West and its Arab allies. Like Bin 
Laden, Zarqawi saw Iraq as central to a larger scheme, declaring in September, “The 
spark has been lit here in Iraq and its heat will continue to intensify—by Allah’s permis-
sion—until it burns the Crusader Armies in Dabiq.”133 Referring to a prophecy contained 
in a hadith, Zarqawi intimated that the conflict in Iraq would eventually lead to a battle 
in the Syrian town of Dabiq, where Islam would finally triumph over the West in the 
Armageddon. Such declarations had powerful religious meaning but also made head-
lines, which proved beneficial to the parent organization’s recruiting and fundraising.
At the same time, al-Qaeda’s senior leaders in Pakistan were concerned with Zarqa-
wi’s barbarism and his focus on targeting Iraq’s Shi’a and starting a civil war—a plan that 
he had outlined to al-Qaeda’s senior leadership in the 2004 letters carried by Hassan Ghul. 
As a result, al-Qaeda had insisted on two conditions for the merger: first, that Zarqawi 
focus his attacks against the United States, which al-Qaeda saw as the more dangerous 
“far enemy”; and second, that Zarqawi not provoke intra-Muslim conflicts until after 
the United States was defeated in Iraq.134 Zarqawi would essentially ignore this agree-
ment from the start, much to the consternation of al-Qaeda’s leaders, who had asked the 
Jordanian to organize an attack against the continental United States to demonstrate his 
commitment to the broader jihad.135 
Indeed, even as Zarqawi negotiated the conditions of his union with al-Qaeda, he 
made political and tactical moves toward his goal of igniting a civil war in Iraq, meeting 
with leaders of Ansar al Sunna and Jaysh Muhammad in Abu Ghraib in early January 
to plan a joint campaign against the Shi’a-led government in Baghdad. An integral part 
of his strategy was to increase the number of foreign suicide bombers infiltrating the 
country and use them to target the elections and the new government.136 While Ansar al 
Sunna would ally with al-Qaeda in Iraq after the meeting, the attempted alliance with 
Jaysh Muhammad would soon break down, and the two groups became bitter enemies.
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From late December onward, Zarqawi continued his attacks against the Shi’a without 
letup. On December 15, a bombing killed seven at a Shi’a shrine in Karbala and wounded 
an aide to Grand Ayatollah Sistani.137 In the next 2 weeks, twin bombing attacks killed 
70 in Najaf and Karbala, while a car bomb that targeted the SCIRI party headquarters in 
Baghdad killed 13 and nearly killed Abdul Aziz al-Hakim.138 On January 12, two senior 
aides to Sistani were killed in separate attacks in Karbala and Salman Pak. On February 
22, Zarqawi’s operatives carried out 5 nearly simultaneous suicide bomber attacks across 
Baghdad that killed 39 and wounded 150 Shi’a celebrating Ashura.139 A week later, a sui-
cide car bomber dispatched from Anbar by Zarqawi’s cousin detonated his vehicle in the 
midst of Iraqi Army and police recruits in the Shi’a city of Hillah, killing 122 in the single 
worst bombing of the war to that point.140 
With the body count mounting, Zarqawi’s offensive began to have its intended effect, 
causing Shi’a patience for nonviolent responses to wear thin. In January, frustrated by the 
seeming inability of the coalition and the government to stop Zarqawi’s terror attacks, 
members of the Da’wa Party and the Badr Corps formed the Mukhtar Battalion—a Shi’a 
death squad focused against Salafis, Wahhabis, and Ba’athists.141 They represented the 
first of what would soon become a wave of Shi’a militant groups targeting the Sunni 
communities of central Iraq.
Zarqawi’s ascension represented a tectonic shift in the insurgency. The Sunni Arab 
resistance, made up mainly of former regime elements that had been the backbone of the 
insurgency, fell into the background as Zarqawi rose to prominence. The loss of Fallu-
jah, as well as concerns about Zarqawi’s extremist attacks on Iraqis, led many of the less 
religiously extreme Sunni insurgents to seek ways to rejoin the mainstream and reconcile 
with the new government. Mohammed Mahmoud Latif, the head of the Ramadi Shura 
Council, met with other insurgent leaders in Hit in early 2005 to advocate for a political 
solution to the conflict and even asked Dulaim tribal leaders to serve as intermediaries 
with the Iraqi Interim Government.142 Though Latif supported the election boycott of Jan-
uary 2005, his overtures created a schism within the Sunni insurgency between rejection-
ists and those willing to join the political process.143 The rift between Latif and Zarqawi 
deepened so quickly that in the wake of the disastrous Sunni boycott, open fighting 
erupted in Ramadi between AQI and more nationalist insurgent groups. By February, 
Latif and others temporarily stopped targeting coalition forces in order to fight al-Qaeda 
in Iraq and other Salafi groups that promoted takfir (a religious duty to kill apostates).144 
The schism was not solely between Latif and Zarqawi. In March 2005 in Qusaybah, 
foreign fighters from AQI fought pitched battles with local Sunni insurgents who had 
grown tired of fighting coalition forces and of the extremist version of Islam that Zarqa-
wi’s group brought with them.145 In the same month, Harith al-Dhari’s Association of 
Muslim Scholars issued a fatwa that prohibited the killing of Iraqi national guardsmen, to 
which AQI defiantly responded by increasing its kidnappings and assassinations of ISF. 
Car-bomb attacks against the Anbar contingent of Special Police Commandos became 
so numerous that the unit effectively disintegrated as a result.146 Undeterred, Latif and 
several other insurgent leaders joined forces with Dhari in late March to form the Sunni 
Shura Council, which sent envoys to the Iraqi Government to propose, as a reconciliation 
measure, that over a thousand Iraqi police be replaced with former regime officers.147 
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To a degree, the offer signified Sunni leaders’ realization that they had made a mistake 
in boycotting the January election. As word spread of the proposal, other Sunni leaders 
endorsed the initiative, including some of those who had headed Sunni insurgent groups 
in 2004: Ahmed al-Khalida from the Ramadi Shura Council, Khalid Shirabi from Mosul, 
some Syrian-based former regime elements, supporters of Sheikh Abdullah Janabi, and 
even an errant AQI leader, Abdul Qadr al-Damook.148 For these leaders, contributing 
Sunnis to the ISF did not mean supporting the coalition; instead, it meant they would 
be building a bulwark to prevent Shi’a encroachment into Anbar and setting themselves 
up potentially to retake control of the Iraqi Government once the coalition withdrew. To 
demonstrate their resolve, they offered a symbolic 3-day cessation of attacks against coa-
lition forces in April that was ultimately respected by over 2,500 insurgents.149 
Unfortunately for those willing to reconcile with the coalition, al-Qaeda in Iraq reacted 
quickly and violently to these events, targeting the renegade Damook for assassination 
and forcing him to flee the country, and also targeting members of the Ramadi Shura 
Council.150 The brutality and effectiveness of AQI’s vengeance campaign, combined with 
the nationalist insurgent leaders’ seemingly desperate outreach to the new government, 
seemed to signal to the insurgency’s rank-and-file that groups such as the Ramadi Shura 
Council were losing, at least for the time being.151 
The View From MNF-I
MNF-I only partially recognized the transformations occurring within the Shi’a and 
Sunni insurgencies. While MNF-I leaders correctly assessed that Zarqawi and his orga-
nization had become a major threat, it was difficult for the coalition to shift from its ini-
tial focus on former regime elements and acknowledge the degree to which Zarqawi 
had usurped the Ba’athists’ place as the dominant force within the Sunni resistance. An 
MNF-I assessment in January 2005 concluded “the primary threat is Former Regime Ele-
ments. Zarqawi remains spectacular and effective, but is not the primary threat.”152 Like-
wise, MNC-I’s April 2005 intelligence assessment concluded, “The insurgency in Iraq is 
principally Sunni Arab, centered on Former Regime Elements, particularly former Ba’ath 
Party and Former Regime military and intelligence service members. . . . Foreign Islamic 
extremists are a relatively small, yet lethal, problem in Iraq.”153 The same estimate also 
downplayed both Zarqawi’s union with al-Qaeda and Zarqawi’s ultimate objectives, 
noting that the “possible merger” aimed to “develop Iraq into a training ground for a 
generation of global jihadists.” They believed that Zarqawi’s intent, as evinced by the 
captured Ghul letter, was to “create tension between Sunni and Shi’a factions within Iraq 
to forestall the peaceful transition to Iraqi sovereignty.”154 In hindsight, these assessments 
completely missed the import of Zarqawi’s calls to incite civil war in Iraq and between 
the Shi’a and Sunni sects across the Middle East. Further demonstrating the disconnect 
between the coalition’s assessments and the true state of the insurgency, at the end of 
2004, 6 of the top 10 targets on the MNF-I high-value target list were still former regime 
elements. The number one high-value target was Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, while number 
two was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Of the 31 names on the list, 17 were part of Zarqa-
wi’s organization or other affiliated jihadist organizations, while 13 were associated with 
former regime elements.155 Notably, only one name was associated with Shi’a militant 
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groups. In the big picture, MNF-I was effectively targeting only Sunnis, and the Sunnis 
knew it.
***
While the successful elections were a moment to savor, the Sunni boycott would 
prove to have far-reaching negative consequences. Almost as soon as the election results 
were tallied, Sunni Arab leaders began to realize that their gamble on a boycott had been 
a horrible mistake. While many in MNF-I wrote off the boycott as a hard lesson for the 
Sunnis, in reality, Sunni Arabs became terrified that they had enabled the handing over 
of the country to the Shi’a. This disconnect in perceptions would persist for over a year, 
and consequently, the election results, quite paradoxically, made progress on the political 
track more difficult than progress in security matters. Coalition leaders saw elections as 
a unifying factor, one that would lend legitimacy to the Iraqi state and decrease violence 
in the country as the elected government found its bearings. In the course of events, how-
ever, the elections would soon be used by political actors to capture the machinery of 
government and use it to promote their sectarian agendas. At the same time that MNF-I 
judged its campaign had achieved “irreversible momentum” in Iraq, the institutional 
Army in the United States was experiencing considerable stress on its forces. Continu-
ing to transform in the midst of two wars without a significant increase in the Army’s 
end strength forced Army leaders to make the difficult choices of operationalizing the 
National Guard, the nation’s strategic reserve, and deploying some units that had not 
been resourced for combat duty. Other active duty Army units, whose core functions and 
expectations had not included deploying on contingency operations, were pushed into 
deploying and faced similar challenges to the operationalized National Guard units.
When these units began arriving in Iraq, they faced further challenges as they were 
called to implement an entirely new campaign plan—a transition strategy that empha-
sized preparing the ISF rather than fighting insurgents. This new approach proved diffi-
cult for Army units for whom advising and collaborating with host-nation forces had not 
been a core component of any training or other preparation. In the best traditions of the 
Army, these units would improvise, making do without doctrine or experience to guide 
them, inaugurating a long campaign of pairing with Iraqi units to ready them to take 
control.
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CHAPTER 16
GOING WEST, APRIL-AUGUST 2005
During the waning days of the lame duck Ayad Allawi government, the spirits of 
the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) staff and leadership had been buoyed by the 
announcement that a new cabinet and Prime Minister had finally been selected. For the 
first time, a freely elected Iraqi Government was formed. MNF-I believed that this event 
signaled that its campaign plan was on track and that the country was on the path to a 
fully legitimate Iraqi Government that could assume the responsibility for its own secu-
rity. Yet, under the veneer of this optimism, ethnic tensions roiled Iraq, threatening to 
overwhelm the entire process. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 
would soon undertake a terrorist offensive in Baghdad, targeting government officials 
and Shi’a communities in an attempt to destabilize the new government and provoke 
a Shi’a response. As this sectarian violence began to increase in central Iraq, General 
George Casey faced a choice about where to employ the coalition’s limited combat power: 
in central Iraq, where the bulk of the damaging sectarian attacks were taking place; or on 
the Iraq-Syria border, where AQI and other Sunni insurgent groups enjoyed freedom of 
movement into Iraq.
NEW GOVERNMENT AND NEW SECTARIAN VIOLENCE
The Ja’afari Government and the Mada’in Incident
On April 7, 2005, after 2 months of negotiations among the major parties, the newly 
seated Iraqi Parliament elected Jalal Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurd-
istan, to the position of Iraqi President, with Sunni tribal leader Ghazi al-Yawar and the 
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq’s (SCIRI) Adel Abdel Mahdi as vice presi-
dents. Talabani immediately named Da’wa Party leader Ibrahim al-Ja’afari as Prime Min-
ister designate, meaning that Ja’afari would have 1 month to form a government. Ja’afari 
had emerged as the United Iraqi Alliance’s (UIA) consensus candidate after almost 2 
months of negotiations among the major parties. Ja’afari’s installation as Prime Minister 
marked the end of the Iraqi Interim Government and the beginning of the Iraqi Transi-
tional Government, whose primary purpose was to draft a national constitution. For the 
first time in its modern history, Iraq was about to come under Shi’a political control, an 
opportunity that Iraq’s Shi’a leaders were not going to squander.
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Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Ferdinand Thomas (Released).
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and  
Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja’afari.1
However, the month-long period of Ja’afari’s government formation was fraught 
with tension. On April 16, the week following Ja’afari’s appointment, but before he had 
actually entered office, reports surfaced in the mixed-sect town of Mada’in, 16 kilometers 
south of Baghdad, that Sunni insurgents had taken as many as 150 Shi’a hostages, threat-
ening to execute them if the remaining Shi’a did not abandon the village immediately. 
The specter of such overt sectarian cleansing on top of already strained sectarian rela-
tions created a political crisis in Baghdad. Iraqi National Security Minister Qasem Daoud, 
a Shi’a politician close to Grand Ayatollah Ali Husayni Sistani, described the reported 
incident as “an attempt to drag this country into civil war,” while other members of the 
National Assembly described it as “a kind of ethnic purge.”2
Three battalions of the Iraqi Army surrounded Mada’in prepared for a Fallujah- type 
house-to-house battle, but as Iraqi troops moved into the town, they found no insurgents, 
only townspeople who claimed to reporters that no hostages had been taken.3 In the 
days following the incident, Sunni and Shi’a politicians disagreed bitterly on what had 
happened. Sunni politicians denied the hostage-taking and massacre had taken place, 
claiming a hoax had been perpetrated as a pretext for “striking the Sunni areas around 
Baghdad as a preface to sparking riots and fights between the two sects.”4 Shi’a political 
groups and government officials claimed the hostages had been killed and dumped in the 
Tigris, a claim that was bolstered 3 days later when local officials pulled 57 bodies from 
the river a few miles downstream at Suwayrah. Talabani announced that the corpses at 
Suwayrah were those of the massacred Mada’in hostages, and SCIRI leader Abdul Aziz 
al-Hakim wrote interim Prime Minister Allawi to provide the names of those that SCIRI 
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believed were responsible. In one of his last acts before leaving office, Allawi asked Gen-
eral George W. Casey, Jr., to open an investigation into the Mada’in “assassinations,” to 
which Casey replied that the Iraqi Government should conduct the investigation with 
U.S. help, assuring Allawi that the names of the alleged terrorists SCIRI had furnished 
would be added to the coalition’s intelligence database.5
The reported Mada’in “massacre” illustrated that Iraq had become a sectarian tinder-
box, where a single instance of sectarian violence, or even a rumor of one, was enough to 
provoke a national-level crisis and serious talk of civil war. The incident also served as 
a microcosm of the larger Iraq at the time. After the incident, rather than cooperate on a 
joint investigation to determine what happened, Sunni and Shi’a politicians created dif-
fering narratives of what occurred, complete with their own “facts” that they exploited 
for personal and political gain. It also revealed the true nature and complexity of the 
“fog” of Iraq, giving clarity to the depths of the challenges that the coalition faced in 
trying to determine what really happened in the aftermath of a significant episode with 
operational implications. In a cogent example of the coalition’s limited situational aware-
ness in the area of sectarian violence and cleansing, MNF-I officials remained unsure of 
what exactly had happened in Mada’in, even though it was mere kilometers from the 
MNF-I headquarters in Baghdad.
Into this sectarian swamp waded Ibrahim al-Ja’afari. Ja’afari’s leadership of the Da’wa 
Party, one of the few political factions without a militia, made him an acceptably non-
threatening Prime Minister option for the various members of the UIA, and Ja’afari was 
able to garner enough votes to be seated on May 3, 2005, as the first freely elected Prime 
Minister in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq.
Ja’afari’s Da’wa Party was originally a reformist Islamic organization founded in 1959 
by young Najaf-based clerics and laymen who modeled themselves after Egypt’s Muslim 
Brotherhood.6 Ja’afari, a Shi’a Arab and trained physician, joined the party in 1966, shortly 
before the Ba’athists came to power.7 The ascendency of the Ba’ath brought considerable 
pressure on Da’wa, including arrests and harassment, which resulted in the organization 
evolving into a revolutionary movement by the mid-1970s.8 When Saddam cracked down 
on the party at the outset of the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq war  in 1979-1980, 
many Da’wa members fled to Iran, including Ja’afari.9 By the end of the 1980s, the exiled 
Da’wa had fractured into multiple branches, and Ja’afari moved to London.10 After Sadd-
am’s fall, he returned to Iraq and served as one of the two deputy presidents in the Iraqi 
Interim Government.
On April 28, 2005, Ja’afari received the Parliament’s approval for his proposal to create 
a cabinet consisting of 32 ministers and 3 deputy prime ministers. Following its clear 
election victory, the UIA meant to ensure that as the government formed, Shi’a leaders 
would control a majority of the ministries, including the most powerful ones. Ministerial 
positions and the executive power associated with them were among the most important 
trophies to the new Shi’a administration in what was soon to become a de facto war to 
capture control of Iraq’s state institutions. The eventual division of ministries reflected 16 
Shi’a ministers, 8 Kurds, 6 Sunnis, 1 Christian, and 1 Turkoman.11 Notably, Bayan Jabr, a 
SCIRI activist with ties to the Badr Corps, became Iraq’s interior minister, and three Sadr 
supporters assumed ministerial positions, despite the fact that Moqtada Sadr had called 
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for a boycott of the election.12 Although new Defense Minister Sadoun Dulaimi was a 
Sunni, the UIA balanced his role by appointing a Shi’a as his deputy.13
Bayan Jabr and the Interior Ministry
The distribution of ministries to the political parties within the UIA created fiefdoms 
that were accountable to their party leaders rather than to the new Prime Minister. The 
most clearly detrimental posting was Bayan Jabr as the interior minister. The coalition 
initially met Jabr’s appointment with optimism. At Multi-National Security Transition 
Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus came away from ini-
tial meetings with Jabr hoping that he would prove to be less corrupt and more focused 
on security than previous interior minister Falah Naqib, whom the coalition suspected 
had stacked the ministry with cronies.14 Naqib had also been responsible for staffing the 
Special Police with former officers from the Republican Guard and Special Forces, a step 
the Shi’a and Kurdish parties had vehemently criticized.15 However, Jabr quickly proved 
to be worse than his predecessor was. Shortly after taking over the ministry, Jabr purged 
the Special Police of 300 Sunni leaders, labeling them “criminals,” and replaced them with 
Shi’a officers, mostly members of the Badr Corps. 
In his first weeks in the ministry, Jabr hired 15,000 
new recruits into the Special Police, the major-
ity of whom were Shi’a.16 As the demographics of 
the Commandos and other Special Police shifted, 
becoming majority Shi’a, the units took on the nick-
names of the “Wolf Brigade” and the “Scorpion 
Brigade,” and under the pretext of hunting down 
insurgents and terrorists the brigades began a cam-
paign of extrajudicial violence and intimidation in 
Sunni neighborhoods.
Jabr initiated a shift in the Interior Ministry’s 
local Baghdad strategy from defensive to offensive 
actions (under the name Operation LIGHTNING) 
and greatly increased the number of police bat-
talions in Baghdad.18 While this change had little 
impact on the number of insurgent attacks in the 
Baghdad area, it did result in accusations by the Sunni Arab parties that the Interior 
Ministry was deliberately “allowing large-scale infiltration of Shi’a militias and alleged 
‘death squads’ into its ranks.”19 As this infiltration progressed, reports became more fre-
quent from Sunni neighborhoods that “gunmen in police uniforms routinely abducted 
people from their homes, cars, and—in one particularly flagrant case—hospital beds.”20 
According to Finance Minister Ali Allawi, “It was common knowledge that Baghdad’s 
60,000 strong police force was divided between the Mahdi Army and the Badr Organi-
sation” with 12,000 former Badr Corps members absorbed into the Police Commandos.21
With its focus on the Sunni insurgency and on transition to the Iraqi security forces, 
MNF-I failed to recognize this escalation in government-sponsored sectarian violence. In 
briefings during mid-2005, several of Casey’s senior intelligence analysts warned their 
Source: DoD photo by 1st Brigade Combat 
Team, 4th Infantry Division Public Affairs 
(Released).
Bayan Jabr, Iraqi Minister of the 
Interior (2003-2004).17
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commander that their greatest fear was that the Iraqi security forces would become dom-
inated by the Shi’a, which could spark sectarian violence and a civil war, a danger Casey 
discounted since the minister of defense and the majority of Iraqi Army generals at that 
time were Sunni.22
The Rise of Sectarian Cleansing
Partially as a reaction to the formation of the Ja’afari government, sectarian elements 
crept into Baghdad’s mixed-sect areas aiming to establish bases of operation and cleanse 
neighborhoods. For AQI, the objective was to intimidate Shi’a living in Baghdad and 
destabilize the first Shi’a Iraqi Government in the nation’s modern history. To this end, 
Zarqawi formally announced the creation of the Umar Brigades on July 5, although it 
is likely that they were operating before the announcement. The brigades were named 
after the second caliph, Umar, who, in a symbolic reference to the contemporary strug-
gle against Iran, had conquered Persia and spread Islam through South Asia. Virulently 
anti-Shi’a and anti-Iranian, they began targeting Badr Corps leaders and Shi’a civilians in 
Baghdad and Anbar, successfully assassinating Badr commanders Kharry al-Amri and 
Adel Khosk Khabar. Using sophisticated media campaigns that created a strategy for 
each major city in Anbar Province, the brigades were largely successful in harnessing 
Sunni fear and painting Zarqawi as the defender of Iraq’s Sunni population.23
Shi’a militias from Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and Badr responded to AQI’s violence with 
their own attacks as a way to cement their hard-won political gains, protect their own 
neighborhoods, and extend their influence and control. Often, these sectarian elements 
first threatened civilians of rival sects, pressuring them to move. When intimidation 
failed, they quietly resorted to violence to achieve their objectives. One resident of the 
primarily Sunni neighborhood of Ameriyah described how the initial phases of the sec-
tarian infiltration occurred:
In 2005, we began to see how insurgents, Al-Qaeda, were taking root in the gangs roaming 
Ameriya. The first sign that al-Qaeda was moving into our area was the graffiti. . . . [Then] one of 
the mosques in the area known for its sectarian leanings became a gathering point for those of the 
al-Qaeda mindset. That was when this new ideology began emerging in the neighborhood. People 
started saying that Shi’ites were infidels. Many of my Shi’ite neighbors fled then.24
Shi’a militias, both Jaysh al-Mahdi and the Badr Corps, were using strikingly similar 
tactics in other mixed neighborhoods of Baghdad and north Babil. Saman Dlawer Hus-
sein, a Sunni who lived on the sectarian border between the Baghdad neighborhoods of 
Mansour and Washash, described how the Jaysh al-Mahdi militia moved in:
Everything started to change for the worse . . . around the beginning of 2005. . . . The troubles started 
with three suicide car bombs in Washash . . . then we started to hear stories about how the Mahdi 
Army was forcing Sunni families to leave Washash. There was no killing during this time that we 
knew of, no murdering of Sunni families. Sunnis were being made to leave Washash under threat, 
but widespread murders were not happening yet. . . . As the neighborhoods around Baghdad split 
along sectarian lines, it became difficult to move around the city because of the checkpoints set up 
by insurgents and militias. . . . A lot of my classmates began dying in their neighborhoods.25
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The sectarian gangs often disposed of their victims’ bodies in the Tigris River, result-
ing in scores of bodies being recovered each month downstream of Baghdad at Salman 
Pak and Suwayrah, as had potentially been the case with the Mada’in hostages. Despite 
the level of terror, the violence was controlled: acts of intimidation were usually method-
ically planned and often covert. On both sides, functioning organizations managed the 
violence, preventing it from becoming chaotic and uncontainable.
The developments were not just a Sunni-Shi’a affair. As the sectarian violence esca-
lated and rival militias and extra-governmental armed organizations began to propagate, 
Kurdish parties also recognized what was happening and became more overt in expand-
ing their own extra-governmental security apparatus, which had existed as a failsafe to 
prevent another genocide. In July 2005, Talabani began to establish an official all-Kurd 
Presidential Security Brigade outside of the Iraqi security forces. Even though Casey sent 
a formal letter strongly warning him against the move, Talabani went ahead with the 
formation of the unit, based in his presidential compound in Baghdad’s Karada neigh-
borhood. With ethno-sectarian armed groups, both official and unofficial, springing up 
across the map, Baghdad was becoming an armed camp.26
MNF-I had assessed that violence would spike during the volatile period while the 
government was forming and then die down. However, as the new government took 
office and attacks remained high, MNF-I was slow to appreciate its true sectarian nature 
and depth. Even so, MNF-I leaders intuitively knew that something had changed. In 
an April videoconference with Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld, Casey 
had acknowledged the escalating trend and added that “the feel is different,” without 
being able to articulate the shifting character of the conflict.27 At the same time, however, 
the MNF-I commander optimistically noted that the violence was still below the levels 
that prevailed before Iraq had regained its sovereignty and that Iraqi security forces con-
tinued to grow significantly in size.28 Despite the rosy statistics, Casey’s intuition was 
correct—the conflict was undergoing a tectonic shift, morphing from an insurgency to a 
sectarian conflict.
Al-Qaeda’s Car-Bomb Offensive
To this already bitterly toxic sectarian environment, AQI added a massive car bomb 
campaign in Baghdad that exceeded in size or scope all of its previous campaigns. In the 
mind of Zarqawi, the formation of the Ja’afari government, and the handing over of the 
reins of power to Shi’a apostates, was cause to launch an offensive against Baghdad’s Shi’a 
civilian population. Determined to incite civil war, Zarqawi employed tactics that were 
distinct from the more secular Sunni resistance organizations in their nihilistic violence, 
killing hundreds of innocents by design to achieve his overall objective. With the ascen-
dancy of Zarqawi and al-Qaeda in Iraq, a sea change had quietly taken place in the war. 
The focus of the Sunni insurgency was no longer on expelling the “occupying forces,” but 
on killing Iraqis, specifically apostate Shi’a, in support of Zarqawi’s goal of starting an 
apocalyptic sectarian civil war in Iraq and beyond. Describing Zarqawi’s blind hatred of 
the Shi’a, one coalition analyst noted that “if he had gas [chambers] and ovens, he would 
be throwing the Shia in them.”29 Years later, while imprisoned as coalition detainees, 
some of Zarqawi’s senior lieutenants described the AQI leader’s desire to incite a global 
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sectarian war by comparing him to the Joker, Heath Ledger’s character in the 2008 movie, 
“The Dark Knight,” whose central desire was “to watch the world burn.”30
It was to this end that the Jordanian launched the car-bomb campaign and infiltrated 
extremists into Baghdad neighborhoods. The spike in these attacks in the capital during 
the period surrounding Ja’afari’s swearing-in was striking. During a 13-day continuous 
surge in activity that lasted from the end of April until May 11, AQI carried out 79 car-
bomb attacks against primarily Shi’a targets. On the last day, Baghdad endured nine such 
assaults that killed 112.31 By the end of May, the number of bombings reached 142, the 
highest monthly total for 2005. In June, the bombings and sectarian violence continued 
unabated, resulting in the deaths of 1,347 Iraqi civilians, the most since the invasion phase 
of the war.32 On July 15, Baghdad was hit by eight car bombs in a 24-hour span.33 The next 
day in Musayyib, 56 kilometers south of Baghdad, a single suicide bomber killed over 100 
and wounded 150 more, destroying 150 shops and a Shi’a mosque when his device set off 
a nearby propane tanker.34
The majority of these suicide bombers were foreigners; Saudis and Kuwaitis were 
chosen, often personally, by Zarqawi. After their selection, they were ensconced in a safe 
house with four to five other bombers as the car bomb itself was constructed, separated 
from others, and fed a daily diet of religious readings and diatribes to strengthen their 
resolve. The isolation also offered AQI the opportunity to videotape their “suicide state-
ment,” which was a critical element in the deadly cycle of recruiting new bombers.35
As the bombings continued throughout the summer, a pall of fear hung over Baghdad. 
For Baghdad residents, simply leaving home to shop or run errands became a risky prop-
osition because a car bomb or suicide bomber could strike public areas at any moment. 
The sense of fear was especially strong on public transportation because of the predilec-
tion of suicide bombers for targeting the city’s buses, and because most Iraqis had no 
other transportation option. One Baghdad resident recalled that:
minibuses were a target for bombings during the bad period, and we were always reminding 
each other to stay off the crowded ones. The idea was that a bomber would probably not waste 
explosives on a minibus carrying few people. . . . So, if your bus pulls up and it’s packed, better to 
wait for the next one in the hope that it is less crowded.36
This pervasive sense of dread was an indicator that the sectarian violence was rap-
idly becoming self-perpetuating. AQI and the Sunni insurgents launched car bomb and 
kidnapping forays into Shi’a neighborhoods, while Jaysh al-Mahdi and other Shi’a mili-
tias continued their campaigns of intimidation, violence, and sectarian cleansing against 
Sunnis. At the same time, many Iraq Special Police units conducted a campaign of illegal 
arrests, torture, and execution of Sunnis. By midsummer, sectarian killings of all types 
had reached unprecedented highs, with the Baghdad morgue recording 1,100 violent 
deaths in July. A full 900 of the victims showed evidence of some type of torture or exe-
cution, such as cigarette burns, hands tied and bullet in the head, or power tool wounds.37
During this critical period of governmental transition and sectarian horrors, the U.S. 
Embassy lacked an ambassador. Ambassador John Negroponte had departed Iraq on 
March 17 after being selected by President George W. Bush to serve as the first director of 
national intelligence.38 Serving in his place, the charge d’affaires, Ambassador James Jef-
frey, was a career foreign service officer who had served as an infantry officer in Vietnam 
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and had been deputy chief of mission during the turbulent transition from Coalition Pro-
visional Authority (CPA) to the embassy. Jeffrey was highly capable but was an interim 
leader of America’s diplomatic efforts who had to manage two portfolios, as well as nav-
igate relationships with some Iraqis who were circumspect and restrained in their rela-
tions with the embassy, until the new ambassador arrived.
COALITION RESPONSE IN ANBAR AND NINAWA
Reestablishing Control of the Western Border
While the overall level of sectarian bloodshed did not alter MNF-I’s new transition 
plans, the size and scope of al-Qaeda in Iraq’s suicide car-bombing campaign led to exten-
sive deliberations on how best to stop the attacks. In June, Casey began to suspect that the 
car-bomb campaign was threatening the legitimacy of the Iraqi Government, and thus 
the coalition’s center of gravity because AQI’s ability to bomb targets with impunity cre-
ated the perception that the government was incapable of protecting its citizens.39 Casey 
also feared that the bombings could unhinge the October constitutional referendum and 
December parliamentary elections, effectively derailing the coalition’s campaign plan. 
Major General Richard P. Zahner, MNF-I’s deputy chief of staff for intelligence, com-
mented, “We had days . . . of 17 plus VBIED operations [in Baghdad] and the question 
really boiled down to at what point were the Shia going to cease exercising restraint in the 
face of an extraordinarily violent campaign?”40 The question was an apt one. Even for the 
most restrained Shi’a community leaders, patience was running out. On July 16, Grand 
Ayatollah Sistani, who previously urged the Shi’a not to retaliate violently against the 
sectarian attacks, began calling on the Ja’afari government to “defend the country against 
mass annihilation.”41
Worried that an end to Shi’a patience could lead to sectarian reprisals against Sunnis 
that, in turn, could threaten the upcoming elections, coalition leaders began exploring 
how to stem the tide of bombings. The vital components of the car bombs were following 
two infiltration routes, or rat lines, that originated in Syria, MNF-I and Multi-National 
Corps Iraq (MNC-I) analysts determined. They also believed that the vast majority of the 
suicide car-bomb drivers were foreign fighters who had to infiltrate along these routes 
because Iraqis were purportedly less willing to participate in suicide operations. These 
factors led Casey to conclude that targeting the infiltration routes and the foreign jihadist 
car bombers who used them could be decisive for stopping the wave of attacks in central 
Iraq. By reestablishing control of Iraq’s western borders, Casey believed the coalition 
would cut both infiltration routes into Anbar and Ninawa Provinces, thereby preventing 
the bombings. The first infiltration route crossed near the border town of Al Qa’im in 
Anbar Province and followed the Euphrates River Valley past Hadithah, Ramadi, Fal-
lujah, and into Baghdad. The second originated along historic desert smuggling routes 
in western Ninawa Province near the town of Sinjar, traveled east through Tel Afar to 
Mosul, and then followed the Tigris River Valley south through Salahadin Province into 
the Baghdad region.
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Donald Rumsfeld (left). Source: DoD photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Chad J. McNeeley (Released).
SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld and  
Major General Richard P. Zahner, MNF-I CJ-2.42
Casey’s and Zahner’s judgment that the main security problem was externally driven 
aligned with the public narrative of many senior Iraqi leaders. Senior officials such as 
national security adviser Mowaffaq Rubaie charged that Iraq’s violence stemmed not 
from internal strife, but from foreign powers who sent suicide terrorists into Iraq to thwart 
the political ascendancy of Iraqi Shi’a and Kurds. Most of the internal fighting, these Iraqi 
leaders contended, was merely a response to this foreign intervention. At any rate, the 
belief that the foreign-facilitated car-bomb network constituted the greatest threat to the 
coalition’s objectives represented a shift in MNF-I’s perceptions. Before June, MNF-I had 
considered former regime elements intent on derailing the political process to be its prin-
cipal enemy, but as the number of car bombs increased, MNF-I leaders came to the con-
clusion that foreign fighters and terrorists, especially Zarqawi’s AQI, were the greatest 
danger to the coalition campaign. Despite this considerable change in threat assessment, 
MNF-I leaders saw the sectarian attacks as tactical moves best answered by reposition-
ing coalition tactical forces rather than by altering the plan to transition responsibility to 
the Iraqi security forces. On June 23, Casey reported to Rumsfeld that “the nature of the 
insurgency has not changed in a way that invalidates our strategy or places our campaign 
plan at unacceptable risk.”43 Still describing the insurgency somewhat monolithically, 
Casey’s report also sanguinely judged that “insurgents will retain sufficient popular sup-
port to sustain operations. Intimidation will have limited effects, but will not increase 
popular support to the insurgency. . . . Attacks against civilians will continue, but will not 
prevent growing optimism and support for the political process.”44 The report concluded 
with the optimistic statement, “Support for the government is growing.”
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In retrospect, it appears that MNF-I saw the transformation of the insurgency in 2005 
as a change in management rather than an alteration in aims or ideology. Thus, MNF-I 
officials failed to address Zarqawi’s plan—known to the coalition since his correspon-
dence had been captured in early 2004—to ignite a sectarian civil war, even as the sectar-
ian situation in central Iraq grew more combustible.
Syria’s Role
The idea that the coalition needed to reestablish control of the border was also a tacit 
recognition of the role that Syria was playing in the conflict. Syrian President Bashar al-As-
sad provided open sanctuary to foreign jihadists and Iraqi insurgents and even assisted 
them on their way to the border. One striking example of this was the Syrian regime’s 
support to Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, the former deputy leader of Saddam’s Ba’athist regime, 
to whom the Assad regime supplied weapons via Syria’s intelligence services. Douri had 
seen the shifting political sands within the insurgency and had become a de facto ally 
of Zarqawi and al-Qaeda in Iraq, using his former Iraqi Intelligence Service contacts to 
smuggle the Syrian weapons across the border. To leverage the former Ba’athist infra-
structure fully, Douri told former Ba’athists that they would be reinstated to senior posi-
tions when the Ba’ath returned to power.45
While Assad, a leader of the Shi’a-minority Alawite sect, gave sanctuary to Sunni 
jihadists that would normally be his archenemies, the jihadists returned the favor. For 
jihadists such as al-Qaeda in Iraq, ignoring the Alawite “apostate” ruling Syria gained 
them the freedom to infiltrate Iraq easily with foreign fighters, weapons, and supplies. 
The route had become so important that by the summer of 2005, news correspondents 
had begun calling the upper Euphrates River Valley “Iraq’s Ho Chi Minh Trail” as a way 
to explain its importance.46 A senior Sunni insurgent known as Abu Ahmed later recalled, 
“All the foreigners I knew got into Iraq that way. It was no secret.”47 MNF-I’s intelligence 
analysts estimated that 100 to 125 foreign fighters entered Iraq each month through the 
Euphrates River Valley route.48
Most foreign fighters entered Syria by flying into the Damascus Airport. From there, 
facilitators from local mosques would transport them to safe houses. The volunteers 
would then be assessed for their skills, with experienced fighters sent quickly across the 
border while raw recruits entered training camps. At the camps, the recruits learned mil-
itary skills and took classes on Iraqi dialect and customs in order to assimilate better 
into the Iraqi population. When the fighters were ready to enter Iraq, they used two 
main infiltration routes from Syria into Iraq, both of which MNF-I had correctly iden-
tified. In the north, they would enter through the Tel Kushik border crossing or back 
roads near Shaddadi or Qamishli. Once inside Iraq, fighters who had shown less promise 
went through a second training cycle near Biaj, while experienced fighters proceeded to 
Tel Afar or Mosul. A southern route passed through Albu Kamal, through Al Walid, or 
across the vast expanses of the Jazeera desert north of the Euphrates before moving on to 
Al Qa’im, Ramadi, or Baghdad.49
For the Assad regime, support to Iraq’s Sunni insurgency was a way to regain leverage 
against the United States at a time when the Syrian military was being ousted from Leb-
anon by the U.S.-backed Cedar Revolution. Allowing Salafi fighters to enter Iraq through 
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Syrian territory would help keep the United States off balance, while perhaps preventing 
Iraq from becoming a U.S. ally from which attacks against Syria could be launched. The 
mission was important enough that senior regime officials headed by Bashar al-Assad’s 
own brother-in-law, Assef Shawkat, were directly involved in facilitating foreign fight-
ers into Iraq. Helping jihadists flow into Iraq also served as a relief valve for the Syrian 
regime’s own domestic Sunni opposition. Each Syrian jihadist killed across the border 
equaled one fewer problem the regime might have to contend with in the future. Pro-
viding official support and transportation to the jihadists also enabled Assad’s security 
services to identify and track individuals and groups in Syria’s domestic opposition, cat-
aloging them for potential future use.50
Because disrupting the insurgent sanctuary inside Syria was beyond the authority 
and means of the operational commanders in Iraq, Casey worked with General John Abi-
zaid at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and senior U.S. officials in Washington to 
address the problem. Abizaid, who recognized the extent of Syrian regime involvement, 
argued in a July 2005 letter to Rumsfeld, “We must send a clear message that they [Syria] 
will either secure their borders to include insurgent flow in and out or we will do it for 
them.”51 To achieve this end, Abizaid proposed several options, including armed recon-
naissance into Syrian airspace, using ground forces to strike Syrian targets of opportunity 
while in “hot pursuit” of insurgents retreating across the border, and a naval show of 
force in the eastern Mediterranean.52 While reviewing these options, CENTCOM officers 
assessed that 65 to 75 percent of the foreign fighters entering Iraq came through Syria, 
with Damascus as a “funnel point for foreign fighter entry to Syria.” They further noted, 
“restricting the flow [of foreign fighters] on a 600-kilometer eastern border is difficult; 
[we] must focus on Damascus as the entry point.”53 Accordingly, Abizaid and General 
Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, proposed to Rumsfeld that the 
United States bomb the Damascus Airport to stem the flow of foreign fighters and to 
send a signal short of invasion that Syria should stop supporting the infiltration routes.54 
The two generals believed that, even if Syria did not comply, damaging the airport could 
effectively shut down the foreign fighter pipeline fueling Zarqawi’s car-bomb campaign. 
Though Rumsfeld did not endorse the military leaders’ suggestion, at a higher level, the 
National Security Council was also exploring options for the Syria problem.55 One course 
of action discussed at both deputies’ and principals’ meetings in the summer of 2005 
was that of conducting “regime change” against the Assad government, but, as with the 
Damascus Airport proposal and other coercive actions, U.S. leaders ultimately rejected 
the idea.56 As a result, the strategic problem of the Syrian sanctuary was effectively left for 
Casey and MNF-I to manage.
The Casey-Vines Dispute
While there was general agreement at the strategic and operational levels about how 
foreign fighters were entering Iraq, there was considerable disagreement on how best to 
respond to the threat. In particular, the MNF-I and MNC-I commanders disagreed on 
how to interdict the two infiltration routes and ultimately turn the tide of the bombings 
in Baghdad. Casey believed that the geographic center of gravity for the campaign had 
shifted to the Iraqi-Syrian border in Ninawa and Anbar Provinces. As such, he believed 
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that there should be an operational-level restructuring of forces to reflect the changed 
priority, with additional combat power shifted to the border. In his view, waiting until 
the explosives, suicide bombers, and other key components of the car bombs arrived in 
Baghdad amounted to acting too late.
By contrast, Vines believed that the operational focus should remain in Baghdad and 
its environs. “[T]here was an area of healthy tension between MNF-I and MNC-I head-
quarters about the nature of the threat and what to do about it,” he recalled. “[T]here was 
an argument about whether [reestablishing control of the borders] was to be part of our 
main effort, center of gravity, or a decisive point because there were a lot of resources 
that were going to have to be committed.”57 From the MNC-I commander’s perspective, 
the border zone was a huge, porous area that would require massive amounts of combat 
power to control, something the shortage of coalition forces would make difficult to 
achieve. Vines judged that a push to the border would require more than two brigades’ 
worth of combat power, 80 percent of the coalition’s engineer assets, and 70 percent of 
its tactical transportation assets.58 Rather than committing so many forces to the border 
area, he favored focusing intelligence resources on that region, especially the increasing 
amounts of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) becoming available in the 
form of unmanned aerial vehicles. Coalition ISR platforms could identify the car bomb-
ers at the border and then track them to the belts of Baghdad, which Vines described as 
“support zones,” using classic insurgency terminology. Because the threat had to consol-
idate in the belts before launching attacks into the city, he believed it was more effective 
and economical to track the enemy combatants there and then strike before they could 
execute their attacks.
Vines was not alone in his judgment. At MNSTC-I, General David Petraeus was aware 
of the differing views and believed that Vines was right. For Petraeus, it made little sense 
to shift significant forces from the center of the country to the border in hopes of disrupt-
ing the insurgency because “the bad guys were already inside the wire” in central Iraq. 
Removing troops from the center amounted to uncovering insurgent-contested territory, 
the MNSTC-I commander believed.59
Marine leaders in MNF-W also were reluctant to move forces to the border and argued 
that securing the populated areas closer to Baghdad encompassing Ramadi, Fallujah, and 
Habbaniyah was more important for the holding of successful elections in the fall of 
2005.60 This disagreement resulted in miscommunication and interservice friction. With 
the Marines reluctant to internally retask their forces and move them west, MNF-I was 
unable to force the issue.61
The friction with MNF-W only served to further cloud the way forward between Casey 
and Vines, essentially delaying an eventual confrontation over the border initiative. After 
a multi-week delay by MNC-I in moving forces west, Casey realized the disconnect and 
clarified his intent with Vines. By that time, the disagreement had become intense. Vines 
felt so strongly that the diversion of resources from Baghdad to the border was a mistake 
that he asked Casey to provide the order in writing. Convinced his strategy was correct, 
Casey overruled Vines, and MNC-I began planning to move forces west to restore control 
of the Iraqi-Syrian border.
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Bad to Worse in Anbar
When coalition officers began to write the specifics of the plan to reestablish control 
of Iraq’s western border, they had to face the hard reality that the tactical and operational 
approaches used in Anbar were not working. The security situation in the province in 
general, and at the border specifically, had deteriorated significantly since the end of 2004 
and the withdrawal of the forces that had conducted Operation AL FAJR in Fallujah. By 
April, al-Qaeda in Iraq had regenerated after its losses in Fallujah and MNF-W’s disrup-
tion campaign.62 Because of new AQI offensives, Hit, Hadithah, and Rawah effectively 
fell to AQI control. In Hit, al-Qaeda in Iraq established Sharia courts, took control of gov-
ernment offices, and used profits from commandeered gas stations to help finance opera-
tions.63 In Hadithah, insurgents took over a defunct government power station and used 
it as a bomb factory and foreign fighter safe house.64 One hundred insurgents openly 
paraded through Rawah daily and used the local water treatment plant as their head-
quarters.65 Al Qa’im also fell in April, after which Zarqawi declared it the new capital of 
Iraq and made it his headquarters. To make Al Qa’im a symbol of what life would be like 
under an Islamist state of his making, Zarqawi set up Sharia courts, implemented Islamic 
law and punishments, and took over mosques to ensure they preached his orthodoxy. 
Religious police patrolled the streets to ensure men were cutting their hair and growing 
their beards, and the town hall flew the green flags of an Islamic state instead of Iraq’s 
flag.66
To a degree, Zarqawi’s shift west was a result of pressure from Mohammed Mah-
moud Latif and Ramadi-based insurgent groups that had decided to explore joining the 
Iraqi political process. The counterbalance that Latif and the Ramadi Shura Council pro-
vided against the eastward expansion of AQI was temporarily upset in May when coali-
tion forces arrested Mohammed Daham, a key ally of Latif on the council.67 With Daham 
arrested, Latif changed course and opened discussions on realigning the Shura Council 
with AQI.68 The temporary realignment would not last, however, as Latif and Zarqawi’s 
perspectives on the future of Iraq and the route to achieving that vision were simply 
irreconcilable.
Despite internal disagreements among the Sunni insurgent groups, the insurgent 
position across Anbar Province was strong in relation to the coalition. Demonstrating 
their strength, on April 11, AQI fighters launched a sophisticated attack against Camp 
Gannon, a Marine outpost located in Qusaybah on the Syrian border.69 The attackers used 
three successive explosive-laden transports driven by suicide bombers, each designed to 
breach farther into the compound. The first was a sport utility vehicle, the second a dump 
truck with welded-on armor, and the third a fire truck so heavily laden with explosives 
that it blew up in a mushroom cloud, with effects felt 16 kilometers away.70 The vehicles 
were followed by an assault force of nearly 100 insurgents, leading to a battle that lasted 
24 hours and required fixed- and rotary-wing air strikes to put down the militants.
Because of a lack of sufficient coalition combat power either to hold ground or to 
gain adequate situational awareness, many of MNF-W’s operations during the spring 
and early summer of 2005 were more akin to raids, in which Marine forces would clear 
an insurgent sanctuary and then leave. Colonel Stephen Davis, the Regimental Combat 
Team 2 commander responsible for western Anbar Province, explained that, because he 
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only had four rifle companies, he was only able to conduct operations that would dis-
rupt the insurgency. He later recalled, “I was trying to create the illusion of a greater 
force structure by showing up everywhere but nowhere, in order to not be predictable.”71 
Operations RIVER BLITZ, RIVER BRIDGE, MATADOR, and NEW MARKET all fell into 
this category of temporarily disrupting only the insurgent activity. So little was known 
about the enemy situation that part of the mission of the 1st Marine Division during 
Operation RIVER BLITZ was to “conduct offensive operations in Al Anbar Province to 
disrupt anti-Iraqi forces [AIF], defeat AIF elements, and generate intelligence in order 
to set the conditions for operation River Bridge.”72 On May 9, Operation MATADOR 
was different from the other operations in that it struck Ramana, on the north side of the 
Euphrates River. During the battle, an Army engineer unit built a ribbon bridge across 
the river under enemy fire—the first time since the Korean war—while Marine amphibi-
ous vehicles swam the Euphrates to secure the far side of the bridge site. Despite fighting 
that left 9 coalition troops killed and 39 wounded, as well as 144 insurgents killed and 
40 detained, all of the coalition forces that conducted the operation returned to their gar-
risons less than a week later, effectively ceding Ramana back to the insurgency.73 Many 
Marines were intensely frustrated by this operational approach, with one officer later 
describing their technique as, “we cleared, [and] abandoned; cleared, [and] abandoned.”74
This operational disruption approach was neither effective in keeping AQI and other 
Sunni insurgents off balance nor in preventing them from successfully attacking high-
value targets among the coalition’s partners. On May 12, Zarqawi’s men managed to 
kidnap Anbar Governor Rajah Nawaf Farhan al-Mahalawi, along with his son and some 
of his supporters.75 The governor’s body was discovered in Rawah nearly 3 weeks later in 
the aftermath of a battle between U.S. forces and insurgents. Because of Farhan’s position 
within the Albu Mahal tribe, his death reignited the long-standing hostilities between 
AQI and the Albu Mahal, with the tribe again looking for vengeance against Zarqawi’s 
group.
Worse yet, the disruption approach had a series of unintended consequences. In some 
cases, AQI insurgents fled to other, more remote areas of Anbar that had been untouched 
by extremism, spreading the insurgency like a malignant cancer as they went. During 
operations in Hit, Hadithah, and Ramadi, al-Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgents left tem-
porarily but returned as soon as coalition forces departed and targeted Iraqi civilians 
who had cooperated with the coalition. One group of Syrian foreign fighters went house 
to house in March offering those who had committed the “crime” of allowing coalition 
forces into their homes a choice between being killed or joining the insurgency for a 
monthly salary that was twice that of an Iraqi policeman.76
However, the disruption operations did reveal to MNF-W and its higher headquar-
ters the degree to which western Iraq had been taken over by al-Qaeda in Iraq. When 
coalition forces battled disciplined fighters wearing paramilitary fatigue uniforms and 
body armor, the insurgents demonstrated tactics and capabilities that coalition forces had 
not previously seen. This knowledge provided further impetus for MNF-I to take bold 
action on the border.77
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The Western Euphrates River Valley (WERV) Campaign
Realizing that the level of resources that had been available in Anbar Province for the 
first half of 2005 was insufficient, MNC-I flowed reinforcements westward to meet Casey’s 
intent. MNF-W received three additional Army battalions (taken from three separate com-
mands, as MNC-I did not have an uncommitted operational reserve), considerable Army 
intelligence assets, and even the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit, CENTCOM’s theater 
reserve.78 The arrival of the additional combat power would allow Regimental Combat 
Team 2, the subordinate Marine element that had responsibility for Area of Operations 
Atlanta in western Anbar Province, to consolidate its forces closer to the border and 
increase the tempo of its operations. From the Combined Joint Special Operations Task 
Force (CJSOTF), an entire company, one of only nine in the country at the time, moved 
from Kirkuk to Anbar, accompanied by a Navy Sea, Air, and Land Teams (SEAL) Task 
Unit, representing the first Special Forces returning to Anbar in nearly a year.79 
Before the arrival of these additional forces, only a single regimental combat team of 
3,200 Marines and Sailors had held the westernmost districts of Anbar Province, a battle 
space of about 77,700 square kilometers equal in size to the state of South Carolina.80 
By the time all of the reinforcements arrived in the early fall, more than 14,000 coalition 
troops were occupying the same area.81 As these forces concentrated, MNC-I planned 
Operation SAYAID (“Hunter”) (more commonly called WERV by the Marines), focusing 
on reestablishing control of Al Qa’im and Hadithah. The operation also envisioned that 
the Marines would push east near Ramadi as a hammer against the anvil of the 3d Infan-
try Division in Baghdad.
As MNC-I and MNF-I drew up the details of Operation SAYAID, a challenge emerged 
north of the Euphrates that had first materialized during Operation MATADOR. Orig-
inally, the Marines in Multi-National Forces West (MNF-W) had responsibility for both 
sides of the river, with the boundary between their area of operations and Multi-National 
Brigade Northwest (MNB-NW) lying north of the river. However, a lack of bridging 
assets made it “extraordinarily dangerous,” in Vines’s words, for the Marines to consis-
tently operate north of the river.82 As a result, MNF-W had limited its presence and oper-
ations there, meaning that the territory along the Syrian border north of the Euphrates 
River but south of Tel Afar in Ninawa Province had become an open seam between the 
two coalition commands. For all intents and purposes, the vast Jazeera desert region—an 
area with a rich smuggling history—had been left virtually undefended against incur-
sions from Syria.
After a considerable internal debate, MNC-I closed the gap by shifting the bound-
ary between MNF-W and MNB-NW south and assigning MNB-NW responsibility for 
the north bank of the Euphrates. This decision, based on MNC-I’s inability to convince 
MNF-W to reposition forces internally, created significant discord among the coalition 
commanders because it meant that MNB-NW had to move some of its already limited 
combat power hundreds of kilometers away from its original area of responsibility and 
stretch its extended span of command and control even farther. Simply resupplying the 
forces in the new sector from Mosul would require over seven hours of driving each 
way.83 The boundary change, however, did enable MNF-W to focus its combat power 
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over a smaller area and push additional forces to the Syrian border from Fallujah and 
Ramadi.
As Task Force Freedom took up its expanded battle space in MNB-NW, MNC-I 
ordered Major General David M. Rodriguez’s command to establish a combat outpost 
in the desert roughly 30 kilometers northeast of the town of Rawah by July 15. It was 
a location theoretically optimal for patrolling roads on the north side of the Euphrates 
River and running interdiction missions into the empty Jazeera desert space between 
the two major routes from Syria. Given the size of the area to be covered, Rodriguez and 
Task Force Freedom ordered the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (a Stryker brigade) in 
Mosul to send its reconnaissance squadron with an attached infantry company to estab-
lish the new outpost.84 After establishing Combat Outpost Rawah, the Soldiers began 
patrolling the towns along the north side of the river and realized their fears of find-
ing an insurgent sanctuary were well founded. When the reconnaissance, surveillance, 
and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron first entered Rawah, it had to fight its way into 
town, enduring two dozen improvised explosive device (IED) attacks and eight suicide 
car bombs in its first month after arriving.85
At MNF-I’s request, other special operations forces also supported Casey’s operational 
surge into Anbar as part of the WERV Campaign. Combat elements were pushed west 
to the newly cleared outpost at Rawah, along with additional enablers, support assets, 
and rotary-wing assets—all aimed at disrupting the flow of foreign fighters and targeting 
key leaders. The increased assets included the significant deployment of a new battalion 
that had served as a strategic reserve in the United States and required authorization 
by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for commitment to Iraq. In a change from 
normal command relationships that regularly had special operations forces working to 
support conventional forces, MNC-I instead designated the assigned special operations 
headquarters at Combat Outpost Rawah as the supported element, with some Army and 
Marine conventional forces in support.86 Support from conventional forces included ISR, 
Strykers, a company of Apache attack helicopters, a Multiple Launch Rocket System bat-
tery, and a platoon-size quick reaction force (see Map 17).87
The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment to Ninawa Province
As part of his operational plan to reestablish control of the Iraqi-Syrian border, in May 
Vines ordered all but one squadron of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment to reposition 
from southern Baghdad to Ninawa Province. While the move of the 3d Armored Cavalry 
Regiment to Ninawa represented a northern complement to the WERV Campaign that 
aimed to shut down the foreign fighter infiltration route that passed through Sinjar and 
Mosul, it also was a tacit recognition of the under-resourcing of MNB-NW. The move also 
highlighted the turbulence of forces that was a by-product of not having an operational 
reserve. The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment’s repositioning came a mere 3 months after 
it had assumed responsibility for its original battle space in the infamous “Triangle of 
Death” area encompassing the towns of Yusufiyah, Mahmudiyah, and Lutufiyah, south 
of Baghdad.
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Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.
Map 17. MNF–I Border Campaign, Summer–Fall 2005.
The addition of these forces effectively doubled the combat power in Ninawa Prov-
ince, and MNB-NW was temporarily renamed MNF-NW. Task Force Freedom then 
assigned the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment the mission of pacifying the town of Tel Afar 
and the terrain beyond the town to the Syrian border, including Sinjar and the border 
town of Rabiah. At the same time, the unit was tasked to block insurgent infiltration from 
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Syria. The new concentration of combat power allowed Task Force Freedom to focus its 
remaining brigade, 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, on Mosul.
The Zarqawi-Zawahiri Dispute
Just as the coalition had experienced considerable internal debate and disagreement 
over how to respond properly to al-Qaeda in Iraq’s operational moves, AQI experienced 
similar discord with its professed headquarters of al-Qaeda’s senior leaders in Pakistan 
over what constituted the most appropriate strategy. Zarqawi’s tendencies to use unre-
strained violence and to target Iraq’s Shi’a population deeply worried al-Qaeda’s senior 
leaders. While unafraid to massacre civilians when it served their purposes, al-Qaeda’s 
central leaders generally made cautious, almost business-like calculations before launch-
ing attacks to maximize their effectiveness and achieve the desired intent. By contrast, 
Zarqawi seemed to be driven by a deeply held theological hatred of the Shi’a—a reckless 
style that many in al-Qaeda’s senior levels were coming to believe was counterproductive.
It was this style that prompted Ayman al-Zawahiri, thought to be the intellectual 
“brains” of al-Qaeda, to write Zarqawi a letter on July 9, warning him that he had gone 
operationally off track and asking him to get back on course. In the letter, Zawahiri 
expressed concern that the violence and sectarian strife that Zarqawi sowed endangered 
his movement’s popular support in Iraq and neighboring countries.
If we are in agreement that the victory of Islam and the establishment of a caliphate in the manner 
of the Prophet will not be achieved except through jihad against the apostate rulers and their 
removal, then this goal will not be accomplished by the mujahed movement while it is cut off from 
popular support. . . . In the absence of this popular support, the Islamic mujahed movement would 
be crushed in the shadows.88
To avoid losing this popular support, Zawahiri counseled Zarqawi that “the Muja-
hed movement must avoid any action that the masses do not understand or approve, 
if there is no contravention of Sharia [religious law] in such avoidance, and as long as 
there are other options to resort to.”89 Zawahiri specifically criticized Zarqawi’s practices 
of beheading hostages and attacking Shi’a Muslims, which the al-Qaeda leader believed 
jeopardized the popular support he deemed so critical to al-Qaeda’s broader efforts. 
Zawahiri was blunt in his challenge to Zarqawi’s tactics, explaining that:
among the things which the feelings of the Muslim populace who love and support you will 
never find palatable also are the scenes of slaughtering the hostages. You shouldn’t be deceived 
by the praise of some of the zealous young men and their description of you as the shaykh of 
the slaughterers. They do not express the general view of the admirer and the supporter of the 
resistance in Iraq, and of you in particular.90
Zawahiri noted that while he believed the coalition used equally brutal tactics, citing 
the use of cluster bombs, depleted uranium, and the death of his own wife and daughter, 
al-Qaeda should not bring itself to the same level, for practical reasons. Al-Qaeda should
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Osama Bin Laden (left). Source: Photo by Hamid Mir.
Al-Qaeda Leaders Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri.91
not be governed by emotion in its responses, Zawahiri concluded, because at least half of 
the battle would be fought on the media battlefield, where maintaining popular support 
and the “hearts and minds” of the Muslim community was paramount.
On the topic of provoking a sectarian civil war, Zawahiri wrote that most Muslims 
had not come to realize that the Shi’a were apostates, and as a result, “many of your 
Muslim admirers amongst the common folk are wondering about your attack on the 
Shia. The sharpness of this questioning increases when the attacks are on one of their 
mosques, and it increases more when the attacks are on the mausoleum of Imam Ali 
Bin Abi Talib, may God honor him.”92 Attacking the Shi’a, Zawahiri warned, “won’t be 
acceptable to the Muslim population however much you have tried to explain it.”93 Mir-
roring Abizaid’s counsel not to provoke a fight with Shi’a militants in early 2004, Zawa-
hiri warned Zarqawi that starting a civil war with the Shi’a was folly because it amounted 
to the opening of a second, unnecessary front when AQI was already fully committed in 
its fight to eject the coalition. Emphasizing the difficulties associated with opening such 
a second front, Zawahiri rhetorically asked Zarqawi, “can the mujahedeen kill all of the 
Shia in Iraq? Has any Islamic state in history ever tried that? . . . [W]hat loss will befall us 
if we did not attack the Shia?”94 He also questioned why Zarqawi would want to openly 
publicize making war against the Shi’a and claim responsibility for such attacks, noting 
that doing so “compels the Iranians to take counter measures,” which could endanger 
the de facto Iranian–al-Qaeda nonaggression pact. Pointing out that Iran held over 100 
al-Qaeda leaders in custody, Zawahiri reasoned, “we and the Iranians need to refrain 
from harming each other at this time in which the Americans are targeting us.”95
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Zawahiri also addressed the topic of the overall objectives of the Iraqi jihad and how 
they should be achieved. First, Zawahiri reaffirmed the centrality of the campaign in Iraq 
for al-Qaeda’s global strategy and instructed Zarqawi that his ultimate objective should 
be reestablishing the caliphate in the country. He wrote, “The victory of Islam will never 
take place until a Muslim state is established in the manner of the Prophet in the heart 
of the Islamic world, specifically in the Levant, Egypt, and the neighboring states of the 
Peninsula and Iraq.”96 Yet as a first step, Zawahiri counseled, Zarqawi’s primary near-
term objective should be expelling coalition forces from Iraq. Declaring the return of the 
caliphate too early was unwise, Zawahiri judged, because it might bring stronger exter-
nal opposition against al-Qaeda in Iraq. Instead, Zawahiri argued that an emirate should 
be established in Iraq, but only after American forces had withdrawn. The al-Qaeda emir-
ate should be allowed to grow and strengthen before the declaration of an Islamic state 
and the return of the caliphate.
Despite the warnings from Zawahiri, Zarqawi continued along the same path, barely 
altering his tactics. The disagreements between al-Qaeda’s senior leadership hiding in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan and its more violent Iraqi offshoot would persist until relations 
between the two groups would finally fracture in 2014.
Targeting of the New Government and the International Presence
Over the summer and early fall of 2005, Iraq’s internal security situation deteriorated, 
with elected officials attacked by rival factions intent on affecting the future government 
and enhancing the power of their own ethno-sectarian groups. Zarqawi’s operatives and 
other Sunni insurgent groups continued to assassinate and intimidate government lead-
ers and Shi’a religious leaders as a way to undermine the legitimacy of the new Shi’a 
government, but rival Shi’a organizations and Iranian proxies also joined in the violence. 
On April 18, 2 days before an attempted assassination of Allawi, insurgents assassinated 
Major General Adnan Qaragholi, a senior adviser to the defense minister, in his home 
in southern Baghdad.97 On July 1, gunmen killed a senior aide to Grand Ayatollah Sis-
tani in a drive-by shooting outside a Baghdad mosque. On the same day, a car bomb 
struck the offices of Prime Minister Ja’afari, killing one Iraqi. Also on that day, a mortar 
attack against a government-run power station caused a water plant to shut down, leav-
ing millions of Baghdad residents without running water in 100-degree temperatures.98 
Lower-level government officials were targeted as well, with 83 mid-ranking officials 
assassinated from the start of the year until the end of June, and reported acts of intimida-
tion against Iraqi police increased 73 percent over the same period.99 Intimidation events 
of all classes skyrocketed in the fall as the elections approached, jumping from a gener-
ally consistent monthly average of approximately 70 events from March through August 
to 275 in September, and nearly 400 in October.100
Attacks against weaker members of the coalition and supporters of the new Iraqi Gov-
ernment persisted during the same period. On July 2, al-Qaeda operatives kidnapped 
and executed the new Egyptian ambassador shortly after his arrival in Iraq, making him 
the most senior hostage to be murdered since the start of the conflict. His killing was 
meant as a message to neighboring states that supporting the new Shi’a-led government 
would carry a price, even among those who normally had immunity. In the case of Egypt, 
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the attempt to isolate the new Iraq from its neighbors was effective, as the Egyptians did 
not assign a new ambassador to Baghdad until 2009. A mere 3 days after the abduction 
of the Egyptian ambassador, gunmen attacked separate convoys carrying the senior dip-
lomats for Bahrain and Pakistan, wounding the Bahraini diplomat and leading Pakistan 
to withdraw its ambassador. Sixteen days after those attacks, al-Qaeda in Iraq continued 
the tactic by abducting and eventually murdering two Algerian diplomats in Baghdad.101
On July 7, four terrorists inspired by the larger al-Qaeda movement detonated bombs 
on London’s public transportation network, killing 52 and injuring over 700. While the 
bombers had no direct ties to al-Qaeda in Iraq, in prerecorded videos aimed at the West-
ern audience they described themselves as soldiers; praised Osama Bin Laden, Zawa-
hiri, and Zarqawi as heroes; and promised additional attacks that would “continue and 
become stronger until you pulled your troops out of Afghanistan and Iraq.”102 A second 
set of terrorists made a failed attempt at similar strikes in London 2 weeks later. These 
assaults were in keeping with Zawahiri’s advice to Zarqawi to focus on expelling the 
coalition rather than focusing on the Shi’a, but, unlike many of the previous attacks on 
coalition countries, they did not buckle the British support for the mission.
The Arrival of Ambassador Khalilzad
On July 24, the senior U.S. diplomat Zalmay Khalilzad arrived in Iraq to fill the 
ambassador’s post that had been vacant for 4 months. Khalilzad was an Afghan-Ameri-
can Sunni Muslim who had served in senior Department of Defense (DoD) and Depart-
ment of State posts in various administrations. Prior to his appointment as ambassador to 
Iraq, he had served as the ambassador to Afghanistan, and his experiences there shaped 
his approach to Iraqi politics. In Afghanistan, he had become well versed in the basic 
concepts of counterinsurgency and had broken new ground on collaboration between 
embassy and military commands, championing the concept of provincial reconstruction 
teams that focused on nation building and economic development.
Khalilzad also arrived with a Washington-endorsed mission of reversing the Janu-
ary Sunni boycott. Whereas Casey and other MNF-I leaders believed Negroponte had 
slowed outreach to Sunnis in the crucial period before the January 2005 elections, Khalil-
zad arrived in July with an explicit mission of persuading Sunnis to join the political 
process in time for the constitutional referendum and the next round of parliamentary 
elections.103 Casey was predisposed to such outreach, and by July he had begun pro-
posing to use engagement and nonlethal tools with Sunni rejectionists and insurgents 
who espoused the ideas of neither AQI nor the Ba’ath Party as a way of driving a wedge 
between different elements of the insurgency.104
Also during the summer, Bush had asked Casey to remain the MNF-I commander for 
another year, until roughly June 2006, and the general agreed. These decisions resulted in 
the establishment of the sixth interagency team to head the coalition in Iraq since the fall 
of Saddam slightly more than 2 years before.
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Ambassador Khalilzad (left), Rumsfeld (center), General Casey (right).  
Source: DoD photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Chad J. McNeeley (Released).
Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad and Commanding General, MNF–I,  
George W. Casey, Flank Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.105
THE CONTINUING DETENTION PROBLEM
Roots of the Detention Problem
By mid-2005, the coalition’s detention problems had begun to boil over again. A funda-
mental problem that had bedeviled the coalition from its earliest days was that the Feday-
een Saddam, insurgents, and militias that opposed the coalition did not neatly fit into any 
category under the Geneva Conventions. From an early stage, the coalition had decided 
to hold captured enemy fighters as civilian internees or security detainees addressed by 
the Fourth Geneva Convention, rather than enemy prisoners of war covered under the 
third Geneva Convention. That decision drove much of the coalition’s subsequent deten-
tion policy because civilian internees were due considerable legal protections, including 
a review of their detention status every 6 months after capture. Based on a legal interpre-
tation of the rules associated with civilian internees in the initial months of the war, the 
CPA had also established a requirement for an Iraqi-U.S. board, called the Joint Detainee 
Committee, to review detainees’ status after 18 months of detention. Barring convincing 
evidence that detainees posed a security risk, it was assumed that detainees should be 
released after that review. Consequently, holding a detainee past 18 months required the 
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approval of both the Iraqi Prime Minister and the MNF-I commander.106 The requirement 
for this review did not change for the duration of the war.
Another factor contributing to MNF-I’s detention problems was intense pressure from 
Rumsfeld to transfer detention responsibilities to Iraqi authorities as quickly as possible. 
His frustration with the fact that U.S. troops were still running the detention program 
in Iraq spurred him to send three snowflakes (short memoranda requiring action on the 
part of a DoD official) over a 5-week period in February and March 2005, calling on Casey 
to expedite the transition. In his second snowflake, Rumsfeld was particularly blunt. “We 
have to figure a way to get out of the Iraqi detainee business,” he wrote. “Iraq is a sover-
eign state, with an elected government, and must get arranged to take on the responsibil-
ity of holding, interrogating, and trying their prisoners with relatively few exceptions.”107 
When told that developing a transition plan would take until early summer, he again 
pressed MNF-I to speed the transfer of detainees, writing, “That is too long. I need some-
thing much faster, by mid-July at the latest, this ought to be a top planning and execution 
priority.”108
Iraqi Government leaders echoed Rumsfeld’s views. Almost as soon as the coali-
tion transferred sovereignty to the Iraqis in June 2004, Iraqi political leaders questioned 
why the coalition was conducting unilateral arrests of Iraqi citizens and sending them to 
detention centers not run by the Iraqi Government. Demands to release prisoners became 
commonplace, with both Allawi and Ja’afari personally interceding with Casey on sev-
eral occasions to obtain the release of relatives of constituents. For example, on April 11, 
2005, Allawi wrote to Casey in an attempt to take more control over the process.
I would like to request that the detainee file be re-addressed, there are numerous Iraqi suspects that 
have been apprehended during times of instability under the suspicion of involvement in terrorist 
or insurgent activities, however, these detainees have not yet been convicted of any crime and 
currently remain in an undefined form of detention. . . . I consider this matter to be of the utmost 
importance and look forward to a briefing on how it is to be resolved in a timely manner.109
When these factors were paired with a rapidly expanding prison population, they 
produced a volatile cocktail. Rumsfeld’s desire to transition the detention program to the 
Iraqis translated into a policy of little-to-no new prison construction, a decision that only 
exacerbated a rapidly developing overcrowding problem. That overcrowding, when 
combined with intense Iraqi political demands and the legal requirements of the Geneva 
Conventions, created tremendous pressure to release large numbers of detainees regu-
larly. Those releases would create a rift between the tactical and operational level that 
would persist for the duration of the war. At the same time, the overcrowding would also 
lead to a loss of control within the camps, a problem that itself created further pressure 
for additional releases.
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Source: U.S. Army photo by Sergeant Lynne Steely (Released).
Major General William H. Brandenburg, CG, TF 134.110
Evidentiary Requirements and Review and Release Boards
In the summer of 2004, MNF-I had created Task Force 134 (named after the building 
number of its headquarters) to handle the pressures on the detention system and to correct 
the problems that the Abu Ghraib scandal had brought to light. The new headquarters 
created regulations and policies to meet the legal requirements of the Geneva Conven-
tions, to effectively manage the detention program, and to try to balance demands from 
Washington and Baghdad.
Some of these well-intentioned regulations created unintended burdens at the tactical 
level as they reshaped the military detention system into one resembling civilian law 
enforcement operations. By mid-2005, MNF-I required two sworn witness statements 
or forensic evidence in order for units to detain an individual beyond 72 hours.111 For 
most units, this requirement was a substantial hurdle. Only a handful had conducted 
predeployment training with police forces on writing witness statements and collect-
ing evidence. The quality of physical and testimonial evidence was uneven, resulting 
in some detainees ultimately being released. In 2005, Task Force 134 Commander Major 
General William H. Brandenburg tried to remedy the deficiency by sending a mobile 
training team to each brigade in Iraq, but transitioning combat Soldiers to a new law– 
enforcement–like paradigm was difficult.112
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The new rules were meant to address concerns that some U.S. units tended to detain 
military-age males in large dragnets not driven by specific intelligence—mockingly nick-
named “block parties” or “roundups”—as well as to set limits on how long detainees 
could be kept at each level. After initial capture, detainees could spend a maximum of 
72 hours at a battalion or brigade detention facility and then either be moved to a divi-
sion-level detention facility for up to 21 days or processed into one of the theater intern-
ment facilities.113 At each level, the detainee’s arrest packet was reviewed, resulting in 
some detainees being released for insufficient evidence.
Tactical units generally bristled at these requirements, with commanders objecting 
that the arbitrary timelines prevented them from exploiting intelligence obtained during 
interrogations and that, once detainees were sent to theater internment facilities, units 
tended to receive no information about their further interrogations. MNF-I and Task 
Force 134 officials countered that the timelines prevented potential detainee abuses by 
centralizing the process and simplifying oversight, and that information gained after the 
72-hour time limit was often of little tactical value.114 Interrogations were conducted at 
the theater facilities in 2005, but lingering concerns from the Abu Ghraib abuses, coupled 
with the lack of resources to conduct the interrogations properly and exploit documents 
and other materials captured with the detainees, limited their effectiveness.
Once detainees entered one of the coalition’s four theater internment facilities, their 
legal status as civilian internees under the fourth Geneva Convention meant that a review 
of detainee records was required every 180 days to determine if the detention should 
continue.115 These assessments were conducted by the Combined Review and Release 
Board (CRRB) composed of MNF-I officers and representatives from Iraq’s Ministries of 
Interior, Justice, and Human Rights, with the Iraqi board members usually constituting a 
majority.116 There were significant drawbacks with this system, as there were no fixed cri-
teria for release. The evidence that coalition units used to lead to arrests was usually clas-
sified, and witness statements often were taken from sensitive human sources, meaning 
the Iraqi members of the board often could not examine all of the information explaining 
why detainees had been captured in the first place. Additionally, the requirement for two 
witness statements or forensic evidence, which had not existed during the early months 
of the war, proved particularly onerous since most of the early detainees had neither 
statements nor forensic evidence in their detention files. Technology to facilitate captur-
ing such forensic evidence, such as hand swipes that could detect explosive residue and 
biometric sensors, was only beginning to be fielded to coalition forces by the summer of 
2005. Worse, as the Interior and other ministries came under the control of various Shi’a 
sectarians in 2005–2006, the integrity of the board itself came into question at times.
If the CRRB determined that detainees met the criteria for release, Task Force 134 
would send notices to all of the multinational divisions 10 days before the planned release 
date. If any coalition units objected to a detainee’s release, Brandenburg, the Task Force 
134 commander, would intervene to halt the process. “If the division came back and red 
carded [the detainee], I would hold them and not release them,” he explained later, and 
“I would override the CRRB.”117
Brandenburg and Task Force 134 believed this approach was a sufficient check 
and balance, but the gulf between the tactical- and operational-level perspectives was 
profound. Many tactical units believed the notification timeline was not sufficient for 
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involving their commanders in the process, given unit deployment cycles and personnel 
turnover. In many cases, by the time the board reviewed detainee packets, the unit that 
had captured the detainee had already rotated home. While Task Force 134 made efforts 
to contact units in these cases, the reassignment of personnel, or the wholesale moving of 
units from one base to another because of Army transformation, often meant the original 
unit and its leaders had dropped from the picture.
“Catch and Release”
From August 2004 to November 2005, the Combined Review and Release Board 
reviewed 23,079 detainee files, recommending 4,546 for unconditional release and 7,902 
for discharge with guarantors (local Iraqis who promised to keep the detainee on the 
straight path), of which just over 400 were blocked from release after the multinational 
divisions raised objections.118 After the multinational divisions’ responses and objections 
were evaluated, ultimately 12,025 detainees were released during this period.119 In sum, 
this meant that over 50 percent of detainees that went before the board were recom-
mended for discharge when their files were reviewed, and almost 97 percent of detainees 
recommended for release by the board were ultimately freed.120 When these releases were 
added to the discharges resulting from legal reviews at the brigade and division level, 
statistically 75 percent of detainees were freed within 6 months of their capture.
Chart 4. Releases at Theater Internment Facilities by Calendar Year.
The high percentage of releases was at least partly a response to prison overcrowd-
ing. Rumsfeld’s goal of handing over detention operations, combined with the coalition’s 
overarching assumption that a coalition drawdown and withdrawal were on the horizon, 
translated into a U.S. policy of not funding prison construction in Iraq. Rumsfeld had 
initially wanted MNF-I to return the tainted Abu Ghraib prison complex to the Iraqis by 
February 2005, a goal that was missed by more than a year. However, the slowdown in 
prison capacity was not matched by a decrease in the number of detainees being captured, 
so that the coalition’s detention facilities quickly became filled to capacity and required 
a relief valve in the form of detainee releases on a regular basis to prevent dangerous 
overcrowding. With little-to-no new construction authorized because of Rumsfeld’s aim 
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to “get out of the Iraqi detainee business,” the question of whether to hold detainees or 
discharge them became partly a mathematical one. Each day, an average of 50 detainees 
arrived at the theater internment facilities, although this number spiked to 70 detainees a 
day during the higher tempo of operations in the January 2005 pre-election period.121 As 
of February 1, 2005, the coalition’s detention facilities held a detainee population of 8,517, 
virtually equal to the maximum detention capacity of 8,540. Despite numerous releases 
and some slow growth in temporary tent-like facilities, the capacity of the detention facil-
ities did not keep pace with the growth in the number of detainees in 2005. By November, 
the population had reached 13,389, far exceeding the maximum capacity of 11,506.122
Chart 5. The Detention Conundrum.
As a result, releasing detainees became not just a policy goal, but also a security imper-
ative if the coalition were to avoid escape attempts, prisoner riots, or the reproduction 
of the conditions that had led to the Abu Ghraib abuses. According to Brandenburg, one 
of Task Force 134’s core problems was “just the pure physics of it. We could only house 
so many. Security operations ramped up. We were scrambling to keep up with it. It is a 
function of how long it takes to build and get money to be able to build and where you 
are able to do it.”123 The MNF-I headquarters and Casey also used discharges of screened 
detainees as a relief valve for prison overcrowding and targeted releases of detainees, 
of whom about 95 percent were Sunnis, as part of a larger plan to entice Sunnis into the 
political process after the January 2005 election boycott.124 Several detainee releases were 
part of back-channel negotiations to try to improve Sunni participation, including a large-
scale discharge of 929 detainees in August and a second round of 1,134 in September.125 
However, even with this approach, the buildup of detainees exceeded the rate of releases 
for both of these months and every other month of 2005 except for one.
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The high rate of discharges created frustration and mistrust in many tactical-level 
units, who chafed at the idea of risking their troops’ lives to capture insurgents only to 
have them released a few months later, sometimes seemingly without explanation. For 
many U.S. field units and commanders, the coalition seemed to have strayed into a “catch 
and release” approach to the insurgency. By the summer of 2005, U.S. units saw signs 
that insurgents had begun to understand the detention system and were making efforts 
to manipulate it. In one case, an insurgent taken into custody by a Special Forces Opera-
tional Detachment Alpha in Anbar Province defiantly told his captors, “I’ve killed a lot of 
tribesmen [who were assisting the coalition] in the past. I’ve probably been detained for 
it before. I’ll go to Abu Ghraib or to Camp Bucca for a few days. I’ll eat my three meals 
a day, and I’ll be back and kill them again.”126 In another egregious case, one insurgent 
captured while emplacing IEDs had his Combined Review and Release Board (CRRB) 
release papers in the truck that contained his bomb-making devices.127
The recidivism rate of released detainees was one of the most problematic and divi-
sive issues of the entire process. As of December 2005, Task Force 134’s statistics showed 
an impossibly low 1.6 percent recidivism rate. However, tactical units claimed that the 
recidivism data was often based on fake or mistaken detainee names and insufficient 
biometric databases that some released detainees were being killed rather than recap-
tured, and that other released detainees had returned to the fight but had simply evaded 
recapture.128
Added together, MNF-I’s detention policies had the unfortunate effect of creating 
mistrust between tactical units and higher echelons, as well as producing a lack of faith 
in the entire detention system. In some cases, it created moral-ethical dilemmas for junior 
leaders. Soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and junior officers on numerous occasions 
had reason to question why the dangerous insurgents they captured were often released 
from detention and back on the streets, sometimes within a unit’s year-long rotation. 
Some commanders noted that the catch-and-release system created a perverse incentive 
among U.S. troops to use deadly force on any insurgent that did not immediately surren-
der. Anecdotal evidence indicated that, though most leaders did not act on this incentive, 
some troops and leaders condoned such practices. In one case, during the planning of a 
mission to capture an insurgent for the third time, an officer recommended that his men 
should “just shoot him unless he surrenders first.”
Loss of Control Inside the Camps
The overcrowding of the theater internment facilities made it difficult for Task Force 
134 to maintain a careful separation among different classes of detainees. One RAND 
report later described, “The large number of detainees presented such logistical chal-
lenges that, initially, their administrators were fully occupied with the task of simply 
‘warehousing’ them and accomplishing crude separations of those groups judged most 
likely to harm or kill each other if housed together.”129 In 2005, the overcrowding created 
a lack of order and control in many of the coalition’s larger, open-air detention camps, 
where insurgent groups effectively took control of what happened inside and made them 
too dangerous for coalition guards to enter. Insurgents in the camps formed recruiting 
cells, conducted training, and in some cases ran their own Sharia courts. As new detainees 
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arrived, hard-core jihadists and other extremists set up propaganda cells to radicalize 
those less prone to extremism. One former insurgent leader from Dhuluiyah, Mullah 
Nadhim Jabouri, described the process of radicalization:
While I was detained, my ideology changed from that of the Islamic Army to that of  
Al Qaeda. . . . Because of the freedom that the Americans gave to the prisoners, I was able to learn 
and study Al Qaeda’s ideas while I was in prison. I had the chance to meet foreign fighters who 
fought in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Sudan while I was in prison. They started to move the Iraqis 
towards their ideas and beliefs.130
In addition to recruiting, insurgent leaders were able to meet with fellow leaders from 
across the country to network and exchange tactics, techniques, and procedures. “We 
could never have all got together like this in Baghdad, or anywhere else,” one mid-level 
insurgent recalled in 2014. “It would have been impossibly dangerous. [In Camp Bucca] 
we were not only safe, but we were only a few hundred meters away from the entire 
al-Qai’da leadership. . . . Bucca was a factory. It made us all. It built our ideology.”131 Some 
frustrated tactical units began to refer derisively to the detention facilities as “Jihadist 
Gladiator Training Camps” in recognition of this development. 
Riots and escape attempts went along with the lack of control. On January 31, 2005, 
riots at Camp Bucca escalated to the point that U.S. commanders on the scene, fearing a 
massive prison break, authorized guards to use live ammunition to quell the uprising. 
Four detainees were killed and six injured.132 Another riot at Camp Bucca that began 
on April 1 lasted 3 violent days. After discovering that the hand sanitizer in the camp’s 
portable bathrooms was flammable, detainees set fire to tents and made launchable fire-
bombs, using slingshots and milk cartons filled with the liquid. The detainees also used 
wooden sleeping pallets as shields and broken chunks of rock as slingshot ammunition. 
In the riot’s early hours, they targeted the on-scene commander of the 105th Military 
Police Battalion from the North Carolina National Guard, injuring him so seriously with 
a rock that he required evacuation.133 Just before the riot, military police discovered and 
destroyed a nearly complete 357-foot escape tunnel that could likely have turned the riot 
into a massive, coordinated escape.
At exactly the time the April riots at Camp Bucca were consuming much of Task Force 
134’s attention, al-Qaeda in Iraq insurgents launched a complex attack on April 2 against 
the detention center at Abu Ghraib. Seven suicide car bombers and up to 150 fighters 
struck the prison with crew-served weapons, vehicles, and mortars in a battle that lasted 
for several hours, until a Marine quick reaction force arrived from MNF-W and turned the 
tide against the attackers. Zarqawi himself allegedly planned the assault, and the assail-
ants were composed of foreign fighters and Albu Issa tribe members. The tribesmen were 
reportedly attempting to free fellow tribe members and seeking vengeance for coalition 
operations that killed some of their sheikh’s family.134 Twenty Soldiers and Marines were 
wounded in the fight.135 After the battle, Rumsfeld again questioned Casey in a snowflake 
about why the Iraqi security forces could not take over the detention mission.136
Halfway through Brandenburg’s command, the problems inside the detention camps 
had become clear, as had the fact that Task Force 134 was too poorly resourced to solve 
them. In July, Brandenburg requested an additional three battalion headquarters, eight 
military police companies, and other support troops that would double the task force’s 
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strength to 1,700.137 The general’s request would also expand the transition team concept 
to the detention field, creating Detention Transition Teams (DTTs) to train Iraqi correc-
tional officers. Ironically, despite Rumsfeld’s intent to close down America’s detention 
operations in Iraq, Brandenburg’s request was approved, and the task force became one 
of the few organizations in Iraq that grew in size on the SECDEF’s watch.
Recognizing that the loss of control within the camps was also a facilities problem, 
Brandenburg pushed requests for military construction through the budgeting system. 
Despite considerable resistance from Rumsfeld and others in DoD, the construction 
requests ultimately prevailed, at least partly because of Casey’s dogged support. The 
new construction would expand Task Force 134’s detainee capacity while replacing most 
of its temporary facilities and tents with buildings that complied with the Geneva Con-
ventions requirement to house detainees in structures similar to those of the soldiers 
fighting the war. At the same time, the new facilities would be designed to segregate 
detainees into smaller groups and allow the task force to separate radicals and leaders 
from insurgent foot soldiers and less ideologically driven fighters. Reflecting the slow 
speed of the military bureaucracy, however, none of those additional resources would 
arrive until after Brandenburg’s departure from Iraq in December 2005, and the problems 
inside the detention facilities were left to his successors.
***
By the late summer of 2005, MNF-I had concentrated combat power in Anbar and 
Ninawa Provinces and was poised to begin its campaign to stop the car-bomb offen-
sive against Baghdad by retaking the WERV and the Sinjar–Tel Afar corridor. In doing 
so, Casey and MNF-I believed they would be striking at foreign fighters who were the 
principal threat to central Iraq and to the elections scheduled for October and December. 
Unfortunately, this MNF-I view of the problem missed the gathering threat of sectar-
ian violence and civil war that was spreading across the Baghdad region and surround-
ing provinces. As the coalition shifted almost a division’s worth of combat power to the 
Syrian border with the intention of protecting Baghdad, the perpetrators of most of Bagh-
dad’s violence were already within the city. Death squads from sectarian militias and 
rogue sections of the government were already working to cleanse the capital of their 
rival sects. In other words, the coalition was pulling forces from central Iraq’s cities just as 
sectarian violence was rising there. These sectarian threats and the pervasive sense of fear 
that hung over the country manifested itself in Baghdad on August 31, 2005, as over a 
million Shi’a pilgrims made their way to the Kadhimiyah shrine to mark the martyrdom 
of Musa al-Kadhim, the seventh Shi’a imam. After a nearby mortar attack killed seven 
and injured dozens, a rumor began to spread among the crowds crossing the al-Aimmah 
Bridge into Kadhimiyah that suicide bombers were in their midst, causing thousands of 
panicked pilgrims to stampede. As they reached a chokepoint near the bridge, the crowd 
surged through the small area, trampling those unable to keep up and pushing others 
off the bridge to their deaths in the Tigris River below. Nearly 1,000 died, most of them 
elderly, women, or children. There had been no suicide bomber, but the terror of the 
crowd had produced what was the single largest loss of Iraqi lives in the entire war.138
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The tragedy at the bridge made clear how deeply the sectarian attacks had cut into 
an already fragile society. The violence in central Iraq was approaching the point of 
becoming self-sustaining, and the tinderbox of Iraq needed only a spark to send it into a 
conflagration.
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CHAPTER 17
INNOVATION IN THE FACE OF WAR, SUMMER-FALL 2005
With almost a division’s worth of coalition combat power moved from central Iraq to 
the Syrian border zone by midsummer, General George Casey, Jr.’s operations to rees-
tablish control of the Syria-Iraq border were ready to begin. An operation in western 
Ninawa and an operation in western Anbar would seek to disrupt al-Qaeda in Iraq’s 
(AQI) lines of communications from its Syrian sanctuary in time to protect the October 
constitutional referendum and the December elections that were crucial to the U.S. polit-
ical strategy for Iraq.
The ensuing battles in Tel Afar and Al Qa’im would showcase several innovative 
units employing tactics that had been refined and distilled over the first 2 years of the 
war. In broader terms, these organic innovations represented a larger trend in which 
tactical units were learning to conduct counterinsurgency operations through experience 
and self-study. Curiously, while these tactical units would find surprisingly successful 
approaches to local security problems, the coalition’s large-scale, strategic-level initia-
tives experienced slow starts, at best, in the second half of 2005.
COUNTERINSURGENCY REDISCOVERED
The Counterinsurgency Survey
Casey had arrived in Iraq convinced that stabilizing the country would require a coun-
terinsurgency approach, with American troops working through indigenous forces rather 
than conducting high-intensity security operations themselves, and he had emphasized 
this concept in his April 2005 campaign plan. He had also been concerned that U.S. troops 
focused for 3 decades before 2003 on preparing for high-intensity, force-on-force battles 
were not prepared for the kind of counterinsurgency fight that Iraq required. Accord-
ingly, in late summer 2005, Casey dispatched a team of close advisers led by Colonel Wil-
liam Hix and Kalev “Gunner” Sepp to survey the U.S. units in theater and assess whether 
they were following an appropriate approach and to compile a report of best practices. 
In August 2005, Hix’s team conducted its qualitative counterinsurgency survey by visit-
ing 5 multinational divisions and 9 of the 15 U.S. brigades that held territory in Iraq, as 
well as coalition units in Multinational Division Central-South (MND-CS) and Task Force 
Maysan in southern Iraq.1 The team’s field reports were illuminating. All U.S. forces in 
the country were committed, and the lack of a “credible reserve force” at any level meant 
that units were unable to surge for any new initiatives or offensives.2 “Few, if any, units 
have enough troops to maintain any meaningful presence in an area after they clear it 
of insurgents,” Hix’s team noted, “which only serves to create a vacuum that insurgents 
quickly refill, leaving units to re-clear an area again at a future time. Units are paying 
twice (sometimes three times) for the same terrain in too many cases.”3 As a result, MNF-I 
had created a situation that “assumes risk everywhere.”4 In Ninawa and Anbar where 
coalition troops were sparse, the average coalition battalion was tasked with controlling 
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over 2,000 square kilometers and 430,000 inhabitants.5 Under these conditions, the team 
concluded, “MNF-I/MNC-I should postpone any decision on off-ramping until at least 
Spring [20]06” in order to avoid “a rush to failure by handing over battle space to ISF 
[Iraqi security forces] before they are capable and ready.”6
Another factor hampering operations, the Hix team found, was that many of MNC-I’s 
unit boundaries did not take into account “cultural, political, tribal, or traditional link-
ages . . . creat[ing] seams that the enemy is effectively exploiting.”7 The restive Babil 
Province, for example, had been inexplicably split between Multi-National Force-West 
(MNF-W) and MND-CS, allowing the enemy to launch attacks on one division’s battle 
space and then cross the boundary when pursued. The report also recommended estab-
lishing a reconciliation council for disaffected Sunnis (such as those who refused or were 
unable to participate politically because of their Ba’athist ties), harnessing all elements of 
the U.S. interagency for the counterinsurgency campaign, and ensuring transition teams 
had at least 2 years to mold the Iraqi security forces into shape.
However, not all of these recommendations went to Casey and General John Abizaid. 
Some of the team’s leaders considered the conclusions too harsh and instead briefed a 
milder version of their findings to Casey on August 19, focusing heavily on the perfor-
mance of tactical units rather than on some of the problematic operational issues the team 
had uncovered. In terms of the coalition forces themselves, Hix reported, “20 percent of 
the Brigades got it, 60 percent were in the middle, and 20 percent clearly didn’t get it.”8 
While some units arrived in Iraq well prepared to conduct counterinsurgency opera-
tions immediately, many units underwent a difficult trial by fire because home-station 
training lagged well behind the current situation in Iraq.9 U.S. units and their Iraqi coun-
terparts were “not yet sufficient to stop intimidation of the population and local Iraqi 
force,” meaning that the bulk of security operations were not necessarily contributing 
to the security of the Iraqi people. Rather than increase combat power, refocus forces on 
protecting the population, or reorient the mission entirely, Hix recommended a greater 
emphasis on governance and economics, for which the military had limited capacity.10 
Many units focused only on killing or capturing the enemy and not engaging with Iraqis, 
Hix told Casey. Much of MNF-I’s operational approach was not conducive to a counter-
insurgency campaign, Hix said, particularly MNF-I’s effort to build and train an indige-
nous military in its own image, and its ongoing concentration of coalition military units 
on large bases. Finally, the present counterinsurgency campaign, Hix concluded, was 
a “decentralized company and battalion fight but without the commensurate resources 
and authority decentralized to the same levels.”11
Casey disagreed with most of Hix’s conclusions, except for the concept of denying the 
enemy access to the population, which he endorsed.12 Two days later, Hix and his team 
presented the same findings to Abizaid, though once again without emphasizing their 
findings of the insufficient number of coalition forces and the lack of a credible opera-
tional reserve. Hix repeated his observation that, while military operations received most 
of the coalition’s attention, much more needed to be done in the areas of governance and 
economics. “Units are generally doing that ad hoc,” Hix noted, by “pulling reservists 
with direct experience and other talented people out of their existing units and form-
ing Provincial Reconstruction type units.”13 When Hix suggested Abizaid should request 
additional reservists with civilian skills related to governance, such as judges, mayors, 
447
INNOVATION IN THE FACE OF WAR, SUMMER-FALL 2005
city managers, and police chiefs, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander 
responded that taking responsibility for governance was not the military’s core mission 
and that the rest of the government needed to contribute more effectively. Undeterred, 
Hix pointed out that the Army has been asked to do these functions since its founding.14 
Without knowing it, Hix had touched on a key issue for Abizaid, who was engaged in 
a struggle inside the U.S. Government to get agencies beyond the military involved in 
the campaign to stabilize Iraq. As he tried to mobilize nonmilitary help, Abizaid was not 
interested in Hix’s suggestion that the military should go ahead and do the civilians’ jobs 
for them.
The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment and Colonel H. R. McMaster in Tel Afar
Casey’s operations to block the northern infiltration route across the Syrian border 
began in May 2005 with the movement of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment from the 
“Triangle of Death” south of Baghdad to western Ninawa, an area that had not recovered 
from its fall to insurgent control 6 months before. As an economy of force sector, Multi- 
National Brigade-Northwest’s (MNB-NW) area of operations had not had sufficient coa-
lition combat power to take the initiative against the insurgency. This was especially true 
in the restive mixed-sect Turkoman city of Tel Afar, which played an outsized part in the 
Sunni insurgency. Tel Afaris (or “Afiri,” as Iraqis knew them) had been over-represented 
in Saddam Hussein’s army and intelligence services, giving the city an unusually high 
proportion of men with military experience. A number of senior Iraqi military leaders 
hailed from the city or its surrounding area, and after Saddam’s fall, some of them had 
relocated to Syria to facilitate insurgent attacks against the coalition, Kurds, and the new 
Shi’a-led government.15
The post-2003 environment in western Ninawa was one of sectarian strife among Tel 
Afar’s population, which U.S. units estimated were approximately 60 percent Sunni and 
40 percent Shi’a. Sunni Turkomans who had been loyal to Saddam’s regime resisted the 
new ascendancy of Kurds—the Sunni Turkomans’ natural enemies throughout north-
ern Iraq—and the rise of the Shi’a Turkoman minority, which grew in power by align-
ing itself with the newly empowered Shi’a Islamist parties in Baghdad. In the months 
leading up to 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment’s arrival in Tel Afar, parts of the primarily 
Shi’a Turkoman police force had effectively become sectarian death squads. The situation 
worsened in April 2005 when the Iraqi security forces responded to a request for assis-
tance from Tel Afar’s Shi’a Turkomans by deploying the Scorpion Brigade, an Arab Shi’a 
special police unit from Hillah. The addition of the predominantly Shi’a unit with a fierce 
reputation for fighting Sunni insurgents inflamed the situation, and, as the International 
Crisis Group put it, “battles between government forces and insurgents turned into a 
fight between Sunnis and Shi’ites within the Turkoman community.”16
The change of mission to Tel Afar was the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment’s third 
assignment in Iraq. The regiment had originally expected to be assigned to Mosul, but 
had been redirected to the Triangle of Death, and, in fact, Multi-National Corps-Iraq 
(MNC-I) had kept one of the regiment’s three maneuver squadrons behind in north Babil 
when the main body moved to Ninawa. The unit’s flexibility in taking on the successive 
new missions reflected, in part, the approach its commander had taken in predeployment 
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training. Colonel Herbert Raymond “H. R.” McMaster, the regimental commander, had 
authored an important study on the Vietnam war that concluded senior military leaders 
had been derelict in allowing President Lyndon Johnson’s flawed strategy to continue 
with only muted internal protest. McMaster was also a student of counterinsurgency 
doctrine and practice, an often-overlooked academic topic in the Cold War Army and the 
Army of the 1990s. Upon taking command in June 2004 and in anticipation of the unit’s 
impending deployment, he had required his subordinate leaders to complete a reading 
list on counterinsurgency and Middle Eastern culture. In training, he had enlisted the 
aid of Arab-Americans to play roles in a variety of tactical simulations, and to mitigate 
the regiment’s dearth of Arabic interpreters, he had sent dozens of Soldiers to Arabic 
immersion courses at a local college.17 Above all, he emphasized what he believed was 
the most important tenet of counterinsurgency: protecting the population. McMaster and 
his staff had designed their training programs with little help from the Army, which was 
still grappling with the question of whether the Iraq campaign would last long enough to 
disrupt the standard training and education of “core war fighting functions” and replace 
part of that instruction with preparations for counterinsurgency.
Once in Ninawa, McMaster assigned his 2d Squadron responsibility for the city of 
Tel Afar.18 The city as the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment found it in May 2005 was one 
of the most violent in Iraq, with 170 attacks per month driven by 500-1,000 foreign and 
Iraqi insurgents mainly from AQI, Ansar al-Islam, and other groups that had fled the coa-
lition onslaught in Fallujah in November 2004.19 These fighters had terrorized the city’s 
population for months with suicide bombs and car bombs against civilians. Some of the 
insurgent violence was simply depraved, as when insurgents murdered a young boy and 
then rigged his body cavities with explosives that killed his father when the man came to 
retrieve his son from the street.20 As the insurgents had clamped down on the city before 
the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment’s arrival, they had tortured and executed Tel Afaris 
who resisted them, while perversely conscripting local boys whom they systematically 
raped and trained to serve as assistants in executions.21
From May to August 2005, the regiment worked to isolate the city, cutting off insur-
gent lines of communications. West of Tel Afar, McMaster tasked his 1st Squadron with 
disrupting insurgent infiltration routes along the 280-kilometer Syrian border in the reg-
iment’s area of operations and reconstituting the local Iraqi border police brigade. The 
1st Squadron’s base was in Sinjar, a mixed-sect town containing Arabs, Kurds, and tens 
of thousands of Yazidis, a sect of ethnic Kurds who practiced an obscure ancient religion 
akin to Zoroastrianism.
The 1st Squadron found Sinjar, once a major stop on the ancient Silk Road, to be the 
major waypoint and safe haven for al-Qaeda and other militant foreign fighters making 
their way from Syria to the Tigris Valley. To understand its area of operations better, 1st 
Squadron conducted a zone reconnaissance that covered more than 340 kilometers of the 
border area, uncovering a vast network of “safe houses, weapons caches, transportation 
companies, [and] passport counterfeiters.”22 The operation resulted in over 300 border 
interdictions of foreign fighters and other contraband, revealing both the depth of Syrian 
regime complicity and the degree to which the infiltration routes had been developed by 
AQI. On one mission, elements of an air cavalry troop found an insurgent-led convoy 
of 40 trucks crossing the border through uninhabited desert. When Apache helicopters 
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engaged with Hellfire missiles and cannons, 
the trucks fled back to Syria, but not before 
secondary explosions on several of the vehi-
cles hit in the fusillade confirmed they were 
smuggling arms and ammunition.23
With only two maneuver squadrons at 
his disposal, McMaster compensated for his 
dearth of infantry by partnering with the Iraqi 
3d Division, a Kurdish-majority unit with three 
brigades arrayed across western Ninawa, and 
he formed a new light cavalry troop that was an 
equal mix of Iraqi and American Soldiers. The 
one-time surge of Special Forces for the Bat-
talion Augmentation Training Team mission 
partnered an unprecedented nine operational 
detachment alphas (ODAs)—two full Special 
Forces companies—with his armored cavalry 
regiment and the 3d Division, enabling both an ODA and one of McMaster’s troops or 
companies to pair with each Iraqi battalion.25 Some Iraqi battalions also benefited from 
partnered military transition teams (MiTT). To partner with the special operations forces 
(SOF) in his battle space, McMaster co-located headquarters and attached an air cavalry 
troop, logistics element, and light reconnaissance troop to beef up SOF capabilities.26
Zaynal Hassan Wahab (left), Major General Mixon (center), and Najim Abed Jabouri (right).  
Source: U.S. Army photo by Sergeant Amanda White (Released).
Zaynal Hassan Wahab, Major General Benjamin R. Mixon, 
and Najim Abed Jabouri.27
Source: U.S. Army photo by Sergeant 1st Class 
Donald Sparks (Released).
Colonel Herbert Raymond McMaster,  
Commander, 3d Armored Cavalry 
 Regiment.24
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At an early stage, McMaster and his subordinates identified a number of drivers 
of instability, including government-sanctioned sectarian retaliation against the Sunni 
majority, low rates of education and literacy, high unemployment, and a negative view 
of U.S. forces based on earlier military operations.28 Addressing these problems required 
not just security operations, but extensive engagement with local Sunni leaders to resolve 
local political differences. In this area, McMaster benefited greatly from the role of Major 
General Najim Abed Jabouri, a Sunni Arab from the Mosul area who had been assigned as 
Tel Afar’s police chief in May after the firing of his insurgent-allied predecessor. Jabouri 
proved an able local diplomat, shuttling between Sunni and Shi’a Turkoman tribes with 
a 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment leader to broker cease-fires and organize opposition to 
AQI and other insurgent groups. Jabouri would later be appointed Tel Afar’s mayor, a 
position he would hold from late 2005 until 2008. In June 2005, the Ministry of Defense 
announced that there would be a security operation to resolve the Tel Afar situation, and 
a group of about 30 Sunni sheikhs traveled to Baghdad in July for a peace conference that 
resulted in a temporary but significant decrease in violence.29 At the same time, local Shi’a 
leaders lobbied their government contacts in Baghdad to request support for reestablish-
ing stability in the city.
Operation RESTORING RIGHTS
Despite these political initiatives, by July McMaster and his commanders had decided 
that driving al-Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgents completely from Tel Afar would require 
a major operation. Recognizing the piece he was playing in MNF-I’s plan to secure the 
October constitutional referendum and the December parliamentary elections, McMas-
ter chose the name Operation RESTORING RIGHTS. However, he rejected the idea of 
a highly destructive clearing of the city similar to the assault on Fallujah or Operation 
BLACK TYPHOON the previous fall, both of which McMaster believed had heightened 
local resentment toward the coalition. Instead, he aimed to conduct an operation that 
would kill or drive off the insurgents, while having a much lighter impact on the civilian 
population and much less collateral damage. To affect this outcome, McMaster took steps 
to control and then displace Tel Afar’s civilian population systematically, so that insur-
gents could not hide among the populace and precipitate collateral damage. As a way 
to offset potential ill will from any disruption caused by the operation, he ordered the 
construction of a center for displaced Iraqis, capable of supporting over 1,500 people, and 
the stocking of humanitarian relief supplies.30 To buffer the impact of the operation fur-
ther, McMaster planned post-combat activities in advance. Aiming to jump-start recon-
struction efforts immediately after combat operations ceased, he purchased transformers 
to restore the city’s electrical grid, contracted for teachers and instructional material to 
reopen schools, and marshaled material and designs for reconstruction projects.31
McMaster also physically isolated the city. At the recommendation of 3d Division 
Commander Major General Khorsheed Saleem al-Doski, McMaster’s troops spent 3 
weeks building a 12-foot-high berm around the city that enclosed 15 square kilometers.32 
With the berm in place, Tel Afaris could only drive vehicles through one of the four 
checkpoints manned jointly by Iraqi and U.S. Soldiers, allowing for population control. 
Under the pressure of improved border security, the creation of the berm, and better 
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intelligence coming from a more friendly relationship with Tel Afari civilians, the insur-
gents who had virtually controlled the city since late 2004 began to lose their freedom of 
maneuver, falling back on their stronghold in the town’s Sarai district.
For the actual clearance of the city, the regiment requested two additional U.S. infan-
try battalions and additional Iraqi security forces, but the troop-starved MNC-I was only 
able to provide one U.S. battalion (2d Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment), which 
would not arrive until several days after the operation had begun. To make up some of 
the shortfall, the Interior Ministry ordered a Special Police Commando brigade to join 
the operation. However, the commandos and their Badr Corps–affiliated commander 
quickly proved to be a liability.33 When the poorly disciplined and ill-trained Commando 
Brigade arrived with empty trucks that its troops explained had been brought for “liber-
ating the furniture of Tel Afar,” McMaster ordered the Iraqi commander to withdraw his 
troops from the city immediately, and the brigade played no part in the ensuing oper-
ation.34 Realizing he would not be receiving the reinforcements he needed, McMaster 
decided to accept risk on the Syrian border by splitting his 1st Squadron and sending half 
of it to help clear west Tel Afar.35
In late August, the operation began with the displacement of almost all remaining 
civilians in the city. Constant messaging from the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment and 
Iraqi commanders explained that their intent was not to attack the city and its people, but 
to focus the assault against the “takfiri” insurgents (extremists who believed their doc-
trine of “takfir” obligated them to kill apostates) that had held the population in thrall.36 
At the beginning of September, judging there were still too many civilians inside the city 
to allow the attack to proceed without collateral damage, McMaster delayed the start of 
the operation by a day and told local Sunni leaders, “If you don’t get your people out of 
there tomorrow, the blood is on your hands.”37 As nearly 150,000 civilians departed the 
city, Soldiers used screened informants at the four exits through the berm to identify and 
detain scores of fighters attempting to flee in disguise.38
On September 2, 2d Squadron initiated a “three-day zone reconnaissance . . . of Tel 
Afar designed to force the enemy into the Sarai [District] and allow the AIF [anti-Iraqi 
forces] only one means of escape—a predetermined path to a location south of the city.”39 
With 3,000 American troops and 5,500 Iraqis committed to the mission, McMaster aligned 
2d Squadron to the east side of the city and 1st Squadron to the west side of the city.40 
Attacking from north to south, the regiment and its Iraqi partners intended to split the 
city, isolating the insurgent-held Sarai District. During the first few days, the fighting was 
intense, with tanks, Bradleys, and Hellfire missiles used in street-to-street fighting against 
insurgents.41 Over the course of a week, 2d Squadron conducted a methodical clearing 
operation, searching every building as they closed in on Sarai District.42 As fighting raged 
on one street, other elements of 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment would pause to evacuate 
civilians only blocks away. Sunni residents who were afraid to evacuate south through 
Shi’a areas were transported by Iraqi Army vehicles, and “screened, given humanitarian 
assistance, offered temporary shelter, and released.”43
The fight continued for more than a month. By the end of the operation in October, 
the regiment had killed over 150 insurgents and captured almost 600 at the cost of two 
Americans killed and 11 wounded, totals significantly lower than the operation in Fallu-
jah the previous November.44 The operation highlighted the progress of the Iraqi Army, 
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which, when paired with Special Forces ODAs, fought alongside McMaster’s Soldiers. 
Unlike previous performances of the Iraqi security forces, the Iraqis stood, fought, and 
took casualties: eight were killed and 19 wounded, although the casualties again dis-
proportionately came from the 1st Commando Battalion, previously known as the 36th 
Commando Battalion.
The operation was a milestone, as it was the first time since the fall of Saddam that 
Iraqi forces outnumbered U.S. forces in a major operation. As in the August 2004 Battle 
of Najaf, however, the Iraqi security forces’ performance in Tel Afar was overstated by 
MNF-I and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), with both 
commands incorrectly declaring that regular Iraqi units had been “employed as inde-
pendent maneuver elements” under the command and control of an Iraqi headquarters.45 
Other challenges became clear after the battle had concluded. Although the operation 
successfully won over much of Tel Afar’s population, which had expected a repeat of 
BLACK TYPHOON, the operation had allowed a number of insurgents to flee to safe 
havens such as Lake Tharthar, north of Baghdad.
After clearing the city, McMaster pushed the regiment’s combat power off the larger 
forward operating bases and into small combat outposts that were comprised of U.S. and 
Iraqi soldiers and arranged in a grid across the urban terrain, usually within sight of one 
another.46 This establishment of combat outposts ran counter to MNF-I guidance to con-
solidate U.S. forces on forward operating bases, and it reflected the most important tenet 
of McMaster’s strategy—protecting the population. It also meant the 3d Armored Cav-
alry Regiment would no longer commute to the areas it was responsible for but instead 
maintain a constant presence within the community. Also unlike many coalition opera-
tions, once the mission was over, the combat outposts did not recede like the tide. They 
remained in place to build the trust between coalition forces and Iraqi civilians that was 
essential to providing intelligence, and to provide a venue to mentor Iraqi Army interac-
tions with the population. Within a week after the battle ended, Tel Afar’s electricity was 
restored, its schools reopened, and new construction had started. As the projects began 
to restore a sense of normality, McMaster moved to rebuild Tel Afar’s local police force, 
which had disintegrated during the battle. Seeing the police as one of the most important 
components of counterinsurgency operations, he had obtained MNSTC-I’s approval to 
fill three successive police academy classes with Tel Afaris carefully screened by local 
sheikhs, regimental counterintelligence personnel, and informants who could recognize 
insurgent supporters. After the recruits completed their training, regimental officers 
handpicked prospective police leaders and sent them to training, filling the police leader-
ship cadre with trusted officers who had little inclination for corruption or sectarianism. 
When the police chief that succeeded Jabouri began using his force for personal ven-
dettas, McMaster convinced senior Iraqi Parliamentarian Haider Abadi, later to become 
Iraq’s Prime Minister, to have the police chief replaced immediately. The restructuring of 
the police also gave the regiment an opportunity to align boundaries for the Iraqi police, 
Iraqi Army, and coalition force units, creating a unity of effort that had not previously 
existed.47
For a time, Tel Afar was an impressive example of what could be done when sufficient 
coalition forces employed proper counterinsurgency tactics with the full support of their 
higher headquarters. Yet Tel Afar’s good fortune would not last long. Within months of 
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the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment’s departure in February 2006, the city would again see 
a minimal coalition presence, and its security would deteriorate again.
The Battle for the Western Euphrates
As additional coalition forces concentrated in western Anbar, coalition leaders began 
to realize how badly the security situation had deteriorated in the western Euphrates 
region that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi aimed to make an al-Qaeda emirate. This proto-Is-
lamic State, which had begun in Hit in the early summer, had expanded to Hadithah, 
Haqlaniyah, and Barwanah by late summer and early fall. As in Hit, with each new con-
quest, AQI established Sharia courts, command structures, and intelligence and security 
cells. This expansion of territory led to a growth in complexity and bureaucracy, with the 
jihadist emirate developing detailed recordkeeping, robust finances, and security infra-
structure down to the city block level.48 As AQI evolved from an insurgent organization 
to a quasi-government, its leaders became intensely interested in determining religious 
justification for their actions and in explaining the Sharia rationale for maintaining order 
in their new territories.49
Coalition attempts to retake AQI-controlled territory led to heavy fighting. During an 
unexpected 4-day battle in Hadithah in early August, insurgents wiped out an entire six-
man Marine sniper team in an ambush and later destroyed a Marine assault amphibious 
vehicle (LVTP-7) with an improvised explosive device (IED). The LVTP-7 attack killed 
14 Marines and their Iraqi interpreter, making it the deadliest IED attack for U.S. troops 
since the start of the war.50 The destruction of the lightly armored LVTP-7 highlighted 
the fact that the Marines and some other coalition units were fighting the war with force 
protection means that had fallen behind IED technology. The Army requirement for 8,186 
up-armored High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) was 99 percent 
filled by November 2005. However, the Marine contingent in Iraq had only 33 percent 
of its 2,715-vehicle requirement, and in fall 2005, many Marine units were still maneu-
vering through the increasingly dangerous Euphrates Valley in basic model HMMWVs 
with armor plates welded on the vehicles.51 At the same time, an MNF-I initiative to add 
electronic countermeasures to vehicles was slow to develop, fielding just 17 percent of 
MNF-I’s total requirement by November.52 These shortfalls added up to the costly fact 
that coalition units were struggling to keep up with the insurgency’s advances in IED 
production and use.
Shortly after the Hadithah battle at the end of August, insurgent attacks in Qusaybah 
led to intense fighting that culminated in multiple air strikes. During 4 days of battle, coa-
lition aircraft dropped a surprising amount of ordnance: 4 guided bomb unit (GBU)–38 
500-pound Joint Direct Attack Munitions, 11 GBU–12 500-pound Paveway II laser-guided 
bombs, and 10 Maverick air-to-ground missiles, in addition to rockets and strafing runs.53 
Also in August, elements of the Iraqi Special Operations Forces Brigade, now comprising 
the 1st Commando Battalion and the Iraqi Counterterrorism Force, deployed to Anbar 
with their Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) advisers to rein-
force the Marines. Paired with Marines from Regimental Combat Team 2, they assaulted 
Haqlaniyah, fighting block to block and discovering a seven-story hotel rigged to explode 
as coalition forces entered the building.54
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In an attempt to stem the flow of insurgents across the Euphrates River, in early 
September, MNF-W used Marine fixed-wing aircraft and Army M270A1 guided mul-
tiple-launch rocket systems to destroy two bridges outside Al Qa’im, near the Syrian 
border.55 Demonstrating the challenges associated with the often short-term perspectives 
of a 1-year or 7-month rotational policy, the next Marine unit rotating into the area discov-
ered that the destruction of the bridges had infuriated the local population because “the 
bridge served not only as a link to commerce and economic development but also a con-
duit to relationships, families, and a complex social network with far reaching effects.”56 
Seven months after the two bridges were destroyed, an assault float bridge was installed 
as a replacement, which, in turn, was replaced by a permanent bridge 8 months later at 
the cost of $6.5 million.
A series of indecisive smaller battles followed in October, including Operation IRON 
FIST, which amassed over 1,000 Marines against AQI fighters in the villages of Sadah 
and Karabilah; and Operation RIVER GATE, which pitted 2,500 Marines of Regimen-
tal Combat Team 2 against AQI in Hadithah, Haqlaniyah, and Barwanah. During these 
operations, MNF-W killed at least 41 insurgents, while losing five Soldiers and Marines.57
The Western Euphrates River Valley (WERV) Campaign culminated in November 
with MNF-W’s Operation STEEL CURTAIN, a 16-day clearing of Qusaybah, Karabilah, 
and Ubaydi, the towns outlying Al Qa’im. To further increase combat power for the oper-
ation, CENTCOM sent its theater reserve, the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit, ashore in 
mid-October, after which the unit embarked on a 558-kilometer road march to Al Asad 
airbase.58 With more than 4,500 Soldiers and Marines, Operation STEEL CURTAIN was 
the largest operation in MNF-W since the November 2004 Battle of Fallujah.59 As they 
cleared the restive towns, U.S. troops killed 139 insurgents and detained 388 others, while 
losing 10 Marines killed and 59 Soldiers and Marines wounded, and while calling in no 
fewer than 67 air strikes.60
At the operational level, the WERV would succeed in its clearest objective: ensuring 
the late 2005 elections would occur unhindered. Such an accomplishment was no easy 
feat, as al-Qaeda in Iraq and Zarqawi were determined to prevent other Sunnis, worn 
down by months of intense fighting, from reconciling with the coalition and choosing 
political engagement. During 2 months of brutal fighting, MNF-W reported killing 529 
fighters and detaining another 1,584.61 This progress was fragile, for as the combat power 
that had been surged into Anbar receded yet again, tactical units would once more have 
to expand their footprint and cover larger swaths of territory.62 The impact of AQI’s losses 
was also blunted somewhat by its leaders’ ability to “melt away” during the fighting, 
only to reemerge later with additional domestic recruits and foreign fighters.
3d Battalion, 6th Marines, and Lieutenant Colonel Julian Alford in Al Qa’im
Most of the operations in the WERV followed a typical pattern: thinly stretched coa-
lition forces cleared terrain in brutal battles, only to leave days or weeks later because 
insufficient forces existed to hold the vast expanses of Anbar. However, the 3d Battalion, 
6th Marines in Al Qa’im were an exception, as their commander, Lieutenant Colonel 
Julian “Dale” Alford, had decided ahead of the operation to take a different approach. 
Arriving in Al Qa’im with his battalion in late August during a normally scheduled 
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Marine unit rotation, Alford had declared to his skeptical regimental commander that 
he intended to go into Al Qa’im and stay there. It was a difficult task in a city that was 
immediately adjacent to AQI’s most active foreign fighter facilitation base in the town 
of Albu Kamal, a few dozen meters away on the Syrian side of the border. Like McMas-
ter, Alford was a student of counterinsurgency theory who had spent considerable time 
preparing his battalion intellectually for its Iraq deployment by reading classic studies 
such as David Galula’s Pacification in Algeria, Francis “Bing” West’s The Village, and the 
1940 Marine Corps Small Wars Manual.63 He had also led his battalion in a 2004 combat 
deployment to Afghanistan, where the unit had tested and honed their tactics against an 
active insurgency.
As McMaster was doing simultaneously in Tel Afar, Alford emphasized the primacy 
of protecting the population in counterinsurgency operations, describing what he saw as 
the center of gravity in the simple epithet: “It’s the people, stupid.” He warned his troops 
to avoid creating more of what he called “POIs” (pissed off Iraqis) by carefully managing 
escalation of force incidents, indirect fire, and close air support.64 Alford likened proper 
kinetic operations to bow hunting, which required tremendous patience, stealth, per-
sistence, proper target selection, and close proximity to the target.65 Alford later recalled, 
“I talked to the Marines about killing discreetly and selectively. I used the bow hunter 
mentality. You have to avoid complacency, you need patience, persistence, and presence 
at all times . . . to kill discreetly and selectively and without killing the wrong people, 
to kill the bad guy and not the 99 percent of Iraqis [who were] good people.”66 This 
latter point required living and operating closely among the Anbari population in a way 
MNF-W units were not used to doing. Instead of consolidating in large bases as MNF-I 
was instructing units across the theater to do, Alford expanded his battalion’s footprint 
into dispersed battle positions. Upon its arrival 
in Al Qa’im in late August, Alford’s six-com-
pany battalion held only three positions but 
used offensive operations in October to fight 
their way into several towns in the Al Qa’im 
district and create four new platoon outposts. 
In a change from most of the rest of the WERV 
operations, once Alford’s men fought to gain a 
foothold in new areas, they did not withdraw, 
but instead looked to expand their local pres-
ence further. Throughout November, the unit 
grew its footprint to a total of 16 platoon posi-
tions in the Al Qa’im area.67
Each platoon outpost was a bare-bones  affair, 
consisting essentially of earth-filled Hesco bar-
riers dropped in place in the outline of a platoon 
position. There were no showers, morale tele-
phones, or internet, and the Marines had to resort 
to burning their own waste with diesel fuel. “You 
can’t be in those big FOBs with [Kellogg, Brown 
& Root], the internet, and all the different things 
Source: Photo by Marine Corps History 
 Division (Released).
Lieutenant Colonel Julian Alford, 
Commander, 3d Battalion, 6th  
Marines.68
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we were doing,” Alford described after the operation. “You have got to split up and be 
where you can protect the population.”69 As a result, the battalion’s positions were usu-
ally in the middle of a town, where the Marines had only to walk outside their position to 
be among Iraqis. Mindful of the impact that the Quartering Act had on pre-Revolutionary 
America, Alford eschewed the practice of commandeering Iraqi houses as coalition out-
posts, thereby avoiding the creation of more “pissed off Iraqis.”70
To strengthen relationships between the Marine outposts and local Iraqi communi-
ties, Alford encouraged his Marines to eat on the local economy, a practice that pro-
duced a microeconomic boom as Iraqi merchants provided a takeout food service to the 
battle positions for cash. The principle extended to 3d Battalion, 6th Marines’ foot patrols, 
which Alford’s men nicknamed “eats on the streets” for the way in which they were 
conducted meal-to-meal, with Marines stopping at food vendors in Iraqi neighborhoods 
as they patrolled.71 To force the majority of his troops to patrol on foot and interact with 
Iraqis, Alford limited each patrol to a single accompanying vehicle. He also banned the 
concept of “presence patrols,” instead, requiring each patrol to have a specified mission. 
Many of these patrols were related to the counterinsurgency precept of population con-
trol, conducting censuses of the population and buildings near each battle position to 
enable Alford’s men to understand who and what was around them while compiling 
detailed records for follow-on forces.72
Throughout 3d Battalion, 6th Marines’ rotation in Al Qa’im, Alford also aimed to 
recreate the successful model of the combined action platoons used during the Vietnam 
war.73 Each of Alford’s battle positions included a platoon of Marines and a platoon of 
partnered Iraqi Army troops living, eating, and working in the same place, a rarity in the 
aftermath of the December 2004 Marez dining facility bombing. Throughout their deploy-
ment, Alford impressed on his units an enforced partnership approach: if ever discov-
ering any of his units conducting a mission without an equally sized Iraqi force, Alford 
would send them back to the main forward operating base at Camp Al Qa’im in shame, 
replacing them with a unit that had better embraced his combined action concept.74
By the end of the unit’s rotation in March 2006, Al Qa’im, an area that had been under 
Zarqawi and al-Qaeda in Iraq’s near-complete control in mid-2005, was well on its way 
to returning to coalition control, with the city itself firmly in Marine hands and with the 
insurgency slowly receding from outlying districts. When Casey visited Alford’s unit 
near the end of the battalion’s rotation, the stunned MNF-I commander told Alford and 
Colonel Stephen Davis, the Regimental Combat Team 2 commander, “I never thought 
you guys could take that [Al Qa’im] back.”75
The Counterinsurgency Academy
The counterinsurgency techniques McMaster and Alford were putting into practice 
coincided with the creation of a theater-level venue for training U.S. commanders in sim-
ilar tactics. Based on the results of the counterinsurgency survey in late summer, Casey 
approved Hix’s recommendation to create a “COIN [counterinsurgency] Academy” in 
Taji, just north of Baghdad, to ensure incoming leaders had a baseline understanding of 
counterinsurgency principles and their application in the Iraq operating environment. 
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Casey mandated that all leaders of incoming brigade combat teams, from company com-
mander to brigade commander, would attend the 1-week course.
Casey had put significant pressure on the MNF-I staff to stand up the organization 
quickly, and it was teaching its first classes by November. Among its first lecturers were 
McMaster and Alford, whose respective successes Casey recognized by personally pre-
senting each officer with a Bronze Star as their deployments ended. Alford was the only 
battalion commander that Casey honored with such a presentation. However, while Casey 
clearly recognized what successful COIN operations looked like, he had a greater chal-
lenge in communicating and implementing that vision across the force that was rotating 
into the Iraq theater. In some ways, the COIN Academy was a reflection of the continuing 
disconnect between the Army’s institutional training base and the operational needs of 
the force in Iraq. Ideally, Hix noted, U.S. units should be learning the lessons of the COIN 
Academy much earlier in their training cycle, perhaps before conducting training at the 
Army’s combat training centers, but the U.S. training base was lagging behind in accom-
plishing this task. The COIN Academy remained in operation in Taji well past Casey’s 
tenure as commander and ultimately received mixed marks for achieving its purpose. 
To a degree, the COIN Academy epitomized Casey’s response to Hix and Sepp’s COIN 
survey by selecting a tactical solution to address the host of strategic and operational 
problems that the survey had laid bare.
Special Operations Forces in Anbar
To support Casey’s operational-level effort to reestablish control of the Iraqi-Syrian 
border, other SOF also pushed west, establishing themselves at the remote base in Rawah. 
These SOF were deemed so important to the overall mission that for Operation SAYAID 
(Hunter), which ran from mid-July to August, they were MNC-I’s main effort.76 There 
they were paired with conventional forces to an unprecedented degree, and by October, 
two infantry companies along with their battalion headquarters were placed under the 
SOF headquarters’ tactical control. It was the first time since the invasion that SOF were 
locally made the main effort and given conventional forces to support them. The model 
was successful enough that by November an entire infantry battalion was placed under 
SOF control.
The intensity of the fight in Anbar was unlike anything the special operations elements 
had previously experienced. Their assault forces frequently faced well-trained foreign 
fighters dug in with sandbagged defensive positions, crew-served weapons, night-vision 
goggles, and quick reaction forces. Many foreign fighters expected to die and either wore 
suicide vests or wired the entire structure they occupied with explosives to be detonated 
when the special operators entered the building. Demonstrating the level of insurgent 
resolve, a handful of SOF raids had to be extracted under pressure with the support 
of AC–130 and rotary wing fires. This resulted in the increased use, on some missions, 
of a “call out,” in which a megaphone was used to instruct noncombatants to leave a 
surrounded building. If the fighters inside did not surrender, or if they opened fire, the 
building would then be reduced with an air strike rather than risk troops’ lives.
The SOF participation in the WERV Campaign was a large-scale effort, focusing on the 
insurgent sanctuaries of Al Qa’im and Hadithah. Raid after raid eliminated IED factories 
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and killed or captured al-Qaeda in Iraq senior leaders. A series of operations in Septem-
ber 2005 by a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) included the rescue of a U.S. 
hostage, partly based on intelligence and leads from the 3d Infantry Division in Baghdad.
By November, the commander of the JSOTF decided to keep three battalion-level task 
forces in Iraq, a measure that required shifting additional forces from external locations, 
and created significant stress on the force. In the same month, the command captured 
senior terrorist bomb maker Ali al-Fadhil in Anbar. Fadhil had returned to his native 
London in September 2003 after being seriously injured by his own bombs in Iraq. In the 
United Kingdom (UK), he received prosthetic limbs, and then returned to his chosen pro-
fession, building bombs that were used in the July 7, 2005, attacks against London before 
escaping back to Iraq.
THE EARLY ROOTS OF THE AWAKENING: THE DESERT PROTECTORS
The coalition’s experimentation with more nuanced counterinsurgency approaches 
among Iraqi Sunni communities coincided with an increasingly heavy hand of al-Qaeda 
in Iraq in those same locations. By summer 2005, AQI’s brutal behavior had caused the 
group to wear out its welcome with some Anbari tribes. AQI had upset tribal sheikhs by 
forcibly taking over the cross-border smuggling trade, traditionally a tribal venture, and 
by enforcing its puritanical interpretation of Islam. In Al Qa’im, Hit, and other western 
areas, AQI commanders enforced prohibitions on music, gambling, and other licentious 
activities while forcing some Anbaris to give their daughters in marriage to AQI for-
eign fighters—ironically, the same behaviors Ayman al-Zawahiri had warned Zarqawi 
about, and with the same effects Zawahiri had predicted. The situation came to a head 
when AQI, which banned secular law enforcement in territory that it claimed, murdered 
and then beheaded Al Qa’im’s police chief, a well-respected Albu Mahal tribal member. 
Incensed by these actions, the Albu Mahal and other tribal elements collaborated with 
Mohammed Mahmoud Latif and the Association of Muslim Scholars in the preparation 
of a fatwa that authorized the tribes to fight AQI’s foreign fighters. Other tribes soon 
joined the Albu Mahal in its fight against AQI. In Hit, seeking revenge for a killing of 
a tribesman, the Albu Nimr allied with Jaysh Muhammad and the Albu Mahal against 
AQI and Ansar al Sunna in intense fighting that left at least 32 dead. In June, the Albu 
Mahal and its allies were able to recapture Qusaybah, and by July, they had expanded 
their footprint to include old Ubaydi and Sadah.77 With its own tribal unit, the Hamza 
Battalion, not aligned with coalition efforts the Albu Mahal tribe fought al-Qaeda in Iraq 
until August when AQI cut the battalion’s supply line, divided the forces, and defeated 
it piecemeal. In the aftermath of the uprising, AQI was particularly brutal in its revenge 
against the Albu Mahal, hoping to make an example that would discourage other tribes. 
In Qusaybah, AQI went house-to-house, identifying members of the tribe and executing 
them publicly.78 With nowhere left to turn, the splintered Albu Mahal tribe fled to Jordan 
and deep into the Iraqi desert, making an important decision to request coalition assis-
tance in its fight against AQI.79 Sheikh Kurdi Rafee Farhan al-Mahalawi, one of the Albu 
Mahal’s tribal leaders, later recalled:
A lot changed when al-Qaeda started its terrorism against the Iraqi people. When that began, a lot 
of people wanted to fight with the Americans against al-Qaeda, because al-Qaeda cut off a lot of 
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heads, destroyed a lot of houses, destroyed infrastructure. Not a single city was without dozens of 
bodies thrown everywhere, whether in the street or elsewhere. . . . Speaking for myself, . . . I said, 
I will cooperate with the Americans, even with the devil, if it means kicking al-Qaeda out of the 
area.80
While al-Qaeda in Iraq’s activities were the primary reason for the tribe’s actions, the 
change in the coalition’s posture in Anbar also contributed to the tribe’s decision. The 
increased U.S. combat power that had flowed into Anbar as part of Casey’s border cam-
paign, along with new outreach from units such as Alford’s Marines, had helped to per-
suade some tribal leaders that the coalition could be a counterbalance to AQI.
The intensity of the tribal uprisings, as well as the decisions of insurgent groups such 
as the Ramadi Shura Council to seek reconciliation with the Iraqi Government, alarmed 
al-Qaeda’s senior leadership in Pakistan into sending one of its senior leaders, Abdul 
Hadi al-Iraqi, to Iraq on a fact-finding mission.81 Its alarm had been magnified by exag-
gerated warnings from the insurgent group Ansar al Sunna, which had long resented 
Zarqawi and believed it—rather than AQI—should be in charge of al-Qaeda’s franchise 
in Iraq. Ansar al Sunna held Zarqawi personally responsible for the destruction of its 
parent organization, Ansar al-Islam, in northern Iraq in 2003, and, like some other insur-
gent groups, opposed Zarqawi’s targeting of Iraqi civilians and brutal beheadings. More-
over, Ansar al Sunna’s leaders believed that AQI and Zarqawi frequently took credit for 
attacks that Ansar al Sunni launched, and poached members from among their ranks.82 
Relations between the two insurgent groups were bad enough that al-Qaeda’s senior 
leaders received reports that open fighting might break out.83 To resolve this dispute and 
get a better grasp of the situation in Iraq, Abdul Hadi, part of Osama Bin Laden’s inner 
circle, twice requested Zarqawi’s help to infiltrate Iraq, but Zarqawi claimed the security 
situation would not permit it.84 Abdul Hadi’s visit to mediate between the two groups 
was delayed 7 months because of Zarqawi’s intransigence, and the AQI–Ansar al Sunna 
feud festered in the meantime.
The disputes between insurgent groups and the uprising of Anbari tribes against AQI 
reached MNF-I’s attention by September when an MNF-I assessment noted, “since May 
[2005] select western Sunni tribes . . . have been in armed conflict with AQI for the town 
of Qusaybah in the Western Euphrates River Valley area. . . . Intelligence reports indicate 
Sunni tribal members—as many as 1,000—are increasingly disillusioned with AQI and 
are formulating plans to expel Foreign Fighters.”85 Sensing an opportunity to extend his 
Sunni outreach efforts, Casey authorized meetings with the exiled Albu Mahal tribe in 
Jordan and later sent an aircraft to bring the tribe’s senior leader, Sheikh Sabah, to Bagh-
dad to negotiate a formal alliance, though Casey was wary of providing too much assis-
tance and creating another local militia for his units to handle.86
As Casey’s diplomatic initiative with the Albu Mahal was developing, CJSOTF units 
were returning to Anbar for the first time in a year and were eager to reenergize the irreg-
ular force they had tried to create in 2004. Because of the CJSOTF’s relatively low person-
nel turnover, many of the same troops who had led the 2004 effort now returned to the 
same locations in Anbar. Master Sergeant Andy Marchal and other special operators who 
had worked with the Albu Nimr tribe in 2004 returned to Hit and quickly reestablished 
contact with the tribe. At the same time, Major Adam Such, who had helped pioneer the 
2004 effort, was now the battalion operations officer responsible for planning the new 
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initiative, which called for an even larger irregular tribal force named the Desert Protec-
tors. The CJSOTF’s plan was a pragmatic one that recognized the sheikhs’ goals would 
simply be to “get the shooting [with AQI] to stop” so they could rebuild their neighbor-
hoods and restore their influence over the local economy.87 The CJSOTF leaders fully 
accepted that their partner sheikhs would skim a percentage of money from whatever the 
coalition provided, so long as it was carefully managed and the tribal elements accom-
plished what was expected of them. Recognizing the process of standing up a tribal force 
capable of defending itself and maintaining law and order could take up to 2 years, the 
CJSOTF plan also counseled patience. Accepting these stipulations, Casey—with Ambas-
sador Zalmay Khalilzad’s support—approved the plan and began to steer MNF-I and 
MNSTC-I resources to it.88
The transformation of the tribal elements into a force that supported the coalition 
began first with the Albu Mahal tribesmen who were eager to take revenge against 
al-Qaeda and return to Al Qa’im. The CJSOTF initially organized and trained a platoon 
of tribal irregulars whose pay would come from Iraqi Army coffers, but who, unlike the 
army, would not be required to deploy anywhere outside of their immediate tribal areas. 
Marine units in MNF-W quickly supported the effort because the tribesmen effectively 
served as scouts who could identify AQI fighters and leaders during the battles of the 
WERV Campaign. As the effort began having tactical effects, leaders in the Albu Nimr 
tribe petitioned to join the initiative, partly out of rivalry with the Albu Mahal and partly 
because of rekindled contacts with the CJSOTF.89 The Albu Nimr offered more than 500 
fighters to Iraqi Minister of Defense Sadoon Dulaimi, an Anbari Sunni who had helped 
broker the initial agreement between Casey and the Albu Mahal. Dulaimi was forced 
to downsize the request, telling the Albu Nimr that “neither Prime Minister Ja’afari nor 
SCIRI leader Hakim wanted a Sunni army division created even [though] they feigned 
support for Sunni political inclusion.”90 Ultimately, only a platoon’s worth of Albu Nimr 
volunteers completed training in Fallujah, but with this modest addition, the Desert Pro-
tectors spread east to Hit, and the conglomerated tribal force grew to company size.91 
Though they did not have a decisive impact in 2005, the Desert Protectors demonstrated 
that, under the right conditions, local irregular forces could partner with coalition units 
against AQI to great effect, a concept that would be important during the Awakening in 
2006.
Recognizing the potentially strategic implications of these tribal realignments, AQI 
violently struck back to intimidate other tribes from joining the movement. Prominent 
Albu Issa members, who had worked with the coalition in 2004 and banned their tribes-
men from joining the insurgency, were targeted in June by car bombs and assassination 
attempts, resulting in the deaths of two tribal leaders and the flight of another to Jordan.92 
With many of its leaders gone, the Albu Issa tribe fractured, with some members joining 
AQI. Fighting also broke out between al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Jaghayfi tribe in May after 
AQI burned down houses of tribesmen in Hadithah and beat local civilians. By midsum-
mer, AQI and local tribes were in open conflict in Hadithah, Hit, and Qusaybah.93
In Ramadi, Mohammed Mahmoud Latif, seeing the disruptive effect that tribal forces 
were having on AQI, proposed to local sheikhs that they create their own tribal force.94 
The proposal progressed over the summer. In mid-August, Anbar’s Governor Ma’moun 
Sami Rashid Latif al-Alwani agreed to hold a meeting with 50 imams to discuss the details 
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of setting up such a force against AQI. When AQI learned of the meeting, it launched an 
attack against the meeting place, doing little damage but emboldening Latif, Governor 
Ma’moun, and the restive tribal leaders.95 Ultimately, however, the Iraqi Government in 
Baghdad did not act on their proposal, and the Ramadi tribal force would not materialize 
in 2005.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES TRANSFORMATIONS
The return to the tribal engagement effort was only one of several significant changes 
that SOF was undertaking in 2004 and 2005. Like McMaster and Alford, SOF leaders 
were also introducing sweeping innovations, many of which reflected tactical lessons 
they had learned in their shorter but more frequent rotations in Iraq. Perhaps the most 
significant innovation was a near-revolution in the special operations targeting cycle. 
Doctrinally, SOF had emphasized extensive preparations that usually involved seques-
tering or isolating detachments for 96 hours or more, during which they received target-
ing packages and intelligence from higher headquarters. These detachments would then 
perform detailed planning, conduct multiple briefings to obtain mission approval, and 
then rehearse plans exhaustively. Such deliberate tactics were mismatched to Iraq, where 
intelligence usually came from the bottom up, and where targets were usually fleeting. 
In order to adapt to this type of warfare, the CJSOTF pushed intelligence analysts down 
to the company level and below and developed procedures to operate against time-sen-
sitive targets, establishing “playbooks” of battle drills that ODAs could execute on short 
notice, without extensive planning and with minimal rehearsals.96
Another significant change for special operations forces was the new need to oper-
ate in the battle space of conventional units. Doctrinally, special operators prepared for 
most of their careers to work in their own joint special operations area located far behind 
enemy lines or in denied territory where there were no conventional forces. However, in 
Iraq, any action they took, whether lethal or nonlethal, could affect the campaign plan of 
the conventional unit who owned the battle space. Operating among conventional units 
created some frictions, but also some significant advantages. Special operations forces 
were smaller in size and flatter in organization and decision-making authority, but they 
lacked the combat power and logistics to conduct sustained operations that conventional 
units could provide.97 Additionally, special operations forces were able to collect human 
intelligence far more effectively than conventional forces could.98 When this symbiotic 
relationship worked well, often the special operators would gather intelligence, synchro-
nize an operation with the local conventional units to ensure it had the desired impact, 
and then conduct missions with the battle space owner providing a quick reaction force. 
Colonel Stephen Davis, the commander for Regimental Combat Team 2 in Anbar from 
2005 to 2006, later explained his perspective on the value of synergy between special 
operations and conventional forces and his lack of concern about doctrinal command 
relationships. “RCT-2 forces were QRFing [Quick Reaction Force] every assault they 
[SOF] did. . . . Was it SOF in support of general purpose forces? Was it general purpose 
forces in support of SOF? Who really cares? The bottom line is you need to . . . focus on 
the mission. Don’t worry about who gets credit. Leave your ego at the door.”99
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The special operations–conventional relationship was not smooth everywhere. 
In some instances, the same disputes over unity of command and unity of effort that 
had prevailed in the 2003 invasion resurfaced, especially when new units rotated into 
Iraq. In northern Iraq, the relationship frayed when the 1st Infantry Division took over 
MND-NC in 2004. From the perspective of 1st Infantry Division Commander Major Gen-
eral John Batiste, the issue was one of unity of command, telling Army historians in 2005, 
“When you put a Special Forces outfit, at whatever level, inside a division command-
er’s battle space, and they’re [essentially] autonomous, with theoretical coordination 
relationships . . . it’s a recipe for disaster. . . . [T]hose Special Forces units need to be task 
organized appropriately with the divisions, either attached or in direct support. And 
there’s no other way to do it.”100 In some cases, poor junior leadership among special oper-
ators had resulted in special operations units not consulting with battle-space owners, so 
there was some truth to Batiste’s complaint. However, by early 2005, such “procedural 
fouls” were becoming rarer, especially after the CJSOTF issued an order requiring all mis-
sions to obtain battle space owner approval in advance except in rare circumstances.101 
The CJSOTF, which was officially under MNC-I’s tactical control, was loath to accept 
the command relationship Batiste proposed, partly because special operations units had 
previously been asked by other conventional commanders to perform inappropriate mis-
sions such as serving as scout platoons, long-range surveillance detachments, or basic-
training-style platform trainers for the Iraqi security forces. CJSOTF leaders who were 
responsible for operations across the entire country also wanted to remain free to reposi-
tion their forces to match the insurgency’s main effort, as they did when moving an entire 
company from Kirkuk to Anbar to support the WERV Campaign.102 As a result, CJSOTF 
leaders generally believed the joint doctrinal command relationship of “supported ele-
ment” and “supporting element” better allowed the CJSTOF to meet the MNC-I and 
multinational division commanders’ needs. Nevertheless, the dispute between Batiste 
and CJSOTF leaders grew fractious enough that the CJSOTF limited its missions within 
the MND-NC area of operations, an unfortunate development from which other multi-
national divisions nonetheless benefited.103
By the time of the third major rotation of forces for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 
early 2005, relationships between special operations and conventional commanders had 
matured enough that some CJSOTF units began participating in the predeployment  exer-
cises of the conventional units they expected to support. However, turbulent unit moves, 
such as the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment’s multiple moves in country and the CJSOTF’s 
short notice Battalion Augmentation Training Team mission, disrupted this beneficial 
pre-mission training.104 The rotation of forces also accented a trend which would continue 
to progress through the war: that Marine and Army commanders who returned to Iraq 
often had already worked with special operations forces on prior rotations, and had come 
to understand better their roles and capabilities.
During 2005, other special operations forces were also experiencing transformative 
changes similar to conventional forces and the CJSOTF. Like the CJSOTF, other spe-
cial operations forces learned that the entire intelligence cycle had to be revolutionized 
from top to bottom, with intelligence collection, exploitation, and analysis pushed to the 
lowest level possible. Some of the most important enablers in this revolutionized intel-
ligence cycle were intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, which, 
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when paired with other capabilities, created the ability to establish a “pattern of life” for 
an intended target. Unfortunately, early in 2005 it became clear that other special opera-
tions forces did not have enough ISR platforms to have the operational effects that they 
desired. On February 20, 2005, other special operations forces were following Zarqawi’s 
movements with one ISR platform. Just as Zarqawi’s location appeared to be confirmed, 
the video camera on the ISR platform malfunctioned and needed to be reset, a process 
that took only 23 seconds. In that short time, Zarqawi himself was able to disappear from 
sight, escaping capture from an assault force that arrived seconds later. While the team’s 
main prize was gone, it did capture Zarqawi’s vehicle and many of his personal posses-
sions, including his laptop, seven thumb drives, and 50,000 euros. The near miss resulted 
in a redoubling of efforts to increase the number of ISR platforms to allow for backups 
in the case of malfunctions and to permit the coverage of more targets. Starting the war 
with only two helicopters equipped with full-motion video cameras, by April 2005, the 
addition of Predator unmanned aerial vehicles and manned aircraft enabled the number 
of dedicated orbits for other special operations forces to reach 4.21 (each orbit is defined 
as the ability to cover a single target continuously for a 24-hour time period). By March 
2006, the total had reached 6.25 orbits, and imagery-related intelligence had come to be 
considered as important as signal-related intelligence.
Source: U.S. Air Force photo by Tech Sergeant Effrain Lopez (Released).
Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.105
Over time, other special operations forces brought exploitation capabilities, opera-
tors, and analysts together under one roof, preventing institutional myopia that would 
slow down the processing and analysis of raw intelligence. The in-theater exploitation 
of documents found on objectives, which previously had to be sent back to the United 
States for translation and analysis, became an especially crucial capability that enabled 
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quicker follow-on targeting of AQI leaders. Likewise, the human intelligence garnered 
from detainee interrogations was deemed so important and effective that a temporary 
screening facility was established, which was authorized to hold detainees for exploita-
tion until transferred to the theater facility.
The new paradigm in intelligence was matched by a revolutionized perspective in 
operations that led to missions being conducted to gather intelligence—a reversal of 
prewar special operations doctrine in which intelligence guided operations. In almost a 
reconnaissance-in-force methodology, operations were launched to stir up enemy groups 
to see “reflections,” or how the enemy reacted, as well as to gather information from an 
objective in order to assemble pieces of a larger intelligence picture that would lead to 
follow-on missions. While this approach was sometimes criticized for its similarity to a 
whack-a-mole arcade game that lacked decisive focus, it reflected the belief that success 
against AQI would come not from a decisive blow, but from constant pressure that put 
AQI into a reaction mode, unable to respond to attacks and unable to repair itself as fast 
as it was being hurt. If AQI could be dealt enough body blows in rapid succession, SOF 
leaders believed, the network, like an organism, would go into shock and collapse. To 
that end, raid after raid was launched during the same night. Bolstered by the additional 
battalion that arrived earlier in 2005, the number of missions conducted each month hit 
nearly 300 by the end of the year. As the operations multiplied, special operations forces 
shifted many of the targets from top-tier AQI leaders to mid-level managers of the orga-
nization, reflecting yet another transformational perspective that mid-level leaders were 
the guts of an organization and the most difficult to replace.
This industrialization of special operations was best seen in Mosul over the summer 
of 2005, when Abu Talha and Abu Zubayr, AQI’s regional emir and his replacement, 
were killed along with numerous subordinate AQI leaders. By November 7, four more 
replacement leaders, including the sixth emir of Mosul, Abu Sayf, had also been killed, 
and AQI’s Mosul branch began to grind to a halt. Conventional forces also contrib-
uted to the destruction of the group in Mosul, raiding terrorist safe houses and killing 
scores of AQI’s rank-and-file. During one such raid on November 19, a platoon from 
the 172d Stryker Brigade Combat Team found itself pinned down and outnumbered by 
AQI fighters. Although the platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and several other Soldiers 
were wounded in the fighting, the unit rallied and defeated the insurgents with grenades 
and rifle fire. The platoon’s tenacity earned its members two Silver Stars as well as a 
Distinguished Service Cross for Private First Class Stephen Sanford, who, despite being 
wounded five times, shielded wounded Soldiers with his body and performed first aid 
until he passed out from blood loss.106 While these efforts significantly damaged AQI in 
Mosul, it proved a challenging opponent to destroy, and over time, would slowly rees-
tablish itself in the city.
CASEY AND KHALILZAD BRING PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 
TO IRAQ
In the aftermath of the operation in Tel Afar, McMaster tried to resolve some of the 
underlying causes of instability in the city by pressing the MNF-I and embassy systems 
to use a combination of Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) money and 
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funds from MNSTC-I to create jobs and improve education. With this money, Iraqi con-
tractors began to rebuild police stations, refurbish schools, and provide potable water 
and electricity to the entire city.107 The Iraqi Government committed $44 million for lon-
ger-term projects, but after an initial $4–5 million, it never followed through with the 
remainder of the funds.108 What happened in Tel Afar was similar to what had happened 
in Fallujah and other Sunni enclaves. According to MNC-I Commander Lieutenant Gen-
eral John Vines, “Even though the money was available in the Iraqi Government, and 
part of it was probably from U.S. origin, you couldn’t get them to allocate it. . . . The 
central government probably didn’t want to see . . . money flowing through primarily a 
Sunni area.”109 The problem of trying to get the Shi’a-led Iraqi Government to reconstruct 
Sunni-majority areas was never effectively resolved.
To compensate for these shortcomings in Iraqi governance, during late 2005 another 
innovation was transplanted, with modifications, from Afghanistan to Iraq. By the 
summer, Casey had become concerned that the development of the Iraqi Government 
was not keeping pace with perceived improvements in security and the Iraqi security 
forces. He worried that the progress of the Iraqi Government was being hampered by 
multiple transitions caused by the decision to hold three elections in one calendar year, 
and worried that the U.S. military simply did not have the skills necessary to help Iraqi’s 
political sphere develop properly. Without a concerted effort to improve Iraqi gover-
nance, Casey judged, one of the critical legs of the MNF-I campaign plan could falter.
This line of effort fell primarily within the State Department’s bureaucratic purview, 
yet Casey believed the State Department was not structured or funded to accomplish 
the mission. He, therefore,  sought a way to fuse State Department expertise with DoD 
capability. Together with Abizaid, and with the endorsement of Ambassador James Jef-
frey, Casey decided to stand up provincial support teams, modeled on the provincial 
reconstruction teams already operating in Afghanistan, which would be organized from 
resources already present in Iraq. Casey explained later, “They had elected a provincial 
council and governors, but they had no revenue stream coming out of Baghdad, and the 
people had no way of penetrating the bureaucracy. We needed to get something on the 
civilian side going, and it seemed like [the PRT] was working in Afghanistan.”110 Even so, 
the initial provincial support teams had negligible effects. Despite Jeffrey’s endorsement, 
embassy support for the project was lukewarm, and the teams were too small to make a 
difference. Many were comprised of only four or five military officers and a State Depart-
ment representative, and some members had additional duties unrelated to the support 
team mission.
The arrival of Ambassador Khalilzad in July brought an immediate change. Khalil-
zad, having seen firsthand the impact the provincial reconstruction teams had on gover-
nance, the rule of law, and economic development efforts in Afghanistan was determined 
to replicate them in Iraq. He threw his weight behind efforts to establish the teams and 
recognized they needed to be much more robust in personnel and capabilities than the 
provincial support teams. “What really got it [PRTs] going was the fact that Ambassador 
Khalilzad showed up . . . and said, ‘How come we don’t have PRT’s in Iraq?’” one MNF-I 
officer recounted.111 Given the significant differences between Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
Iraqi teams would focus more on developing provincial governance in order to improve 
the connection between the central government and its constituents.
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Implementing provincial reconstruction teams, however, meant overcoming the 
reluctance not just of the State Department, but also of Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) 
Donald Rumsfeld, who regarded the teams as a sign of mission creep that would result in 
DoD paying to accomplish a State Department function. Only after pressure from Casey, 
Abizaid, and Khalilzad did Rumsfeld acquiesce in the initiative.112 By November, the 
first three reconstruction teams opened in Ninawa, Tamim, and Babil Provinces, with an 
additional 13 planned to follow in other provinces in 2006.113 At the same time, MNF-I 
began planning for 14 teams to directly assist Iraq’s ministries at the national level and 
focus on core governmental functions.
Like all the other ad hoc organizations created for the Iraq mission, provincial recon-
struction teams were slow to reach full capacity due to delays in the arrival of personnel, 
though many of the teams ultimately grew to 30 to 45 representatives from across the U.S. 
interagency, with most teams led by a foreign service officer and a military deputy. For the 
military component, a civil affairs element ranging from a team to company size would 
pair with an engineer officer to work on reconstruction, while MNC-I would provide a 
liaison from the multinational division and MNSTC-I would provide a police partnership 
program coordinator. With the Army’s civil affairs units stretched to the breaking point, 
Navy personnel were hastily assigned to fill reconstruction team billets, even though they 
had little or no civil affairs experience.114 While the State Department provided a majority 
of the civilian personnel, most teams also had a rule of law expert from the Department 
of Justice and representatives from the U.S. Agency for International Development.115 The 
teams had almost as many contractors as government personnel because they depended 
on private companies such as Blackwater or Triple Canopy for security, and on contrac-
tors such as the Research Triangle Institute to run local governance programs.
Despite their potential, the reconstruction teams faced considerable challenges. Man-
ning was a continuous problem, as personnel from civilian agencies could not be forc-
ibly detailed into the positions. The lack of combined pre-mission training meant that 
the teams had to work through differences in organizational culture, identity, and ethos 
while conducting a new mission. Allied forces in MND-CS and MND-SE were reluctant 
to invest their own resources in the program but were also reluctant to allow Ameri-
can-led teams into their sectors. Many of the commanders within the U.S. sectors were 
unhappy with the command relationship of the provincial reconstruction teams to the 
multinational divisions, preferring to have direct control of the teams themselves rather 
than having them controlled by coalition officials in Baghdad.116
SHORTCOMINGS IN THE ISF DEVELOPMENT MISSION
MNSTC-I Takes Over the Interior Ministry Mission
By early 2005, coalition leaders concluded that the development of the Iraqi Ministry 
of the Interior, begun under the short-lived tenure of Bernard Kerik in 2003, was fall-
ing further behind the development of the Ministry of Defense as time passed, so much 
so that the coalition’s plan to establish police primacy in Iraq’s internal security affairs 
was at risk. To speed up the Interior Ministry’s development, Lieutenant General David 
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Petraeus put in place plans to improve the Iraqis’ performance at both ministerial and 
tactical levels. One problem was that coalition advisers had far less access to the Inte-
rior Ministry in east Baghdad than they did to the 
Ministry of Defense inside the Green Zone. Thus 
in April 2005, Petraeus’s command expanded For-
ward Operating Base Shield, a coalition base adja-
cent to the Interior Ministry, so that advisers could 
maximize contact hours with their Interior Ministry 
counterparts.117
Petraeus also pressed coalition leaders to consol-
idate the police training mission under MNSTC-I, a 
measure that Ambassador John Negroponte and the 
State Department opposed because it would make 
Iraq the only country in which DoD, rather than 
State, had authority to organize, train, and equip a 
civilian police force. With the arrival of Khalilzad in 
July 2005, however, the U.S. Embassy changed its 
position and acknowledged that the civilian agen-
cies had not been able to resource the police mission 
with the people or money required. Accordingly, 
in October 2005, a month after Lieutenant General 
Martin Dempsey took command of MNSTC-I from 
Petraeus, the police training mission was trans-
ferred in its entirety from the State Department to 
MNSTC-I. All elements of the U.S. Embassy’s Iraq 
Reconstruction Management Office that had been 
working on Ministry of Interior affairs came under 
Dempsey’s operational control.119 The decision finally created unity of effort within the 
security force assistance mission, giving MNSTC-I, in Dempsey’s words, “responsibility 
for the entire enterprise, from individual [Iraqi] soldier to Minister of Defense or individ-
ual policeman to Minister of Interior,” and providing for the first time “one organization, 
one commander, with the resources to accomplish the mission.”120
With full control over the Iraqi police training and advisory effort for the first time, 
MNSTC-I and MNF-I made plans to accelerate police development dramatically, which 
they assessed to be lagging about a year behind that of the Iraqi Army.121 Casey and 
Dempsey announced that 2006 would be the “Year of the Police,” in which the coalition 
would increase capability at the ministerial level while speeding up the development of 
tactical units. Nearly 700 new international police liaison officers (IPLO) were contracted 
to mentor local police units, which had had no coalition advisers since Prime Minister 
Ayad Allawi’s objections to the creation of local police transition teams in 2004. The arrival 
of the IPLOs in 2006 would mirror the use of external military transition teams already 
underway in 2005. In order to increase the output of the Ministry of the Interior’s police 
training programs and put more police officers on the beat quickly, MNSTC-I would also 
recruit 700 additional Iraqi police instructors and contract 185 additional international 
police trainers.122 The coalition would also help Ministry of the Interior forces field more 
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capable vehicles, starting with a battalion of 30 armored security vehicles issued to the 
Special Police in the fall.123 Coalition leaders hoped the combination of these changes 
would enable the ministry to shoulder a greater share of security responsibility and 
lighten the demands on the Iraqi Army, which, in turn, would allow the coalition to 
accelerate its transition of security responsibilities to Iraqi authorities. 
These optimistic plans for police development, however, did not foresee the severe 
difficulties the rising tide of sectarian warfare would bring to Iraq’s Interior Ministry. The 
transfer of the Interior Ministry advisory mission to MNSTC-I increased coalition com-
manders’ visibility on the ministry’s inner workings, about which MNF-I leaders were 
receiving increasing warnings of sectarian influence and violence.124 Under MNSTC-I, the 
coalition quickly increased the number of advisers in the ministry headquarters from 40 
to 106 personnel, an expansion made possible by the growth of Forward Operating Base 
Shield.125 As these MNSTC-I and MNF-I advisers were making preparations for a reen-
ergized police development effort, several thousand recruits were already entering new 
“public order battalions” created by Prime Minister Ja’afari and Interior Minister Bayan 
Jabr. Though coalition officials initially took Ja’afari and Jabr’s initiatives at face value as a 
sign that Iraqi leaders wanted to act more self-sufficiently, they quickly realized that Iraqi 
leaders were keeping the 3,000-man force out of the normal coalition-supervised vetting 
processes to ensure they were “nearly 100 percent Shi’a,” as Dempsey later recalled.126
Elsewhere in the Interior Ministry, the Iraqi border forces lagged just as far behind 
coalition expectations as did the police. The disconnect between Casey and Vines over 
shifting the coalition’s main effort from Baghdad to the Syrian border had been mir-
rored in a disconnect between MNSTC-I and MNF-I over support to the border forces. 
Although border transition teams, designed to help Iraq’s Department of Border Enforce-
ment, had been part of the transition team plan since its inception, by fall 2005 only 11 
10-man teams were present on Iraq’s entire western border, and not until mid-October 
did MNSTC-I operationalize Casey’s instructions to enable Iraqi border forces to reestab-
lish control.127 With the border forces’ operating at just 70 percent, MNSTC-I assisted the 
Department of Border Enforcement in a recruiting campaign to bring in nearly 2,500 new 
guards by the end of the year.128 In order to advise the larger organization, which by all 
accounts was in worse shape than the police force, Casey requested additional U.S. forces 
from CENTCOM to increase the total number of border transition teams from 15 to 26. 
Given the slow nature of the deployment process, these new forces would not arrive until 
spring 2006.129 In the meantime, MNSTC-I contracted for the completion of 91 additional 
border forts, many of which at the time existed only as intermittent border-crossing loca-
tions with berms and tents.130 MNSTC-I also coordinated with the Department of Home-
land Security to pay for approximately 20 customs and border patrol agents to deploy to 
advise the Iraqi Department of Border Security.131
Unfortunately, all of MNSTC-I’s extensive efforts were on the Syrian border. At the 
same time that the Iranian regime was increasing its infiltration of weapons and opera-
tives into Iraq, not a single team had been assigned to the Iranian border.
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The Iraqi Army
As MNSTC-I was putting renewed effort into the police force, it reviewed its plans for 
building the Iraqi Army and shifted its main effort from the generation of tactical units to 
the development of institutional capacity, especially mentoring the Ministry of Defense 
and the Joint Forces Headquarters on their roles in organizing, training, and equipping 
the Iraqi military. The most acute need was to accelerate the generation of Iraqi officers 
and noncommissioned officers (NCO), which transition readiness assessment reports for 
December 2005 showed at a 66 percent and 60 percent fill, respectively.132 MNSTC-I also 
began to reexamine the organization of the Iraqi logistics system to increase its internal 
capacity. Under new MNSTC-I plans, each Iraqi battalion would gain a headquarters 
and services company with maintenance, supply, medical, and transport capabilities; 
each division would gain a motor transport regiment; and the Ministry of Defense would 
receive a national depot with 10 regional base support units.133 However, Iraqi brigades 
would gain no logistics capability, and all life-support functions such as food, fuel, and 
laundry would remain in the hands of private contractors. Finally, MNSTC-I’s new plans 
also envisioned that three infantry brigades would be converted to motorized brigades to 
serve as an operational reserve; four new strategic infrastructure battalions would guard 
oil pipelines and other infrastructure; and each division would gain a signal company, 
a bomb disposal company, an engineer company, and an intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance company.134 Despite the shift in MNSTC-I plans, however, the combat 
service support changes to the Iraqi Army were slow in coming, as the coalition’s de facto 
main effort for Iraqi force generation continued to be combat units, and recruitment for 
the specialized fields of mechanics, medics, doctors, and logisticians was challenging in 
Iraq in any case. 
MNSTC-I’s review of plans for the Iraqi Army also led to a reassessment of the via-
bility of Iraqi Army’s force protection requirements. Realizing that the pickup trucks the 
coalition had initially purchased for Iraqi units were becoming increasingly unsafe in the 
IED-laden environment, MNSTC-I officials and their Iraqi counterparts procured 2,073 
up-armored HMMWVs of the same model used by U.S. forces. By November 2005, 267 
had been delivered to the Iraqi security forces, with the remainder scheduled to arrive by 
August 2006.135
At the same time, MNSTC-I began fielding Iraqi armor units. On November 12, Iraq 
received 77 T-72 tanks from Hungary and 36 BMP-1 armored fighting vehicles from 
Greece.136 While these units would not be operational for more than a year, the return 
of tanks to the Iraqi Army was a significant milestone, finally overturning Walter Slo-
combe’s 2003 design for an Iraqi military of light infantry that would lack any offensive 
capability that might be used against its neighbors.
Rocky Start for the Military Transition Teams
In May 2005, the first external military and special police transition teams began to 
arrive in Iraq for a transition mission that was already falling behind schedule. Although 
Casey had directed the multinational divisions to stand up internal transition teams 
while the external MiTTs were being organized in the United States, the results were 
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uneven. Some units had supported the new mission fervently, but some overburdened 
commanders who lacked the means to control their areas properly were reluctant to 
reduce their combat power further by setting aside officers, NCOs, and equipment for 
the military transition team mission. Nevertheless, by September 2005, 174 internal and 
external transition teams were in place, including some within allied sectors, and the 
program continued to grow.137
Unfortunately, by the fall of 2005, it was clear the external transition teams that made 
up the majority of the program faced considerable systemic obstacles, especially person-
nel issues caused at least in part by the institutional Army’s reluctance to embrace fully 
the military transition team concept. Rather than providing incentives for officers and 
NCOs to serve on the transition teams that were theoretically the main effort of the war 
in Iraq, many in the Army saw service on a transition team as a career-harming move. 
This judgment was seemingly validated by the fact that the Army in 2005 did not catego-
rize transition team assignments among the “key developmental or branch qualifying” 
jobs officers required for promotion. At a managerial level, some Army personnel offi-
cials advised their top-performing officers to avoid assignment on the transition teams.138 
They also often selected MiTT members haphazardly, at times even using the criteria of 
finding personnel who had not yet deployed to combat. These dynamics resulted in sig-
nificant skill mismatches for the transition team mission, such as the inclusion of artillery 
and engineer Soldiers as battalion-level advisers even though Iraqi Army battalions had 
no fire support and no engineer assets except at the division level.139
Some MiTT members also were not prepared for the rigors of living as a small ele-
ment in an austere environment outside of the normal Army logistical footprint. The fact 
that the teams were so small, officially 10 or 11 people at full strength, but often 8 or 9 in 
reality, magnified the impact of having poorly matched or qualified personnel. One spe-
cial police transition team leader related later:
If a person doesn’t want to be there, it’s different on an 8-man team than it would be in a 120-man 
company, because everybody counts. We had an NCO who absolutely hated all Iraqis based on his 
previous war experience and refused to eat with them, refused to socialize with them. He said, ‘I’ll 
only do what I’m ordered to do and required to do. I’m not eating their food, I’m not socializing, 
and I’m not playing soccer with them.’ That creates a poison in a small-team environment.140
The motley nature of the transition teams resulted in some MiTTs, in a play on words, 
calling themselves Mutts instead.141
Another structural challenge of the external transition teams was that their com-
mand relationship created unity of effort problems with local commanders. The tran-
sition teams were only under the tactical control of commanders in the multinational 
divisions and, as such, the battle-space owners could not restructure the military transi-
tion teams or rate their leaders.142 Instead, the rating chain ran through the various layers 
of MiTTs (battalion, brigade, and division) up to the Iraq Assistance Group, a one-star 
headquarters formed under MNC-I to ensure the teams were properly supported across 
the country. Keeping the teams’ rating chain separate from the brigades and divisions in 
Iraq was a decision made out of concern that MiTT officers senior rated by division or 
brigade commanders would wind up competing—at a disadvantage—against battalion 
commanders or other peers in those divisions, with the result that MiTT members could 
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end up with career-harming evaluation reports. It was an arrangement that irritated 
many battle-space owners, who believed the initial MiTTs tended not to take into suffi-
cient account the objectives of the units responsible for the territory in which the MiTTs 
were operating. The requirement to support the transition teams without the ability to 
control their day-to-day activities or evaluate their personnel bred resentment toward 
the program among many battle-space owners. The quality of individuals on some of 
the first transition teams, a result of the haphazard selection process, only magnified 
the resentment. Although in many cases the transition teams and battle-space owners 
worked through these challenges, doing so resulted in lost time and misdirected efforts 
for the overall campaign.143 The after action review of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment 
in Operation RESTORE RIGHTS captured many of these concerns:
Many of the MiTT teams . . . had not been adequately trained to the MiTT role. . . . Because of this, 
[Special Forces] ODA teams and partnership Squadrons would pick up the slack and crossover 
into the role of the MiTTs. This caused the MiTTs to no longer perform their understood functions 
because the ODA teams were doing it for them. . . . The Army needs to clearly define the roles 
and responsibilities of these different combat multipliers in terms of their relationships and 
responsibilities to the ISF [Iraqi security forces]. . . . ODAs or the partnership Squadrons need to 
have the MiTTs attached to them and have OPCON [operational control] of their teams IOT [in 
order to] allow these clearly defined roles to exist.144
In Baghdad, 3d Infantry Division Commander Major General William Webster echoed 
similar concerns among senior U.S. commanders:
I think the [transition teams] ought to be attached to divisions and the division commanders ought 
to be made responsible for the success or failure of the Iraqi units. I don’t think they ought to be 
deployed as a separate organization. . . . We need those combat commanders, at the division and 
brigade and battalion level, responsible for counterparts in the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi Police 
forces to make them better and they would invest a hell of a lot more. We have invested a lot in 
them and they have a lot to do; but, they also have a staff and a whole huge organization for getting 
it done.145
In advocating that unit commanders, rather than small transition teams, should be re-
sponsible for developing the Iraqi units with which their units were partnered, Webster 
was also echoing the similar argument put forward by General Peter Schoomaker in the 
initial debate over the transition teams the previous year.
For their first several cycles, the transition team deployment timelines were not syn-
chronized with the units they were meant to work with in Iraq, so that the teams gen-
erally arrived midway through a unit deployment without having participated in any 
of the unit’s pre-mission training. It was a crucial missed opportunity to form cohesive 
teams. “In retrospect, the externally-sourced MiTTs should have been given to the BCTs 
stateside or in Europe as augmentees,” observed Brigadier General Daniel Bolger, who 
had served as Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) commander in 
2005. “Most of the angst among MiTTs came from externally sourced teams glued onto 
cohesive BCTs. They felt like outsiders, they were on a different rotation cycle, and it was 
not easy for either the advisers or the partner units.”146
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The size of the teams also limited their 
basic effectiveness. With 11 people at most 
on a team and a countrywide force pro-
tection rule that convoys could consist of 
no fewer than three vehicles, no military 
transition team could conduct split oper-
ations without external assistance or secu-
rity, and they often resorted to using field 
grade officers as either drivers or turret 
gunners to move from place to place. 
Webster recalled later, “We knew that 
these SPTTs and MiTTs were going to be 
10-man elements, and we knew then that 
what that meant in an insurgency was that 
they either all had to stay in one place or 
they all had to move, because it took ten 
guys to secure ten guys all the time.”148 
A September assessment of the MiTTs by 
the Iraq Assistance Group minced words diplomatically, noting, “Transition teams that 
are larger and who have strong partnership support do better, faster.”149 In many cases, 
the additional requirement to provide security for the transition teams became a tax on 
battle-space owners’ already thinly stretched forces. Equipment problems also hampered 
the military transition teams’ effectiveness, especially for the first yearlong rotation. 
By September, the teams only possessed 46 percent of their equipment, with the worst 
shortages in communications equipment and night-vision devices.150 While these supply 
shortages were generally resolved by the time the second group of teams arrived in 2006, 
they hamstrung the teams’ effectiveness in 2005—a critical period in which the rapid 
development of Iraqi security forces was the centerpiece of MNF-I’s plan.
Most transition teams went through a short training period in the United States, fol-
lowed by 10 days of Iraq-specific training in Kuwait (including vehicle rollover drills, 
convoy procedures, IED battle drills, and live-fire exercises). However, in after action 
reviews, few transition team members had positive comments about the utility or appli-
cability of their training.151 To further complicate the predeployment preparations, the 
Army initially conducted pre-mission training at Fort Carson, CO, but over the span of 
a year moved the location first to Fort Hood, TX, and then to Fort Riley, KS, causing a 
reboot of the program with each move.152 Upon arriving in Iraq, the teams finally had 
8 days of focused transition team training at the Phoenix Academy in Taji, created by 
Casey because of his concern that the Army’s institutional preparatory training would 
be insufficient.153 Much of the training prepared the transition teams to teach the mili-
tary decision-making process and other staff functions to the Iraqi battalion and brigade 
staffs, rather than to build warfighting units at platoon and company level.154 
The arrival of the transition teams also revealed more clearly the challenges of the 
Transition Readiness Assessment, the tool that MNSTC-I had set up in coordination with 
MNF-I to evaluate the performance of Iraqi units and to inform U.S. troop withdrawal 
decisions. Many transition teams expressed frustration that the majority of the ratings 
were only focused on staffing and equipping statistics, and ignored the intangible, more 
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subjective determinations of whether an Iraqi unit was cohesive and actually ready for 
combat. In addition, as Iraqi units were passed from one transition team to the next, the 
perils of the perspective of a 1-year rotation became apparent. Frequently, as a transition 
team worked with an Iraqi unit, they would chart the unit’s steady progress, showing 
its development over the length of their deployment. When the next team arrived, with 
little basis to judge unit capabilities other than their experiences with the U.S. Army, 
they would be appalled at the state of the Iraqi Army, and the Iraqi unit’s ratings would 
plummet overnight. Casey himself had observed these challenges, recalling later, “What 
would happen is that the guys [in MiTTs] would get them [Iraqi partners] and they would 
work with them and miraculously, as they got to the end of their tenure, [the Iraqis] 
looked better and better. Well then, the next guys would come in and say, ‘What the Hell 
is this?’”155
Challenges of Iraqi Military Culture
The military transition teams’ organizational challenges were matched by those of 
the Iraqis they were meant to advise. The true scale of the teams’ task was revealed after 
they began working with the Iraqi security forces and realized that they would have to 
overcome pervasive corruption and anachronistic military practices. Corruption in the 
Iraqi security forces was endemic. Its clearest manifestation was the problem of “ghost 
soldiers” listed on the Iraqi Army and police rolls by corrupt commanders who had con-
siderable incentives to overstate the size of their units and pocket the excess pay, which 
the Iraqi Government doled out in cash. At a May 2005 conference for MNSTC-I, MNC-I, 
and transition team leaders, coalition officials conservatively estimated the number of 
ghost soldiers to be between 15,000 and 30,000, a figure representing between 10 and 20 
percent of the entire Iraqi security forces at the time, though anecdotal reports indicated 
the actual numbers could be even higher.156 MNSTC-I and MNF-I’s 2004 decision to use 
contracts for Iraqi units’ life support such as food, fuel, and laundry exacerbated the situ-
ation, as the cash for the contracts went to unit commanders on a per-soldier basis. Some 
corrupt officers also skimmed money off the life support contracts themselves, a practice 
that sometimes resulted in rotten or insufficient food, or in soldiers having to pay for 
their own uniforms. One special police transition team member recalled: 
When we started reviewing who was there, trying to get a personnel status report from these guys 
was crazy. . . . We were just looking for numbers, let alone names, but a couple of reviews of the 
names came up that they had guys on their books who were not there anymore. They were still 
collecting their paychecks, so the question was, ‘Where’s the money going to?’157
The worst corruption came at the highest ministerial level. In September and October 
2005, the Iraqi Government issued arrest warrants for Hazem Shaalan, who had served 
as Minister of Defense under the Allawi government, and 23 other defense officials.158 
Shaalan and other senior members of the Ministry of Defense had set up a vast scheme of 
overpayments, kickbacks, shell companies, and other ploys to steal an estimated $1.3-2.3 
billion from defense contracts in the space of barely a year.159 Shaalan and many of his 
co-conspirators were eventually tried and convicted in absentia for the enormous theft 
because they had fled to other countries before the warrants were issued. The looting of 
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the Iraqi defense budget by its own minister left lasting effects on the security forces by 
draining the treasury and delaying the proper equipping of the force.
In Iraqi tactical units, absenteeism was a serious problem, as it had been in Saddam’s 
army. One cause was the Iraqi Army’s leave policy, which promised soldiers 1 week of 
home leave out of every 4 weeks. This policy, in existence since the Iran-Iraq war, had 
been instituted because of Iraq’s lack of a modern banking system. In a country that 
functioned on cash-and-carry arrangements, soldiers received their pay in cash, with no 
system to transfer funds electronically to their families, and thus most Iraqi troops carried 
the cash home by hand. Low pay also contributed to the absentee problem, creating a 
situation in which some Iraqi troops found it more economical to desert their posts than 
to stay. “In 2005, Iraq paid a rifleman about $300 a month,” CMATT Commander General 
Bolger noted. “The [mujahideen] would pay him $300 on one night to plant a roadside 
bomb.”160 According to Brigadier General John McLaren, the Iraq Assistance Group com-
mander from 2005–2006, these factors resulted in a 30 percent annual turnover rate for 
the Iraqi Army.161 Iraqi commanders’ ability to discipline deserters was low because Iraq 
had no uniform code of military justice and therefore had no enforceable law requiring 
the all-volunteer force to stay on duty.
Sectarianism was also prevalent within the ranks, and many units had effectively 
become ethnically “pure.” The near-exponential growth of the Iraqi security forces, paired 
with increased Iraqi sovereignty that gave the Iraqis the lead in managing that growth, 
made the detailed tracking of ethnic composition within security force units difficult. In 
a memorandum written after his tenure of command in MNF-NW, Major General David 
Rodriguez noted:
The 2d Iraqi Army Division leadership is 100 percent Kurdish and its subordinate brigade level 
leaders are 80 percent Kurdish. Overall the 2d Iraqi Army Division’s ethnic composition is 29 
percent Arab and 61 percent Kurdish. . . . The 3d Iraqi Army Division senior leadership is 75 
percent Kurdish and the brigade level leaders are 65 percent Kurdish. The 3d Iraqi Army Division 
ethnic composition is 69 percent Arab and 31 percent Kurdish. This situation does not lend itself 
to building cohesive teams that are representative of the people of Iraq. The high percentage 
of Kurdish leaders makes those Iraqi Divisions vulnerable to political pressure from Kurdish 
leadership whose agenda is not always in line with Iraq’s national interest.162
Similar situations existed across the country, with the Iraqi Army units in Baghdad 
and the south being predominantly Shi’a. Despite MNSTC-I’s noble objectives of creat-
ing an Army that was a truly national force, Iraq’s ethno-sectarian forces had essentially 
carved it up, much as they had done with Iraq’s political spoils after the elections. This 
sectarian streak in the security forces, especially in the Interior Ministry, created a fragil-
ity that could be exploited, either in preventing units from deploying and fighting to act 
in the national best interest, or in some cases, convincing the units to carry out sectarian 
violence themselves.
Coalition advisers also found that the new Iraqi units retained some of the less desir-
able traits of the old Iraqi military. “Talking to Iraqi officers had some echoes of talking 
to Germans after World War II. Saddam’s heavy hand crushed professional instincts,” 
Bolger recalled.163 The average senior officer in the Iraqi security forces had grown up in 
a police state in which multiple military organizations had competed with one another 
for influence, while regime leaders had aimed to ensure no one organization became 
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effective enough to launch a coup. In such an environment, there was little incentive to 
share information because information represented a potential advantage over rivals. 
The most capable officers were those most likely to be purged because they represented a 
potential threat to the regime. Because of these dynamics, the pre-2003 Iraqi military cul-
ture valued the blind following of orders, loyalty, micromanagement, and the avoidance 
of initiative. When many of the officers and soldiers of the pre-2003 military returned to 
serve in the new Iraqi security forces, they brought with them some of these same dys-
functional values and group norms. One military transition team leader described some 
of the absurd practices that resulted, “When we arrived, the [Iraqi] chief of staff had all 
the paper in the headquarters locked up in his office. He would literally count out sheets 
and only give them to the primary staff officers of the sections. If they came in and asked 
for five pieces of paper, he would ask why they needed it. He would then unlock the cab-
inet and pull out what they needed.”164
In many ways, the transition teams had been tasked to rebuild the very sinews of the 
Iraqi military, including its ethos, a task that was sweeping, slow, and unlikely to meet 
MNF-I’s deadlines. Yet it was on the shoulders of these transition teams, ad hoc organiza-
tions comprised of a mismatched group of personnel with only eight days of adviser-spe-
cific training, that the MNF-I campaign plan rested.
***
As MNF-I approached the crucial elections of fall 2005, Casey and other leaders were 
buoyed by the successes of McMaster at Tel Afar and the growing success of Marines 
such as Lieutenant Colonel Julian Alford in Anbar. The operational shift of forces to the 
border had led to successful operations at the tactical level. MNF-I’s counterinsurgency 
survey had led to the creation of the COIN Academy, which, in turn, gradually shifted 
the tactical focus of new units as they arrived in Iraq. Casey’s Sunni outreach was bear-
ing fruit, and Anbari tribesmen were beginning to shift sides, a marked contrast to the 
outright rejectionism and resistance that marked much of 2004. Provincial reconstruction 
teams and transition teams, critical to the handover of security and governance respon-
sibility to the Iraqis, were finally coming online. The Iraqi security forces were growing 
rapidly, and the initial transition readiness assessments showed some Iraqi units would 
soon be able to assume control of battle space from the coalition. AQI, for the first time 
in the war, was under considerable pressure from rival Sunni insurgent groups, restive 
Anbari tribesmen, and even from al-Qaeda senior leaders who worried about the direc-
tion in which Zarqawi was taking their Iraqi franchise.165
However, the seemingly improving enemy picture and the hard-won tactical victories 
in Tel Afar and Al Qa’im obscured the reality that, at the operational level, the campaign 
was heading in the wrong direction. The successes in western Ninawa and the western 
Euphrates had come by pulling critical combat power away from Baghdad and remov-
ing the most effective brake on sectarian violence that would soon begin to spin out of 
control. The October constitutional referendum and December parliamentary election, 
elections the coalition expected to be national compacts that would lead to reconciliation, 
would instead become divisive, identity-driven events that sparked further conflict.
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CHAPTER 18
DEFEATED BY DEMOCRACY, WINTER 2005-2006
As the coalition entered the fall of 2005, many senior leaders wanted to believe they 
were approaching the crescendo of their effort. General George W. Casey, Jr., and others 
hoped that the October constitutional referendum and December parliamentary election 
would serve to tamp down the insurgency and put Iraq on a new, positive trajectory. 
Many assumed that democracy would serve as a vehicle for reconciliation and provide 
a viable alternative to violence that would drive a wedge among different factions in the 
Sunni insurgency. Successful elections, they hoped, might end the wave of violence that 
had begun with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s Sunni regime and gained momen-
tum ever since. Many insisted it would restore Iraq to equilibrium, which would make it 
possible for the coalition to accelerate transitions to the government of Iraq, draw down 
military forces, and plan for withdrawal.
Yet a sense of fragility permeated the optimism. Many challenges remained, even if 
democratic elections went smoothly. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) had expanded its campaign 
of brutality. Sectarian tensions simmered across the country, ready to boil over at the 
slightest provocation. Death squads from all confessionals, some wearing the uniforms 
of the Iraqi state, stalked the streets in a quiet campaign of ethnic cleansing. All the while, 
influential neighboring states attempted to manipulate Iraq’s internal processes. Faced 
with all of these dangers, Iraq was on the brink of civil war, not peace, and elections held 
in this context would serve as the spark, not the damper.
THE IRAQI CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM
One of the most notable political consequences of the Sunni boycott of the January 
2005 election was that Sunni leaders found themselves frozen out of the writing of the 
Iraqi constitution. On May 10, 2005, the newly elected Iraqi National Assembly nomi-
nated a constitutional drafting committee that had only two Sunni Arabs out of 55 total 
members.1 Fearful of the prospect of a new constitution written by the Kurdish and 
Shi’a Islamist parties, nearly 1,000 Sunni Arab notables met in Baghdad in late May and 
demanded a say in the drafting process.2 Recognizing the danger of another Sunni rejec-
tion of the political process, U.S. diplomats pressed Shi’a and Kurdish leaders to make 
the process inclusive of Sunni Arabs, so the resulting constitution would be a national 
compact, not a document subordinating one community to the rest.3 In early July, U.S. 
Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad and other U.S. officials persuaded Iraqi leaders to 
add 15 Sunnis as voting members of the committee and another 13 as nonvoting experts, 
but the addition made little difference to the process.4 On July 19, two of the new Sunni 
members were assassinated, which seemed to underscore the message that their partici-
pation had not been wanted.5
During drafting committee conferences, the other Sunni members received similar 
signals. “When the Sunni walked in, the Shi’a said, ‘you sit over there. You are only 
here because the Americans made us let you come,’” Casey recollected in 2008. As the 
committee did its work, Khalilzad pushed for the inclusion of Sunni Arab views, but few 
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were incorporated into the final document.6 Most significantly, the Kurdish parties and 
the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) representatives leading 
the committee included articles making Iraq a federal state whose provinces retained the 
right to form autonomous regions. Those regions would also have the power to form 
their own regional governments, create their own internal security forces, and control 
revenues from new energy discoveries.7 The three Kurdish-majority Provinces of Erbil, 
Dahuk, and Sulaymaniyah were already deemed to be their own region, administered by 
the Kurdistan Regional Government, and allowed to have their own elected President and 
Parliament. Concerning the thorny issue of who would govern oil-rich Kirkuk, the draft 
constitution set a December 31, 2007, deadline for a referendum to determine whether the 
province would join the Kurdistan region.8 The Sunni Arabs bitterly opposed these mea-
sures, but Sunni representatives on the constitutional committee had little power to resist 
them. On August 28, the Iraqi Government approved the first draft constitution without 
consensus support from the drafting committee.9
As Iraq edged closer to its dual fall elections, Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF-I) con-
cerned itself less with the elections’ political implications than with the necessity to pro-
tect the important voting process physically. As with the January elections, Casey feared 
that AQI and other Sunni insurgents might launch mass attacks in the days before the 
vote, in a Vietnam war Tet-like offensive that would derail any political gains made.10 
To secure the October and December elections, MNF-I chose to use much of the same 
playbook from the January elections, including a temporary surge of additional U.S. 
forces to disrupt insurgent activities and protect polling sites. To this end, Multi-National 
Corps–Iraq (MNC-I) arranged the timing of the transition between the 101st Airborne 
Division and 42d Infantry Division in Multi-National Division–North Central (MND-
NC) so that both units would be in Iraq in October, temporarily boosting the number of 
brigade combat teams (BCT) during the critical period of the referendum. Additionally, 
two battalions from the 82d Airborne Division’s division-ready brigade, Task Force (TF) 
2-325 (2d Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment) and TF 3-504 (3d Battalion, 504th 
Parachute Infantry Regiment), deployed to Iraq in September for a 120-day period that 
would encompass both electoral events.11 The 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), 
U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) operational reserve, also deployed to Iraq from 
October to December 2005.12 For their part, Iraqi leaders agreed to put in place many of 
the same protective measures as in the January elections, including declaring nationwide 
curfews, closing international borders and the Baghdad International Airport, curtailing 
vehicle movement, and canceling all leave for the Iraqi security forces (ISF).13
As the fall elections approached, many native Sunni insurgent groups, having con-
cluded that the boycott of the January election equated to a political disaster for Sunni 
interests, changed course and actively advocated participation in the electoral process. 
Many of these groups, such as the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades, Jaysh Muhammad, and 
Jaysh al-Islami, erroneously believed that Sunnis were the majority sect in Iraq, which 
would mean they could easily win a fair election without a boycott. In Fallujah, this new 
direction took the form of a July 2005 fatwa, or religious edict, issued by 15 clerics who 
urged residents to participate in both the constitutional referendum and the parliamen-
tary elections.14
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Mohammed Mahmoud Latif took this new direction even further by attempting to 
negotiate a cease-fire in Ramadi and announcing his intention to run as a candidate in 
the December elections. Latif’s announcement split the Ramadi Shura Council, with most 
of the council’s top leaders siding with him, but many of the groups’ rank and file broke 
away to formally join with AQI.15 By the end of July, Latif had to break off cease-fire 
negotiations with the coalition as a result of AQI assassination plots and pressure from 
the splintering of the Shura Council, but he did not abandon his support for the electoral 
process.16
Over the same period, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had grown increasingly concerned 
with Latif’s and other Iraqi insurgent groups’ decisions to enter the political process. On 
August 13, AQI declared those who would write or support the constitution to be “apos-
tates,” and that the “judicial court of the Organization of al-Qaeda in Iraq has ruled that it 
is a duty to uphold God’s law and kill those who have declared themselves God’s partners 
in drafting this void constitution.”17 In response to AQI’s declaration, militants attacked 
poll workers, election officials, and even election sites used in January in the hopes of 
causing enough carnage to forestall the elections. In one brutal incident on August 18, 
insurgents kidnapped three election workers who were hanging voting posters in Mosul 
and publicly executed them in front of a crowded mosque the next day.18
The Sunni groups that supported political participation resisted AQI’s violent efforts 
to discourage voting. By late September, support among Anbaris for changing course 
had grown to the point that Sunni leaders in the province were confident enough to 
form the Anbar General Conference, which lobbied for a unified political front to repre-
sent Sunni equities in the upcoming elections. Even prominent Sunni insurgent leaders 
joined the conference, including Harith al-Dhari, Mohammed Mahmoud Latif, and one 
of Abdullah Janabi’s senior lieutenants.19 The insurgent group Jaysh Muhammad went so 
far as to finance anti-AQI sermons in mosques, post flyers with names and photos of AQI 
members, and threaten merchants against distributing AQI propaganda.20 To counter 
Zarqawi’s claim that participation in the electoral process amounted to apostasy, Latif 
and the Association of Muslim Scholars declared that participating in the referendum to 
vote against the constitution was equivalent to jihad—the duty of every Muslim.21
On October 15, the day on which the constitutional referendum was held, insurgents 
managed only 88 attacks nationwide, down significantly from the 299 reported attacks 
during the January 2005 election. Attacks against election sites were also down, from 
89 in January to only 19 in October, as were the total number of casualties, from 213 
to 49.22 With several insurgent groups actively encouraging voting, and near-universal 
participation by Sunni political leaders, turnout increased dramatically during the refer-
endum, as virtually all the Sunni community hoped to reject the draft constitution and 
its federal articles. But their unrealistic hopes were quickly dashed. When the final votes 
were tallied after the October 15 vote, overall turnout had jumped to 66 percent. The vote 
included near-universal Sunni rejection of the draft constitution in the Sunni-majority 
provinces: in Anbar, 97 percent of voters voted against the constitution; and in Salahadin 
and Ninawa, the “no” votes were 82 percent and 55 percent, respectively.23 In the ethni-
cally mixed Diyala Province, where Sunnis were a plurality, 49 percent of the population 
voted against the constitution. Despite the strong opposition in these provinces, Iraqi 
voters nationwide approved the constitution by a clear majority of 78.6 percent.24 Sunni 
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opposition fell just short of the referendum requirement that two-thirds of the voters in 
three provinces had to reject the draft constitution to block its adoption. The constitution 
drafted mainly by Shi’a and Kurdish political parties in the late summer became Iraq’s 
new foundational law.
The results in Anbar, in particular, gave a window into the state of the insurgency. In 
areas where the more nationalistic insurgent groups still had sway, election participation 
was high. In Fallujah and its environs, 69 percent of the population voted, a high enough 
percentage that electoral officials had to request additional ballots.25 In the AQI-con-
trolled territory that included Al Qa’im, Qusaybah, and Hadithah, voting did not occur 
at all because it was unsafe even to establish polling sites. Across the province, 32 percent 
of eligible voters participated, a sharp increase from the 2 percent that voted in the Janu-
ary election.26
However, the increase in participation obscured a sober truth: that while many Sunnis 
had decided to join the electoral process, they were rejecting wholesale the political 
changes proposed in that process. The vast majority of those Sunnis who cast votes were 
voting against a constitution they believed would forever transform Iraq and cement 
their marginalization in society.27 Yet, their opposition to the constitution would ulti-
mately prove to be an act of futility and a further sectarian irritant. That some Sunni 
parties had left the insurgency to join the political process, likewise, was not a signal of 
future stability, since those parties generally stressed Sunni identity politics, opposed 
federalism, and demanded the reconstitution of the old Iraqi Army—all factors that the 
major Shi’a and Kurdish parties vehemently opposed.28
Ultimately, the identity-driven election would only serve to drive a deeper wedge 
between Iraq’s ethno-sectarian groups. Casey, in retrospect, concluded that the consti-
tutional referendum “was not a national compact . . . 70 percent of the Sunni went out 
and voted against it. You had this document that was written by Iraqis but it was not 
a national compact of the whole of the country together. In fact, it was probably more 
divisive.”29
Exploiting “Success:” The Bridging Strategy and the Plan to Reduce U.S. Troops
Coalition leaders took the adoption of the constitution as an indication that a turning 
point had arrived, despite the fact that Iraqi Sunnis had largely voted against the char-
ter. One week after the voting, MNF-I’s October 22 campaign assessment pronounced, 
“Bottom Line: The successful referendum period was a strategic victory for the political 
process in Iraq and dealt a considerable blow to the enemy providing us with a unique 
opportunity to exploit success.”30 With a new democratically elected Iraqi Government 
expectedly in the offing, MNF-I began to revise its campaign plan. “We recognized that 
the campaign plan ran out in December,” Casey later recalled. “So we knew we were 
going to need another campaign plan; but I knew we wouldn’t get it done until we saw 
what the heck it looked like after the elections.”31 Having experienced a nearly 6-month 
delay in the formation of the Ja’afari government, the MNF-I commander was concerned 
that the coalition would face a similar delay in the wake of the December elections and 
therefore aimed to create a temporary strategy to “bridge” MNF-I from the election to 
489
DEFEATED BY DEMOCRACY, WINTER 2005-2006
the formation of a new government. After the bridge, the new government would have 
a 4-year term, enabling MNF-I to generate new, long-term plans in partnership with it.
MNF-I’s new bridging strategy, published on October 30, was built on the same guid-
ing principles as the original August 2004 campaign plan: preventing Iraqi dependency 
and avoiding the creation of antibodies in Iraqi society by continuing to shrink the coa-
lition footprint as quickly as conditions would allow. However, the new version also 
emphasized Casey’s desire to reconcile with the Sunni population and to accelerate tran-
sition of responsibility to the Iraqi Government and Iraqi security forces, new priorities 
that Casey encapsulated in the phrase, “Al Qaeda Out, Sunni In, ISF Increasingly in the 
Lead, and Bridge the Gap.”32
For the objective of driving al-Qaeda out, Casey’s planners judged that the success-
ful conclusion of the border campaign in the Western Euphrates River Valley (WERV) 
and Tel Afar had done much of the work, but a shift in effort to Ramadi was required to 
finish the job. “AQI presence and pressure [in Ramadi] remains strong. Removal of this 
threat . . . may be the key to unlocking the insurgency in al Anbar province,” Casey 
wrote in a strategic planning directive on October 30.33 To assist in this effort against AQI, 
Casey judged that information operations could be an important tool in driving a wedge 
between AQI and the Iraqi population. He ordered MNF-I to take action to exploit AQI’s 
blunders in Anbar as evinced in the Ayman Zawahiri letter.34 
Casey’s objective of “ISF in the Lead” effectively meant an acceleration of his policy 
to transfer responsibility to Iraqis. On October 30, he wrote, “We are approaching the 
point in the campaign where the work of the past two years with the ISF is beginning 
to pay off . . . [t]he pace of transitions should pick up in the next months.”35 Casey also 
wanted to accelerate the development of Ministry of the Interior (MOI) forces, calling 
on Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC-I) to “develop an action 
plan to operationalize 2006 as the ‘Year of the Police,’ with a goal of having the MOI 
capable of leading border security efforts by June 06 and beginning to assume the lead 
in the counterinsurgency effort [from the Army] by the end of 2006.”36 This effort would 
include a request for additional forces to create transition teams with local police.
“Bridging the Gap,” meanwhile, meant accelerating the transition of responsibility to 
the new Iraqi Government, which Casey eagerly awaited in the belief that the coalition 
would finally have a long-term partner government and that Iraqis would create a gov-
ernment of national unity. Accordingly, the October 30 directive called for the creation of 
ministerial assistance teams to bolster key Iraqi governmental functions and for expand-
ing the provincial reconstruction teams from the original three cities to nine. As Secretary 
of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld had long wished, Casey’s directive also sped up 
detainee transfers to Iraqi control. Finally, the directive emphasized “leveraging reduc-
tions in Coalition Forces to demonstrate the results of improving ISF, and [demonstrate] 
that the coalition presence is finite.” Coalition units were instructed to “prepare for the 
next off-ramp decision.”37
The one component of Casey’s directive that took the coalition in a significantly new 
direction was his “Sunni In” provision, which aimed to create “an environment where 
the Sunni population sees the coalition as the guarantor of its participation in the political 
process and the rejectionists find the military option too costly to pursue.”38 Accordingly, 
MNF-I would press for the reconstruction of the predominantly Sunni cities damaged by 
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fighting in 2004 and 2005: Fallujah, Samarra, and Tel Afar. Casey stressed the importance 
of increasing voter turnout in the Sunni provinces, and he ordered an expansion of the 
Desert Protector program. Lastly, he called on his staff to develop a Sunni amnesty plan 
that would include sizable detainee releases.39
One major component of Casey’s “ISF in the Lead” effort was a reduction in coalition 
troops and a shrinking of the footprint of those that remained. Both Casey and General 
John P. Abizaid maintained, as they had done at the time of the first MNF-I campaign 
plan in August 2004, that, with a new democratic Iraqi Government in the offing, the 
gradual reduction of the coalition military presence was vital to ensuring the new gov-
ernment’s popular legitimacy. Even before the October referendum, the coalition had 
steadily reduced the footprint of its bases in 2005. By October 2005, XVIII Airborne Corps 
had closed 31 forward operating bases since assuming responsibility as the MNC-I head-
quarters in February, turning most of the bases over to Iraqi security forces.40 The base 
closures were part of MNF-I’s effort to move as many forces as possible out of Iraq’s 
cities, partly to force political transition with the Iraqis, as U.S. forces had done by leaving 
their bases in Najaf in September 2005 and transferring responsibility for the entire city to 
the Iraqi Government, the first such transfer of the war.41
The reduction in the coalition footprint was also the implementation of Abizaid’s 
guidance to decrease the number of antibodies created through friction with the local 
population. Like Abizaid, Casey believed that no matter how much good coalition troops 
might do, they were operating on borrowed time because Iraqis universally viewed them 
as occupiers. By October 2005, MNF-I leaders noted that 80 percent of recorded insur-
gent attacks took place in just four provinces: Baghdad, Anbar, Salahadin, and Ninawa.42 
Though those four contained a majority of Iraq’s population, Casey and MNF-I leaders 
believed the statistic meant that the insurgency was localized and could be contained—
but only if the coalition sapped the insurgency of its motivation to fight against the coa-
lition presence. A further MNF-I statistic that showed 80 percent of all insurgent attacks 
were directed against coalition forces—and not against Iraqis—seemed to reinforce the 
belief that coalition forces were part of the problem, not the solution.43 In a September 
MNF-I poll taken in Baghdad, 79 percent of respondents had expressed no confidence in 
coalition forces to improve security, 90 percent had reported feeling very unsafe in the 
presence of coalition troops, and 53 percent had supported attacks against coalition forces 
in order to hasten their withdrawal. Conversely, 78 percent had expressed confidence in 
the Iraqi Army and 79 percent confidence in the Iraqi police.44 The poll, like many others 
during that period, failed to break out Iraqi opinions by ethno-sectarian groups, thereby 
masking Sunni resentment and sectarian tensions, and it did not consider the validity of 
polling results in such a war-torn, traumatized society in the first place. Nevertheless, 
the poll’s results reinforced MNF-I leaders’ strong impression that opposition to the coa-
lition was a major motivator among Iraqis. In October 2005 briefings to Rumsfeld and 
then-President George W. Bush, Casey argued in favor of “off-ramping,” or canceling 
the deployment of a few Iraq-bound U.S. units, thereby reducing the coalition’s military 
presence in order “to remove [the] central motivation attracting foreign fighter[s] and 
drawing Iraqis to the insurgency.”45 Time was fleeting to make such a reduction, Casey 
warned, because Iraqis’ “tolerance for coalition presence is diminishing.”46
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Beyond Baghdad, however, not all coalition commanders concurred with Casey’s off-
ramp recommendations. In September, when MNC-I asked both the current and incom-
ing multinational divisions for input on the question, the soon-to-depart 42d Infantry 
Division and 3d Infantry Division supported the off-ramp proposal, with the latter judg-
ing that “[Iraqi Army] assumption of battle space will help mitigate the PAX [person-
nel] delta between 3ID and 4ID.”47 The soon-to-arrive 4th Infantry Division and 101st 
Airborne Division, however, opposed the off-ramp, with the 4th Infantry Division voic-
ing the strongest opposition: “This [course of action] placed 4ID into the medium-high 
risk category for mission success . . . [and] reflects the growing impression that MNC-I 
is willing to assume risk in Baghdad during a critical phase of the Campaign Plan.”48 
In Multi-National Force–West (MNF-W), meanwhile, Marine commanders warned that 
they did not have sufficient troops for their mission and requested a reallocation of some 
of the off-ramped forces to Anbar.49 Finally, in October, Casey’s own MNF-I Red Cell 
also recommended against its commander’s idea for a two BCTs off-ramp, advising that 
the situation was too uncertain for the loss of two brigades before spring 2006.50 The 
Red Cell’s assessment matched precisely the draft recommendation in the August 2005 
counterinsurgency survey, which had also recommended postponing any off-ramp deci-
sion until spring 2006, but these recommendations were forgotten once coalition leaders 
judged the October referendum a strategic success.
Iraqi Attempts to Participate in the Planning Process
For a document that emphasized Iraqi independence, Casey’s October 30 directive 
reflected little actual input from Iraqis, a fact not lost on Iraqi leaders. While MNF-I and 
the U.S. Embassy were developing these new plans, Iraqi National Security Adviser 
Mowaffaq Rubaie wrote Casey and Khalilzad on November 6 to ask them to allow Iraqis 
into the strategic planning process. Rubaie noted:
I can see there is a tendency, especially on the U.S. side, to prepare far-reaching plans for all aspects 
of Iraq’s future . . . with minimal involvement from Iraqi stakeholders. . . . I am fully aware that 
both of you are wedded to the idea of Iraqi ownership, but I am concerned that this is not always 
acted upon when the idea goes down the line.51
Rubaie then critiqued the existing campaign plan, which, in his view, amounted to little 
more than holding off the insurgency long enough to allow a coalition withdrawal. 
“People can see the writing on the wall that MNF-I’s focus has essentially been to keep 
a lid on the insurgency, transfer security responsibilities to the ISF and lay the ground-
work for the eventual withdrawal of Coalition forces. Obviously those objectives do not 
address defeating the insurgency.”52 Instead of “hunting down and killing insurgents,” 
Rubaie argued, the coalition and the ISF should focus on protecting the population from 
attacks and creating secure areas that would last even “after clearing operations have con-
cluded.” Rubaie acknowledged that such a strategy would require “many more troops 
on foot patrol,” but was also “aware that calling for additional forces in Iraq is politically 
unacceptable to Washington.”53
In Rubaie’s proposal, instead of American troops, the massive number of additional 
forces required to protect the population and create secure areas would come from Iraqi 
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irregular forces. “This approach must somehow find a way to leverage personnel from 
the tribes and local areas,” Rubaie wrote, presaging the approach the U.S.-led coalition 
would eventually adopt in 2007. Rubaie added, “Native, indigenous forces like these 
could be attached to the ISF with specific tasks and timelines. These tribal and local forces 
may be trained as a form of ‘public safety guards’ authorized by the MOI [Ministry of the 
Interior] or MOD [Ministry of Defense].”54 Dealing with irregular forces was complicated, 
Rubaie conceded, but the benefits outweighed the problems of hidden agendas and even-
tual questions of demobilization, and in any case, the dire security situation called for 
taking risks. Casey forwarded Rubaie’s proposal for comment to his Strategy, Plans, and 
Assessment directorate, where it had a negligible impact on the ongoing development of 
the new campaign plan.
The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq
At the same time that Americans and Iraqis in Baghdad were wrestling with how to 
adjust the campaign plan in Iraq, senior leaders in Washington were examining Casey’s 
transition strategy and questioning how it fit into U.S. national objectives. At the White 
House, National Security Adviser Stephen J. Hadley asked Rumsfeld to have Casey 
explain the details of the campaign plan. What followed was a series of videoconferences 
in which Casey, joined by Abizaid, explained how the mission in Iraq had evolved and 
where MNF-I envisioned the campaign headed. At the conclusion of this interrogative 
process in the early fall, the National Security Council (NSC) gave Casey no significant 
course corrections to his strategy, but instead in November, catching MNF-I somewhat 
off guard, published a document optimistically titled “National Strategy for Victory in 
Iraq,” the first publicly released, national-level strategy for the war in Iraq. The national 
strategy identified Iraq as “the central front in the global war on terror,” and it noted that 
an American failure there would create a safe haven for terrorists, cause the United States 
to lose the trust of Middle East reformers, and leave Iraq to slide into tribal and sectarian 
chaos.55 The enemy opposing U.S. efforts was loosely defined as Sunni Arab rejectionists, 
former regime loyalists, and terrorists associated with al-Qaeda. Like Casey’s campaign 
plan, the national strategy did not consider Shi’a militants a viable threat to coalition 
goals, and assumed that “such elements can be handled by Iraqi forces alone and/or 
assimilated into the political process in the short term.”56
The national strategy laid out a conditions-based, integrated approach along polit-
ical, security, and economic lines. The political track—Isolate-Engage-Build—involved 
isolation of enemy elements and engagement of potential partners willing to “turn away 
from violence” while building “stable, pluralistic, and effective national institutions.” 
The security track—Clear-Hold-Build—focused on clearing “areas of enemy control,” 
holding “areas freed from enemy control,” and building “Iraqi Security Forces and the 
capacity of local institutions.” The economic track—Restore-Reform-Build—consisted of 
the restoration of Iraq’s infrastructure, reform of Iraq’s economy to make it self-sustain-
ing, and building “the capacity of Iraqi institutions to maintain infrastructure, rejoin the 
international economic community, and improve the general welfare of all Iraqis.”57
From Casey’s perspective, Hadley and the NSC had slightly tweaked the MNF-I cam-
paign plan and made it into the national strategy document.58 Khalilzad agreed, later 
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commenting that, “if you look at the document and you look at what we were doing on 
the ground, you will find that it was more a reflection of what was [already] happening,” 
a process exactly backward from the common military expectation that policymakers 
would issue explicit wartime guidance that the military would, in turn, use to write mil-
itary plans.59 “Someone once told me that the decision-making process at the national 
level is ‘idiosyncratic’ at best,” Casey later wrote. “That is an important lesson for future 
leaders when providing military advice. Do not look for the military decision-making 
process at the national level.”60
Despite their increased interaction with Hadley and the NSC, Casey and Abizaid were 
frustrated by their seeming inability to explain the character of the Iraq conflict to coun-
terparts in Washington. “I would get asked, ‘why are guys going off post? They are just 
driving around and getting hit by Improvised Explosive Devices,’” Casey recalled later.61 
The day-to-day nuances of counterinsurgency warfare, combined with complicated met-
rics for showing progress, were difficult for many senior political decision makers to 
comprehend, Casey concluded. Bush and his senior advisers had understood the high- 
intensity battles of late 2004 in Fallujah, Najaf, and Samarra much more easily than the 
2005 counterinsurgency campaign that was largely devoid of such decisive action, Casey 
told military historians years later.62 In their near-daily phone conversations, he and Abi-
zaid frequently commiserated on the issue, asking each other after videoconferences with 
NSC principals, “Do you think we got through [to them] today?”63
Casey’s struggles in communicating with Washington had come to a head when the 
general, who had long desired to reduce the U.S. footprint as part of his 2004 campaign 
plan, told reporters in early August 2005 that the United States was on track to make 
“some fairly substantial reductions,” in the period after the October and December elec-
tions. The pronouncement was ahead of official U.S. policy and was corrected publicly 
a few days later by Bush, who noted that talk of troop reduction was “speculation” and 
that “pulling the troops out now would send a terrible signal to the enemy.”64 While the 
incident was quickly overshadowed by larger issues related to the two Iraqi elections, it 
highlighted the difficulties an operational commander faced in trying to stay synchro-
nized with U.S. national strategy.
With the publication of the national strategy, Casey and Khalilzad together produced 
a new joint U.S. Embassy and MNF-I mission statement, a significant change from the 
August 2004 mission statement that had been created by MNF-I and merely endorsed 
by the U.S. Embassy. Even so, the new objectives were only slightly modified from the 
original, calling for:
[a]n Iraq at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the War on Terror, with a representative 
government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, security forces sufficient to maintain 
domestic order and to deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists, and effective national, regional, and 
provincial institutions capable of meeting the needs of the Iraqi people and creating conditions for 
rule of law and prosperity.65
The only additions were that Iraq would be an ally in the War on Terrorism and its insti-
tutions would be capable of establishing the rule of law. These new goals would be over-
come quickly by events, as at the end of 2005, Iraq would not have a truly representative 
government that respected the rights of all Iraqis.
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PREAMBLE TO CIVIL WAR: SHI’A SECTARIANS INSIDE THE IRAQI 
GOVERNMENT
The Interior Ministry and the Jadriyah Bunker
Despite MNF-I’s optimism that the fall 2005 elections would be uniformly positive 
events, the underlying tensions between the Shi’a and Sunni communities ultimately 
made the elections even more partisan than those in January. In retrospect, the elections 
served as an accelerant to sectarianism, as factions postured themselves for what they 
rightly expected would be a violent power struggle after the election outcome. For its 
part, al-Qaeda in Iraq continued its car-bomb campaign against Shi’a targets, and while 
the overall effectiveness of AQI attacks diminished after early summer 2005, they contin-
ued to target Shi’a neighborhoods and exhaust Shi’a patience. On September 14, Zarqa-
wi’s men struck Baghdad with 12 coordinated car bombs, killing 167 and wounding 
nearly 600. On September 16, they hit Shi’a worshippers at a shrine in Tuz Khormato, 
209 kilometers north of Baghdad, killing a dozen and wounding 23.66 In one horrific 
incident south of Baghdad on September 26, Sunni extremists dressed as Iraqi police 
entered a school and executed five Shi’a teachers and their driver in a classroom.67 Near- 
simultaneous car bombs in Balad on September 29 resulted in 95 casualties.68 Large- 
scale attacks against predominantly Shi’a areas a few weeks later on November 18–19 
resulted in another 324 civilian casualties.
As AQI did its murderous work, various government ministries dominated by Shi’a 
militant groups who were part of the Ja’afari government began to withhold basic ser-
vices in many Sunni areas, forcing Sunnis to cross into other, more dangerous neighbor-
hoods. Along the routes to these neighborhoods stood several checkpoints, which had 
become dangerous places where Sunnis were subject to intimidation or abduction from 
militia-allied police or even from militias in government uniforms. Caught between two 
militant sides, many civilians of both sects found themselves facing a choice between 
seeking protection from sectarian militias or succumbing to sectarian cleansing, as Jaysh 
al-Mahdi (JAM), Badr Corps, and al-Qaeda in Iraq each began to take control of various 
neighborhoods in Baghdad. In some areas, JAM  attempted to emulate Lebanese Hizbal-
lah’s model of gaining popular legitimacy by providing public services. The militia gave 
cash to civilians affected by the violence in Baghdad and provided lodging, usually in 
abandoned Sunni houses, to Shi’a refugees displaced by the fighting.69
In October, Iraq’s Sunni deputy Prime Minister and nine other Sunni ministers wrote 
Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja’afari demanding action against Shi’a militants who carried 
out acts of violence against Sunnis with what appeared to be government sanction.70 The 
six-page letter cataloged alleged abuses by the Ministry of the Interior, including sys-
temic torture, underground detention facilities, executions, and abductions of Sunnis. 
The ministers charged that the killers often used Interior Ministry uniforms and vehicles 
and even claimed to be from the Interior Ministry’s public order and special commando 
units. According to the letter, many of the victims were tortured, with eyes poked out, 
noses cut off, and hands drilled. Those who were killed were nearly always found bound 
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or handcuffed. “Our people are being executed under the official or semi-official cover of 
the law,” the Sunni ministers wrote, with the result that:
[t]hese acts have transferred Iraqis from living under the fear of terrorism to living under 
governmental terror. It is unsafe for an Iraqi to be detained. Most [Iraqis] have come to think it 
better to resist and die in his home rather than having his head pierced or body burned or parts cut 
off and his body thrown on the road to be eaten by the hungry animals.71
The Ja’afari government made little effort to investigate the accusations. The extent to 
which Sunni complaints were ignored in the Interior Ministry was made clear on Novem-
ber 13, 2005, when U.S. Soldiers inspected a central Baghdad facility known as the Jadri-
yah bunker, run by the ministry’s Special Interrogations Unit. After hearing a parent’s 
complaint that his son had been detained illegally at the facility, Brigadier General Karl 
Horst, assistant commander of the 3d Infantry Division in Baghdad, led a team of Soldiers 
to search the bunker. Acting on his intuition, Horst demanded access to an area behind a 
locked door that Iraqi guides purposely avoided. There he discovered 169 malnourished 
prisoners, 166 of them Sunnis, all showing signs of 
torture.72 The bunker and the organization that ran 
it had been kept off the Interior Ministry’s books 
and not officially sanctioned, likely because they 
were being run by senior Badr Corps officer Bashir 
Nasser al-Wandi, also known as Engineer Ahmed, 
whom Bayan Jabr had appointed as deputy director 
of the Interior Ministry’s intelligence directorate. 
When Khalilzad questioned Interior Minister Jabr 
about Engineer Ahmed’s facility, Jabr described the 
detainees as terrorists and downplayed the abuse 
by saying that the prisoners “weren’t beheaded; 
they weren’t killed; there was no torture.”73
An MNF-I investigation of the incident uncov-
ered additional evidence of sectarian activities by 
the Ja’afari government. Investigators found that 
Engineer Ahmed led an organization known as the 
Special Investigations Directorate (SID) that since 
its formation in July 2005 had “illegally detained, 
abused, tortured, and murdered Iraqi citizens.” 
Many of the SID’s victims were allegedly “former 
regime personnel, former Ba’th Party members, or 
former military officers who had participated in the 
Iran-Iraq War.”75 The SID’s Jadriyah bunker was 
just a part of a larger sectarian machinery, a holding area where SID members exacted 
confessions through torture before the victims were executed, ransomed, or tried in the 
Iraqi courts. The SID men had plenty of political top cover. Jabr, the MNF-I investigation 
found, “had knowledge of illicit activities taking place in the bunker,” and “failed to act 
on multiple reports of abuse and torture in the Bunker.”76 In addition, when complaints 
of the bunker reached Iraq’s nascent judicial system, “investigative judges who objected 
Source: U.S. Army photo by Matthew 
Webster, 100th Mobile Public Affairs  
Detachment (Released).
Brigadier General Karl Horst, 
Assistant Commander, 
3d Infantry Division.74
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to the illegal procedures were reassigned,” some of them by order of Chief Justice Medhat 
al-Mahmood. Others were threatened by Engineer Ahmed. One investigative judge who 
opened an inquiry became the victim of an unsolved murder.77 MNF-I concluded that the 
investigation had been “constrained by the non-permissive environment, the lack of Iraqi 
Government cooperation, reluctance of witnesses to come forward, and the perception of 
official complicity or complacency.”78
Public news of the facility heightened the tension between Iraq’s Sunni and Shi’a com-
munities before the December elections. The bunker was the first indisputable evidence 
that sectarian violence had been institutionalized, originating within the government and 
its police forces, and was not just the work of rogue Shi’a militias. It also confirmed Sunni 
leaders’ worst fears, fueling the Sunni rejectionists’ argument that the only way to survive 
was to continue resistance against the Shi’a government and the coalition. The discov-
ery also compounded Sunni frustrations with the coalition, as Casey previously received 
no fewer than 40 letters from senior political and religious leaders alleging government 
abuse of detainees, but was unable to produce a tangible change in Jabr’s behavior.79 The 
coalition’s reluctance to hold Jabr and Prime Minister Ja’afari accountable played into 
Sunni rejectionist claims that the United States was not to be trusted because its actions 
only served to protect the Shi’a.
As notorious as the Jadriyah bunker became, it represented a mere fraction of the 
sectarian infiltration of the Interior Ministry and other security offices in 2005. MNF-I 
estimated that the various Iraqi security ministries ran at least 8 to 10 more unauthorized 
facilities that held between 2,000 and 10,000 prisoners.80 Further accentuating the Inte-
rior Ministry’s problems, in October MNSTC-I had discovered that the ministry’s public 
affairs had issued a public service announcement video depicting Iraqi police dancing 
over dead bodies and chanting praise for Moqtada Sadr. MNSTC-I offered to retrain 
the ministry’s public affairs personnel, but Jabr had promised to fire those responsible 
instead.81
Sectarian moves were not limited to the Interior Ministry. In the first week of Decem-
ber, Prime Minister Ja’afari issued orders that would have eliminated the Iraqi Joint Head-
quarters and replaced 10 Sunni senior leaders with Shi’a officers.82 Among the purged 
would be three division commanders and the respected secular Shi’a officer Lieutenant 
General Nasier Abadi, the deputy commander of the Iraqi Joint Forces. Replacing Abadi 
would be Lieutenant General Mohan al-Furayji, an officer whom Lieutenant General 
Martin Dempsey described as “a bad piece of work.”83 Sensing the danger in Ja’afari’s 
changes, Casey’s British deputy MNF-I commander, Lieutenant General John Nicholas 
Houghton, warned that “the overpowering importance of the proposed changes is the 
political impact they would have in marginalizing the Sunnis at a critical time and in 
placing the Ministry of Defense at the mercy of an extremist Shi’a agenda. The political 
motivation behind the proposed moves is self-evident.”84 Ja’afari had issued his decrees 
without notifying Sadoun Dulaimi, the Sunni Minister of Defense, who, when learning of 
the proposed actions, begged the coalition to fight the changes, which Casey quickly did. 
MNF-I’s timely intervention stopped the purge, but the fact that Ja’afari had attempted 
the move added to Sunni leaders’ perceptions of organized wrongdoing by the Shi’a par-
ties in the government.
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As coalition leaders in Baghdad responded to the Jadriyah bunker incident and Ja’af-
ari’s power play, coalition units throughout central Iraq were beginning to report similar 
instances of quasi-official sectarian killing. The clearest perspective on the matter came 
from the 3d Infantry Division, whose commander, Major General William Webster, later 
recalled that during the winter of 2005:
I kept telling General Casey and Lieutenant General Vines . . . that in spite of the fact that the 
election had been held, sectarian violence, to include inside the Iraqi Security Forces, was becoming 
the foremost problem that we had to deal with. . . . We found people murdered, beheaded, ripped 
apart, dumped into rivers and we found that the majority of attacks were taking place at the mixed 
margins of the neighborhoods.85
Reports from the Baghdad morgue in December showed that 780 murdered bodies, 
400 of which had torture or execution wounds, seemed to confirm Webster’s warnings.86 
Webster believed most of the trouble came from the Interior Ministry’s police forces, 
which according to his units’ reports were not just complicit with sectarian violence, but 
directly involved in it. “The Ministry of the Interior, absolutely, from top to bottom, could 
not be trusted, with very minor exception[s],” Webster reiterated later.87 “You could not 
trust them, they lied every day, they tortured people, and they had hidden detention 
facilities and prisons.”88 The worst, Webster judged, were the Special Police, which did 
not have unit boundaries, allowing them to operate across Baghdad with impunity and 
providing them a convenient excuse to operate in Sunni areas far from their bases. In an 
attempt to rein in some of their illicit activity, Webster forced Special Police units in Bagh-
dad to accept unit boundaries and, to signal his seriousness, “promised them we would 
kill them from their leader on down if they came across their boundary and conducted 
operations in an adjacent unit [area].”89
Webster’s threat slowed the Special Police’s activities for a time, but the problem of 
sectarianism in the Ministry of the Interior remained widespread. In Baqubah in MND-
NC, Colonel Steven Salazar and his 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, shared Webster’s 
conclusion about the Special Police. When Salazar learned in November 2005 that seven 
battalions of Special Police would descend on the predominantly Sunni Baqubah for an 
MOI-initiated operation, he formally objected in an e-mail that the operation “would be 
a disaster of Biblical proportions . . . and the worst possible thing that could happen to 
Baqubah.”90 Though MND-NC Commander Major General Thomas Turner and MNC-I 
Commander Lieutenant General John R. Vines concurred with Salazar’s request to stop 
the operation, MNF-I was unwilling to shut down a rare example of an Iraqi-planned 
and Iraqi-led mission. As the Special Police arrived, Salazar ordered his units to scru-
tinize their every move to prevent gross abuses, but the operation was still little more 
than a thinly veiled roundup of nearly 400 Sunni military-aged males. Only Salazar’s 
personal intervention prevented Interior Ministry units from detaining the Sunni mayor 
of Baqubah without any evidence. Nevertheless, MNSTC-I’s November assessment to 
MNF-I touted the mission as “the Special Police force’s first independent division-level 
operation. The Special Police planned and executed this operation with minimal sup-
port from Coalition Forces. This operation will serve as a model for future Special Police 
operations.”91
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Warnings similar to Webster’s and Salazar’s had already gone directly to the Penta-
gon. On September 19, 2005, James Steele, a retired Special Forces officer, who had served 
as a civilian adviser to the Special Police Commandos in 2004 and was a trusted confidant 
of Rumsfeld, wrote the secretary about his observations of the Interior Ministry during 
an official visit to Iraq. “There is a systematic effort by SCIRI and its Badr militia to take 
control of the high-end units within MOI,” Steele reported, adding that:
[t]his effort ranges from assigning Badr officers to command units to protecting thugs like the 
commander of the Wolf Brigade who had been involved in death squad activities, extortion of 
detainees and a general pattern of corruption. Nearly all of the new recruits within the commandos 
are Shi’a, many of them are Badr members. . . . [This effort] also contributes to the possibility of a 
Lebanon-type scenario where a civil war ensues with the Sunnis being driven into the arms of the 
insurgents as their militia. This would put us in an untenable position.92
Rumsfeld, in turn, shared Steele’s assessment with Bush and Vice President Richard 
Cheney in a short memorandum a few days later.
Malign Iranian Influence
The sectarian activity that U.S. officials were seeing at the tactical level went hand 
in hand with an increase in destabilizing activity inside Iraq by the Iranian regime and 
its proxies. By fall 2005, Colonel Kevin McDonnell, the commander of the 5th Special 
Forces Group and the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Arabian Peninsula 
(CJSOTF-AP), concluded that Iran was conducting a full-scale unconventional warfare 
campaign in Iraq to dominate the emerging Iraqi Government while keeping the U.S.-led 
coalition off balance by supplying deadly explosively formed penetrators (EFP) to Shi’a 
militias. First introduced by Lebanese Hizballah against the Israelis, EFPs were complex 
shaped-charge explosives that required careful milling of a concave copper plate that 
transformed into a molten slug when detonated. The copper slug offered significant 
advantages over a regular improvised explosive device (IED) because it could penetrate 
the armor of almost all coalition vehicles, including the M1 tank, and because it could fly 
a reasonable distance and hit a target at a standoff range. MNF-I statistics from the time 
showed that the weapon was becoming more prevalent: EFP attacks nearly tripled in 
just 4 months in mid-2005, from about 20 in June to 58 in October.93 By comparison, EFPs 
averaged only five per month through April 2005.94
Source: U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sergeant Dennis J. Henry, Jr. (Released).
A U.S. Army Soldier Empties a Massive Weapons Cache of EFPs.95
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Drawing on their extensive human intelligence network, McDonnell’s troops discov-
ered that, in addition to providing EFPs to Shi’a militias, Iranian intelligence services and 
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran (IRGC) were creating front companies in 
Iraq to facilitate their covert activities, as well as funneling extensive financial support to 
the Badr Corps.96 In an effort to convince MNF-I of the scope of Iranian subversive activ-
ity, the CJSOTF-AP held a briefing in October for Casey, Vines, Special Operations Com-
mand Central (SOCCENT) commander Brigadier General Francis Kearney, and Major 
General Richard P. Zahner, Casey’s G–2. Casey and Zahner were skeptical and wanted 
concrete forensic evidence that corroborated the CJSOTF-AP’s analysis before taking 
action. Though McDonnell’s human sources were adamant about Iranian intervention, 
MNF-I’s technical sources were not picking up the same indicators, making MNF-I lead-
ers cautious about the implications. To some at the meeting, it seemed as if technical 
capabilities had a halo effect, and Zahner and Casey put less stock in the CJSOTF-AP’s 
human intelligence network, even though the allies in southeast Iraq had limited techni-
cal capabilities.97 For his part, it is likely Casey’s caution stemmed from the fact that U.S. 
national policy toward Iranian meddling in Iraq had not yet been set, and Casey under-
stood that he was to avoid a regional expansion of the conflict. However, CJSOTF-AP 
reports concerned Casey enough that in late October 2005, he ordered his staff to draw 
up contingency plans for a possible conflict with the IRGC and other Iranian operatives 
in Iraq, and tasked his staff judge advocate to determine whether the IRGC–Qods Force 
(IRGC-QF) could legally be declared a hostile force. Such a declaration would make Qods 
Force operatives enemy combatants, allowing coalition forces to kill them on sight no 
matter if they demonstrated hostile intent first. The legal review found that not only had 
the Qods Force provided guidance, training, logistics, and financial support to Shi’a mil-
itants, it had also “support[ed] two separate Iraqi EFP networks by sponsoring EFP IED 
training in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon, and facilitating movement of EFP network personnel 
and equipment between Iran and Iraq. . . . Such activities are clearly hostile and constitute 
a direct threat to the security and stability of Iraq.”98 Despite the clarity of Iranian culpa-
bility in the deaths of Americans, the memorandum cautioned against the action, noting: 
“a sweeping hostile force declaration against the IRGC-QF could result in an increase in 
Iranian support to Iraqi insurgents and lead to open confrontation with Iran.”99 The mem-
orandum also noted that most Qods Force members operated mainly in Multi-National 
Division–Southeast (MND-SE), and the British were not required to honor an American 
hostile force declaration.
Getting British support for such a project undoubtedly would have been difficult. 
McDonnell’s information about Iranian activity, including the infiltration of EFPs across 
the southeastern Iraqi border, was sharply at odds with reporting from Multi-National 
Division-South East (MND-SE), which reflected little malign Iranian activity. To resolve 
this incoherence, McDonnell hoped to position a Special Forces company and a partnered 
Iraqi commando battalion in Basrah, where they could capture hard evidence or poten-
tially push some of the EFP smuggling farther north into areas with a greater concentra-
tion of American forces. Enlisting the aid of Major General Nicholas R. Parker, the British 
deputy commander of MNC-I, McDonnell traveled to Basrah in December to convince 
MND-SE leaders to allow American special operations forces into the province.100 British 
commanders, however, quietly declined the offer out of concern that CJSOTF operations 
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could spark violence with Iran’s local proxies, potentially disrupting MND-SE’s fragile 
equilibrium and making a British withdrawal more difficult.101
Unable to get British consent, McDonnell focused his troops in MND-CS on the mis-
sion, and they soon delivered the evidence Casey and Zahner had required. Six months 
after being rebuffed by MND-SE, CJSOTF-AP Operational Detachment Alphas (ODAs) 
intercepted crates of the copper plates that went into making EFPs, and all were turned 
on the same lathe in Iran. The FBI traced several Nokia phones captured in the same ship-
ment back to their origin in Japan, where they found the purchase order that had shipped 
them to Iran.102
Problems in Basrah
McDonnell’s difficulties in dealing with MND-SE leaders illustrated that after the 
havoc of the brutal Sadrist uprisings of April and summer of 2004, the British effort in 
MND-SE had become disconnected from the coalition command in Baghdad, eventually 
reaching a point where the British were pursuing different objectives than the MNF-I 
campaign plan. The problem originated in London. The British public and even some 
within the British Government questioned the legality of continuing the conflict beyond 
the invasion and expressed a great aversion to British casualties. Increasingly, British 
officials began to view the war as a political risk that needed to be minimized by lim-
iting the British military’s exposure.103 At the Ministry of Defense, the Permanent Joint 
Headquarters (PJHQ), and MND-SE headquarters, these pressures translated into poli-
cies of casualty avoidance and a view of the conflict as an internal Iraqi dispute in which 
British military forces and funds were of little relevance. Additional pressures on the 
British mission in Iraq came because of the U.K. Ministry of Defence’s 2004 restructur-
ing plans, which called for steep cuts in the British Army. Four infantry battalions were 
eliminated—10 percent of the British infantry force—as well as seven tank squadrons and 
six artillery batteries.104 Managing these sizable reductions while simultaneously deploy-
ing troops to Iraq and Afghanistan created considerable pressure to decrease the British 
presence in Iraq. For the British Government, Operation TELIC—the name of Britain’s 
national operation in Iraq—by 2005 had become an economy of force effort in which the 
level of military resources was dictated by domestic policy rather than by the situation 
in theater.105
Organizational factors worsened the divergence in the allies’ objectives. Although the 
deputy MNF-I commander in Baghdad was a British three-star general, PJHQ had desig-
nated the two-star MND-SE commander in Basrah as the United Kingdom’s national con-
tingent commander to give the British Government greater awareness of the area where 
nearly all British troops were based, rather than having information filtered through a 
higher headquarters. As a result, British commanders in Basrah came to see PJHQ rather 
than MNC-I as their next higher headquarters, and British leaders in London often 
bypassed the MNF-I headquarters.106 One MND-SE commander later commented, British 
defense leaders “jumped through the theater/operational level and concentrated directly 
on what was going on in the Multi-National Division in Basrah: Baghdad was a distrac-
tion.”107 As the British Government and public became more casualty-averse, the result of 
this reporting chain was a heavy emphasis on force protection from London.108
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The British rotational policy did not help the divergence in national objectives. In a 
period of 18 months in 2004 and 2005, five British brigade commanders rotated through 
Basrah.109 The high turnover among the senior British commanders in MND-SE made it 
difficult for MNF-I and MNC-I leaders to detect the changes occurring in British policy 
because they were camouflaged by the frequent change of personalities in British leader-
ship. In addition, with each new commander came new priorities that disrupted continu-
ity in planning and operations. The short command tours also hindered MND-SE leaders 
from establishing strong working relationships with their coalition counterparts, as well 
as with Iraqi military and civilian leaders.110 One British Ministry of Defence study later 
concluded that “the short-term horizon and rapid turnover of UK in-theatre commanders 
made it more likely that the significance of key events would be missed.”111
As UK leaders in London began to signal to MND-SE in 2005 the importance of gradu-
ally disengaging from security operations in southern Iraq, the British efforts to improve 
governance and security at MND-SE collided with the intra-Shi’a political conflict emerg-
ing in the far south. With the formation of new provincial governments after the January 
2005 elections, Shi’a militias associated with local governments, especially the Sadrists, 
stepped up attacks against British troops and against each other. When the Staffordshire 
Regiment began to round up suspected JAM militia members led by Ahmed al-Gharrawi 
in Amarah in mid-May 2005, the Sadrist provincial governor, Adel Muhoder al-Maliki, 
threatened to cut all ties between the British and Maysan’s provincial council if the oper-
ation was not halted. A few days later on May 29, a British patrol near Amarah was hit 
by an EFP, killing one soldier.112 EFPs had been used in the south as early as August 
2004, but when the remnants of this one were sent to Baghdad, U.S. analysts determined 
it was of the same design used by Lebanese Hizballah and likely of Iranian origin.113 A 
short time later, another EFP in Amarah killed three soldiers in a Land Rover patrol, after 
which British commanders decided that all British patrols would be conducted in War-
rior infantry fighting vehicles.114
Intra-Shi’a violence, meanwhile, worsened in the summer of 2005 as the various par-
ties jostled for position ahead of the December 2005 elections. On August 24, tensions 
exploded when the Sadrists tried to reopen an office in Najaf a year after it had been 
closed during the August 2004 uprising. They were prevented from finishing their task 
by members of the Badr Corps, leading to fighting between the two groups that lasted 
for 2 days. Once again showing their ability to mobilize their forces across the country 
on short notice, the Sadrists responded with attacks against the Badr Corps in Basrah, 
Hillah, Diwaniya, Amarah, and Baghdad. When the fighting finally stopped, 100 had 
been killed, and the Sadrist office in Najaf had been burned to the ground.115
The Jamiat Police Station Crisis
The late August clashes showed that the Sadrists had regained their footing a year 
after their defeat in Najaf, and their resurgence quickly became a threat to the British 
strategy of transitioning security responsibility to local Iraqi forces. By spring 2005, Bas-
rah’s police force was increasingly falling under the control of the JAM militia. In April, 
British forces discovered evidence of torture at Basrah’s Jamiat police station while inves-
tigating the death of a detainee that had been turned over to the Iraqi police’s infamous 
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Serious Crimes Unit commanded by a Sadr loyalist named Captain Jaffar.116 Basrah police 
chief General Hassan al-Sade admitted publicly to the press in May that he could not 
control three-quarters of his force due to its infiltration by militias, particularly the JAM 
and Badr Corps. Officers loyal to the militias, Sade said, used their positions as cover to 
carry out executions against rivals and mostly Sunni former regime loyalists.117 As was 
happening in Baghdad, local Basrah civilians began observing police checkpoints jointly 
manned by Iraqi police and JAM militiamen. At the same time, British officials in Basrah 
began receiving reports of Jaffar’s close ties to Basrah JAM leader Ahmed al-Fartusi and 
his militia.118
Despite this growing body of evidence, British commanders were cautious about 
confronting the militias’ expanding influence within the Iraqi police and throughout the 
city. Clashing with the militias could have several consequences: it could undermine key 
relationships with members of Basrah’s security and governance teams, increase British 
casualties, and set back British efforts to draw down troops.119 Seeking to resolve the prob-
lem by political means, the senior British police adviser in Baghdad presented Interior 
Minister Bayan Jabr with a list of police officers in Basrah that MND-SE recommended 
for dismissal, but Jabr ignored the recommendation.120 Rebuffed, MND-SE developed a 
list of 200 individuals, 180 of them police officers, for arrest in an attempt to bring the 
militia to heel. Included on the list was Fartusi, though British leaders found they could 
not arrest him because of his presence on Prime Minister Ja’afari’s “no-strike” list.121 But 
when three British soldiers were killed within the same week by EFPs linked to Fartusi, 
Brigadier John Lorimer, commander of the 12th Mechanized Brigade, decided to arrest 
the JAM leader with or without Iraqi Government approval. On September 17, a Special 
Air Service (SAS) detachment supported by the Coldstream Guards and 1st Battalion, the 
Royal Anglican Regiment, seized Fartusi at his Basrah home in a nighttime raid.122
Two days later, in likely retribution for the capture of Fartusi, plainclothes Iraqi police 
ambushed two SAS operators as they were trailing Jaffar, who had become a suspect in 
the April detainee murder.123 In the ensuing gunfight, the SAS men killed one of their 
police attackers and wounded another, but were eventually captured by another Iraqi 
police element while trying to return to their unit. The SAS operators, who had been 
dressed as Iraqi civilians, identified themselves as British personnel but were taken to the 
Jamiat station and badly beaten.124 MND-SE responded by dispatching reinforcements 
from the Coldstream Guards and the Royal Regiment of Wales to seal off the city and 
surround the Jamiat station while flying a negotiating team in to secure the release of 
the SAS men. Lorimer met with Basrah’s governor at the same time British Ambassador 
William Patey met with Jabr. Both demanded the British soldiers’ immediate release, but 
neither the governor nor the minister could, or would, secure the men’s freedom.125 
Back inside the station, Iraqi police officers, including Serious Crimes Unit head Jaffar, 
accused the SAS soldiers of being Israeli spies. The British negotiating team, meanwhile, 
found itself trapped inside the station. Outside, the Coldstream Guards fended off an 
unruly crowd and other police, while taking fire from militiamen that destroyed two 
Warrior infantry fighting vehicles and damaged seven others.126 In the confusion, Iraqi 
police moved the two SAS detainees to a JAM stronghold on the western outskirts of the 
city, but British surveillance tracked the movement, laying the groundwork for a rescue 
mission.127 That evening, an SAS squadron, flown from Baghdad, with support from 2d 
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Battalion, The Royal Welsh, smashed into the Jamiat station and rescued the negotiating 
team before moving on to the JAM stronghold and rescuing the two SAS soldiers.128 The 
incident was highly embarrassing for the British, who had long contended that Basrah 
was stable, that ISF training was progressing on target, and that ordinary crime rather 
than nefarious militia activities was responsible for most security problems. As recently 
as July, the MND-SE commander reported to Casey that Basrah had “insurgents but no 
insurgency,” and that the province would be able to revert to provincial Iraqi control by 
early October.129 After the Jamiat incident, however, Chief of the General Staff General 
Sir Michael D. Jackson visited Basrah and wrote to General Richard Dannatt, the com-
mander of Land Command, “Though there was no sense of defeatism in theatre, the 
possibility of strategic failure was mentioned in earnest on this visit more than on any 
before.”130 The raid on the Jamiat station had exposed the truth that militia influence 
in MND-SE was destabilizing security and undermining coalition efforts to strengthen 
Iraqi governance. The week after the fiasco, coalition leaders canceled Basrah Province’s 
scheduled September 22 return to provincial Iraqi control, a decision that meant the de 
facto abandonment of the British plan to withdraw nearly 5,500 soldiers by April 2006.131
The Jamiat operation also showed that the British forces in Basrah had no credible 
Iraqi force with which they could partner. While training of Iraqi forces had been ongo-
ing since the fall of Saddam, there had been no embedded advisers until early in 2005, 
when Major General Jonathan Riley, the sixth MND-SE commander, embedded members 
of an entire UK battle group with Iraqi Army units, mirroring the U.S. military transition 
team program. Unfortunately, the plan came with the Whitehall-imposed caveat that 
British troops could only embed at the brigade level or above, since officials in London 
judged that embedding at lower levels would expose British troops to more risk than 
the United Kingdom was willing to accept. Such restrictions had proved to be onerous 
and impeded progress at the battalion and company levels, organizations that critically 
needed mentoring. The progress of the Iraqi police in Basrah had been even worse since 
British police advisers did not embed with their counterparts at all. These choices had 
significant long-term consequences, as they made it difficult for British commanders to 
judge the true capabilities of Iraqi units and so limited their ability to shape Iraqi forces 
positively that British leaders expected to shoulder the responsibility for security as Brit-
ish forces withdrew.132
Nonetheless, the incident did not cause the British Government to abandon its overall 
strategy. Back in London, an interdepartmental review 2 weeks after the Jamiat operation 
recognized that stability was being threatened by the intense rivalries among political 
parties and their militias. However, it argued that negative media portrayals overstated 
the depth of the problem, that militia influence within the Iraqi police was minor, and 
that the governor and provincial council’s refusal to work with the British was “awk-
ward” but “not significant.” Rather than taking a more direct approach to confront the 
militias with clearing operations, reforming the police, embedding with the ISF, and 
exerting more influence in MND-SE to establish security, the review recommended that 
UK forces take action only against militias who directly threatened them. The review 
also recommended that Iraqi leaders in Baghdad should exert more control in the south 
and should replace Basrah’s police chief.133 The British Government’s reluctance to take a 
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more direct approach and increase its own involvement would set the stage for Basrah’s 
eventual tailspin.
AQI AND THE AMMAN, JORDAN, BOMBINGS
Elsewhere, the threat from Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq was broadening. In a bid to 
expand the war in Iraq into a regional battle, AQI initiated attacks outside of Iraq and 
publicly declared its true sectarian intentions for the first time, two moves that ran counter 
to the advice of al-Qaeda’s senior leaders. On September 14, Zarqawi issued a statement, 
announcing that “al Qaeda . . . is declaring all-out war on the Rafidha [a derogatory term 
for Shi’a] wherever they are in Iraq.” He exhorted Sunnis to “wake up from your slum-
ber . . . [because] the war to exterminate Sunnis will never end.”134 It was a significant 
message from the AQI leader who previously had been publicly coy about his intentions 
toward the Shi’a, often claiming the attacks he launched were aimed to force a coalition 
withdrawal instead of sectarian mayhem.
On November 9, al-Qaeda in Iraq took another step toward expanding the war when 
it attacked three hotels in Amman with four Iraqi suicide bombers, leaving 67 dead and 
more than 150 injured.135 Taking responsibility for the attacks, Zarqawi preposterously 
claimed that the attack had targeted establishments harboring Western and Israeli spies, 
calling the hotels “playgrounds for Jewish terrorists.” In reality, however, only one Amer-
ican was killed, and almost all of the casualties were Jordanian, the largest concentration 
of them coming at a wedding attended by a number of Jordanian notables in the Radisson 
Hotel.136 The death toll could have been even worse had one of the attackers, a rare female 
suicide bomber, not failed to detonate her explosive vest successfully. The woman, an 
Iraqi from Anbar named Sajida Rishawi, was captured after her suicide-bomber husband 
successfully detonated his own belt. Under questioning, Rishawi revealed that one of her 
fellow bombers had once been detained by U.S. forces but had been released when U.S. 
officials no longer deemed him a threat. She also confessed that she had joined the mis-
sion because three of her brothers were killed while fighting for AQI against U.S. troops 
in Anbar.137
Zarqawi’s actual goal was likely to destabilize the monarchy in his native Jordan and, 
in fact, the bombing was not the first attack Zarqawi launched inside the kingdom in 
2005. In August, AQI had carried out an unsuccessful rocket attack against two U.S. Navy 
amphibious warfare ships, the USS Kearsarge and the USS Ashland, in the port of Aqaba.138 
Instead of destabilizing the regime, the Aqaba and Amman attacks produced a backlash 
against AQI, with thousands of Jordanians taking to the streets to support King Abdul-
lah and denounce Zarqawi.139 Representatives of Zarqawi’s Khalayleh tribe, including 
his own brother and cousin, publicly disowned him by taking out half-page advertise-
ments in all three of Jordan’s major newspapers, declaring, “We sever links with him 
until doomsday.”140 Days after the attack, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas visited 
the bombing site and declared that the perpetrators “do not belong to any human race, 
Arab, or Islam. May God curse them from this day until Judgment Day.”141 Subsequent 
reactions in the Arab media in Syria, London, Lebanon, and Kuwait, as well as Sunni 
communities in Jordan, Iraq, and throughout the Middle East, would long haunt Zarqawi 
and his organization.142
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The Atiyah Letter
In the aftermath of the Amman attack and its repercussions throughout the Arab 
world, al-Qaeda’s senior leaders again tried to rein in their wayward Iraqi franchise. 
Atiyah Abd ar-Rahman, a top lieutenant of Osama Bin Laden, wrote Zarqawi a highly 
critical letter, urging him to cease his more violent attacks and follow orders from al-Qae-
da’s leadership on strategy.143 In the letter, likely sent in December 2005 just after the 
Amman attacks, Atiyah compared Zarqawi’s extreme tactics in Iraq to the massacres 
conducted by the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria that had destroyed popular support, 
implying that al-Qaeda in Iraq was on course to bring about its own downfall as well. 
Atiyah warned:
We are against all acts that alienate from killing to any sort of other treatment. Even insofar as the 
corrupt ones and traitors from among the Sunnis, we shouldn’t kill them unless the people would 
understand and think that it was a good thing due to the obviousness of their corruption, their 
treason, and their evil. . . . If we come and kill some people whom we know to be corrupt and 
treasonous, but who are respected and beloved by the people, then this leads to great trouble and 
it is an act against all of the fundamentals of politics and leadership.144
Atiyah singled out Zarqawi’s attacks against religious scholars and tribal leaders, 
warning him that such attacks were corrosive to their efforts and that Zarqawi’s move-
ment was too weak to fight fellow Sunnis, the Shi’a, and coalition forces at the same time. 
Channeling Mao Zedong, Atiyah warned Zarqawi that the popular support that their 
movement enjoyed would be fleeting if Zarqawi did not change his tactics:
The Muslim nation is with us, loving us, harboring us, supporting us, sympathizing with us, and 
concurring with us. Also among these are our mettle and the mettle of our soldiers, which are 
the waters that our fish inhabit . . . if we waste this great foundation, then we would be remiss, 
profligate, and liable to fail.145
Atiyah also criticized Zarqawi’s unilateral decisions to expand the war, urging him to 
“abstain from making any decision on a comprehensive issue (one with broad reach), and 
on substantial matters until you have turned to your leadership; Shaykh Usamah and the 
Doctor [Zawahiri] and their brothers.”146Atiyah stressed that “announcing a war against 
the Shi’ite turncoats and killing them . . . expanding the arena of war to the neighboring 
countries, and undertaking large scale operations whose impact is great” should not have 
been conducted without the approval of al-Qaeda’s senior leadership.147
Atiyah was not the only Salafist who was alarmed by Zarqawi’s excesses. Zarqawi’s 
own Jordanian mentor, Sheikh Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi, publicly broke with his 
former protégé in July, denouncing Zarqawi’s killing of innocent Iraqis. Other prominent 
Sunni clerics followed suit, and Egypt’s Sheikh Mohammed Sayyid Tantawi and Saudi 
Arabia’s Mohsen Al Awaji joined the chorus of voices denouncing Zarqawi’s tactics.148
NATIONAL GUARD CHALLENGES
As the threats from Zarqawi, the Shi’a militants, and the Iranian regime began to 
mount in the crucial election season of 2005, inside MNF-I a few signs of trouble emerged 
among some of the National Guard units that had arrived as part of the third major 
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rotation of forces. The 2004 decision to operationalize the National Guard had resulted in 
an abnormally high number of National Guard units in Iraq during most of 2005. Most 
of these units performed well at the company level and below, such as the troops of 
the Kentucky-based 617th Military Police Company. When ambushed near Salman Pak 
on March 20, 2005, the 617th Military Police Company responded so ferociously that it 
routed its attackers, killing 27 insurgents and wounding or capturing 7 others in intense 
fighting that required the guardsmen to clear two enemy trenches in close combat. One 
Soldier, Staff Sergeant Timothy Nein, was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross and 
two others were awarded the Silver Star. One of the Silver Stars was awarded to Sergeant 
Leigh Ann Hester, who became the first woman to earn the award since World War II 
and the first woman to earn the medal for close combat.149
Some other National Guard units at higher echelons, however, did not perform as well 
under the intensifying pressure of the summer and fall of 2005. While many of the Guard 
units around Baghdad performed admirably—as well or better than their active coun-
terparts—several Guard units had problems operating in the difficult Iraq environment. 
The first signs of trouble appeared in the 1st Battalion, 184th Infantry Regiment from the 
California National Guard, which had been assigned to the 4th BCT, 3d Infantry Division 
in Baghdad. The battalion had been given responsibility for the Karada District, just south 
of the Green Zone, in February 2005. By summer, accusations surfaced that the battalion’s 
leaders had condoned illegal activities with prisoners, and U.S. officers found a video of 
unit noncommissioned officers abusing seven prisoners by kicking them in their genitals 
and shocking them with a taser.150 The initial investigation into detainee abuse uncov-
ered systemic problems with the battalion, leading to at least 10 other investigations that 
revealed a negative command climate.151 The battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel 
Patrick Frey, was an eccentric officer who had first fought in Vietnam before fighting as a 
mercenary in Rhodesia; in Iraq, he carried a tomahawk that he “cleared” at clearing bar-
rels and used to “knight” Soldiers during promotion ceremonies.152 Frey tolerated similar 
eccentric behavior in his subordinates such as allowing Soldiers to carry Samurai swords 
on patrol. As the investigations expanded, investigators discovered that Frey had almost 
been relieved of command during the battalion’s predeployment training, and one of 
the generals responsible for training the unit had predicted Frey would “get Soldiers 
killed.”153 Frey had also been accused of mistreating his own troops during mobilization 
training, placing some of them in a survival school-style isolation to toughen them and 
causing a near-mutiny that came to the attention of The Los Angeles Times.154 The pattern 
of abuses and poor leadership had continued in Iraq. Battalion leaders had interpreted 
the rules of engagement aggressively, leading one investigator to describe Frey and his 
men as “trying to fight World War III. . . . It was them against the world.”155  The inves-
tigations also revealed that the unit was falsifying patrol reports, as in one case in which 
a lieutenant sat in his HMMWV inside a forward operating base and called in reports 
over the radio so his platoon could sleep.156 In another case, a company first sergeant 
was found to be extorting money from his Soldiers. The investigations found enough 
wrong within the battalion that Webster, the 3d Infantry Division commander, chose to 
relieve Frey and several company commanders, replacing them with new commanders 
drawn from the 3d Infantry Division staff. Webster was forced to use his own personnel 
because the U.S. Army’s Personnel Command and National Guard Bureau were unable 
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to provide replacement commanders from the United States on short notice.157 In a tragic 
turn of events, Frey’s replacement and a replacement company commander died in a 
double-IED attack less than 2 months later.
Meanwhile, MNC-I leaders began to suspect by fall 2005 that just south of Baghdad, 
Georgia Guardsmen were having problems as well. On June 22, the 48th BCT had taken 
control of the infamous Triangle of Death, an area south of Baghdad around the towns of 
Yusufiyah, Mahmudiyah, and Lutufiyah. The 48th BCT was filling the gap created by the 
reassignment of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment from the area to Ninawa. The 48th 
BCT had been dealt a difficult hand, taking over violent districts that no coalition unit 
had held for longer than 3 months, and some unit leaders believed there were areas that 
had never seen coalition forces.158
The 3d Infantry Division, which managed the inspector general and legal complaints 
for the brigade, began to notice patterns similar to those of the 1st Battalion, 184th Infantry 
Regiment. Soon after arriving in Iraq, the 48th BCT was racked by so many disciplinary 
issues that division leaders judged the brigade’s problems were diverting its attention 
from fighting the war.159 One investigation led senior 3d Infantry Division leaders to con-
clude that the brigade command sergeant major was sexually harassing the women in 
his unit.160 Multi-National Division–Baghdad (MND-B) and MNC- I leaders also assessed 
the brigade was struggling tactically, and that confronting the well-developed insurgent 
sanctuary south of Baghdad exceeded the brigade’s capabilities.161 By the end of October, 
the 3d Infantry Division and MNC-I leadership lost confidence in the 48th BCT’s lead-
ers and relieved the unit of its duties in its battle space, redirecting it to the mission of 
escorting logistics convoys as the theater security force. In its place, the 2d Brigade, 101st 
Airborne Division, took control of the Triangle of Death. As the 2d BCT assumed the 
battle space in October, the number of U.S. casualties and combat engagements spiked. 
On the 2d BCT’s first day, an IED killed five of its Soldiers, following a considerable 
period in which the 48th BCT had reported no attacks of any significance.162 Over its first 
47 days in the Triangle of Death, the 2d BCT’s units found themselves engaged in bat-
tles merely to leave their forward operating bases, and 22 of the brigade’s Soldiers were 
killed or evacuated.163 During one of the brigade’s first offensive operations, it found 14 
IEDs daisy-chained together over a roughly 100-meter area and another 23 IEDs in a 500-
meter area.164 The brigade’s area of operations apparently was patrolled so lightly that 
insurgents had had time to build some of the IEDs with 500 to 700 pounds of explosives 
and cover the bombs with concrete to conceal them from metal detectors. Other missions 
in the brigade’s sector uncovered several car-bomb factories, likely for use in AQI’s car-
bomb attacks in Baghdad.
While many National Guard units were facing the difficulties of the worsening secu-
rity situation in Iraq, back in the United States, a crisis arose in which the National Guard 
units were sorely missed. On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall, creating 
a swath of destruction in the Gulf states. With so many National Guard units deployed 
to Iraq, some of the Gulf states lacked the troops they would normally call up to perform 
disaster response missions. Mississippi and Louisiana, the two hardest-hit states, each 
had a brigade combat team in Iraq when Katrina struck, meaning that 35 percent of the 
Louisiana National Guard and 40 percent of the Mississippi Guard could only watch 
the disaster unfold on television from 7,000 miles away.165 The residual Guard forces in 
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the United States faced an equipment shortage as well because a substantial amount of 
their equipment had been harvested by Coalition Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) and MNF-I 
over the 2 years of conflict. Harvested equipment remained in Iraq to equip the next 
unit in the rotational cycle and save the Army the cost of shipping equipment each time 
units changed. Lieutenant General Steven Blum, the chief of the National Guard Bureau, 
argued that the shortages “left troops at home without modern communications and 
night-vision equipment, as well as the vehicles necessary for Guard troops to traverse 
neighborhoods flooded in the wake of Katrina.”166
The situation resulted in a strange role reversal as more than 20,000 stateside active 
duty Soldiers rushed to the Gulf states to perform disaster response missions in place of 
the absent National Guard troops. Of the 65,000-man relief effort for Katrina, nearly one-
third were active forces, including a Marine expeditionary unit and the division-ready 
brigade of the 82d Airborne Division.167 The reversal of roles seemed to validate some 
state governors’ criticism of what they considered the overuse of the National Guard 
outside of the United States. “Is it really the best use to take a first responder from home 
and put him in to guard an airport in Saudi Arabia?” Virginia Governor Mark Warner 
had asked at a gathering of governors in July.168 National Guard brigades that mobilized 
were unavailable for emergencies for at least 18 months, given the 6-month preparatory 
training for units headed into combat. The concern was particularly acute in states with 
smaller National Guard forces such as Montana, where Governor Brian Schweitzer had 
requested earlier in 2005 that the Department of Defense (DoD) immediately redeploy all 
1,500 guardsmen from Iraq—almost half the state’s total force—so they could respond to 
state emergencies.169 Because of the challenges of 2005, Guard units would not be brought 
back to Iraq in force until 2009.
ELECTIONS AND OFF-RAMPS
The December Parliamentary Elections
In an electoral whirlwind, Iraqis went to the polls again on December 15 to elect their 
first government under the newly ratified constitution. As with the October referendum, 
Sunni insurgents had little effect on the actual voting, carrying out just 80 attacks and caus-
ing 14 casualties nationwide.170 The surprisingly peaceful election day capped a 2-month 
drop in violence: from the October 15 referendum to the parliamentary elections, MNF-I 
assessed that attacks had dropped by 26 percent and casualties by 29 percent.171
One likely reason for the drop in election-day violence was MNF-I’s outreach to Sunni 
leaders ahead of the vote. Casey’s interactions with Sunni notables since the summer of 
2005 had led him to the realization that Sunni political and tribal leaders not only inter-
acted with the insurgency, but also exerted influence over it, a fact that Casey believed 
presented an opportunity to drive a wedge between insurgent factions.172 Accordingly, 
in November he had authorized Minister of Defense Sadoun Dulaimi to engage 18 key 
Sunni leaders as a way to expedite the “Sunni In” component of Casey’s bridging strat-
egy. By December, the talks seemed to show progress, and the Sunni leaders had asked 
that MNF-I pause offensive operations as a confidence-building measure. Unwilling to 
cease offensive operations fully as AQI and other groups tried to disrupt the elections, 
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Casey had instead agreed on December 11 to pause offensive operations at the battalion 
level and above until after the election and to consider releasing specific detainees.173
The drop in election violence was also driven by Sunni opposition to al-Qaeda in Iraq. 
By November, the Anbar General Conference—the Sunni political organization formed 
in September—had expanded and renamed itself the Anbar People’s Conference. The 
group, now claiming nearly 100 politicians, tribal sheikhs, technocrats, and insurgent 
leaders, began organizing municipal security committees to protect and facilitate the 
December parliamentary elections.174 In Ramadi, for example, Mohammed Mahmoud 
Latif’s followers in the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades forcibly drove AQI from several 
neighborhoods to protect the electoral process, and in one district, Latif’s ally Sheikh 
Nasser abd al-Karim Mukhlif al-Fahdawi raised a tribal militia to guard polling sites 
against AQI attacks.175
To a degree, emboldened by AQI’s failure to disrupt the constitutional referendum, 
Sunni Arabs had doubled down on their efforts to jump-start the political process, hoping 
that they could eventually return to their dominant position in Iraqi politics and reestab-
lish control of the Iraqi state. These efforts culminated in the merging of Sunni political 
parties into the Iraqi Tawafuq Front, as Sunni leaders believed they could garner more 
seats in the National Assembly by pooling their resources and running together.176 The 
Tawafuq Front ran on a platform that called for insurgent disarmament and coalition 
withdrawal, and many of the group’s expatriate leaders were having covert discussions 
with coalition representatives to begin the process.177 All of these moves were hailed by 
Casey and MNF-I as evidence that important elements of the Sunni Arab resistance were 
interested in reconciling and joining the political process.
Voter turnout for the election seemed to be promising as well. Over the year, voter 
participation increased significantly, from 58 percent in January to 66 percent in October 
and 75 percent in December.178 More importantly, the long-sought Sunni participation 
seemed to have materialized on December 15. In Anbar, overall voter turnout increased 
from 2 percent in January, to 38 percent in October, to a whopping 86 percent in Decem-
ber. In Ninawa, participation jumped from 16 percent, to 53 percent, to 70 percent across 
the three elections, and Salahadin’s reported turnout grew from 29 percent, to 90 percent, 
to 98 percent.179
Because of a 75 percent overall voter turnout and significant Sunni participation, the 
makeup of Iraq’s governing body shifted.180 Across the country, Iraqi voters overwhelm-
ingly cast their votes along sectarian lines, leading one Iraqi commentator to pronounce 
that Iraq had held “not an election, but a census.”181 The Shi’a United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) 
dropped from 140 to 128 seats, the Kurdistan Alliance decreased from 75 to 53 seats, 
and Ayad Allawi’s secular Iraqi National Accord decreased from 40 to 25 seats.182 The 
Tawafuq Front and another new Sunni party, the Iraqi National Dialogue Front, obtained 
44 and 11 seats, respectively. The expanded Sunni parliamentary bloc was led by Tariq 
Hashimi, the former Muslim Brotherhood leader Adnan Dulaimi, the former Ba’athist 
Saleh Mutlaq, and Jaysh al-Islami insurgent leader Khalaf Ulayan.183 With a total of 275 
seats in the Council of Representatives, Iraq’s new Parliament, no bloc achieved an out-
right majority, meaning that Iraq’s next government would be a coalition of parties from 
different sects and ethnicities.
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However, the election was not completely unmarred by sectarian violence as SCIRI’s 
militant wing, the Badr Corps, had carried out an intimidation campaign during the par-
liamentary electoral cycle. In Basrah, Maysan, and Muthanna Provinces, Badr members, 
some in police uniform, tore down rival parties’ campaign posters, burned down Alla-
wi’s campaign office in Samawah, and threatened supporters of other political parties.184 
In Basrah and Amarah, Badr members tampered with the vote by removing ballots for 
Allawi’s list and filling in blank ballots for the Shi’a UIA.185
The Off-Ramp Continues
The surprisingly high turnout figures, particularly in the Sunni areas that had boycot-
ted the January voting and had been strongholds of the insurgency, indicated to Casey 
and MNF-I that their plan to bring the Sunnis into the political process had worked. In 
the days after the election, Casey concluded that the time was right to signal to Iraqis 
that the reward for turning from violence to politics was the beginning of an end to the 
U.S. military occupation. Security and political conditions in the country, Casey believed, 
warranted going ahead with the off-ramp of two BCTs that MNF-I had been exploring 
since before the October referendum. Violence had continued to decrease over time, 
MNF-I analysts noted. Car-bomb attacks had decreased by 62 percent between the Janu-
ary and December elections, while the casualties caused by those attacks had fallen by 97 
percent.186 Numerically, suicide car bombs had decreased from more than 60 in June to 
26 in November and just 12 by mid-December.187 The drop in attacks seemed to indicate 
that the coalition’s operations in the western Euphrates and Tel Afar had succeeded in 
shutting down the foreign fighter pipelines and stemming al-Qaeda in Iraq’s  devastating 
wave of car-bomb attacks. The increased voter participation also reflected Sunnis’ rejec-
tion of AQI’s calls to boycott the elections, Casey and MNF-I judged. “Improved Sunni 
Arab participation in the political process helped drive a wedge between Sunni rejection-
ists and terrorists and foreign fighters,” MNF-I analysts concluded in a report, “2005: The 
Insurgency Year in Review,” issued on election day.188 With security rapidly improving 
and former insurgents apparently choosing the ballot box over violence, the coalition was 
in a “better position vs. AQI than at any time in the previous 18 months,” Casey reported 
to Bush the following day, adding that “recent coalition and ISF operations have restored 
Iraqi control to the Syrian border, disrupted AQI facilitation networks, and set conditions 
for future success” (see Chart 6).189
The state of the Iraqi security forces was improving enough, Casey believed, that the 
time had come to use the drawdown of coalition troops as a forcing function to make 
the ISF perform more security tasks. (See Charts 6–8.) In terms of raw numbers, the ISF 
had grown considerably in 2005, reaching 214,000 members by December and marking 
a turning point at which ISF strength exceeded that of coalition troops for the first time 
in the war.190 More importantly, ISF units seemed to be reaching a level at which they 
could operate independently. The metric used to reflect Iraqi unit capabilities, the Tran-
sition Readiness Assessment (TRA) for December 2005, showed one Iraqi Army battalion 
already operating fully independently (TRA level 1), another 44 in the lead with coalition 
forces acting in a supporting role (TRA level 2), and another 55 operating side by side 
with coalition forces (TRA level 3).191 Another eight battalions of Iraqi Special Police were 
511
DEFEATED BY DEMOCRACY, WINTER 2005-2006
also in the lead, according to their TRA ratings. By MNF-I’s calculations, 10 Iraqi battal-
ions at TRA 1 or TRA 2 could be considered the equivalent of one U.S. brigade, meaning 
that the ISF of December 2005 was more than capable, in MNF-I’s view, of making up for 
the two U.S. brigade combat teams that Casey was considering off-ramping.192
 
Chart 6. MNF-I Assessment of Aggregate ISF Size.
Off-ramping two BCTs would incur some tactical risk, Casey acknowledged: there 
could be a “reduction in tactical and operational effectiveness and flexibility,” as well as 
a “misperception of the U.S. ‘running away’,” the “creation of expectation for continuous 
drawdown,” and the danger that the insurgency could increase in size and effective-
ness.193 Violence was likely to surge in the period immediately following the elections, 
Casey expected, but he believed it would be the last breath of a dying insurgency extin-
guished by the democratic process and a new government with popular legitimacy. 
Deciding not to off-ramp the BCTs in the wake of a successful election, meanwhile, could 
incur strategic risk. In addition to the political implications of such a decision, refusing 
to off-ramp U.S. troops now that the Iraqi battalions were approaching full readiness 
could “[increase] the potential for Iraqi dependency on coalition forces,” Casey warned 
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Rumsfeld on December 19.194 For all of these reasons, the coalition “had to draw down to 
win,” the MNF-I commander argued.195
 
Chart 7. MNF-I Transition Readiness Assessment Ratings 
for Iraqi Army Battalions.
Taking Casey’s recommendation, Bush announced on December 23, 8 days after the 
elections, that the United States would off-ramp the two BCTs Casey had designated.196 
The president’s decision would mean the reduction of U.S. BCTs in Iraq from 17 to 
15 by January 2006 as units in Iraq redeployed.197 To hedge his bet, Casey had agreed 
with CENTCOM that one of the off-ramped brigade combat teams—the 2d Brigade, 1st 
Armored Division—would deploy to Kuwait and serve as a “call forward force,” essen-
tially an operational reserve for MNF-I. However, inside Iraq, the off-ramp would mean 
a reduction of 6,700 U.S. combat troops, along with about 3,000 additional troops in U.S. 
support units that also would not be needed. Because almost all of the BCTs deploying 
to Iraq in 2006 would be transformed modular units with fewer troops than the legacy 
brigades they were replacing, MNF-I expected an additional net reduction of 2,700 troops 
from “modularity savings.”198 The overall reduction of the coalition footprint would come 
in other areas as well. From late 2005 to fall 2006, MNF-I planned to replace 5,922 support 
Soldiers with contractors gradually, at a cost of $866 million, while the MNF-I headquar-
ters itself would shrink from 999 personnel to 864.199
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of expectation for continuous drawdown,” and the danger that the insurgency 
could increase in size and effectiveness.189 Violence was likely to surge in the period 
immediately following the elections, Casey expected, but he believed it would 
be the last breath of a dying insurgency being extinguished by the democratic 
proc ss and a n w government with popular legitimacy. Deciding not to off- amp 
the brigade combat teams in the wake of a successful election, meanwhile, could 
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Chart 8. MNF-I Transition Readiness Assessment Ratings 
for Special Police Battalions.
The Consequences of Flawed Data
Casey’s recommendation and Bush’s decision rested on data that both men believed 
indicated an improving situation in Iraq. Attacks had dropped significantly with each 
electoral cycle. Electoral participation had increased, and polls indicated that those who 
were participating in the political process were ready for the coalition to withdraw as 
soon as possible. The Iraqi security forces, at least based on the Transition Readiness 
Assessment, seemed to be reaching the point at which they could replace coalition units. 
However, each of these metrics was fraught with problems. Modern polling meth-
ods were incapable of accurately gauging Iraqi public opinion in 2005. The challenging 
security environment prevented balanced access to all of Iraq’s communities, and poll-
sters almost never broke down their respondents along sectarian lines. Polling results 
like those of the October and December elections masked Sunnis’ growing anger with 
a political system they perceived as intended to subjugate them permanently. After 35 
years of Ba’athist rule, Iraqis’ long-standing fear of responding truthfully to queries also 
skewed polling results. While most Iraqis told pollsters they wanted coalition forces to 
withdraw, many Sunnis also noted that nothing created greater fear than Iraqi security 
forces arriving in their neighborhoods without American troops in tow.
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were, they were usually not broken down along sectarian lines. They were also not 
usu lly categorized by scale, so tha  an attack that kill d over a hundred civilians might 
be treated the same as an attack that killed one coalition soldier. Thus did the U.S. 
military’s post–Vietnam War aversion to maintaining body counts reach its logical 
conclusion and produce unintended consequences in the Iraq War.
The oft-cited statistics showing increased participation in the democratic process 
also were deceptive. While Sunnis voted in greater numbers with each successive 
election, they were participating to register their dissatisfaction with the new political 
system rather than their support of it. Similarly, the Transition Readiness Assessment, 
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MNF-I’s significant activities (SIGACT) data, used to calculate attack trends over time, 
also tended to cloud the coalition’s understanding of the situation. MNF-I considered 
attacks against coalition forces to be significant activities and used them as the principal 
indicator of the insurgency’s strength and of the security situation. Attacks against Iraqi 
security forces were sometimes included in MNF-I’s significant activities data as well. 
Rarely, however, were attacks against Iraqi civilians included, and when they were, they 
were usually not broken down along sectarian lines. They were also not usually catego-
rized by scale so that an attack that killed over 100 civilians might be treated the same 
as an attack that killed one coalition soldier. Thus, the U.S. military’s post–Vietnam war 
aversion to maintaining body counts reached its logical conclusion and produced unin-
tended consequences in the Iraq War.
The oft-cited statistics showing increased participation in the democratic process also 
were deceptive. While Sunnis voted in greater numbers with each successive election, 
they were participating to register their dissatisfaction with the new political system 
rather than their support of it. Similarly, the Transition Readiness Assessment, which 
produced results showing that Iraqi units were ready to assume security responsibility 
from coalition forces, belied the Iraqis’ real capabilities. While Iraqi units might be fully 
equipped and manned, they were far from ready to face insurgents and sectarian forces 
on their own. Many units had become ethnically pure and unwilling to respond to orders 
that would threaten their own faction, while others who might have been willing to fight 
lacked the proper training and logistics functions to make them effective. These problems 
with the metrics that guided MNF-I’s decision-making were little recognized in 2005, but 
they had far-reaching consequences.200
Geographic Impacts of the Off-Ramp
In geographical terms, MNF-I planners intended to absorb the troop deficit created 
by the off-ramp in Baghdad and Diyala, two of the most violent areas in Iraq.201 For Bagh-
dad, the loss of one off-ramped brigade in 2006 would mean a precipitous drop in troops 
that was the continuation of a multiyear trend. The number of U.S. troops in Baghdad 
had dropped from 35,000 in 2004 to 30,000 in 2005 and to 24,000 in 2006. These changes 
were ostensibly balanced by a parallel growth of the Iraqi security forces, which, in Bagh-
dad, went from 22,000 to 36,000 to 56,000 over the same time period.202 As MND-B was 
losing significant combat power, its area of operations was expanding 10-fold, partially 
as a result of the departure of the 1,600-strong Ukrainian contingent from MND-CS in 
December 2005, but also because MNC-I had decided to shift Najaf from Multi-National 
Force-West’s (MNF-W) area of operations to MND-B to allow the MEF to focus solely 
on the challenging situation in Anbar.203 By early January 2006, the greatly expanded 
MND-B area included all of Babil, Karbala, and Najaf Provinces, creating a gerryman-
dered sector that stretched from Baghdad all the way to the Saudi border.204 With the 
Ukrainian departure, meanwhile, the adjacent shrunken MND-CS was effectively one 
BCT strong (see Map 18).205
U.S. troops in the north were about to be similarly stretched. In MND-NC, the off-
ramp would decrease the number of U.S. BCTs from four to three, a sharp difference from 
late 2003, when two full U.S. divisions had held the restive northern Iraq. With the off-
ramp, Multi-National Division-North Central (MND-NC) contained 12 battalions spread 
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over only 18 forward operating bases in 2006, down from 17 battalions and 28 forward 
operating bases in 2005.206 Like MND-B, MND-NC expanded its area while losing troop 
strength. In January 2006, Major General Thomas Turner and his 101st Airborne Division, 
having taken over MND-NC in November, assumed responsibility for MNF-NW from 
departing Major General David M. Rodriguez and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 
forming a new division area called MND-N. The 101st took charge of the 172d BCT in 
Mosul as well as the Kurdish provinces of Dahuk and Erbil, where the South Korean 
MND-NE had begun to reduce its presence.207 While the two Kurdish provinces were gen-
erally quiet, they still required a troop commitment to help develop the ISF, governance, 
and the rule of law. These changes greatly taxed the capacity of the 101st Airborne Divi-
sion’s headquarters, which had shrunk significantly as a by-product of transformation.
Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.
Map 18. 2006 Transitions, January-March 2006.
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In both MND-N and MND-B, the drawdown of  bases and personnel paralleled accel-
erated efforts to reduce the coalition presence in Iraq’s cities. In the days immediately 
following the December 2005 election, Casey issued new planning guidance for MNF-I 
basing that represented the fruition of his and Abizaid’s concern with coalition troops 
creating antibodies among the population. “As part of the strategy of reducing our vis-
ibility and profile, we will reduce our presence and operating profile in cities, where 
practical and operational requirements permit,” Casey’s order noted. “Where we need 
to retain the ability to monitor or influence events within cities, [coalition forces] should 
relocate to bases, initially on the outskirts of the urban areas where necessary, and later 
to more distant locations.”208 As part of this effort to downsize the coalition footprint 
from 81 bases to four, the order directed the multinational divisions to plan to move out 
of Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Ramadi, Fallujah, north Babil, Najaf, Kirkuk, Samarra, and 
Baqubah by the end of 2006.209
Political Warning Signs
In the aftermath of the December 15 election, Iraqis did not share the optimistic out-
look that had led Casey and MNF-I to launch the plans for the reduction of coalition 
troops. The election results were far from conclusive. While the UIA had secured a plu-
rality of votes, it needed to forge a complex coalition in order to govern. Far from being 
a unified bloc itself, the UIA had become a fractious Islamist Shi’a alliance composed of 
SCIRI, the Da’wa Party, the Sadrists, the Fadhila Party, and some Shi’a independents.210 
Moqtada Sadr, who, like the Sunni Arabs, had realized that opposition to elections was 
counterproductive, had sponsored a Sadrist party that secured 32 seats, giving Sadr sig-
nificant leverage in the forming of a governing coalition.211 The election had essentially 
legitimized Sadr and his movement and given them an advantage in their long-standing 
battle with coalition forces. Any coalition military action against Sadr’s followers was 
more difficult now that they were certain to be part of the government. “Moving [against 
Sadr] would be perceived as attacking the legitimacy of the government,” MNC-I Com-
mander Vines noted later. “[I]t would be the equivalent of the police coming down and 
arresting the Republican National Committee.”212 The coalition’s most potent enemy 
from the summer of 2004 would now be an integral part of the Iraqi state.
* * *
The October and December elections of 2005 left coalition leaders with the mistaken 
sense that a strategic victory was within their grasp. The coalition had fulfilled the United 
Nations (UN) mandate in UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1546 and was about 
to shepherd into existence Iraq’s first democratically elected government, a step that U.S. 
doctrine, going back as far as the Marine Small Wars Manual, considered a sign of progress 
in counterinsurgency campaigns. From the perspectives of Casey and Abizaid, the elec-
tion results were evidence that Iraqis, especially Sunnis, were choosing the democratic 
political process over the insurgency, and that a fissure was opening between the Iraqi 
Sunni population and al-Qaeda in Iraq. The Iraqi security forces’ success in securing the 
election, meanwhile, seemed to indicate that Iraqi forces were ready to begin taking lead 
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responsibility for the country’s security. For Casey, the time seemed right to begin the 
American troop drawdown and to accelerate the transition of responsibility and bases to 
the Iraqis, which he had believed since August 2004 was the eventual path to success in 
Iraq.
Yet, many of these were deceptive or simply poor indicators. MNF-I’s assessment 
of a decrease in violence came from statistics that principally tracked violence against 
coalition forces, which was no longer the focus of al-Qaeda in Iraq and other groups that 
were more intent on killing fellow Iraqis. The Transition Readiness Assessment inflated 
MNF-I’s perceptions of ISF capabilities. The increase in voter participation across 2005’s 
elections concealed a darker sectarian competition that was playing out. The flawed sta-
tistics also concealed a deeper problem: that the assumptions underlying MNF-I’s cam-
paign plan were themselves fundamentally flawed. Virtually all of the U.S. Government 
had assumed that elections would solve Iraq’s ills, so long as insurgents could not pre-
vent the holding of the vote. MNF-I successfully blocked militant attempts to disrupt the 
elections, but Iraq continued its slow march toward civil war nonetheless, showing in 
hindsight that MNF-I and U.S. national leaders had applied the wrong prescription to 
Iraq. Assuming that Iraq’s main problem was an insurgency against the coalition, U.S. 
leaders expected elections to remove most of the underlying reasons for insurgents to 
continue their struggle. Yet, the Iraq conflict had already evolved into an intercommunal 
political struggle that teetered on the edge of civil war. In such a scenario, elections were 
inherently destabilizing events that served as accelerants to civil war. By incorrectly diag-
nosing the problem, the United States had ensured it would not be able to accomplish a 
key component of its end state: a representative government that respected the human 
rights of all Iraqis.
In the world outside the coalition headquarters, uninfluenced by the flawed metrics 
being meticulously tracked in PowerPoint presentations, Iraqis viewed the late 2005 elec-
tion season not as a stabilizing period, but rather as a potential preamble to sectarian civil 
war. In polls conducted between October and December by the State Department’s Office 
of Research, a majority of Iraqis in the key cities of Mosul, Tikrit, Kirkuk, and Baghdad 
were concerned or very concerned that civil war was imminent in Iraq. In Mosul, 76 
percent of respondents worried that civil war was looming, and in Baghdad, the number 
worried about civil war had doubled since the same question was asked in March, jump-
ing to 53 percent.213 As Iraqis began 2006, they tended to fear that sectarian violence in the 
country was primed to explode, and their fears were justified.
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CHAPTER 19
THE IRAQI CIVIL WAR COMES INTO THE OPEN,  
JANUARY-JUNE 2006
For General George Casey, Jr., and Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, the high Sunni 
voter turnout of December 2005 signified an opportunity to be exploited. Iraq’s Sunnis 
had disregarded threats from al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and other hardline insurgent 
groups against joining the political process, the U.S. leaders noted, and the time was 
right to expand outreach to Sunni leaders to draw them further away from Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi and other Sunni rejectionists. From his headquarters in Tampa, FL, General 
John Abizaid agreed, asking his staff in late 2005 how best to exploit the strategic advan-
tage he believed the coalition had gained over al-Qaeda in 2005.1 Coalition leaders also 
believed 2006 would be the year increasingly capable Iraqi security forces would be able 
to shoulder much of the burden for internal security, allowing U.S. forces to extricate 
themselves from the country gradually as Casey’s campaign plan had envisioned. If the 
coalition could build on the momentum created by Sunnis’ decision to vote, then 2006 
could be the year in which the coalition and its Iraqi partners defeated AQI.
In the course of events, these expectations would not last long. Instead of stabiliz-
ing under the influence of a solidifying government and a maturing security force, Iraq 
was about to erupt in a sectarian conflict that would derail Multi-National Force–Iraq’s 
(MNF-I) drawdown plans and prompt a divisive debate within the coalition over how to 
prosecute the war.
THE RESPONSE TO THE DECEMBER ELECTIONS
Iraq’s Sunni leaders viewed the December 2005 election results in far different terms 
than coalition leaders. Within days of the voting, unofficial election returns began to indi-
cate a large plurality for the Shi’a Islamist parties in the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), and 
Sunni political leaders realized they faced a political disaster. Having campaigned with 
the deeply mistaken assumption that Sunnis formed a much larger portion of the Iraqi 
electorate than they actually did, Sunni politicians had unrealistically expected to win a 
major share of power in the new Parliament. In essence, many Sunnis had come to the 
conclusion that their best hope to return to power was not with the insurgent group Hizb 
al Awda (The Ba’athist “Party of the Return”), but with the political process the coali-
tion and the United Nations (UN) had established. Reestablishing a share of control over 
Iraq’s political levers of power might also have enabled them to stop what they saw as 
a renegade Shi’a sectarian government that was using Iraq’s security forces to terrorize 
Sunnis and cleanse them from the Baghdad region. However, as the unofficial vote count 
showed that Iraq’s Shi’a and Kurdish parties together would easily have a majority in the 
2006 Parliament, it became clear that the Sunni parties possessed little power to secure 
their constituency’s political aims. After spending several months urging the Sunni pop-
ulace to reconcile themselves to the new political process in the hopes that it would return 
them to power, Sunni leaders realized they had gambled their political reputations on the 
election outcome and lost. On December 20, 5 days after the election, several key Sunni 
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leaders, including Tariq Hashimi and Khalaf Ulayan, met with Casey to express their 
anger and frustration at the election result. Unwilling to accept the reality of their demo-
graphic minority, they alleged that the impending Shi’a-Kurdish victory was the result of 
massive voter fraud. According to notes from the meeting, furious Sunni leaders noted 
that they had “spoke[n] out for participation in the elections, it turned out to be useless, 
and now they are shut out of the political process and have lost credibility within their 
community.”2 The encounter worried Casey enough that in a discussion with President 
George W. Bush  the following day, he identified Sunni disappointment with the election 
results, and the potential that the disappointment could lead to increased violence, as 
the most significant of post-election challenges.3 The looming reality that electoral disap-
pointment could lead to increased violence was further evidence that the elections, rather 
than serving as venues for national reconciliation, had in fact been destabilizing events 
that helped push the country toward civil war.
A Second Look at Force Reductions
Casey’s concerns about the Sunni political reaction, however, did not alter MNF-I’s 
plans. By January 5, 2006, Casey had regained enough optimism to predict to Bush that 
MNF-I would be able to cancel the deployments of a total of four brigade combat teams 
(BCT) and one Marine regimental combat team (RCT) for the next troop rotation, draw-
ing the U.S. forces down to just 10 BCTs and 1 RCT in Iraq by October 2006.4 While 
pleased with the scope of these estimates, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rums-
feld was unhappy with their speed, preferring an acceleration of the drawdown with fur-
ther troop reductions in January. Casey disagreed, judging that it was too soon to gauge 
the full impact of the elections and of December’s two-brigade off-ramp decision. “Broad 
trends in Iraq develop over time,” he wrote to Rumsfeld, “and week-to-week (and even 
month-to-month) upward or downward spikes in enemy activity or friendly capabili-
ties often do not identify the true long-term trends.”5 MNF-I had developed a procedure 
to evaluate force structure decisions on a quarterly basis, Casey explained, and he pro-
posed to postpone any decisions until the formal reviews scheduled for March, June, and 
September—each of which might support a decision to cut one to two brigades. “React-
ing to monthly data ‘spikes’ or making the next off-ramp decision before the impact of 
previous unit off ramps is determined risks making off-ramp decisions prematurely,” 
Casey argued.6 Rumsfeld, after insisting that a special, limited distribution briefing be 
put together for him, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the U.S. Central 
Command (CENTCOM) commander relented and agreed to wait until March to make 
any decisions.7 However, Casey and Rumsfeld agreed that in March they expected to 
make a decision that would curtail the 2d Brigade, 28th Infantry Division, PA National 
Guard, by 1 month and curtail 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, by 3 months, with 
neither of those brigades replaced, effectively drawing down the U.S. contingent to 13 
BCTs by May.8
MNF-I’s Sunni Outreach
Having convinced Rumsfeld that the time was not right to consider additional troop 
reductions, Casey turned his attention to attempting to exploit the perceived success 
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of the election through other means. Instead of trying to mollify Sunni anger over the 
election defeat, Casey and other coalition leaders worked to broker better relationships 
between Sunnis and the Shi’a leaders of the government. In January, Casey took Prime 
Minister Ibrahim al-Ja’afari to Ramadi to confer with a group of local leaders called the 
Anbar Security Council. After months of subsequent meetings, Ja’afari would eventually 
pledge $75 million in reconstruction funds for the city—although the Iraqi Government 
would never actually follow through on this promise.9 Ja’afari would also agree to hire 
15,000 Anbaris into the Iraqi security forces (ISF) to offset Sunni perceptions that the ISF 
was becoming a Shi’a sectarian tool, with the tribal sheikhs who were already working 
with the coalition’s Desert Protectors initiative used to vet the new recruits.10
In addition to continuing their engagements with the Anbari sheikhs, MNF-I leaders 
began to expand their months-long negotiations with Sunni insurgent groups with the 
aim of permanently severing them from AQI and its allies. Even before the December 
election turnout, there had been promising signs that some of the Sunni insurgent groups 
were ready to turn against Zarqawi and AQI. By September 2005, the question of whether 
to participate in the elections had created a deep rift between AQI and other insurgent 
groups, a severe enough rupture that members of the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades and 
the Islamic Army in Iraq had agreed to form an alliance to destroy AQI over the issue. 
AQI, in turn, had begun targeting leaders from these rival groups in order to preserve 
its supremacy in the insurgency. Aware of these intra-insurgent dynamics, MNF-I and 
the U.S. Embassy had deftly begun to coax the less recalcitrant insurgent groups into 
the political process, aided by many Sunnis’ grudging acknowledgment that the coali-
tion was becoming a necessary protector against the sectarian behavior of the Ja’afari 
government.
By February 2006, discussions between mid-level leaders in MNF-I and the Sunni 
Iraqi resistance had gained enough momentum that, for the first time, Casey authorized 
a U.S. general officer, Major General Richard “Rick” Lynch, to begin formal talks with 
representatives of at least 15 insurgent groups.11 Casey believed that Sunni insurgents 
had become more willing to negotiate in good faith because they hoped the United States 
could act as a counterweight to rising Iranian influence. At one point, Casey became 
hopeful enough about the negotiations’ prospects that he briefly considered using the 
occasion of the seating of the new Iraqi Government, expected to take place as early as 
March or April, to announce the end of coalition offensive operations and the beginning 
of reconciliation efforts, an idea that would soon be overcome by events.12
The Mujahideen Shura Council
While the election outcome alarmed Sunni political leaders who saw themselves 
headed for a much smaller share of government power than they had hoped, Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi was apprehensive by the election result as well, but for different reasons. 
The high Sunni turnout in the December 15 vote had indeed been a political setback for 
AQI, whose demand that Sunnis boycott the political process had fallen flat, and Zarqawi 
and AQI needed to take quick measures to bolster their popular support. As a Jordanian 
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leader of an insurgent organization with a large number of non-Iraqis, Zarqawi was vul-
nerable to other Sunni groups’ assertions that he and AQI did not operate according to 
native Iraqi interests. Zarqawi also was stung by the criticisms from al-Qaeda’s senior 
leadership in the Zawahiri and Atiyah letters, and he had searched for a way to soften 
his image. His solution to these political problems was to put an Iraqi face on his jihad by 
creating an insurgent front group consisting of AQI and five smaller native Iraqi insur-
gent groups. Two senior Sunni insurgents, Muharib Jabouri and Mullah Nadhim Jabouri, 
organized the groups in a meeting in the Tigris River town of Dhuluiyah, about 97 kilo-
meters north of Baghdad and a mere 16 kilometers from the coalition air base at Balad. 
The resulting Mujahideen Shura Council that announced itself on January 15, 2006, suc-
ceeded in attracting some senior Iraqi insurgent leaders, including Ibrahim al-Badri, the 
future Iraqi State in Syria (ISIS) caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. It also created partner-
ships with elements of the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades in Diyala and Jaysh al-Islami in 
Baghdad, the two insurgent groups whose members elsewhere had turned against AQI 
during the election season. Despite the Shura Council’s purported Iraqi leadership (and 
claims that it could moderate AQI’s behavior), in reality, it was a thinly disguised vehicle 
for Zarqawi and AQI.13 As the real power behind the council, Zarqawi would continue 
his campaign to provoke a sectarian response from Iraq’s Shi’a community, a strategy 
that some Iraqi insurgents did not endorse.
THE SAMARRA MOSQUE BOMBING
The formation of the Mujahideen Shura Council was followed 5 weeks later by 
AQI’s most significant terrorist bombing of the Iraq War. Throughout 2005, U.S. offi-
cials had carefully watched the Iraqi Shi’a community’s reaction to Zarqawi’s campaign 
and tended to conclude that Shi’a leaders were able to preserve the Shi’a population’s 
patience as it absorbed the brunt of AQI’s mass casualty attacks, especially in Baghdad. 
Just 5 days after the December elections, MNF-I’s December 20, 2005, Campaign Progress 
Review assessed that the AQI-led insurgency had failed “to foment sectarian violence. 
Terrorist attempts to provoke violent Shi’a retaliation have failed.”14 Just 2 months later, 
however, Zarqawi and AQI would succeed spectacularly in this regard. Samarra, a city 
with a Sunni-majority population 129 kilometers north of Baghdad and just 29 kilometers 
from the town where the Mujahideen Shura Council had been founded, was home to the 
Askariyah Shrine, one of the four holiest sites in the Shi’a world along with the shrines in 
Karbala, Najaf, and Kadhimiyah. With its famous golden dome, the Askariyah Mosque 
was the destination of hundreds of thousands of Shi’a pilgrims who made their way to 
Samarra to worship at the burial place of Shi’a Islam’s 10th and 11th imams.
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Source: U.S. Army photo by Major Johnpaul Arnold, 1st Brigade Combat Team,  
101st Airborne Division (AA) Public Affairs (Released).
Askariyah Mosque, After the February 2006 Bombing.15
Shortly after midnight on February 22, 2006, seven members of AQI—two Iraqis, one 
Tunisian, and four Saudis—entered the shrine dressed as Iraqi police officers and cap-
tured the five security guards posted there. The AQI men quickly went to work wiring 
the mosque with explosives, and just before 7 a.m. detonated their charges, collapsing the 
golden dome and doing extensive damage to the mosque itself.16 The attackers had chosen 
their target and timing well, doing their work with no interference from U.S. troops or 
Iraqi security forces. Coalition troops had scarcely any forces nearby to prevent the attack 
or respond to the aftermath. As a by-product of MNF-I’s ongoing base closure effort, the 
main coalition bases inside Samarra had again been shut down in late 2005, leaving only 
two platoons from the 101st Airborne Division, a special police transition team, and a 
Special Forces Operation Detachment Alpha (ODA) inside the city of 350,000.17 One of 
the bombers later claimed that “the shrines of the Al Askari imams were chosen because 
of their religious importance and their geographical location, and the choice was meant 
to cause sectarian division among the people.”18
“We’re Not Seeing Civil War”
The news of the Samarra shrine’s destruction unleashed an immediate and furious 
reaction by Shi’a across Iraq. In the days that followed, sectarian violence that had pre-
viously been mostly clandestine and limited began to explode into the open. In several 
major cities, Shi’a protesters flooded the streets calling for revenge. Black-clad Shi’a mili-
tia members dominated the protests, which, in many places, gave way to attacks against 
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Sunni mosques by militiamen using rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons. 
By the end of the day of the Samarra bombing, the Interior Ministry reported that 27 
mosques had been attacked in Baghdad alone and several Sunni clerics murdered. Attacks 
against Sunni mosques took place in Basrah, Diyala, and central Iraq as well. A wave of 
killings accompanied the mosque attacks. In one instance, armed men claiming to be 
police reportedly removed Sunni prisoners from a jail and killed them. In another case, 
U.S. troops found a fresh mass grave with 47 bodies the day following the bombing.19
At MNF-I headquarters, Casey was inundated with frantic phone calls from Sunni 
leaders reporting militia attacks against Sunni mosques and civilians.20 Although Casey 
discounted much of the reporting as hysteria, he and Khalilzad agreed that the danger of 
a dramatic escalation of violence was high and urged Ja’afari to impose a 24-hour nation-
wide curfew. The two U.S. leaders were dumbfounded when the Iraqi Prime Minister 
refused, telling them blithely that “the Shi’a have to blow off steam right now.”21
In the hours and days that followed, dozens of bodies, many with signs of torture 
and mutilation, appeared on the streets and in the Tigris River. The bodies found by 
U.S. patrols were collected and delivered to the overflowing Baghdad morgue. What had 
previously appeared to be a narrowly targeted, systematic murder campaign devolved 
into random sectarian killings, with factors that before had served as a bulwark against 
the violence, such as intermarriage or tribal ties, seeming to dissolve overnight. Saman 
Dlawer Hussein, an Iraqi Sunni, later described how quickly the wave of violence broke 
over Baghdad “The night of the bombing, the head of a prominent Sunni family was 
murdered in Washash [in Baghdad] and left in the street. It was a statement by the Mahdi 
Army saying no Sunni was safe there anymore, no matter who they were. Everyone 
understood what that one killing meant for our area, and we were afraid. And after that 
the real killing started.”22
In the several days following the Samarra bombing, media sources estimated that 
approximately 1,300 Sunnis were killed and over 100 Sunni mosques attacked by Shi’a 
militants.23 Eight Sunni clerics were killed in the first 24 hours.24 A clerk at the Baghdad 
morgue told desperate Sunni families that the morgue required extra time to locate their 
missing family members because more than 1,000 bodies had been delivered since the 
day of the bombing, and a UN official separately reported the same figure to The New 
York Times.25
Despite what media sources were indicating, MNF-I reports in the aftermath of the 
bombing gave a different, less alarming picture of the violence. MNF-I statistics showed 
considerably lower levels of violence, a fact explained in retrospect by the coalition’s 
apparent loss of situational awareness and reliance on faulty metrics. As the violence 
was unfolding, much of the MNF-I leadership discounted the divergence between media 
reporting and MNF-I’s internal reporting as the result of sensationalized press reports 
and the exaggerations of Iraqi Sunnis. Representative of this thinking was a February 28 
report by MNF-I analysts that played down the number of protests and attacks on Sunni 
mosques on the day of the Samarra bombing, noting that:
there were 81 reports of mosques being attacked and damaged that originated from sources other 
than MSCs [major subordinate commands]. . . . Of the 81 . . . 50% were undamaged and another 20% 
were only lightly damaged. This accounts for nearly three quarters of all the reports of damaged 
mosques . . . 78 of the 83 demonstrations (directly attributable to the attack) were peaceful, and of 
the five described as violent the total BDA [battle damage assessment] was one ISF killed and three 
civilians injured.26
535
THE IRAQI CIVIL WAR COMES INTO THE OPEN, JANUARY-JUNE 2006
Mirroring this assessment on the day after the bombing, coalition spokesmen Lynch 
told a press gathering, “We’re not seeing civil war igniting in Iraq. We’re not seeing 77, 
80, 100 mosques damaged. We’re not seeing death in the streets. We’re seeing a confi-
dent, capable Iraqi Government using their capable Iraqi security force to calm the storm 
that was inflamed by a horrendous, horrific terrorist attack yesterday against the Golden 
Mosque in Samarra.”27 In Washington, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice echoed Lynch 
on the same day, saying, “I don’t think we do the Iraqi people any good, or really that 
we are fair to them, in continually raising the specter that they might fall into civil war.”28
Yet despite the differing statistics, Casey chose to hedge his bets by instructing his sub-
ordinate commanders just 2 days after the Samarra attack that the situation demanded 
more than “business as usual.”29 In a strategic directive issued on February 24, Casey 
outlined the ways in which increasing ethno-sectarian violence could jeopardize the coa-
lition’s mission in Iraq and urged his subordinates to take measures to dampen tensions 
and stabilize the situation, particularly in Baghdad. Still, Casey viewed the bombing 
mainly as a threat to future progress rather than a near-term unraveling of the security 
situation. While the attack and its aftermath had triggered warnings, he judged the crisis 
could be managed and even used as an opportunity to bolster confidence in the Iraqi 
Government and demonstrate the capability of the Iraqi security forces, thus reinforcing 
his overall strategy to put the Iraqis “in the lead” and help them as they handled the secu-
rity situation.30 Yet, for the first time, Casey’s command guidance delved explicitly into 
the sectarian conflict that had been roiling Iraq since the toppling of Saddam Hussein. 
Casey ordered his subordinates to “prevent the fracture of the ISF along sectarian lines,” 
to “remain alert for indicators of ethnic or sectarian movement,” and to block “extra-gov-
ernmental armed groups from filling a perceived security vacuum.”31
Casey was right to warn his units of these dangers. While the initial spasm of killing 
seemed to die down after several days, it was replaced by an increasing number of sys-
tematic sectarian abductions, murders, and bombings. On March 8, armed men in police 
uniforms kidnapped and later killed 50 Sunnis at a security company in west Baghdad 
owned by relatives of Ghazi al-Yawar, Iraq’s former interim President. On March 12, 
six car bombs ripped through Shi’a neighborhoods, killing an estimated 50 people and 
wounding at least 200 more in coordinated attacks that bore AQI’s hallmark. Even elite 
members of the Iraqi Special Operation Forces (ISOF) Brigade were not spared, with four 
Sunnis from the unit kidnapped and executed in the first week of March. The U.S. advis-
ers from the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) who accompanied 
ISOF members to recover the bodies in the Baghdad morgue were shocked at what they 
discovered. Throngs of Iraqis queued outside the morgue to look for their missing rel-
atives. Inside, room after room contained stacks of bodies, some with their hands still 
zip-tied, and many displaying evidence of torture. When the special operators asked 
the morgue employees whether the collection of bodies represented a week’s worth or 
longer, the employees simply responded that it was what had come in overnight. Sensing 
that they were witnessing a significant event that had not registered with coalition lead-
ers, the operators recorded the scene and passed the video to Multi-National Corps-Iraq 
(MNC-I) and MNF-I leaders.32
The scene at the morgue was a sign that the Baghdad region had begun to devolve 
into a chaotic state, with populations of either sect coming to realize that neither the 
536
THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR
Iraqi Government nor the coalition could effectively protect them. As a result, previously 
unaligned civilians began joining militias to survive or seek revenge. Across Baghdad, 
minority Iraqis in heterogeneous neighborhoods were driven out by violence and threats, 
fleeing to the relative safety of neighborhoods where their own sect was the majority. 
Ali Kadhem, an Iraqi Shi’a, later described how his family was swept up in Baghdad’s 
demographic changes:
The area we lived [on the western edge of Baghdad] was mostly Sunni, but there were several 
Shi’ite families. After the Samarra bombings, all the Shi’ite families got threat letters from al-Qaeda 
in Iraq. The notes were delivered to every Shi’ite house. The letters said we were dirty collaborators 
working with the Americans, the Iranians, and the Jews and said we had 72 hours to leave. We 
didn’t bother to take anything from the house, just some blankets for the children because it was 
cold weather then.33
As the weeks passed, the violent outburst of February 22 gradually settled into what 
were apparently coordinated plans by militant groups to cleanse mixed neighborhoods 
of the opposing sect and, having captured those neighborhoods, use them as bases from 
which to strike areas controlled by the opposing side. One Sunni insurgent group’s oper-
ational plan, captured in the weeks following the Samarra attack, instructed its militant 
members that “the priority in Baghdad is the Shi’a. . . . Drive away the Shi’a and expel 
their businesses and workplaces from our areas. . . . Expel all merchants of gas, bread, 
or meat. . . . Move the battle to the Shi’a depths and cut off the paths from them by any 
means necessary to put pressure on them to leave their areas.”34
Once neighborhoods had been taken over, militias such as Jaysh al-Mahdi quickly 
began to serve as surrogates for the state, taking over social services and quasi-govern-
ment functions. With mass expulsions from neighborhoods occurring on both sides, the 
militias began assuming responsibility in some neighborhoods for providing the basic 
needs of shelter, security, and food. Rasim Haikel, an Iraqi Shi’a, described this process:
The Mahdi Army had basically taken over our neighborhood [in northern Baghdad] by the middle 
of 2006. They were very open about it. They established checkpoints on the main roads to search 
cars coming and going. . . . At that time, in our area, they controlled everything and were involved 
in everything. One day . . . they summoned me and a bunch of other ration distributors in the  
area. . . . They made it seem like an official meeting. They said the government had given them 
authority to collect any rations dedicated to Sunni families and redistribute them to families of 
Shi’ite martyrs. Most of the distributors were so scared they agreed to cooperate without asking 
questions, even though it was not clear whether there had been such an order from the government.35
In short order, the bombing had driven Iraq’s mixed-sect regions into a situation in which 
the central government had all but failed, with the population’s basic needs increasingly 
met through associations with localized religiously affiliated groups and with mass 
migrations rising significantly.
Considering the post-bombing period in hindsight, Major General Richard Zahner, 
Casey’s intelligence director, judged that Shi’a leaders such as Moqtada Sadr had “basi-
cally let JAM [Jaysh al-Mahdi] off the leash” and allowed Shi’a militants to indiscrimi-
nately attack Sunni mosques, Sunni citizens, and even anyone with a Sunni name. The 
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Shi’a attacks inevitably caused retaliatory violence from the Sunni population, creating a 
cycle of violence with significant momentum and inertia. In essence, “[it] grew to become 
a self-sustaining sectarian conflict,” Zahner recalled.36
Despite these unmistakable signs of civil war, less than a week after the mosque bomb-
ing, CJCS U.S. Marine General Peter Pace began using a refrain that would be repeated 
frequently in the coming months, remarking, “I think that the Iraqi people—Kurds, Shi’a, 
Sunni—walked up to the abyss, took the look in, didn’t like what they saw, have pulled 
together, have pulled back from violence, and are working together to keep things calm 
and to find the right mix for their own government.”37 Casey adopted a similar tone in 
his press engagements and discussions with U.S. officials in Washington. Casey main-
tained that the level of violence had been overstated, recalling later that the phone calls 
from Sunni leaders on the night after the bombing were full of reports “all night long 
about militia here and militia there,” but that when MNF-I had spent several days “going 
around trying to verify . . . stories about mosques being burned down all over Baghdad 
. . . you would go there and there would be a broken window and the mosque would be 
fine. . . . It was a hysterical period.”38 This downplaying of the attack’s aftermath came 
through in a March 3 press briefing in which Casey reported that just 350 civilians had 
been killed in the days since the bombing and told reporters that “it appears the crisis has 
passed.”39 While Casey carefully caveated his conclusion with the comment that “Iraq 
is still not out of danger,” his central message was that the situation was not dire and a 
civil war not imminent, a judgment he reprised on March 9 in prepared comments for 
congressional testimony.40
Casey downplayed the violence in reports to senior U.S. leaders as well. In a March 
10 briefing to Bush on “Post-Samarra Violence in Perspective,” Casey noted that accord-
ing to MNF-I statistics the number of attacks in the aftermath of the Samarra bombing 
was smaller than during the November 2004 Battle of Fallujah, the August 2004 Battle of 
Najaf, and each of the three election periods during 2005 (see Chart 9). “Overall attack 
levels are decreasing since the referendum and have held steady for the last four weeks,” 
he reported.41 Aside from the day immediately following the attack, Casey informed the 
President that the “levels of violence did not increase substantially,” and that “report-
ing [had] exaggerated the levels of violence and instability.”42 Briefing Rumsfeld on the 
post-Samarra situation a few days later on March 22, Casey assessed that “Civil war in 
Iraq . . . is not imminent nor inevitable.”43 As in previous assessments, he emphasized that 
it was important to look at the bombing in the context of what, in his opinion, had been 
other darker periods that the 3-year mission had safely weathered. He added his opinion 
that “Iraq could not be ‘pushed’ into civil war as long as [coalition forces] remain in large 
numbers, ISF remains a national force, and ethnic groups support the political process.”44
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Chart 9. Post-Samarra Violence in Perspective: 
MNF-I’s Viewpoint, March 10, 2006.
In an internal MNF-I discussion on March 31, Casey clarified that he defined the term 
“civil war” in Iraq as meaning “intense, sustained, (and) widespread ethno-sectarian vio-
lence across multiple provinces accompanied by collapse of the central authority and 
the ISF.”45 Casey and his staff selected the American Civil War as the model by which to 
determine whether the crisis in Iraq had, in fact, become a civil war and, in Casey’s view, 
Iraq was nowhere near such a state. “There was no one seceding, there was no one trying 
to set up a different country or join Iran or Syria,” Casey’s chief of strategy pointed out 
years later. “[Even] the Kurds realized they needed to be part of a bigger Iraq.”46 Casey 
and his advisers had set a high bar for describing Iraq’s violence as a civil war.
In retrospect, the difference between MNF-I’s appreciation of the immediate post-Sa-
marra security situation and that of civilians and nongovernmental organizations is strik-
ing. To begin with, MNF-I’s statistics and those of civilian organizations were sharply 
at odds. For the period stretching from the bombing until March 3 in which Casey esti-
mated 350 civilians had been killed, the Baghdad morgue recorded 1,300 deaths and the 
Ministry of the Interior cited 1,077—indicating perhaps that the coalition had succumbed 
to limited situational awareness, but certainly indicating the coalition was not reconciling 
its reporting with that of civilian counterparts.47 One potential reason for the divergence 
in estimates was that MNF-I was principally tracking only the attacks that it character-
ized as ethno-sectarian in nature. An April 10 information paper by MNF-I’s intelligence 
directorate stated that an attack was considered ethno-sectarian if “it is committed by 
individuals from one ethnic or religious group against individuals or symbols of a dif-
ferent ethnic or religious group, where difference in religion or ethnicity are a primary 
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motivation.”48 But because the coalition and Iraqi authorities often lacked evidence and 
basic information about the corpses in Baghdad’s streets or floating in the Tigris River, 
determining whether the motivation of a murder or violent act was ethno-sectarian was 
highly subjective and erratic, a factor that almost certainly skewed MNF-I’s statistics on 
civilian deaths.
Staying the Course at MNF-I
Casey and MNF-I remained on course after the Samarra bombing to continue the 
transition of security responsibility to the Iraqis. In Casey’s regular updates to Wash-
ington, the post-Samarra violence did not figure significantly. Only two of the 25 vid-
eoconferences that Casey conducted with the President, SECDEF, or National Security 
Council between February 22 and the end of May addressed the attack or sectarian vio-
lence. By contrast, three briefings addressed the topic of accelerating the transition by 
further reducing U.S. brigades over the summer. In March, Casey reported to Rumsfeld 
that MNF-I was still on track to draw down from 15 BCTs to 10 by the end of 2006, and 
from 81 bases to around 50 in the same timeframe, indicating that the bombing had done 
little to alter his campaign plan.49 However, the bombing had adjusted the plans that 
Casey and Rumsfeld had made in January to redeploy two brigades early. Now, after 
conducting the March force structure review, Casey recommended that 2d Brigade, 28th 
Infantry Division, Pennsylvania National Guard, would redeploy as planned in June and 
1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, would only be curtailed a month, redeploying in 
July.50 While Casey reported that the December decision had yielded positive returns, 
citing a drop in attacks in Diyala where a brigade was off-ramped, he ultimately argued 
that it was “still too early to fully assess the impact of the December 2005 decision.”51 
With the updated plan, MNF-I would drop to 14 BCTs in June and to 13 by August.52 The 
precipitous drop was a result of MNF-I’s 2005 decision to source only the 2006–2008 rota-
tion with 13 total BCTs, meaning that when the 2d Brigade, 28th Infantry Division, Penn-
sylvania National Guard, left Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W) and the 1st Brigade, 
10th Mountain Division, left Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B), there would be 
no backfill for either unit.53
The MNF-I high-value target list reflected this continuity in strategy as well. Despite 
considerable evidence of Shi’a death squads and militias stoking sectarian violence 
throughout 2005, and in the immediate aftermath of the bombing, MNF-I’s list of the 
most wanted terrorists and insurgents remained almost exclusively Sunni. On the Feb-
ruary 25, 2006, list, 12 of the 19 names were members of AQI or other affiliated jihadist 
organizations, and the top target was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri had 
dropped to number 19 on the list, one of only five former regime members still on the list. 
Tellingly, only two targets were associated with Shi’a organizations.54
Operation SCALES OF JUSTICE
Even as MNF-I continued at the strategic level on its course of transition, drawdown, 
and consolidation, Casey and his commanders recognized that the violence in the Iraqi 
capital required a tactical response. On March 12, MNF-I launched Operation SCALES 
OF JUSTICE, a month-long U.S.-Iraqi effort to establish new fixed-checkpoints in and 
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between Baghdad’s neighborhoods and to enforce curfews reminiscent of the Ba’athist 
regime’s pre-2003 method of controlling the city’s population.55 To ensure that the opera-
tion could serve the additional purpose of demonstrating the Iraqi security forces’ grow-
ing capability, MNF-I planned Operation SCALES OF JUSTICE collaboratively with 
Iraqi leaders and aimed to integrate U.S. and Iraqi units throughout the city, but with 
Iraqi units actually “in the lead” on the street. The fixed-checkpoints, which aimed to 
inhibit the freedom of movement of sectarian elements, were combined with raids to 
capture individuals suspected of conducting sectarian violence.56 Two U.S. brigades, 4th 
Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, in east Baghdad and 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, 
in central south Baghdad would support Iraqi-led operations on either side of the city. 
In southwest Baghdad, MNF-I committed one battalion from 2d Brigade, 1st Armored 
Division, the “call forward force” that had been off-ramped in December from Iraq to 
Kuwait. At the same time, MNC-I moved one battalion from Colonel Michael Steele’s 3d 
Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, in Salahadin Province (MND-N) to east Baghdad, and 
one Marine battalion from RCT-5 to west Baghdad, bringing the total U.S. contingent for 
the operation to 10,000 troops.57
The influx of U.S. troops into the Baghdad area was a partial reversal of the policy 
of shrinking the American footprint in the capital that Casey had been employing just 
weeks earlier. The MNF-I commander had previously aimed to starve U.S. units of troops, 
thereby forcing them to partner fully with their Iraqi counterparts, and to concentrate 
tactical units on the forward operating bases on the city’s periphery. This approach had 
confounded many of Casey’s tactical commanders, who had difficulty finding ways to 
tamp down the sectarian violence with diminishing resources at the same time they were 
instructed to distance themselves from the areas they were tasked to control. When Casey 
visited the 4th BCT, 101st Airborne Division, in east Baghdad on the day of the Samarra 
bombing, for example, brigade commander Colonel Thomas Vail complained that his 
transformed brigade was “stretched” as it tried to secure Sadr City’s population of 3 
million with 2 of its maneuver battalions missing. Casey responded that feeling stretched 
was “part of the plan.”58 As Casey told historians later, in his view, the only way to make 
an Army unit do less was to give it less with which to do the job.59 This concept would 
shape much of MNF-I’s response to the post-Samarra violence throughout the spring and 
summer of 2006.
For his part, Ja’afari committed to reinforce the initial footprint of 26,000 ISF with 
an additional 11,000 Iraqi troops.60 However, in light of coalition commanders’ con-
cerns about the Interior Ministry’s involvement in sectarian activity, the Commando and 
National Police Brigades would fall under the tactical control of U.S. brigade combat 
teams in order to restrain their ability to “conduct rogue operations.”61 All told, the coali-
tion and Iraqi leaders expected an operation involving 47,000 troops inside the city.
Meanwhile, 3 weeks after the spasm of killings that followed the shrine bombing, Casey 
began to reorient his headquarters to the new threat from death squads and “extra-judi-
cial killings.” On March 15, 3 days after the launch of Operation SCALES OF JUSTICE, 
Casey stood up a joint U.S.-Iraqi extrajudicial killing (EJK) task force inside the MNF-I 
headquarters to investigate sectarian violence and nominate targets that could be used 
to detain, prosecute, or neutralize those responsible.62 Even as the Operation SCALES OF 
JUSTICE checkpoints appeared around the city, there were plenty of killings for the EJK 
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task force to investigate. On March 21, Iraqi and U.S. officials estimated that almost 200 
executed and tortured corpses had been found in Baghdad over the previous 2 weeks, a 
tripling of Baghdad’s normal murder rate.63 Five days later, U.S. and ISF troops found 30 
beheaded bodies in Diyala Province.64 On March 29, armed men in police uniforms—who 
were likely actually police—killed nine people in a raid in the Mansour neighborhood in 
west Baghdad. On the same day, gunmen abducted 35 Baghdadis in four separate mass 
kidnappings across the city, and Baghdad morgue officials reported that 30 to 40 dead 
bodies were found on the streets of the city each day.65
Within 2 weeks of the launch of Operation SCALES OF JUSTICE, U.S. troops were 
noting large armed groups in the Baghdad region, a shift in tactics more akin to the 2004 
uprisings than to the more shadowy militant posture of 2005. On March 25, a large gun-
fight erupted between JAM and Sunni fighters in the mixed-sect town of Mahmudiyah 
south of Baghdad, a rare force-on-force battle between militias that ended with an esti-
mated 40 gunmen killed or wounded.66 A day later, on March 26, a combined CJSOTF-
Iraqi special operations raid on a JAM compound in Adhamiya resulted in 16 Sadrist 
militiamen killed.67
The raid in Adhamiya, which had been launched to target the same sectarian forces 
responsible for killing ISOF soldiers earlier in the month, had serious political reper-
cussions. In a display of their information operations savvy, less than an hour after the 
mission had concluded, the Sadrists had removed weapons from the site of the battle, 
repositioned militiamen’s bodies to make it look like they had been executed in the 
midst of prayer, and released photos and a statement accusing the coalition and ISOF 
of massacring innocent Shi’a worshippers in a mosque.68 Picked up by major press orga-
nizations, the photos created political shockwaves that reverberated back to Washing-
ton, with the SECDEF and the CJCS fielding questions about the operation. A 6-week 
investigation that involved the Iraqi Prime Minister’s office and MNF-I ensued, with the 
special operators eventually cleared of any wrongdoing on the strength of recordings 
from helmet-mounted video cameras and a combat cameraman who accompanied the 
mission. However, the political damage had been done. CJSOTF missions against JAM 
death squads were essentially sidelined during the investigation, and when the CJSOTF 
proposed a comprehensive mission in late May that would simultaneously hit dozens 
of JAM targets from Basrah to Sadr City in one night, Casey decided that the missions 
would be conducted sequentially over a period of days instead, blunting their effect.69
The sectarian violence taking place during Operation SCALES OF JUSTICE sometimes 
had political overtones as well. On April 7, three suicide bombers attacked the Buratha 
Mosque in west Baghdad, a Shi’a religious compound controlled by the senior Supreme 
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq politician (and cleric) Jalaladin Saghir. Sunnis 
had long suspected Saghir, a former Badr Corps member, of operating Shi’a death squads 
out of the mosque complex, and the April 7 bombing appeared to target him specifically. 
Two of the bombers, dressed as women, detonated themselves among worshippers, but 
the third penetrated Saghir’s office and almost killed Saghir himself. Altogether, their 
bombings killed 85 and wounded another 160.70
One reason Operation SCALES OF JUSTICE failed to stem this kind of violence was 
that the ambitious plans for Iraqi security forces reinforcements and ISF-led operations 
in Baghdad did not happen. Only 2,000 of Ja’afari’s promised 11,000 Iraqi troops ever 
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materialized, leaving the operation significantly under-resourced.71 Kurdish-led ISF bri-
gades, in particular, did not respond to orders to deploy from northern Iraq to the capital, 
highlighting that the new Iraqi Army the coalition had built was not a national institution, 
but instead a force with many ethnically homogeneous or single-sect units that answered 
to political parties rather than the formal chain of command. The units that did deploy 
in Baghdad suffered from the same ghost soldier problem that coalition commanders 
had observed in the Iraqi Army and police in late 2005, the Iraqi units’ real strength on 
Baghdad’s streets was often significantly less than their strength on paper or in transition 
readiness assessment reports.
The performance of those Iraqi troops that were on the street was disappointing. 
Often relegated to duty at checkpoints, the ISF seldom left them, and the checkpoints 
themselves largely failed to limit the movement of insurgents or weapons. The Iraqi sol-
diers manning the Operation SCALES OF JUSTICE checkpoints tended to be “poorly 
equipped, undisciplined, [and] running around in their skivvies,” MND-B Commander 
Major General James D. Thurman observed.72 Inspecting the checkpoints himself, the 
Iraqi minister of defense commented that the enemy would have to be quite bad not to 
be able to bypass or get through the barriers.73 Meanwhile, Iraqi Army units that were 
well trained and capable often were restrained from operating against Shi’a death squads 
because of the political repercussions of taking on sectarians who were connected to 
major Iraqi political parties.
By the time Operation SCALES OF JUSTICE ended in mid-April, the number of civil-
ian deaths in Baghdad each week had dropped to about 230, down from over 300 in 
the weeks following the Samarra bombing but still significantly higher than the Decem-
ber 2005 average of about 160.74 Nevertheless, despite the still-elevated violence and the 
sobering performance of the ISF, Casey and his command judged that the situation in 
Baghdad had stabilized, at least temporarily.75 MNF-I’s April 15 assessment of the oper-
ations in Baghdad concluded that “Operations Scales of Justice and Northern Lights 
helped reduce the number of VBIED [vehicle-borne IED] and SVBIED/SVEST [suicide 
vehicle-born IED/suicide vest] attacks in Baghdad. The nature of the violence changed as 
there is an increase in the small arms attacks but violence overall appears to be reduced 
since those operations started.”76 Attack levels, meanwhile, were “on the rise but have not 
reached the levels that occurred around the January 2005 election and the Referendum.” 
Finally, rather than blaming the violence on a worsening sectarianism, the MNF-I assess-
ment blamed the slow pace of the formation of the new government, concluding that 
“much of the increase in violence is likely due to the perceived instability of the govern-
ment. This instability is exacerbated by the prolonged period of time that it is taking the 
government to form.”77 As had long been the case, MNF-I leaders hoped that the seating 
of the new democratically elected Iraqi Government would naturally encourage the war-
ring parties to begin to resolve their problems politically.
 “The Fundamental Nature of the Conflict Had Changed”
Despite MNF-I’s relatively positive pronouncements, and Casey’s own, as Operation 
SCALES OF JUSTICE came to a close, the MNF-I commander’s perspective on the post-Sa-
marra environment was beginning to evolve, as was that of his senior subordinates. On 
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April 22, just a week after MNF-I had assessed Operation SCALES OF JUSTICE as a 
relative success, Casey’s intelligence director, Zahner, told Casey and a gathering of coa-
lition commanders that the post-Samarra period had witnessed “a shift in the nature 
of the struggle from a Sunni insurgency attempting to derail the political process and 
terminate an occupation to a competition among social and political leaders and their 
ethno-sectarian constituencies for economic power and political dominance.”78 The driv-
ers of violence had shifted as well, Zahner concluded. Before Samarra, MNF-I had per-
ceived most sectarian violence as a matter of tit-for-tat attacks in which the Badr Corps 
conducted targeted killings of individual Sunni figures, while Sunni militants carried out 
indiscriminate suicide attacks against the Shi’a population. However, after the bombing, 
Shi’a attacks against Sunnis had become indiscriminate as well, with JAM taking a much 
more prominent role by carrying out random sectarian killings against the Sunni pop-
ulation at large.79 Iran’s role in the sectarian violence also became clearer, with MNF-I 
concluding that “Iran is arming, training and financing Shi’a militant groups (especially 
Jaysh al Mahdi and Badr).”80
 
Chart 10. MNF-I Reporting on Monthly Ethno-Sectarian Incidents 
and Casualties as of April 2006.
Casey was coming to the even broader conclusion 2 months after the Samarra attack 
that the nature of the conflict, as he termed it, was changing. It was a proposition he had 
been pondering since before the shrine bombing, reflecting both his frustrations with 
the Ja’afari government and his recognition of the Sunni-supported AQI bombing cam-
paign. A week before the attack, Casey had proffered to his subordinate commanders the 
idea that the Iraq conflict had become a fight for the division of power among compet-
ing ethnic and sectarian groups rather than an insurgency against the coalition.81 By late 
April, Casey’s thinking on the question had crystallized. The war was a struggle for the 
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division of political and economic power by Iraqis, he told a gathering of U.S. generals 
on April 24, with four different groups driving the conflict: Iran, Shi’a extremists, secular 
Sunni resistance, and Sunni extremists.82 In this altered paradigm, fighting the coalition 
was no longer the central objective of the conflicting parties, and for the first time in the 
war, the U.S. theater command was acknowledging the powerful, destabilizing influence 
Iran and Shi’a extremists were having on the campaign.
Casey continued his analysis along these lines in discussions with Rumsfeld 2 days 
later. The nature of the violence had changed, he reported to the SECDEF. Since the 
Samarra incident, eight times more civilians were killed by execution or murder than 
by car bomb, a significant change since AQI’s 2005 car-bomb campaign.83 MNF-I was 
also showing a spike in the number of murders and executions, from 11 a day before the 
bombing to a high of 36 a day for the week of March 8–14. Casey remained hopeful that 
the escalating violence was only a short-term trend and noted that, for the week of April 
13–20, the number of murders and executions had dropped to “only” 29 per day.84
The updated campaign plan that Casey and MNF-I published on April 28 also reflected 
the change in the command’s new understanding of the Iraqi environment. The April 
plan intended to lay out the coalition’s activities throughout a 4-year period that would 
theoretically include the end of the MNF-I mission and a transition to “normal diplomatic 
and security relationships.” But in a change from earlier campaign plans, the April ver-
sion noted that the war had evolved from an insurgency directed against external actors 
(i.e., the coalition) into a conflict “between and among its ethnic and sectarian groups 
over the distribution of political and economic power,” as evidenced by the “outpour-
ing of rage and violence” following the Samarra attack.85 Whereas coalition leaders had 
assumed in late 2004 and throughout 2005 that the Iraqi election process would naturally 
stabilize the country, the April 28 document declared instead that “voting in the elections 
has been substantially driven by ethnic and sectarian identity rather than by political 
issues, reflecting a polarized society which inhibits the creation of a stable, enduring, 
democratic state.” For the first time, the MNF-I directive also identified militias, called 
extra-governmental armed groups, and ethno-sectarian violence as part of the overall 
threat to the coalition’s mission.
Despite this dramatically changed analysis, coalition commanders did not believe 
the changing situation invalidated the core principle of previous campaign plans: that 
responsibility must be shifted to the Iraqis as quickly as possible in order to avoid contin-
ued Iraqi dependency and to minimize the buildup of opposition, or antibodies, against 
coalition forces. “Enduring strategic success will only be achieved by Iraqis; Iraq’s prob-
lems require Iraqi solutions,” the April 28 document stated. “We will succeed by increas-
ingly putting Iraqis in charge across all lines of operations, moving to a supporting role, 
reducing our visibility and level of involvement, and by pressing them to address and 
resolve Iraqi problems with Iraqi resources.”86 In 2006 and 2007, the coalition would aim 
to foster the “formation of a government of national unity” in order to “address those 
conditions that have the potential to push Iraq into a civil war.” At the same time, the coa-
lition would “progressively transition battle space to the IA [Iraqi Army],” prepare Iraqi 
police to “begin assuming the lead role in combatting the insurgency,” and mentor the 
new government so that its ministries and institutions would “begin to develop the skills 
to govern effectively.”87 The coalition would also carry on with its attempts to persuade 
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Sunni insurgents to eschew violence in favor of politics: “Coalition outreach to Sunni 
Arabs will continue to stress that the political process offers the best hope for resolution 
of their legitimate concerns. The involvement of Sunni Arabs in the political process at all 
levels will be essential.”88
Finally, abandoning the 2005 emphasis on reestablishing control over the borders in 
order to interdict what Casey and others had assumed to be the external accelerants of 
the conflict, the April plan declared that “Baghdad’s significance as the seat of govern-
ment and crucible of sectarian strife makes it the coalition main effort for 2006.”89 In addi-
tion to Baghdad, the MNF-I plan identified nine cities of strategic significance where the 
coalition would consolidate its presence and focus on developing capable Iraqi forces 
to assume responsibility for security: Najaf, Ramadi, Baqubah, Babil (Hillah), Fallujah, 
Samarra, Kirkuk, Mosul, and Basrah.90
Casey later explained his rationale for maintaining the core principles of previous 
campaign plans, noting that the Samarra bombing:
didn’t cause me to go back and question the fundamental underpinning of our campaign plan, 
which was that Iraqi success in the long term will only be achieved by Iraqis. My view then and my 
view continues to be now that they had to work through these sectarian problems. It wasn’t going 
to be pretty as they worked their way through them; but they had to solve them, they had to get to 
the bottom of them, and we could only help them get through this period.91
THE “YEAR OF THE POLICE”
The disappointing performance of the Iraqi security forces in Operation SCALES OF 
JUSTICE and the immediate aftermath of the Samarra bombing showed that they were 
far from ready to take the level of responsibility that coalition leaders had hoped they 
would shoulder in 2006. MNF-I and MNSTC-I had begun the year with a set of plans to 
make 2006 the “Year of the Police,” in which the coalition would place special empha-
sis on building the capabilities of the Interior Ministry’s local police and border troops. 
Thus, they could eventually take over internal security duties from the Army, as Colo-
nel William Hix’s 2005 Counterinsurgency Survey had recommended and as Casey and 
other commanders believed was necessary for the long-term success of the counterin-
surgency effort. Three weeks before the Samarra bombing, MNSTC-I had given Casey a 
plan for “accelerating the Year of the Police,” noting that the goal of the enhanced effort 
was to reach Transition Readiness Assessment level 2 for police stations, which would 
“[equal] transition and coalition forces off ramping.”92 To get the Iraqi police to this level, 
MNSTC-I would discard its Police Partnership Program in favor of more robust mentor-
ing. Using the special police and military transition team programs as a model, MNSTC-I 
would create police transition teams (PTTs) that would eventually place coalition advis-
ers in nearly 200 provincial, district, and local police stations with the goal of improving 
community policing in the 10 “strategic cities” identified in MNF-I’s campaign plan.93
On the ground, the police transition teams would be built around MNSTC-I’s 500 
international police liaison officers (IPLO), civilian police professionals from around the 
world who had volunteered to mentor the Iraqi police. Most of these police professionals 
were either contractors with former law enforcement experience, or traffic police or other 
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local law enforcement officers seconded by their governments. Few, if any, were para-
military police units such as the Italian Carabinieri or the French Gendarmes. MNSTC-I’s 
previous experiences with the international officers had shown that the program tended 
to be ineffective because the lightly armed officers with no military training rarely left 
the safety of coalition forward operating bases. However, under the new PTT concept, 
the liaison officers were paired with interpreters and a military police squad that would 
allow the IPLOs to move more freely and interact with the Iraqi police whose capabil-
ity they were supposed to be building.94 To meet this increased requirement for mil-
itary police, MNF-I requested an additional five military police companies to join the 
two brigades already deployed for the mission. The arrival of nearly a brigade’s worth 
of National Guard military police made the total in-theater military police contingent an 
extremely large one for the Army’s low-density military police corps, but also made it 
possible for the first time for the coalition to place transition teams with local police and 
not just the special police. At the same time, to restore the crumbling local police stations, 
MNSTC-I would oversee $425 million in building and renovation contracts. This effort 
was complicated because many police stations were merely leased from private owners 
who, in some cases, took advantage of the upgrading of their property to raise the rent, 
sell the renovated facilities, or release them to higher-paying tenants.95
Like the local police, the Interior Ministry’s Department of Border Enforcement would 
receive heightened MNSTC-I attention in 2006 as well. The plan to grow the number of 
border transition teams (BTTs) from 15 to 26 was adjusted to reflect heightened concerns 
with Iranian malevolence.96 Because a steady drumbeat of intelligence in late 2005 and 
early 2006 had warned of Iranian involvement in explosively formed penetrators (EFP)
smuggling and sectarian violence, MNF-I and MNSTC-I leaders decided that most of the 
new BTTs would deploy to the Iranian border, previously largely without any coalition 
presence, though the new teams would not be in place until the spring.97
As these initiatives were getting underway, MNSTC-I and the Interior Ministry con-
solidated the originally Sunni-majority Special Police and the Shi’a-majority Public Order 
Brigades in April 2006, shortly after their lackluster performance in Operation SCALES 
OF JUSTICE. The amalgamated police units were rebranded as “National Police” bri-
gades, with each of the two formerly separate elements forming a National Police division 
headquarters under the Ministry of the Interior.98 In mute testimony to the increasingly 
dangerous security environment, MNSTC-I decided to outfit the National Police units 
with heavy weapons such as RPK and PKM machine guns and rocket-propelled gre-
nades, an effort that paralleled a similar program to issue each Iraqi Army battalion eight 
mortars, eight DShK heavy machine guns, 10 SVD sniper rifles, and 10 RPGs.99
These new armaments for the National Police and Iraqi Army represented a further 
reversal of the coalition’s original 2004 plan not to provide heavy weapons to Iraq’s secu-
rity forces. They also highlighted an underlying conundrum that had bedeviled the coa-
lition’s advisory mission from the start. On one hand, MNSTC-I and MNF-I planners 
intended that the Iraqi police would eventually perform the true rule of law functions of a 
democracy: investigations, arrests, and processing the accused through a criminal justice 
system. On the other hand, realists in both headquarters knew that such techniques were 
not what Iraq needed in the midst of an insurgency and intense civil violence. Providing 
Iraqi police units with only handcuffs, Glock pistols, and fingerprinting kits was likely 
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to result in dead policemen. As a result, the coalition was effectively training and equip-
ping the police as paramilitaries capable of conducting counterterrorism and counterin-
surgency operations, a fact at cross purposes with the goal of creating police on the beat 
performing rule of law functions.
The addition of transition teams for the local police and border forces added to the 
already complicated picture of provincial reconstruction teams (PRT), special police tran-
sition teams (SPTT), military transition teams (MiTT), and several varieties of special 
operations forces deployed across Iraq. In theory, these elements would follow the guid-
ance of battle space–owning commanders and synchronize their activities with the com-
mander’s intent. However, in reality, the growing array of advisory organizations made 
maintaining unity of effort within the coalition’s brigade and division areas of responsi-
bility even more difficult than before.
THE RETURN OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL PETER W. CHIARELLI
Amid the escalating sectarian violence and new campaign plan of spring 2006, most 
of the U.S. tactical units and their headquarters were rotating out of the country, meaning 
that in many places newly arrived units were 
the ones dealing with the deteriorating security 
situation. In January, Thurman’s 4th Infantry 
Division took over responsibility for Baghdad 
from Major General William “Fuzzy” Webster 
and the 3d Infantry Division. In late Febru-
ary, Major General Richard Zilmer and I MEF 
replaced Major General Richard Huck’s II MEF 
as the headquarters for MNF-W. Unlike pre-
vious Marine rotations, the I MEF headquar-
ters was restructured so that the 1st Marine 
Division headquarters did not have to deploy, 
thereby reducing redundancy in the Marine 
command structure as well as the number of 
Marines deployed.100 In a break with Marine 
doctrine, for the first time in the war, a MEF 
would directly command two Marine RCTs 
and an Army BCT without any intermediate 
layer of command. Also in February, Colonel 
Sean MacFarland’s 1st Brigade, 1st Armored 
Division, a legacy brigade, replaced Colonel H. 
R. McMaster’s 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment 
in Tel Afar.
Within this series of handovers, Lieutenant 
General John Vines and his XVIII Airborne 
Corps relinquished duties as MNC-I to Lieu-
tenant General Peter Chiarelli and V Corps on January 19. Chiarelli’s return to Iraq came 
little more than a year after leaving Baghdad as commander of the Army’s 1st Cavalry 
U.S. Army photo by Specialist Kelly McDowell 
(Released).
Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli, 
Commanding General, 
V Corps/MNC-I.101
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Division and handing responsibility for the city to Webster and the 3d Infantry Division. 
Chiarelli had left Baghdad in early 2005 deeply concerned that the U.S. Army’s culture 
was leading its tactical units to take far too violent an approach to their operations and to 
view their role too narrowly in the fluid counterinsurgency campaign. In Chiarelli’s judg-
ment, it was fairly easy for U.S. brigades to focus on the security component of the cam-
paign, especially the capturing and killing of the armed resistance. However, he believed 
an overreliance on this approach was unnecessarily fueling the insurgency. In a widely 
circulated Military Review article in summer 2005, Chiarelli voiced his frustration along 
with his prescription that the Army should embrace the full spectrum of operations. “It 
is no longer sufficient to think in purely kinetic terms,” he wrote, “executing traditionally 
focused combat operations and concentrating on training local security forces works, but 
only for the short term. In the long term, doing so hinders true progress and, in reality, 
promotes the growth of insurgent forces working against campaign objectives. It is a lop-
sided approach.”102
Arriving in Baghdad in January 2006, Chiarelli set about establishing a “focus on 
improving Iraqis’ quality of life,” emphasizing more precise and measured kinetic 
responses, the improvement of economic conditions, and the provision of basic services 
to the Iraqi population.103 As he published his first MNC-I operations order in April, he 
also encouraged his units to reduce what he saw as their overreliance on raids and to 
focus more on the non-lethal methods he believed would lead to more enduring results.104 
Echoing the approach he had taken as MND-B commander when he organized his divi-
sion to deliver “SWET” (sewer, water, electricity, and trash) services, Chiarelli aimed 
to have MNC-I’s political and economic development efforts catch up with its security 
efforts. It was a sharp break from previous commanders who had accepted the impor-
tance of pursuing all the lines of effort but had generally believed that putting money or 
effort into political and economic development before the security situation had stabi-
lized was folly. Chiarelli, by contrast, believed that the fastest way to stabilize the security 
situation was through economic development. “It is absolutely ludicrous, this concept 
that somehow you have to get to that level of security that will allow commerce to occur,” 
he told reporters in mid-2006.105
In his first few months in command, Chiarelli became more certain that the Army’s 
culture required adjustment toward the non-kinetic factors of counterinsurgency. He was 
cognizant of the increasing sectarian violence in spring 2006, but also convinced that U.S. 
units’ missteps were contributing to the insurgency and violence, particularly in escala-
tion of force incidents in which a perceived threat to coalition troops resulted in the death 
or injury of civilians. Chiarelli’s headquarters monitored these incidents closely, and Chi-
arelli himself believed that decreasing the number of escalation of force incidents was 
not only a moral imperative but also a necessary step that would stop some Iraqis from 
joining the insurgency.106 A study on such incidents commissioned by Chiarelli imme-
diately after he arrived validated his suspicions, concluding that “CF [Coalition Forces] 
escalation of force casualties against Iraqi civilian population far exceed the threat posed 
by them.”107 The study also found that 81 percent of escalation of force incidents occurred 
during coalition force movement under conditions that gave Soldiers and Marines very 
little time—often only seconds—to make life-and-death decisions on whether approach-
ing Iraqis were a threat.108 As a result, most escalation of force incidents resulted in 
549
THE IRAQI CIVIL WAR COMES INTO THE OPEN, JANUARY-JUNE 2006
coalition forces firing on Iraqi civilians: of the 4,492 incidents recorded between January 
2005 and January 2006, only 67 (1.5 percent) actually involved insurgent attacks.109 Con-
vinced that some units were acting too aggressively, Chiarelli was predisposed to react 
strongly when, over the first few months of his command, allegation after allegation of 
violations of the laws of armed conflict and the rules of engagement landed on his desk.
The Hadithah Killings
Barely a month after taking command and just as sectarian violence was about to 
escalate in central Iraq, Chiarelli was confronted with evidence supporting his belief that 
systemic problems in U.S. military culture were creating an overemphasis on kinetic 
operations. When Chiarelli learned that Time Magazine planned to report allegations that 
Marines had deliberately killed 24 civilians in Hadithah the previous November, Chiarelli 
quickly opened an investigation, which was initiated on February 12. The allegations 
were disturbing, and Chiarelli judged that, if true, they had the potential to do as much 
damage to the coalition’s interests as the Abu Ghraib scandal. The story did not take long 
to emerge under investigation. In the aftermath of an improvised explosive device (IED) 
attack that destroyed a High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and 
killed a Marine, the remainder of the Marine squad killed the occupants of a passing civil-
ian vehicle and then systematically cleared nearby buildings, using grenades for forced 
entry and shooting the unarmed civilian residents in the head, chest, and back.110 None of 
those killed had been found with weapons, and the dead included elderly Iraqis, 76- and 
66-years-old, and children, 3-, 4-, 5-, 10-, and 15-years-old.
The initial MNC-I investigation, completed on March 9, highlighted “inadequate and 
untimely” reporting of the killings through the chain of command, which led Chiarelli to 
open a second investigation and refer the case to the Naval Criminal Investigative Service 
based on the possibility of criminal misconduct.111 The initial Marine report of the inci-
dent filed in November had been highly inaccurate, blaming the IED blast for the deaths 
of 15 civilians and indicating that eight insurgents had been killed in the aftermath of the 
ambush, despite considerable evidence to the contrary. An Army Regulation (AR) 15–6 
investigation by Major General Eldon Bargewell, MNF-I’s director of operations, com-
pleted on June 15, did not find evidence that the Marine chain of command had attempted 
to cover up the incident. However, it did conclude that Marine leaders had displayed a 
lack of interest in investigating the massacre and had created an atmosphere in which 
“civilian casualties, even in significant numbers, [were viewed] as routine and as the nat-
ural and intended result of insurgent tactics.”112 Bargewell determined that the Marines’ 
training on the rules of engagement (ROE) and the law of armed conflict (LOAC) had 
been adequate, but that the command climate from platoon through MNF-W levels “may 
not have consistently or professionally encouraged the disciplined application of ROE 
and LOAC.”113 He also recommended that “the USMC [should] determine if the com-
mand climate and philosophy of RCT-2 and subordinate units could have been a contrib-
uting factor in the misapplication of tactical firepower” during the Hadithah incident.114
While Chiarelli and his command were still digesting the initial Hadithah inquiry 
and initiating a formal investigation into the incident, similar crises were developing 
elsewhere. On April 26, in Hamdaniyah, seven Marines and a Navy corpsman from 3d 
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Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, allegedly executed an Iraqi civilian and placed an AK47 
and shovel next to his body to provide justification for the shooting.115 By June 21, the 
week after Bargewell completed his Hadithah report, those involved in the execution 
were charged with murder, kidnapping, conspiracy, larceny, and providing false official 
statements.116
General Chiarelli and Colonel Steele
The next incident occurred on May 9 during the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Divi-
sion’s Operation IRON TRIANGLE near Muthana in Salahadin Province, in which mem-
bers of Company C, 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, executed three detainees and 
tried to cover up the killings. The ensuing investigation raised questions in the mind 
of Chiarelli about the command climate and the aggressiveness of the entire brigade. 
The commander of that brigade, Colonel Michael Steele, had commanded a Ranger com-
pany during the “Black Hawk Down” battle in Mogadishu in 1993, and from that experi-
ence, he had drawn the lesson that his Soldiers above all else must be prepared to fight a 
determined enemy. Steele had employed this lesson during his brigade’s predeployment 
training, emphasizing the skills necessary to kill the enemy and offering unit commem-
orative coins to Soldiers who had achieved confirmed “kills” of insurgents.117 Steele had 
also banned the practice of firing warning shots, a decision which stood in contravention 
of the rules of engagement for the Iraq theater of operations.118 As investigators delved 
into the Company C incident, they discovered that members of the company had kept a 
running tally of the number of kills they had accumulated and that other Iraqi civilians 
had been killed during the operation.119 
Command Sergeant Major Comacho (left), Colonel Steele (right). Source: U.S. Army photo by Captain 
Amy Bishop, 133rd Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (Released).
Command Sergeant Major Vincent Comacho and  
Colonel Steele of 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.120
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For Chiarelli, the most significant element of the case was the investigation’s revela-
tion that, in briefing his unit immediately before Operation IRON TRIANGLE, Steele had 
told his troops that all the military-aged males on a small portion of the operation’s objec-
tive were to be considered enemy combatants and therefore could be killed without the 
step of positively identifying an enemy posing a threat. Chiarelli feared that Steele’s guid-
ance reflected broader problems within the brigade and that Steele’s command climate 
had contributed to wanton killings. Steele had based his justification on an interpretation 
of the ROE that allowed enemy personnel that had been declared enemy combatants, 
including AQI, to be killed simply based on their status, regardless of whether they were 
making hostile acts. This was the same ROE, for example, that the coalition had applied 
after declaring JAM enemy combatants during the 2004 uprisings. Steele had applied his 
ROE interpretation to the portion of his brigade’s objective in which intelligence reports 
indicated that enemy personnel from AQI were present. But MNC-I investigators con-
cluded later that this interpretation had confused many of the Soldiers and leaders in the 
assault force, who concluded that the entire operation was being conducted according 
to status-based rules allowing enemy personnel to be shot on sight. The MNC-I investi-
gation also concluded that Steele’s interpretation had been reached “after a tortured and 
convoluted reading of the ROE.”121 However, a parallel investigation by the 101st Air-
borne Division into the brigade’s command climate diverged from MNC-I’s assessment, 
concluding that:
although the command climate had the potential to contribute to a 3 BCT soldier being more likely 
to use deadly force in a situation where he or she is authorized to do so under the applicable ROE 
[Rules of Engagement], it is apparent that the brigade commander’s comments and actions did not 
result in a command climate that encouraged illegal, wanton, or superfluous killing. Some 3 BCT 
officers, however, clearly felt that it did.122
After reviewing these opposing viewpoints, Chiarelli concluded that Steele’s com-
mand climate had contributed to the incident, and the MNC-I commander ordered the 
Criminal Investigation Division to open an investigation of Steele on charges of derelic-
tion of duty, obstruction of justice, and making a false official statement.123 Contributing 
to Chiarelli’s decision was an MNC-I review that determined that of MNC-I’s 14 bri-
gades, Steele’s brigade had produced the most friendly fire incidents (instances in which 
U.S. troops fired on other U.S. forces or Iraqi forces) and second-most civilian casualties, 
resulting in 15 investigations in less than 6 months.124
From Steele’s perspective, a series of early interactions with Chiarelli had already gone 
badly, leaving the MNC-I commander with a negative picture of Steele and his brigade. 
Most significantly, as U.S. leaders hailed the first meeting of the newly elected Council 
of Representatives on March 16, that political news had been overshadowed by interna-
tional coverage of a combined air assault that Steele and his brigade had conducted with 
Iraqi troops in Salahadin Province that morning. Operation SWARMER, as Steele’s bri-
gade had called it, was the largest air assault mission since the beginning of the war, with 
almost 2,000 Soldiers from the 3d Brigade, along with hundreds of Iraqi troops, assault-
ing into a 26-kilometer-by-14-kilometer square area near Samarra in search of insurgents 
and weapons caches just as the new Parliament was being seated.125 A senior officer later 
recalled that Chiarelli, upon learning of the mission, angrily commented, “The President 
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just called me up and wanted to know what SWARMER was and how come it was the 
lead in the paper.”126 Frustrated by the lack of information operations coordination that 
created a distraction from the more strategically significant political events in the capital, 
Chiarelli and other senior coalition leaders in Baghdad had angrily reproached Steele. 
The perplexed Steele had replied that no one had warned him to delay operations during 
the opening of the Parliament and that his operation had been a combined U.S.-Iraqi 
operation acting on information that Zarqawi himself might be present in the area.127
After receiving the Operation IRON TRIANGLE and command climate investigation 
reports a few weeks later, Chiarelli initially decided to relieve Steele for what he con-
sidered an “unacceptable command climate” and for what Chiarelli considered Steele’s 
failure to report the suspected killings when he first learned about the incident. The relief 
action progressed far enough that MNC-I drafted a press release on what would have 
been the first removal of a U.S. brigade commander in Iraq.128 But after MNC-I’s legal 
experts did not recommend relief, Chiarelli settled on issuing a general officer letter of 
reprimand for creating a command climate “where irresponsible behavior appears to 
have been allowed to go unchecked.”129 Part of Chiarelli’s motivation for punishing Steele 
was to deliver a message to the force. A senior Chiarelli aide later recalled, “I think the 
way that he reprimanded Colonel Steele he thought was both appropriate from a military 
discipline point of view, but also from the point of view of signaling to the rest of the 
force the organizational impact. That [doing] this was not okay, and this is not how we 
should be doing business.”130
The Weight of MNC-I’s Investigations
While Chiarelli was still fully engaged in the investigations of Operation IRON TRI-
ANGLE and Colonel Steele, yet another incident came to light. The event had originally 
happened on March 12 when four Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 502d Infantry Regiment, 
raped, murdered, and burned the body of a 14-year-old Iraqi girl and then killed the 
remainder of her family in Yusufiyah, a rural town south of Baghdad. The crime would 
finally become known in June when insurgents captured and executed two Soldiers from 
the same unit in apparent retribution for the murders.
Faced with successive alleged incidents of crimes by his own troops, Chiarelli decided 
to invest a significant amount of his time and energy into their investigations and con-
sequence management. The MNC-I commander himself spent nearly 30 days review-
ing and studying the incidents and personally presented the Hadithah report to Casey 
during a 2-hour briefing in July. The incident warranted his personal attention, Chiarelli 
later recalled, because:
. . . looking back at [Lieutenant General] Sanchez’s issue with Abu Ghraib . . . I did not want to be 
put into the position that I think Sanchez was put into. He basically took recommendations from a 
written report that he did not have the time to sit down and read. So I looked at all of the evidence, 
rightfully or wrongfully. . . . I was doing that to protect General Casey to make sure that this thing 
got a thorough review by everyone and we did not just sign off on it.131
Yet the investigations would reveal a philosophical fault line between Casey and Chi-
arelli. As the investigations mounted, Casey concluded that Chiarelli was spending too 
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much time personally focusing on them, given the breadth of his responsibilities as MNC-I 
commander. Like Chiarelli, Casey believed the incidents were morally reprehensible and 
should be investigated and prosecuted fully, but he did not share Chiarelli’s judgment 
that the problems with interpreting the rules of engagement cut deeply or systematically 
across the force. Nor did he agree with Chiarelli’s view that the incidents were having a 
significant impact on the coalition campaign.132 Instead, Casey became concerned about 
the potential impact the investigations were having on the vast majority of Soldiers and 
Marines who were conducting their operations professionally. “There was a constant 
patter about why were there so many investigations,” Casey recalled later. “The troops 
and the captains were saying, ‘what the heck, everything we do gets investigated’.”133 
The two commanders’ sharp differences of opinion came to a head during Chiarelli’s 
presentation of the conclusions of the Hadithah investigations, with Casey venting his 
frustration about his subordinate’s focus, according to Chiarelli’s recollection.134
The investigations and MNC-I’s responses to them also revealed deep philosophical 
fault lines about the proper conduct of the war, with the operational-level command on 
one side and some tactical units such as the 101st Airborne Division on the other. “The 
story of Colonel Steele and Operation Iron Triangle is about a fundamental difference 
of opinion about how to prosecute the war in Iraq,” Brigadier General Michael Oates, 
one of the 101st’s assistant division commanders, noted later.135 Many of the 101st lead-
ers believed Chiarelli’s emphasis on restraint at the tactical level simply did not make 
sense in the less urbanized, insurgent strongholds in northern Iraq. They had bristled 
during Chiarelli’s initial visit to the 101st headquarters in Tikrit in late January, when 
the MNC-I commander had, among other things, discouraged the division from using 
artillery counterfire against insurgents firing mortars and argued that it was counterpro-
ductive in civilian areas. The interaction had left Oates and other 101st leaders convinced 
that Chiarelli did not appreciate the character of the conflict in Tikrit, Samarra, and other 
areas that had been the heart of Saddam’s regime.136 For his part, Chiarelli was convinced 
that “there was a cultural issue as the Army was struggling to understand [the] nonlinear 
battlefield. . . . They did not understand the balance of kinetics and non-kinetics and how 
it could change things.”137
To win in Iraq, Chiarelli believed he had to adjust U.S. units’ ingrained focus on kill-
ing the enemy, which he considered a vestige from the Cold War era of interstate conflict 
unsuited to an environment where identifying the enemy was extremely challenging, and 
the reality of who was actively fighting on the side of the insurgents seemed to change 
on a near-daily basis. In Steele, the MNC-I commander believed he recognized the dia-
metrically opposite view, and Steele agreed. In Steele’s view, Chiarelli’s emphasis on 
reconstruction was “a fundamental failure to understand the threat in Iraq. . . . We will 
never win [Iraqis’] hearts and minds. We are fundamentally in tension with their culture. 
And we can give them every dime of taxpayer money, we can build them every project in 
the world, and we will still not win their hearts and minds.”138 For Steele and those who 
shared his views, presence patrols and reconstruction projects would not solve Iraq’s 
problems, and they argued instead that aggressively pursuing and killing enemy organi-
zations “led to fewer dead Americans” and greater operational success.139
By late spring 2006, Chiarelli had decided to take broad steps to suppress the point of 
view that Steele represented. Under Chiarelli’s guidance, MNC-I began using the Army 
Criminal Investigation Division to investigate escalation of force incidents, with a view 
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to reduce those incidents by restraining liberal interpretations of the ROE. In cases where 
Criminal Investigations Division investigators believed they had discovered credible 
information that Soldiers had committed a crime, those individuals were “titled,” a pro-
cess that involved Soldiers or leaders having their fingerprints collected, their mugshots 
taken, and their names added to the Defense Clearance and Investigations Index and 
Army Crime Records Center databases, where they would remain for a span of 40 years 
regardless of the investigation’s eventual outcome.140 The measure appeared to some 
subordinate commanders to be heavy-handed because the databases were often used in 
civilian employment decisions, military promotion and selection boards, and clearance 
reviews.
At the same time, Chiarelli directed all MNC-I units to conduct reinforcement training 
on what he considered the core warrior values, changed the procedures for following 
up on events that triggered command notifications, and prohibited use of the term “mil-
itary-aged males” because it could desensitize U.S. troops “to the distinction between 
insurgents and male noncombatants.”141 In writing to Marine leaders in the wake of the 
Hadithah investigation, Chiarelli also recommended a broader counterinsurgency train-
ing regimen, noting that units “were very comfortable with kinetic operations, but less 
so with the complexities of counterinsurgency operations, in which the support of the 
population is essential to success.”142 Inside Iraq, MNC-I’s core warrior values training 
reflected Chiarelli’s concerns that a small number of individuals were tarnishing the rep-
utation and the accomplishments of the broader coalition through criminal acts and vio-
lations of the laws of war. This group, Chiarelli believed, tended to view every Iraqi as 
the enemy, contemptuously refer to them by names such as “Hajji,” and to presume “that 
because we are at war, the rules that normally govern their conduct don’t apply.”143 The 
MNC-I training packet included discussions of military values and integrity as well as 
training vignettes that covered different situations coalition members might encounter. 
While several of the scenarios covered innocuous subjects such as whether to handcuff a 
detainee in front of his family or the use of female Soldiers to search female Iraqis, one of 
the training scenarios was a close approximation of the Hadithah incident in which a unit, 
having taken casualties in an IED attack, had to respond to its leader’s pronouncement, 
“I think the guy in the window with the phone is the trigger man. Engage him.”144 Par-
ticipants were then quizzed about what they would do in such a situation, with attached 
teaching points emphasizing that immediately engaging was wrong, and stressing the 
ROE and the requirement to positively identify targets as threats before engaging all part 
of Chiarelli’s objective of rebalancing the kinetic and non-kinetic activities of many Army 
and Marine units.145
THE NURI AL-MALIKI GOVERNMENT
As the coalition struggled internally with the question of their forces’ tactical pos-
ture, Iraqi politicians jockeyed for position in the process of forming the new Iraqi Gov-
ernment in the aftermath of the December 2005 elections. Many American officials had 
hoped that Adel Abdel Mahdi, the senior SCIRI candidate, would secure the Shi’a UIA 
bloc’s nomination for Prime Minister. However, in a secret ballot of UIA Members of Par-
liament on February 12, he lost by one vote (64 to 63) to Ibrahim al-Ja’afari, who benefited 
from the support of the 30 Sadrist Members of Parliament.146 After the political turmoil 
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and sectarian infiltration of the government that had occurred under Ja’afari’s year-long 
premiership, however, U.S. leaders were unwilling to support his return. Kurdish parties 
and powerful Shi’a politicians joined the United States in opposition to Ja’afari’s candi-
dacy, creating an extended lame-duck period that frustrated Iraqis and coalition leaders 
alike.147 The hiatus between governments effectively froze coalition efforts to improve 
the Iraqi political environment and the capacity of the government, with “no focus and 
reform of ministries [and] no purging” of sectarian actors, as MNF-I intelligence director 
Zahner later termed it.148
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki (left) and Ninawa Governor Kashmoula (right). Source: U.S. Army photo 
by Sergeant Dennis Gravelle, 138th Public Affairs Detachment (Released).
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki Arrives at Forward Operating Base Diamondback in 
Mosul With Ninawa Governor Duraid Kashmoula.149
The frustration in Iraq’s political stagnation reached to the highest levels of the U.S. 
Government. On March 25, Bush wrote a letter to Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, at least in 
part with the hopes that the Shi’a leader could spur the government formation process 
along. After praising Sistani’s restraint in the wake of the Samarra bombing, President 
Bush emphasized what he viewed as joint Iraqi-American goals, writing:
Like you, I am deeply concerned about the slow pace of government formation and hope for rapid 
progress in the coming days. . . . Working together, we want to help build a democracy that respects 
the principles of majority rule with a respect for minority rights, as provided in Iraq’s constitution. 
Iraq needs a strong, effective Prime Minister to lead it at this turning point in history. . . . Iraq needs 
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a Prime Minister who can unite the nation . . . we would not support a Prime Minister who cannot 
garner the necessary support across communities to meet the constitution’s requirements and thus 
would not be capable of leading a united Iraq.150
Bush concluded his letter hoping that Sistani would use his influence to encourage Iraq’s 
leaders to take brave and decisive steps to demonstrate their commitment to a strong, 
unified Iraq.151
On April 20, Ja’afari finally acceded to the pressure to give up his candidacy and 
placed his support behind Nuri al-Maliki, a senior leader in Ja’afari’s Da’wa Party whom 
Khalilzad had quietly encouraged to seek the premiership.152 Two days later, Parliament 
took the required first step of electing a president—Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 
leader Jalal Talabani—and two vice presidents, paving the way for Maliki’s nomination 
as Prime Minister.153 When the UIA took another vote for premier after Ja’afari’s with-
drawal, Maliki defeated Mahdi by the same 64 to 63 vote that Ja’afari had won 10 weeks 
earlier, with the same Sadrist support. 
Nuri al-Maliki grew up in a small, middle-class neighborhood near Karbala, 121 
kilometers south of Baghdad.154 He was heavily influenced by his grandfather, a tribal 
leader and Shi’a cleric who participated in Iraq’s 1920 uprising against the British; and 
his father, an Arab nationalist who sided with the military against the Ba’ath Party after 
the 1963 coup.155 After earning a bachelor’s degree in theology and a master’s degree in 
Arabic, Maliki worked in the government education department in Hillah and had con-
vinced the department’s senior Ba’ath Party officials that he was a Ba’athist sympathizer, 
even as he secretly worked within the outlawed Da’wa Party.156 He had joined the Da’wa 
Party in 1970 and remained a member as Saddam cracked down on the party in the mid-
1970s. When the crackdown intensified at the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war, Maliki fled 
to Syria, where he established a network of Da’wa activists from Iran to Beirut.157 He left 
Syria for Iran in order to fight against the Iraqi regime in 1982 but eventually returned to 
Syria to oversee the Da’wa Party newspaper published there and to become an important 
political operative. In Damascus, he formed close ties to the Syrian regime of Hafez al-As-
sad, including to Assad’s senior security strategist, Mohammed Nasif Khayr-Bayk, and 
reportedly took part in planning militant operations focused on assassinating Saddam.158 
Following the U.S. invasion, Maliki returned to Iraq, where he became a senior Da’wa 
Party Member of Parliament.
On May 20, the Iraqi Parliament approved Maliki’s premiership and a council of min-
isters that included 8 Sunnis, 7 Kurds, 21 Shi’a, and 1 Christian.159 With a parliamentary 
support base composed of more Sadrists (30) than members of his own Da’wa Party (28), 
Maliki found himself reliant on Moqtada Sadr first to form and then to maintain a gov-
ernment. As a result, the Sadrists gained cabinet posts as the Ministers of Health, Trans-
portation, and Agriculture.160 The Sadrists’ powerful role within Maliki’s cabinet would 
have far-reaching effects, as even the hint of support for coalition operations against Shi’a 
militias could result in Maliki’s ruling coalition falling apart.
Coalition leaders, however, welcomed Maliki’s accession to the premiership enthu-
siastically, judging him a welcome change from the indecisive, sectarian Ja’afari. Maliki 
“said all the right things,” British Ambassador William Patey recalled. “He was leading a 
government of national unity. They agreed to a national programme in May. It was based 
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on national reconciliation, national recovery, international engagement. He said all the 
right things about inclusion . . . we were quite encouraged by his steps and initial state-
ments.”161 Casey, Khalilzad, and other American leaders believed that Maliki’s govern-
ment of “national unity” could finally take action against the violence being carried out 
by sectarian actors both inside and outside the government. For MNF-I leaders, Maliki’s 
nomination in late April signaled that the coalition’s troop drawdown plan could remain 
on track. On May 1, Casey reported to Rumsfeld that the “breakthrough in the formation 
of the Iraqi Government, coupled with the continuing development of the Iraqi Security 
Forces, sets the conditions to go forward with the next force structure step . . . [an off-
ramp of two BCTs that] will result in 3,800 troops not deploying to Iraq.”162
Casey later described the heady time of the government formation as a “false bump.” 
At the tactical level, the situation continued to deteriorate as the Iraqi political par-
ties formed their unity government. On May 10, the newly elected President Talabani 
announced that 1,091 civilians had been killed in Baghdad in April, a sign that the burst 
of killings following the Samarra bombing had not dissipated at all.163 Two weeks later, 
the Iraqi Government arrested 42 soldiers from the Iraqi Army’s 16th Brigade in the Dora 
neighborhood of Baghdad who had effectively become a Sunni death squad, assassinat-
ing Shi’a Baghdadis connected with the government and even murdering their own com-
mander when he threatened to report their activities.164
As the summer approached, Casey himself was unsure of how to interpret the increas-
ing violence. Provided with an assessment of the growing number of daily attacks on 
May 31, the MNF-I commander wrote in the margin, “Attacks may be [the] wrong metric. 
Who are they against?”165 The note seemed to show that the coalition leader’s thinking 
had not yet caught up with the situation, which, by reasonable definitions, had become 
a civil war.
Negotiations With the Sunni Insurgency
The worsening violence was partly masked by signs that a significant number of 
Sunni insurgent factions were responding to MNF-I’s outreach efforts by contemplating 
a cease-fire with the coalition. The discussions of early 2006 in which Lynch and other 
U.S. officials had participated offered promise in this regard, but  in order to take the 
next steps, Casey had demanded that the insurgents demonstrate the ability to reduce 
violence locally in exchange for potential prisoner releases. Though the evidence was 
inconclusive about whether the insurgent representatives could actually deliver the con-
fidence-building measures Casey required, the months of meetings between insurgent 
and coalition representatives led to a formalized exchange of requests between the two 
groups. In a May 10 letter provided to MNF-I, a broad array of Sunni insurgent groups 
outlined 16 major demands, including the preservation of Iraq as a unitary state, the can-
cellation of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)-written transitional administrative 
law, the holding of new democratic elections to reverse the victory of sectarian parties, 
the purging of militias from the Iraqi security forces, and the recall of former Iraqi Army 
and security forces while “purging and removing bad elements who committed crimes 
against the people, as well as dishonest and corrupt elements, and referring them to the 
judiciary.”166
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The insurgent groups also called for a constitutional amendment process to cancel the 
constitution’s de-Ba’athification sections, change the planned distribution of revenues 
from natural resources, and review the federal status of the “region of Iraqi Kurdistan.”167 
The desire to amend the constitution was not just an insurgent aspiration. A December 
2005 poll had shown fully 44 percent of Iraqis supporting such a step, with the Sunni-ma-
jority provinces of Salahadin and Ninawa registering 76 percent and 78 percent support, 
respectively.168
In a final point that revealed much about the Sunni insurgents’ changing calculus, the 
May 10 letter called for “ensuring complete cooperation and coordination between Iraq 
and America in confronting the Iranian Persian presence in and infiltration into the inter-
nal affairs of Iraq . . . and combatting all official and party authorities that facilitate and 
encourage this presence and [its] blatant intervention into the affairs of our country.”169 
As one of the Sunni negotiators told Lynch, MNF-I’s chief negotiator, “General, we hate 
you. We hate the Americans. You’re occupiers. But we hate the Persians worse.”170
To the surprise of many MNF-I leaders, many of the demands of the Sunni resistance 
organizations seemed relatively reasonable, and almost all political in nature. Encour-
aged by the talks, MNF-I released nearly 3,000 detainees as part of the broader effort 
toward reconciliation in June, although amid the intensifying sectarian violence, it was 
difficult to gauge whether the insurgent groups were actually fulfilling their end of the 
bargain by ceasing attacks.171
The Zarqawi Raid
Like the positive developments coming out of negotiations with Sunni insurgents, the 
extended hunt for Zarqawi was bearing fruit. A major lead had come in January when 
Iraqi Interior Ministry forces captured Abu Zar, an al-Qaeda in Iraq operative who spe-
cialized in launching car-bomb attacks on Baghdad. Realizing his importance, other spe-
cial operations forces obtained Abu Zar’s transfer and, in turn, he provided the location 
of an AQI safe house in Yusufiyah, a city in Iraq’s “Triangle of Death” where he had met 
senior AQI leader Abu Ayyub al-Masri. After watching the safe house through intelli-
gence surveillance and reconnaissance platforms for 3 months, U.S. troops were rewarded 
for their patience in April when several vehicles arrived at the abandoned house nearly 
simultaneously. Special operations forces leaders ordered an assault force to be launched, 
and nine senior AQI members were captured, including the AQI emir of northern Iraq, 
Baghdad’s AQI media emir, and a Sufi Iraqi known simply as Allawi. Ironically, Allawi 
had previously been arrested in September 2005 and released from Abu Ghraib in Febru-
ary 2006, only to be recaptured by the special operations assault force 6 weeks later.
After 39 days in detention, Allawi revealed critical information: that an Iraqi named 
Sheikh Abd Ar Rahman was Zarqawi’s spiritual adviser and met with him weekly. Allawi 
also revealed the location of Rahman’s house. Armed with this information, other special 
operations forces shifted assets to watch Rahman’s house, chronicling his activities for 
3 weeks, noticing Rahman at times switched between multiple vehicles in one outing, a 
tactic known to be used when AQI operatives met with Zarqawi.
On June 7, Rahman again used this tactic, eventually arriving at a house in Hibhib, 
a town northeast of Baqubah and a mere 19 kilometers cross-country from the coalition 
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base at Balad. As the house in question met the profile for Zarqawi’s safe house, SOF 
leadership became convinced that Rahman was probably meeting Zarqawi. Facing the 
reality that the location of the house made it difficult for an assault force to kill or cap-
ture Zarqawi successfully, special operations leaders instead requested a lethal strike 
by a pair of orbiting U.S. Air Force F–16s. When a man matching Zarqawi’s description 
appeared on the full-motion video surveilling the target house, they gave the order to 
drop laser- and global positioning system (GPS)-guided bombs on the target and directed 
an assault force to move immediately to the site. As the members of the assault force 
arrived and secured the site, they found a grievously wounded man being loaded into an 
Iraqi ambulance. The wounded man, who would die before he could be questioned, was 
Zarqawi himself, and the long manhunt for Iraq’s most barbarous sectarian murderer 
was finally over.
To a great degree, the success was a result of three transformational ingredients for 
special operations forces: the improvement of the targeting process; the acquisition and 
effective integration of additional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets; 
and the professionalization of interrogation procedures at purpose-built temporary 
detention facilities, all of which had matured in Iraq in 2005–2006.
When Casey called Rumsfeld to inform him of the most significant kill-capture 
mission since the capture of Saddam, Rumsfeld’s initial thoughts when answering the 
unscheduled phone call from Iraq were, “Jesus Christ. . . . What the hell else could have 
gone wrong in that place?”172 The SECDEF’s response typified U.S. anxiety with the Iraq 
mission. Still, the killing of Zarqawi was undoubtedly a coalition success and the culmi-
nation of many months of hard work. Moreover, many coalition leaders hoped that the 
killing of AQI’s founder would help stem the sectarian violence that was wrecking the 
country: with the main Sunni driver for sectarian violence gone, the coalition might gain 
some breathing room to get the situation under control.
***
At the beginning of 2006, Casey and MNF-I believed that their campaign plan was 
broadly on track. Indicators of violence were down, electoral participation was up, the 
Iraqi security forces appeared to be growing in size and capability, and the Sunni insur-
gency appeared to be fracturing. As a result, Casey and his command determined to 
continue, or even accelerate, their process of off-ramping coalition combat power, con-
solidating coalition forces, and passing responsibility to the Iraqis. The bombing of the 
Askariyah Mosque on February 22 highlighted Iraq’s fragility, but in the Samarra bomb-
ing’s immediate aftermath, Casey and MNF-I mistakenly perceived only a temporary 
spike in violence, concluding that the attack had not set off a civil war and that the Iraqi 
political process could resolve Iraq’s problems. MNF-I leaders’ denials that Iraq had 
devolved into civil war were reminiscent of the coalition’s 2003 denial that an active 
insurgency had developed, and, as in 2003, MNF-I in 2006 believed the situation could 
be addressed by tactical responses—and might even provide an opportunity to showcase 
the Iraqis’ self-sufficiency. As MNF-I’s assessments grew less sanguine in spring 2006, 
Casey’s views changed to reflect his realization that the Iraq conflict had shifted from an 
insurgency against coalition forces to a new and complex war for political and economic 
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power among Iraqis.173 Despite this change, Casey maintained his belief that, as had been 
the case in Bosnia, the locals needed to solve their sectarian problems themselves, a con-
clusion that validated MNF-I’s decision not to alter its campaign plan.
At this critical juncture, the seating of a unity government led by Maliki, the killing 
of Zarqawi, and seemingly successful outreach to Sunni insurgents convinced Casey that 
the coalition might have “turned the corner.” Casey later recalled the optimism of this 
period, noting:
Maliki . . . gets the government formed at the end of May, we get Zarqawi on June 7th, and he 
[Maliki] appoints his security ministers the next day. So there is this great ground swell of good 
feeling. . . . At the beginning of June, there was a very positive sense that we had finished the UN 
process and we had an elected Iraqi Government based on their constitution, so there was a great 
sense of optimism. Their army was in good shape and the police had more work to do; but we were 
going in the right direction.174
In actuality, the shrine bombing did not mark the start of the violent power strug-
gle among Iraqis. It marked instead the point at which MNF-I’s perception of the con-
flict began to catch up with the reality that resistance to the coalition occupation was no 
longer the most significant driver of violence. The violent power struggle among Iraq’s 
ethno-sectarian groups had been sparked in earnest at least a year earlier by the forma-
tion of the Ja’afari-led government, and in truth, it had been ongoing since the fall of 
Saddam. Iraqis, by contrast, had understood the magnitude of the bombing, recognized 
how quickly the situation was unraveling, and behaved accordingly. The summer of 2006 
and the sectarian violence that it would unleash would upend Casey’s thesis and chal-
lenge the core philosophy and assumptions of the coalition’s strategic plans, setting the 
campaign on a completely new direction.
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CHAPTER 20
BAGHDAD BURNS, SUMMER-FALL 2006
In the weeks following the Samarra mosque bombing, General George W. Casey, Jr., 
had believed the violence that followed the attack would subside, especially as a result of 
combined security operations, the seating of the new Nuri al-Maliki government, and the 
June 7 death of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. As the new Maliki 
government began to organize itself in the early summer, the coalition’s victory against 
AQI’s top leadership would prove short-lived. By the early summer, violence in central 
Iraq was increasing steadily. Operation SCALES OF JUSTICE had been insufficient to 
halt the killing, both because of a flawed concept and because the Iraqi Government had 
not managed to reinforce the Iraqi security forces (ISF) in Baghdad as it had agreed to do. 
What slowly dawned on coalition leaders in the summer of 2006 was that Baghdad had 
descended into a self-sustaining cycle of communal violence, part of a larger conflict in 
which Shi’a and Sunni militants attempted to cleanse the population of the opposite sect 
from vital terrain inside and around the city. The promising election period of December 
2005 had given way to one of the worst years in Baghdad’s modern history.
TACTICAL RESPONSE IN BAGHDAD: OPERATION TOGETHER FORWARD
As the situation in central Iraq worsened through the spring and early summer, 
Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF-I) looked to reduce violence while continuing its 
planned withdrawal. While Operation SCALES OF JUSTICE had failed to achieve its 
goal of reducing violence in Baghdad during the politically uncertain government for-
mation period of April and May, coalition leaders believed a renewed security operation 
under the newly seated government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki had much better 
chances of success. Accordingly, as Casey prepared in early June to return to Washing-
ton to brief President George W. Bush and the National Security Council (NSC) princi-
pals on the Iraq campaign’s progress, Maliki and his coalition counterparts announced 
a new phase of the Baghdad Security Plan. On June 14, the Prime Minister declared that 
Operation TOGETHER FORWARD would commence immediately following the con-
clusion of SCALES OF JUSTICE.1 In all, nearly 50,000 troops in 48 Iraqi and coalition 
battalions would take part: 13 Iraqi Army battalions, 25 Iraqi National Police Battalions, 
and 10 coalition battalions comprised of 21,000 Iraqi Police, 13,000 Iraqi National Police, 
8,500 Iraqi Army soldiers, and roughly 7,200 coalition forces.2 These troops would aim 
to implement a “clear, hold, build” concept in Baghdad, with the Iraqis in the forefront 
and assigned the most difficult tasks.3 While coalition forces partnered with Iraqi troops 
would “clear” Baghdad neighborhoods, the Iraqi police were expected to “hold” the 
cleared areas and the Iraqi ministries and local governments to “build,” with coalition 
assistance.4 MNF-I’s guidance for the operation emphasized transitioning authority to 
the Iraqis, directing coalition forces to “accelerate the transition from SCALES OF JUS-
TICE to Iraqi Police Lead–Interim Provincial Authority to enable the continued formation 
of the Government of Iraq.”5 The operation envisioned an end state in which Iraqi police 
forces would lead security operations in the Karada Peninsula and begin to take the lead 
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in Rusafa, Adhamiya, Sadr City, and New Baghdad. Operation TOGETHER FORWARD 
also involved the implementation of emergency antiterrorism and weapons control laws. 
Security measures included an increased number of checkpoints and patrols, a citywide 
nighttime curfew, and targeted raids against terrorist networks.6
It became apparent throughout the summer, however, that the Iraqis lacked the capac-
ity for either “holding” or “building,” especially with a police force and ministries that 
were themselves embroiled in the sectarian war.7 While some Iraqi forces were capable 
of clearing and holding territory, they tended to lack the will to do so in areas where the 
troops had no sectarian, tribal, or political ties. On the ground in Baghdad, Operation 
TOGETHER FORWARD focused on Sunni and mixed-sect neighborhoods suspected of 
being support zones for AQI and other Sunni militants. Under Maliki’s instructions, the 
predominantly Shi’a National Police were charged with leading the security initiative, 
while the Iraqi Army and coalition forces played supporting roles.8
Operation TOGETHER FORWARD was typified by large-scale clearing operations 
that yielded little intelligence, roiled the population in Baghdad’s Sunni neighborhoods, 
and largely ignored areas controlled by Shi’a militias such as Sadr City and Sha’ab.9 As 
Sunni areas were cleared, they were often left without any lasting security arrangement, 
so that, in many cases, the local Iraqi inhabitants were under greater danger of sectarian 
killings after U.S. forces had cleared an area than before. Ten days into the operation, 
an MNF-I periodic review noted that “Sunni citizens continue to fear MOI [Ministry of 
the Interior], JAM [Jaysh al-Mahdi], and Badr death squads. High profile (intimidation) 
incidents continue. JAM continues assassinations. Adhamiyah, Dora, Mansour still key 
areas of violence.”10 Media coverage had caught on to the ineffectiveness of the opera-
tion, MNF-I officers noted, with “civil war” replacing the term “reconciliation” in most 
reporting, and numerous reports concluding that “[the] Baghdad Security Plan is failing 
and not protecting.”11
In addition to Operation TOGETHER FORWARD’s lopsided focus on Baghdad’s 
Sunnis, serious shortcomings in the ISF’s performance quickly emerged, especially as 
the operation settled into a system of checkpoints across the city. In east Baghdad, Col-
onel Thomas Vail’s 4th Brigade, 101st Airborne Division noted that police checkpoints 
“required constant supervision” and that, when attacked, National Police outposts tended 
to respond by firing outward in all directions in a “death blossom” without discriminat-
ing among their targets.12 The Iraqi police seemed willing to emplace checkpoints, but, in 
some cases, these became places to identify Sunnis for killing. Iraqi police also searched 
mosques that they believed to be insurgent safe havens and weapons caches. Mosque 
searches were considered a critical metric for MNF-I throughout Operation TOGETHER 
FORWARD and one that MNF-I spokesmen frequently cited.13 However, as Vail later 
recounted, mosque searches by the Iraqi police while coalition forces waited outside 
rarely produced results, and only “with rare exception were we able to trust the results 
of a mosque search.”14
The Shibboleths of Baghdad
The technical deficiencies of Operation TOGETHER FORWARD were many, but 
there were other important reasons for the security forces’ failure to stem the violence in 
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Baghdad. First and foremost, the violence by summer 2006 was intercommunal, with var-
ious neighborhoods and suburbs of the capital in a chaotic state of sectarian war. Bagh-
dad’s nine districts were battlefields on which Sunni insurgents and Shi’a militias preyed 
upon each other’s populations. The city’s civilians were caught between two warring 
sides, with sectarian violence altering their daily lives during what became the deadliest 
summer of the Iraq War.
One early sign of the sectarian violence was the appearance of what Iraqis called the 
“mejhool”—unidentified bodies that were dumped into the Tigris River or left in vacant 
lots in contested neighborhoods such as Dora. By mid-2006, parts of the river had become 
a graveyard as murder victims were dumped in the river and left to float downstream. 
Those found downstream were often stripped of identification, blindfolded, handcuffed, 
or with gunshot wounds to the head. Local police in the town of Suwayrah south of Bagh-
dad reported in fall 2006 that they had collected 339 bodies of men, women, and children 
from the river since January 2005, but that number likely represented just a fraction of the 
dead. “We used to fetch them out,” one local fisherman told reporters, “but now there are 
so many we leave them. Otherwise, there would be no time for fishing.”15 In early May, 
Iraqi President Jalal Talabani announced that more than 1,000 Iraqis had been killed in 
Baghdad alone during the previous month, signaling that the capital had become the 
most violent place in Iraq.16
MNF-I officers began using the term “extrajudicial killing” (EJK) to label the wave 
of largely sectarian murders and death squad activities sweeping Baghdad throughout 
the spring and summer of 2006. As the number of these killings mounted, Casey began 
receiving regular updates from his staff on this new category of violence. MNF-I analysts 
quickly discovered that a great deal of the killing was being carried out by Shi’a militia 
groups that operated either with impunity or with the tacit approval of the local police. 
In one instance in May, a coalition unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) recorded militia mem-
bers in the act of carrying out extrajudicial killings at a JAM compound in Baghdad, and 
Casey thought the incident important enough to show newly appointed Prime Minis-
ter Maliki as evidence that his government needed to rein in the militia. Maliki, after 
viewing the videotape and demurring for several days, asked Casey not to raid the JAM 
compound and not to release the tape publicly, arguing that doing so would “start a sec-
tarian conflict and make it worse than it is now.”17 Having tracked the rise of these types 
of murders over the course of the 3 months following the Samarra bombing, Casey’s 
staff reported on May 23, 2006, that they were having an impact on the overall security 
situation.18 
For many Baghdadis, the most dangerous locations in the city were the many check-
points the police and army had emplaced as part of the Baghdad security plan. In some 
instances, Iraqi security forces allied with JAM used the checkpoints to divert Sunnis to 
secondary checkpoints—manned by militia death squads—on side roads or behind con-
crete walls where Sunnis could be abducted or shot. A similar system of false checkpoints 
for purposes of abducting and murdering Shi’a Baghdadis sometimes sprang up in Sunni 
areas of the capital and the surrounding belts. As the danger from the checkpoints grew, 
many of Baghdad’s residents began employing dual identities just to get around the city. 
Commuters began carrying two sets of identification cards, one with Shi’a information 
and the other with Sunni information, that would allow them to pass through the ISF 
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or militant checkpoints they were sure to encounter on their way. Parents also began 
instructing their children to carry two different identity cards, complete with backsto-
ries for each identity, to give to police or militants who might stop them on their way to 
school. Baghdadis who traveled throughout the city by car even learned to play Sunni 
or Shi’a music, or to hang Sunni or Shi’a symbols from their car mirrors, as they moved 
through different neighborhoods.19
Throughout the early summer of 2006, Sunni suicide bombers continued to target 
Shi’a mosques and markets in Baghdad and beyond. On June 2, a suicide bomber, prob-
ably dispatched by AQI, killed 33 people in Basrah, demonstrating that the terrorist 
group was capable of reaching Iraq’s far south. Back in Baghdad, on June 17, a suicide 
bomber with explosives hidden in his shoes attacked the Buratha Mosque just before 
Friday prayers, killing about 10 people and wounding dozens more in the second major 
attack against the mosque in 2 months. According to Major General Mehdi Gharrawi, a 
notorious National Police commander in the capital, the bomber had detonated a suicide 
belt while praying among other worshippers. Following the attack, the mosque’s leader, 
Jalaladin Saghir, a senior member of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in 
Iraq (SCIRI), placed the blame on AQI members he claimed were targeting leading Shi’a 
clerics in order to “restore some respect after the killing of al-Zarqawi.”20 Despite the 
massive security crackdown in the city as part of Operation TOGETHER FORWARD, 
attacks on Shi’a mosques, holy sites, and neighborhoods became part of daily life as AQI 
and its supporters waged a bloody sectarian war in Baghdad’s streets.
The Iranian Regime’s Destabilizing Role
Another major factor complicating operations like TOGETHER FORWARD was the 
fact that the Iranian regime was playing a destabilizing role in Baghdad and central Iraq. 
In the months after the Samarra mosque bombing, evidence mounted of the Iranians’ 
involvement in promoting Shi’a-on-Sunni sectarian violence and in prosecuting attacks 
against U.S. troops. The situation was problematic enough for General John Abizaid to 
write Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld on May 8, 2006, about the extent 
of Iranian involvement in anti-coalition violence, a report that Rumsfeld shared with Sec-
retary of State Condoleezza Rice and National Security Adviser Stephen J. Hadley the 
following day.21 An increasingly concerned Casey was determined to share this knowl-
edge with Maliki so the new Prime Minister could be persuaded to do something to stop 
it. Casey concluded that the Iranians had two goals in Iraq: first, to establish a friendly 
government by providing political, economic, and security assistance to Iraqi Shi’a allies; 
and second, to impose political, economic, and human casualty costs on the United States 
in order to deter future American military actions against Iran.22 Thus, the Iranian regime 
had an interest in conducting direct, lethal attacks against the United States, not just 
through Shi’a militant groups like JAM or the special groups, but also through the osten-
sibly friendly Badr Corps.23 MNF-I believed that the Badr Corps had, in fact, been trained 
by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran (IRGC) in insurgency tactics in the event 
that the Iraqi Shi’a militia might be called on to fight in a conflict with the United States 
or other countries.24 Casey’s views were seconded by Lieutenant General Peter W. Chi-
arelli and his officers at Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC-I), who on May 13 shared with 
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Casey their assessment that the Iranian regime was “supplying weapons to militia and 
extremist groups, providing safe haven, allowing smuggling of weapons and terrorists, 
and acting in such a manner in Northern Iraq that violates Iraq’s sovereignty.”25
Presenting the problem to Maliki, Casey laid out the broad lines of Iranian influence 
in Iraq, many of which, the MNF-I commander believed, undermined Iraqi sovereignty 
and independence. Iranian-sponsored groups carried out lethal attacks using explosively 
formed penetrators (EFP), Iranian camps trained Iraqi “extremists,” and the Iranians 
even provided some support for AQI. The Iranian regime also had a strong influence 
over Iraq’s Shi’a political parties, especially SCIRI, the Badr Corps, and the Sadrists, and 
was also playing a role in the northern Kurdish regions and in various southern areas 
such as Basrah. Finally, there was an extensive deployment of the IRGC inside the coun-
try, constituting Iran’s largest foreign operational presence.26 Despite Casey’s determined 
efforts to convince Maliki to confront the Iranian foreign minister at an upcoming meet-
ing, however, Maliki did little beyond privately acknowledging to Casey that Iran was 
conducting terrorism in Iraq.27
By May 24, Casey had ordered his staff to evaluate whether the coalition should 
declare the IRGC Qods Force a “hostile force” whose members could be engaged or 
arrested without previously demonstrating hostile intent, the same category into which 
AQI fell and into which JAM had fallen during the 2004 uprisings.28 The review was the 
second time in 7 months that Casey had ordered the same evaluation, and it produced the 
same results—an ambiguous legal recommendation that would make convincing politi-
cal leaders a difficult task.
Chiarelli shared Casey’s concern that the Iranian regime was apparently conducting 
a proxy war against his troops. “[A]t my level what most concerns me is [the Iranians’] 
apparent active participation in killing and maiming U.S. and coalition soldiers . . . . 
Evidence of the Iranian government in violence against the coalition seems to be grow-
ing,”29 he wrote to Casey in late May, also sharing with the MNF-I commander a summary 
of the extent of Iranian-sponsored EFP networks and the lethality of their technology. 
“The Government of Iran is pursuing a multi-faceted, interventionist policy in Iraq,” Chi-
arelli wrote, adding that “the primary purpose of their activities is to ensure that Iraqi 
policy is determined by a relatively weak, pro-Iranian, Shia-dominated, Islamist govern-
ment. . . . The secondary purpose is to either accelerate the withdrawal of Coalition Forces 
or, perhaps, to keep us tied up here and ‘bleed us white’.”30
Chiarelli also noted that Iran was attempting to manipulate Iraq’s politics, supporting 
the “formation of the UIA political alliance” which “advocated for MNF-I withdrawal.”31 
Once the UIA had come to power, the Iranian regime had “increased efforts to place 
SCIRI and Badr members . . . into senior leadership” positions, especially in the Interior 
Ministry.”32 As another means to garner influence, Iran had also given Iraq a $1 billion 
loan for reconstruction projects in Basrah and provided additional funds for schools and 
mosques in Najaf, Karbala, and Amarah.33
In Chiarelli’s view, the most pressing military aspect of the problem was the Iranians’ 
freedom of movement across the border into Iraq. “The Iranians are in at least partial con-
trol of the borders into Iraq, either through proxies or directly,” Chiarelli reported. Chi-
arelli cited the example of Zurbatiyah, where the Iranian regime controlled electricity and 
water to the Iraqi border crossing point that served as a gateway to the militia-controlled 
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city of Kut. Indeed, by August, the MNF-I J–2 had concluded, “Iran [is] smuggling weap-
ons across [the] border near Badrah [in Wasit Province]; using Iraq Ministry of Health, 
Transport vehicles (Sadrist-controlled) to transport weapons throughout southern Iraq.”34 
To address this problem, Chiarelli proposed a redeployment of U.S. forces, unconsciously 
echoing the arguments Casey had made in 2005 about protecting Baghdad by moving 
U.S. troops to the Syrian border:
I believe we should at least consider whether to adjust our own force posture to the region of the 
Iranian border. I believe that a big part of the security problem in Baghdad is originating outside 
of the city—the ratlines are coming in from both the west and the east. To help secure Baghdad, we 
may have to go after the problem at its source. We could, for example, put a battalion (or more) of 
U.S. forces near the eastern border, or establish a screen line away from the border to backstop the 
Iraqi border forces.35
Chiarelli posited that tackling the Iranian border problem might even help with the 
coalition’s Sunni insurgent problem because “Sunni insurgent elements . . . . would see 
us addressing a key concern of theirs. We might leverage a reduction in violence in the 
west and in Baghdad as a result.”36 At his level, Chiarelli planned to take measures to 
“immediately stanch the virtually unimpeded flow of people and materials” through the 
border crossing points, and to “look at whether there are particularly nefarious individ-
uals involved in providing EFP technology and expertise who we may request authority 
to target.” But these steps “would only get at a part of the problem,” he explained to 
Casey. “What we most need is a comprehensive approach that would provide Iran with 
the necessary disincentives to continuing on their current course, inhibit their ability to 
achieve their objectives, and that would get the Iraqis to defend their own sovereignty.”37
Chiarelli saw the issue of controlling the border with Iran as important enough to 
merit an internal MNC-I study to explore courses of action that would address the prob-
lem. When it was briefed to him on July 8, the study concluded that sending additional 
transition teams to support the Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement was not the 
solution, as the problem was a matter of the border guards’ corruption and ulterior 
motives rather than a lack of training. Instead, a more extensive coalition force presence 
was required to oversee the border enforcement employees and ensure they did their 
jobs to standard.38 To meet this requirement, MNC-I proposed sending up to two battal-
ions of U.S. forces, preferably motorized forces, armor, or mechanized infantry. Ideally, 
these forces would come from outside Iraq and deploy to the provinces of Wasit and 
Diyala, the areas MNC-I considered most problematic.39 In effect, Chiarelli’s officers were 
proposing to discard Casey’s military transition team (MiTT)-type approach in favor of 
the unit-to-unit partnership approach General Peter Schoomaker had advocated in 2004. 
Casey met with Chiarelli on June 14, just before the MNF-I commander was to depart for 
meetings in Washington, DC. Casey generally agreed with his subordinate commander’s 
analysis, although he made no final decisions on border security changes. In the strategic 
picture, there was little daylight between the two commanders. There were four groups 
that would have to be neutralized “to allow the Iraqis to work out the division of power 
and resources in a secure environment,” Casey believed: Iran, Sunni extremists, Shi’a 
extremists, and the Sunni Arab “resistance.”40 It was not at all clear, however, that the 
new Maliki government saw the situation the same way. Nor was it clear how far the 
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coalition itself was willing to go to shut down the Iranian regime’s proxy war. The week 
before meeting Chiarelli about the Iranian problem, Casey and his command had pre-
pared a plan to kill or capture Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani, who had made 
his way into Iraq for at least the second time in 2006. However, the U.S. commanders had 
ultimately refrained from taking action against Soleimani, allowing the Iranian general to 
enter and exit Iraq unhindered.41
GENERAL CASEY’S DRAWDOWN PLAN
Five days after the launch of Operation TOGETHER FORWARD, Casey arrived in 
Washington for high-level meetings on the state of the Iraq campaign and discussions 
on the way ahead. He had left Baghdad optimistic that TOGETHER FORWARD and the 
heavier reliance on Iraqi troops to secure Baghdad would reverse the cycle of violence in 
the city, and his presentations in Washington reflected this optimism. In separate meet-
ings with Rumsfeld and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon, Casey reported that 
the security situation would allow MNF-I to cancel the planned deployment of 2 Amer-
ican brigades to Iraq in August, resulting in a net reduction of 7,000 Soldiers.42 Like the 
December 2005 decision that also canceled the deployment of two brigades, MNF-I would 
keep one of the units, 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, at a heightened alert status at its 
home station in Germany but prepared to deploy. If the situation proceeded as MNF-I 
anticipated, Casey later told the NSC principals on June 23, the deployment of additional 
brigades could be canceled, dropping the U.S. contingent to 10 combat brigades spread 
across only 57 bases by the end of 2006. By summer 2007, the force would be reduced 
further to 7 or 8 brigades and 30 bases, and eventually to just 6 combat brigades and 11 
bases by the end of 2007.43
To justify this drawdown in the face of Iraq’s escalating violence, Casey again cited 
growth in the size and capability of the ISF and the pending transfers of provincial con-
trol to the Iraqis. Though the drawdown would incur some risk to the coalition’s mission, 
Casey emphasized that there were risks in not reducing coalition forces, too, noting that 
the proposed reductions would “create a sense of urgency in the Iraqi Government and 
its security forces” and would “continue to remove a central motivation attracting for-
eign fighters and drawing Iraqis into the insurgency.”44 Years later, Casey would argue 
that the drawdown was the best possible response to the mounting violence, noting that 
“since the fundamental problem in Iraq was over the division of political and economic 
power, and that this conflict was the root cause of the sectarian violence, the ultimate 
solution would be political and not military.”45
In the course of events, the drawdown would be temporarily postponed until Casey 
and Khalilzad could discuss its details with Maliki. Yet Casey’s drawdown plan leaked 
to the U.S. media immediately, with The New York Times publishing most of its details 
on June 24, the morning after the general concluded his briefings to the NSC. The dis-
closure of the MNF-I commander’s plans to significantly reduce U.S. combat power in 
Iraq prompted immediate criticism from U.S. observers who were watching the spike 
in violence in Baghdad. A number of prominent critics outside the U.S. Government 
charged that Casey’s drawdown plan resembled the same approach that the United States 
took to stop ethnic cleansing early in the Bosnian conflict. Such a plan avoided directly 
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challenging sectarian forces, and instead relied on American forces pulling back from the 
population, creating fire breaks to prevent the violence from spreading to surrounding 
countries while the country descended into full-scale civil war.46 American forces would 
only return when the ethnic fires had burned themselves out, and the conflicting parties 
were truly ready to negotiate a cessation of violence, often after areas had been ethnically 
“purified.”
Table 4. Iraqi Civilian Violent Deaths, January–June 2006.47
The concern over ethno-sectarian cleansing rose as the civilian casualties mounted. 
Whereas 1,778 Iraqi civilians had been killed in January, by June, the figure had risen to 
3,149, a jump of 70 percent. One week after Casey reported to Bush at Camp David that 
U.S. troop withdrawals could go ahead as planned, the United Nations (UN) estimated 
that 14,338 civilians had died violently across the country in the first half of 2006, with an 
average of 100 people dying per day in June, more than half of them in Baghdad.48
The False Hope of Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC)
One reason for Casey’s optimism about drawing down combat power was his assess-
ment that the long-stagnant effort to improve the Iraqi political situation was beginning 
to show promise. MNF-I had created a program, originally named Provincial Iraqi Gov-
ernance, but changed to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) when a staff officer noted what the 
original acronym would spell, to establish conditions to transfer security responsibility 
in the various provinces back to Iraqi control.49 When a province met the PIC program’s 
specific criteria, the coalition would withdraw its combat forces from the province and 
then transfer authority over security matters to the local Iraqi Government. Following 
the transfer, the Iraqi Army would serve only in a supporting role, and coalition forces 
would move to tactical overwatch in a nearby province, ready to assist if needed. Because 
the Iraqi police would assume responsibility for security, the coalition stipulated that 
the overall threat would have to be low, and the local Iraqi police forces needed to have 
attained a Transition Readiness Assessment level of 2, the level at which Iraqi forces were 
deemed capable of taking the lead in providing security.50 The PIC program also stipu-
lated that each Iraqi province should have a stable provincial government and should 
create a provincial joint coordination center to oversee security operations. If the Prime 
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noting that “since the fundamental problem in Iraq was over the division of political 
and economic power, and that this conflict was the root cause of the sectarian violence, 
the ultimate solution would be political and not military.”45
In the course of events, the drawdown would be temporarily postponed until 
Casey and Khalilzad could discuss its details with Prime Minister Maliki. Yet Casey’s 
drawdown plan leaked to the U.S. media immediately, with the New York Times 
publishing most of its details on 24 June, the morning after the general concluded his 
briefings to the National Security Council. The disclosure of the MNF-I commander’s 
plans to significantly reduce U.S. combat power in Iraq prompted immediate criticism 
from U.S. observers who were watching the spike in violence in Baghdad. A number 
of prominent critics outside the U.S. government charged that Casey’s drawdown plan 
resembled the same approach that the United States took to stop ethnic cleansing early 
in the Bosnian conflict. Such a plan avoided directly challenging sectarian forces, and 
instead relied on American forces pulling back from the population, creating “fire 
breaks” to prevent the violence from spreading to surrounding countries while the 
country descended into full-scale civil war.46 American forces would only return when 
the ethnic fires had burned themselves out and the conflicting parties were truly ready 
to negotiate a cessation of violence, often after areas had been ethnically “purified.”
The concern over ethno-sectarian cleansing rose as the civilian casualties mounted. 
Whereas 1,778 Iraqi civilians had been killed in January, by June the figure ha  risen 
to 3,149, a jump of 70 percent. One week after Casey reported to President Bush at 
Camp David that U.S. tro p withdr wals could go head as plann d, the United 
Nations est mated that 14,338 civilians had died violently across the country in the 
first half of 2006, with an av rage of 100 people dying per day in June, more th n half 
of them in B ghdad (Table 4).47
The False Hope of Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC)
One reason for Casey’s optimism about drawing down combat power was his 
assessment that the long-stagnant effort to improve the Iraqi political situation was 
beginning to show promise. MNF-I had created a program, originally named Provincial 
Table 4—iraqi civilian violenT deaThs, January–June 2006
Months Civilians killed % increase by month
January 1778
February 2165 21.7%
March 2378 9.8%
April 2284 -4%
May 2669 16.8%
June 3149 18.0%
Source: United Nations
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Minister declared a crisis, Iraqi military forces and coalition forces could be called back 
to restore order.51
By June, Casey had briefed Rumsfeld that 5 provinces would be transferred in July, 
7 by August, and 13 by the end of the year.52 It appeared to MNF-I leaders that the hard 
work of the provincial reconstruction teams was paying dividends and that Casey’s Year 
of the Police initiative and increased police transition teams were improving the Iraqi 
police in several provinces.
Those initial estimates proved overly optimistic. The first province would not be 
transferred until July 13, 2006, when Multi-National Division–Southeast (MND-SE) 
Commander Major General John Cooper signed the Provincial Iraqi Control agreement 
for Muthanna Province in the provincial capital of Samawah.53 With the turning over 
of Muthanna Province to the Iraqis, the 600-man Japanese military contingent that had 
focused on humanitarian assistance and reconstruction withdrew completely from Iraq, 
closing an ironic period in the Iraq War in which British and Australian soldiers guarded 
Japanese soldiers building roads and bridges under the hot sun.54 In September, Dhi Qar 
Province, also in MND-SE, became the second province handed back to the Iraqis under 
the PIC program. By the end of 2006, only one other province had been transferred to the 
Iraqis, a far cry from the heady estimates made by MNF-I in June.
The President Loses Confidence in the Transition Strategy
Throughout 2005, President Bush had supported the MNF-I campaign plan to achieve 
what he considered the two most important U.S. goals in Iraq: protecting the United States 
from terrorism, and fostering an Iraqi democracy. The elections of 2005 had appeared to 
bring progress toward Iraqi democracy, and Casey and Abizaid had bet that the forma-
tion of the new Iraqi Government would begin to stabilize the country and reduce the ter-
rorist threat as well. The President had been willing to go along with the transition plans 
as long as they brought progress toward these dual goals, but as the violence in Baghdad 
escalated, the campaign appeared to be neither reducing the terrorist threat (manifested 
in al-Qaeda in Iraq and its allies) nor securing an Iraqi democracy.55
For Casey, the violence in central Iraq and the danger to the new Maliki government 
were unacceptable, but in his view, it remained important that the Iraqis themselves solve 
these problems. Assessing the situation through his Bosnia experience, in which he had 
concluded that Americans could not resolve someone else’s intractable sectarian conflict, 
Casey believed a more forward-leaning U.S. intervention in Baghdad would represent a 
setback on the road to the ultimate goal of a self-sufficient Iraqi Government. As a result, 
he was unwilling to use a large infusion of U.S. troops to calm the situation, believing that 
any gains would be short-lived and easily reversed once the American units inevitably 
left. For Abizaid, the prospect of more U.S. troops on the ground in Baghdad was simi-
larly undesirable. Based on his reading of Middle Eastern history and his experiences in 
Lebanon in 1983, he remained convinced that foreign troops in the Arab world created 
antibodies against their presence. The more numerous and visible the foreign troops, the 
more numerous the antibodies would become. Like Casey, he also believed that Arab 
armies and governments were inclined to allow Western troops to perform their security 
tasks for them if the Westerners were willing to do so. Abizaid had long believed that the 
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proper response to the violence in Iraq was to continue reducing the American footprint 
so that those militants motivated by the offending U.S. presence would stop fighting. A 
steady withdrawal of American personnel would also press the Iraqi Government and 
its security forces to take responsibility for securing their own capital, in his judgment. 
For Rumsfeld, both Casey’s and Abizaid’s analyses rang true, and he agreed that the 
ultimate way to achieve the President’s goals was to encourage, cajole, or even coerce 
Iraqi self-sufficiency. He also added his own consideration that a heavier investment in 
the ground campaigns in both Iraq and Afghanistan would undoubtedly slow the effort 
to modernize the U.S. military into the leaner, more technologically enabled fighting 
force that he believed the United States would need to secure itself against threats in the 
decades to come.56
Over the course of 2006, however, Bush’s assessment of the situation in Iraq diverged 
from the optimistic appraisals made by his generals and SECDEF. In mid-2006, many 
observers in Washington sensed that the situation in Iraq was going awry as sectarian 
violence escalated from month to month, AQI and Iran appeared to be on the rise, and 
Iraq’s political and military elements appeared immobilized.57 The commander in chief’s 
concerns first came to a head during Casey’s return to the United States in early June. 
Speaking to military historians years later, Bush recalled that, along with the other NSC 
principals at Camp David on June 12, he had listened to Casey’s assessments of the Bagh-
dad Security Plan and to the MNF-I commander’s plans to transition security responsibil-
ity to the Iraqis, but that in smaller discussions with his closest advisers, he had decided 
that the transition strategy was not working—and that it could not work.58 Speaking later 
to NSC staffer Meghan O’Sullivan in the Oval Office after she wrote a critical memo 
questioning the validity of the strategy, Bush had asked her how her Iraqi associates in 
Baghdad were faring, and the President was struck by her reply that Baghdad’s popula-
tion had descended into a violent nightmare in which families were afraid to leave their 
own homes.59
National Security Adviser Hadley later told military historians that he, too, had heard 
Casey’s campaign progress report at Camp David and had come away with the conclu-
sion that the transition strategy was no longer capable of achieving the President’s goals. 
In a one-on-one meeting back in the White House, Hadley and Bush agreed that the 
transition and drawdown plans were not working, Hadley recalled.60 What was needed, 
Hadley suggested to the President, was a new approach, and probably new leadership to 
implement it. He asked the President for authorization to proceed quietly with a review 
of the options for changing course and to gather information from Casey and MNF-I to 
inform the strategy review. The President gave his approval, initiating what became a 
6-month process of finding a new approach to Iraq to replace the one the commander in 
chief had concluded had failed.61
By July 21, 2006, Hadley’s review was underway, with the national security adviser 
sending Casey 50 questions inquiring about the situation in Iraq and MNF-I’s plans. 
These were questions, Hadley noted, that “the President asks every day that he [Hadley] 
cannot answer.”62 Rather than review all 50 questions, the somewhat frustrated Casey 
asked rhetorically “whether the real issue wasn’t whether the change in conflict meant 
that there needed to be a change to their strategy.”63 More than 3 years into the war, the 
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President had decided to part ways with his top officials overseeing the U.S. military 
campaign in Iraq.
JULY 2006: THE SECTARIAN CLEANSING OF BAGHDAD
The wave of sectarian killings increased further in July when more than 3,400 Iraqi 
civilians met violent deaths, 1,962 of them in Baghdad alone. Meeting separately with 
Prime Minister Maliki and with the new Iraqi Interior Minister Jawad Bolani on July 8, 
Casey expressed his worry that the combined coalition-ISF operations were not slowing 
the sectarian killings.64 The July death toll led both Abizaid and Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace to comment publicly on the possibility that Iraq could 
descend into civil war.65 Within MNF-I, strategic operations director Major General David 
A. Fastabend made a similar observation that where the question of an Iraqi civil war was 
concerned, “we are at least at Harpers Ferry,” referring to the 1859 event involving John 
Brown that had presaged the coming American Civil War.66
Hours after Casey warned Maliki about the mounting violence, a bloody massacre 
confirmed his concerns. On July 8, a car bomb struck the Shi’a Zahra Mosque in west 
Baghdad, and the next day Shi’a gunmen retaliated by killing about 50 Sunni men, 
women, and children in nearby Hay al-Jihad, a predominantly Sunni neighborhood in 
the Rashid District along the road to Baghdad International Airport.67 After setting up 
checkpoints along a main commercial street in the neighborhood, the gunmen had pulled 
Sunni Arabs from their vehicles and homes, killing them and leaving their bodies in the 
streets. Neighborhood residents reported seeing the victims’ bodies in the streets with 
their hands bound behind their backs, some with gunshot wounds to their heads, others 
with bodies pierced by bolts and nails.68 In an attempt to quell the chaos, the Iraqi Gov-
ernment imposed a daytime curfew and, by early afternoon on the same day, American 
and Iraqi forces had sealed off the neighborhood. Sunni leaders accused the Mahdi Army 
of committing the killings, a charge that Moqtada Sadr deflected by calling the massacre 
a “Western scheme” to foment “a civil and sectarian war among brothers.”69
The Hay al-Jihad massacre set off a string of bloody attacks in Baghdad. In the 5 days 
that followed, over 150 Baghdadis were killed in suicide bombings, indirect-fire attacks, 
and shootings in various neighborhoods of the capital, including attacks on police patrols 
and checkpoints.70 The sectarian violence spread beyond Baghdad as well. On July 18 in 
the Sadrist stronghold of Kufa adjacent to Najaf, a Sunni suicide bomber lured a group 
of Shi’a day laborers into his van and then detonated the vehicle, killing 53 people and 
wounding 100 in one of the deadliest attacks of the year. When policemen arrived at the 
scene, bystanders pelted them with stones and demanded that JAM take over security of 
the city.71
While sectarian violence played out across Baghdad, the composition of its nine dis-
tricts underwent a significant transformation. By the end of the summer, Baghdad’s 
once mixed Sunni-Shi’a neighborhoods had become far more segregated along sectar-
ian lines. The gradual displacement of Baghdad’s population into sectarian enclaves had 
been taking place practically since the fall of the regime, but this process accelerated 
after the Samarra mosque bombing in February 2006.72 West of the Tigris, Hurriyah and 
Washash went from mixed-sect to almost wholly Shi’a in population. East of the river, 
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the neighborhoods of Sha’ab and Hayy al Basateen also went from mixed-sect to predom-
inantly Shi’a, while the Shi’a-majority neighborhoods of 9 Nissan and Rustamiyah lost 
their Sunni minorities completely. In turn, the majority Sunni Ameriyah and Ghazaliyah 
on the west side of the city lost nearly all their Shi’a residents, while al-Jihad and Dora went 
from mixed-sect to majority Sunni. In east Baghdad, the mixed-sect Fadhel neighborhood 
became a Sunni majority, while the Sunni majority Adhamiya lost its small Shi’a minority 
altogether. Meanwhile, west and south of the city, Shi’a were completely expelled from 
the Sunni-majority suburbs of Abu Ghraib and Haswah.73 With these changes, Baghdad’s 
demographic layout was changing virtually beyond recognition.
The Yusufiyah Abductions
In mid-June 2006, news broke that Soldiers of the 1st Battalion, 502d Infantry Reg-
iment, 101st Airborne Division had gang-raped and killed an Iraqi girl and murdered 
her and her family in Mahmudiyah on March 12, 2006, further poisoning Baghdad’s 
already hostile atmosphere. On June 16, in an apparent act of retaliation, AQI fighters 
ambushed three U.S. Soldiers manning a vehicle checkpoint near the Euphrates River. 
The ambushed Soldiers belonged to the same platoon as the Soldiers responsible for the 
March rape and murder.74 Hearing small-arms fire from about a kilometer away, other 
members of the platoon arrived 25 minutes later to find one Soldier’s body lying face 
down in weeds and water near an empty HMMWV and the two other Soldiers on duty 
that night missing.75 After several days of searching along the Euphrates, U.S. troops 
found the two Soldiers’ bodies bearing signs of torture, about five kilometers away near 
the defunct Yusufiyah power plant in the area known as the Triangle of Death.76 On the 
day the bodies were recovered, the Mujahideen Shura Council announced the kidnap-
ping of the two Americans, followed by a statement that the new leader of AQI, an Egyp-
tian named Abu Ayyub al-Masri (who had worked with AQI’s Ayman al-Zawahiri in the 
terrorist group Egyptian Islamic Jihad), had killed the two Soldiers himself.77
In late June, Major General James D. Thurman, the commander of MND-B, ordered 
an investigation into the March killings. On July 9, 2006, a federal court charged four Sol-
diers of the 1st Battalion, 502d Infantry Regiment, with the rape and murder of 14-year-
old Abeer al-Janabi and the murder of three members of her family.78 As the news of the 
incident spread in early July, a number of insurgent groups made retaliatory claims or 
announced revenge campaigns, calling them the “Abeer Operations.” On July 4, JAM 
declared its responsibility for the downing of a U.S. Army AH–64 Apache weeks earlier 
and promised upcoming revenge operations in Abeer’s honor.79 On July 10, the Mujahi-
deen Shura Council released a gruesome video of the mutilated bodies of the Soldiers 
AQI had captured on June 16, with an accompanying message in which a Shura Council 
member claimed the group had carried out the killings as “revenge for our sister who 
was dishonored by a soldier of the same brigade.”80 The following day, Jaysh al-Islami 
claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in the Green Zone “as a revenge operation 
for the rape and slaying” of Abeer, killing dozens of Iraqis in the area.81
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Abizaid and Casey Reverse Course
The apparent failure of Operation TOGETHER FORWARD to stem the sectarian kill-
ing in Baghdad in June and July 2006 was partly a result of the fact that MNF-I’s transition 
campaign plan was creating a shortage of U.S. troops needed to support the shaky Iraqi 
police and army in the city. Throughout the spring, Casey and Abizaid had remained 
committed to MNF-I’s drawdown plan, and Casey had continued to look for opportuni-
ties in May and June to redeploy additional brigade combat teams (BCT) early. While he 
had hoped to allow the 2d Brigade, 28th Infantry Division, PA National Guard in Ramadi 
to depart without a relieving unit, Casey had no choice but to replace the brigade with 
Colonel Sean B. MacFarland’s 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division when it became clear 
that Anbar’s capital was falling into AQI’s hands. The repositioning of MacFarland’s bri-
gade from Tel Afar would leave only one Stryker BCT in Ninawa Province, re-creating 
the conditions that had led to the province’s security collapse in 2004. In Baghdad, how-
ever, Casey went ahead with a plan not to replace Colonel Jeffrey Snow’s 1st Brigade 
Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division despite the fact that the unit was responsible 
for stemming the increasing violence in northwest Baghdad. The decision to replace the 
departing 2d Brigade, 28th Infantry Division with a brigade already deployed in Iraq 
reduced the number of brigades in the country to 14. The scheduled withdrawal of the 1st 
Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division would bring the number of brigades to 
13. When Snow’s brigade withdrew in early August, the unit’s entire area of operations 
fell under the responsibility of a lone reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition 
squadron, the 8th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel 
Gian Gentile.82
Beyond the dearth of coalition troops, SCALES OF JUSTICE and TOGETHER FOR-
WARD had cast doubt on the readiness of the ISF to take over the security missions that 
Casey and Abizaid intended U.S. troops to stop performing. In order to continue the 
drawdown and transition effort, the U.S. commanders needed to find quicker ways to 
increase the Iraqi security forces’ capabilities. In late June, Abizaid dispatched CENT-
COM’s Chief of Staff, Major General Lloyd Austin, to Baghdad to determine how best 
to strengthen the Iraqi forces. From June 20 to July 5, Austin and a team of CENTCOM 
officers dubbed the “Chief of Staff Assessment Team” (COSAT) inspected the ISF devel-
opment mission and optimistically concluded that MNSTC-I had “generated a force that 
within the next 6 months will have the capacity to completely assume the battlespace and 
transition to Iraqi Army Lead (IAL) up to brigade level throughout Iraq.”83 To achieve 
this end state, Austin and his team concluded, Casey would need to make the MiTTs 
the coalition’s main effort and take advantage of “a window of opportunity to reduce 
the presence of [coalition forces] while expanding the capabilities of transition teams as 
behind-the-scenes combat multipliers.”84
By mid-2006, however, it was not clear that Iraq and the U.S. mission there could 
afford to wait those 6 months. On July 11, Prime Minister Maliki met with Senator Joseph 
R. Biden, Jr., who told the Prime Minister that the American public was losing patience 
and that U.S. forces would not remain in Iraq for much longer. In a meeting with Maliki 
and Rumsfeld the following day, Casey laid out for the Iraqi leader his plan to reduce the 
coalition footprint by two brigades—a plan that U.S. leaders had agreed on in Washington 
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in June but had not yet socialized with Maliki. This news, coming directly on the heels 
of Biden’s dire warning, unnerved the Iraqi Prime Minister about the coalition’s commit-
ment to protect his new government.85 Maliki was anxious that the coalition was reducing 
forces, particularly in Baghdad, while sectarian bloodletting continued unabated. After 
Rumsfeld departed, Casey attempted to reassure Maliki about the impending U.S. draw-
down, telling the Iraqi leader that, because the Prime Minister was opposed to any imme-
diate reductions, Casey would “reduce the proposal from two brigades to one and move 
the additional forces into Baghdad.”86 Having been pressed by Iraqi leaders since 2004 
to hand them greater responsibility, Casey now faced the prospect of those same leaders 
resisting the transition plan. To restore the Iraqis’ comfort with the transition, Casey and 
the U.S. Embassy secured Maliki’s support for a U.S.-Iraqi “Joint Committee for Coalition 
Withdrawal,” which met for the first time just 4 days later, on July 16, with Mowaffaq 
Rubaie heading the Iraqi side.87 Rumsfeld, however, was nonplussed when learning that 
the committee had included the words “coalition withdrawal” in its title, and in a typical 
“snowflake,” the SECDEF reminded Casey that the committee’s purpose was to discuss 
the “Way Forward,” and “certainly, in the current environment” both he and Hadley 
believed a committee focusing explicitly on withdrawal “would not be good.”88
Even as he worked to ease the Iraqi leaders’ concern about the departure of U.S. troops, 
Casey began to share the Iraqis’ misgivings after another spike in AQI suicide attacks on 
the capital that resulted in cycles of Shi’a and Sunni retribution. June had seen 104 suicide 
vest attacks and 38 suicide car-bomb attacks across the country, both numbers represent-
ing the highest number of attacks since October 2005.89 Even though the suicide bomb-
ings generated significant media attention, most of the violence in Baghdad—a stunning 
93 percent according to MNF-I statistics—was due to either murders or executions rather 
than terrorist bombings. This violence, causing an average of 105 attacks against civilians 
a day, had been on a continuous, upward trend since the elections held in December 
2005.90 Facing a changed situation, Casey began to agree with the intelligence briefings 
given by Major General Richard P. Zahner, MNF-I deputy chief of staff for Intelligence, 
that posited the conflict had shifted “from a Sunni insurgency attempting to derail the 
political process and terminate an occupation to a competition among social and politi-
cal leaders . . . (and) to a struggle between Sunni and Shia extremists.”91 Zahner argued 
that the shift had begun in February 2006 and had led to a cycle of sectarian violence in 
which AQI bombings triggered JAM retaliatory violence, which then prompted further 
Sunni reprisals, all of which undermined confidence in the Iraqi Government and hurt 
reconciliation efforts.
On July 18, less than a week after hearing Maliki’s concerns, Casey wrote in an e-mail 
to Abizaid and Pace that his thoughts on force reductions had changed. “I am beginning 
to see the retaliatory efforts by the Shia extremist groups less as tit-for-tat violence and 
more as a semi-organized effort to expand geographic control into Sunni areas (primarily 
in Baghdad, Basrah, Diyala, and to a lesser extent, Kirkuk),” he explained. Consequently, 
the MNF-I commander would need “to keep more coalition troops here than I had orig-
inally intended to help the Iraqis through this.”92 In the span of just over a week, Casey 
reversed his previous stand on troop numbers and decided to extend the deployment of 
the 172d Infantry Brigade to stabilize Baghdad and Diyala; to “call forward” the 2d BCT, 
1st Armored Division from Kuwait; and to cancel all pending plans to further reduce 
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MNF-I’s force structure through the end of 2006.93 Casey made these changes grudgingly, 
noting in the same July 18 e-mail to Abizaid and Pace that:
there will never be a good time for reductions until the Iraqis reconcile the past and get on with 
the future. I firmly believe that the longer they feel they can rely on us, the longer it’s going to take 
them to find the political will to reconcile—which they must do for Iraq to move forward. The 
extra brigade will help the security situation, but it is not likely to have a decisive effect without 
the commitment from the political and religious leadership of Iraq to stop the sectarian killing—
something they are not ready to do. I also believe that we must leverage this extension of U.S. 
support to press the Iraqis into reconciliation action. Otherwise, it may actually extend the conflict 
and our timetable by allowing them to postpone their ultimate reconciliation.
In other words, Casey believed the extended presence of the U.S. military merely “post-
poned” the inevitable political reconciliation Iraqis would eventually be forced to 
undertake on their own. Casey’s view did not seem to allow for the possibility that a 
withdrawal of the U.S. military might actually undermine the reconciliation he believed 
would ultimately happen, or that the country might break into warring fragments after 
U.S. withdrawal.
On paper, Casey’s July 2006 plan to stabilize Iraq was impressive, returning the 
number of brigades in Iraq to 15 and effectively reversing his December 2005 redeploy-
ment schedule.94 In reality, however, the plan had significant challenges. First, Colonel 
Robert Scurlock’s 2d BCT, 1st Armored Division was no longer a full-strength brigade, 
as all three of its maneuver battalions had already been called forward: one to Bagh-
dad in March to support Operation SCALES OF JUSTICE, and the other two to Ramadi 
in June to reinforce Colonel MacFarland’s brigade. Thus, when Scurlock’s brigade was 
ordered to Baghdad as part of Casey’s plan, only his headquarters and some support ele-
ments remained to reinforce coalition troops in the capital.95 While this provided a badly 
needed brigade headquarters, Scurlock would command a hodgepodge of three battal-
ions from three different units with which he had not trained.96 His cobbled-together bri-
gade signified again that coalition planners in Iraq were misapplying the Army’s concept 
of modularity down to the battalion level. A second challenge came from the fact that the 
extension of the 172d Stryker Brigade came so late that nearly 400 members of the brigade 
had already returned home to Alaska, with even more Soldiers and equipment in Kuwait 
waiting to redeploy.97 Extending the brigade meant that the redeployed Soldiers needed 
to return to Iraq for another 4 months, a development that damaged morale and was 
deeply unpopular in the brigade’s home community. After the extension, Soldiers from 
the brigade grimly joked that Operation TOGETHER FORWARD had become “Oper-
ation TOGETHER FOREVER.” Nevertheless, the extension was a move that Chiarelli 
had been urging Casey to make for months, since the MNC-I commander had long since 
reckoned he needed to bring the brigade’s combat power and a large infantry contingent 
from Mosul to Baghdad to stabilize the capital.98 On August 2, 2006, a perturbed Rums-
feld wrote to Casey of his frustration over the 172d Stryker Brigade’s late-breaking exten-
sion: “[The] late request to keep the Stryker Brigade in Iraq has been unfortunate. We can 
manage the extension, but the fact they were already en route to Kuwait hurt. We have to 
do a better job looking around corners.”99
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OPERATION TOGETHER FORWARD II
Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.
Map 19. Operation TOGETHER FORWARD II, Baghdad, August–October 2006.
The 172d Stryker Brigade and 2d BCT, 1st Armored Division would form the back-
bone of Operation TOGETHER FORWARD II, MNC-I’s renewed effort to extinguish the 
sectarian fires burning throughout the capital (see Map 19). In Casey’s view, however, 
the real reinforcements needed to come from the Iraqi forces stationed outside the capital, 
something he had been unable to force Iraqi leaders to provide for Operations SCALES 
OF JUSTICE and TOGETHER FORWARD I. In an attempt to reverse this trend, Casey 
flew to Kurdistan on July 20 to press the Kurdistan Regional Government’s President 
Massoud Barzani to agree to the deployment of two majority Kurdish Iraqi Army bri-
gades from the north for the pending operation in Baghdad. With the additional U.S. 
forces and two more Iraqi brigades—5,500 U.S. troops and 6,000 Iraqis—Casey and Chi-
arelli judged the coalition could stanch the bleeding.100 The operation, which began on 
August 7, 2006, had a scheme of maneuver similar to the previous two Baghdad opera-
tions, with coalition troops doing the clearing and Iraqi police the holding, a division of 
labor that Casey still judged appropriate. “COIN [is] about getting the Police to do it,” he 
told Rumsfeld in August.101 While the Iraqi police held terrain, MNF-I would work with 
the Iraqi Government to “build” reconstruction efforts in the capital, spurring economic 
development and improving basic needs measured in employment statistics, power gen-
eration, and popular opinion. As with previous operations, TOGETHER FORWARD II 
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emphasized keeping the Iraqis in the forefront. “[T]o be successful, we will assist the 
government of Iraq in developing and sustaining a well-orchestrated security effort that 
integrates all elements of national and coalition power,” read the commander’s intent for 
the operation.102 As part of this concept, the 172d Stryker Brigade would not be given its 
own area of operations and would instead be used as a mobile strike force to assist other 
American units in clearing neighborhoods. The only significant change from previous 
efforts was Casey’s suggestion to MNC-I to construct a berm around Baghdad because “it 
had worked in Mosul, Tal Afar, Ramadi, and a number of cities in western Al Anbar.”103 
The perimeter security plan for Baghdad would become known as “Lions’ Wall”—an 
88-kilometer obstacle belt around the city that would be tied to the canals and rivers and 
would include 28 enduring checkpoints manned by Iraqi security forces.104 As before, the 
operations would involve the predominantly Shi’a National Police, the Iraqi Army, and 
local Iraqi police, with U.S. troops from Thurman’s MND-B again working alongside the 
Iraqi forces.
From the coalition perspective, TOGETHER FORWARD II was the second phase of 
an Iraqi-led operation meant to reduce sectarian violence by all sides in Baghdad. From 
the Iraqi Government’s perspective, however, it was yet another operation against Sunni 
terrorists and Ba’athist-affiliated militants. Casey’s hope that the operation would also 
target Shi’a militants quickly evaporated. When Casey pressed Iraqi leaders to authorize 
the targeting of Shi’a death squads in Sadr City in mid-August, Maliki forcefully rejected 
Casey’s proposal, accusing the U.S. general of trying to get his government overthrown.105 
The impact of the close election of December 2005, which had given the Sadrists an out-
sized role in the government, had fully materialized. With a relatively small political base 
of his own, Maliki rejected MNF-I’s target packets due to pressure from Shi’a political 
parties and pressed MNF-I to focus solely on Sunni militants. The impasse drove home 
the fact that Maliki fundamentally disagreed with Casey and the Americans over what 
constituted the main threat to security and stability in Iraq. Maliki “was scared to death 
that the Ba’athists were going to come back,” Casey later recalled, and the Iraqi leader 
saw the Sunni resistance and the possibility of a Ba’athist return to power as a far more 
pressing danger than the Iranian regime and its proxy militias.106 He was less troubled 
about the potential for a sectarian civil war, he told Casey on August 14, because “civil 
war [is] easier to deal with than the Ba’athists.”107
The disconnect between U.S. and Iraqi objectives was not the only problem. As the 
172d repositioned to Baghdad, the two additional Iraqi Army brigades from the north 
once again failed to materialize, meaning TOGETHER FORWARD II continued to rely 
heavily on the predominantly Shi’a police forces already in the city. These units, some 
of which were heavily infiltrated by Shi’a militia members, created a counterproduc-
tive dynamic in the Sunni neighborhoods that were the focus of the operation. Their 
aggressive cordon and search tactics, along with their tacit partnership with roving Shi’a 
militants, alienated Sunnis and created the perception that U.S. troops were sanctioning 
their use by partnering with them. The Shi’a ISF units were capable of conducting clear-
ing operations but showed little inclination to secure Sunni neighborhoods against Shi’a 
militias.108
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Major General Thurman (left). Source: U.S. Army photo by Specialist Karl Johnson,  
363rd Public Affairs Detachment (Released).
Major General James D. Thurman, Commanding General, 
4th Infantry Division Meets With Assad Altaee Abu Guilal, the Governor of Najaf.109
For the first weeks of the operation, MNF-I did not fully register these shortcomings, 
partly because coalition leaders continued to emphasize the transition of battle space to 
Iraqi control as a measure of success. At an MNF-I commanders’ conference on August 
19, Casey told his assembled division commanders and general officers that 75 percent 
of the ISF was in the lead in their areas of operations, and that by December, he antici-
pated 90 percent of Iraqi Army divisions would be in the lead and seven or eight more 
provinces transferred to Provincial Iraqi Control.110 TOGETHER FORWARD II was the 
third effort to clear Baghdad, Casey told the coalition generals, and “this one needs to 
be successful.”111 A few days later, on August 25, Casey assured Rumsfeld that the Iraqi 
capital would quickly transition to full ISF control.112 He reported the same to the visiting 
Iraq Study Group (also known as the “Baker-Hamilton Group”) in late August, and when 
asked, assured group members that MNF-I had enough forces for its mission. Violence in 
the capital was down 50 percent over the last 6 weeks, he reported to the visiting digni-
taries, though this figure was juxtaposed awkwardly with an internal MNF-I report the 
same day that casualties had risen 21 percent over the previous week and that MND-SE 
was the only sector of the country not seeing an increase in violence.113 Reviewing a year’s 
worth of attack trends 4 days later on August 29, MNF-I officers told Casey that AQI was 
still “capable of sustaining suicide attacks for 10 weeks before undergoing [a] reconstitu-
tion period.”114 The growing disparity between actual trends and MNF-I’s expectations 
did not sit well with Rumsfeld, who remarked to Casey on August 31 that the planned 
dates to transfer provinces to Iraqi control seemed to continually “slip” because of secu-
rity conditions, so much so that he required the general to start reporting the originally 
planned schedule so the SECDEF could understand the reasons for the slippage.115
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As September came to an end, the sectarian violence that coalition leaders had expected 
TOGETHER FORWARD II to resolve continued to climb, with the last week of the month 
the deadliest of the war by several measures.116 Instead of improving conditions in Bagh-
dad, TOGETHER FORWARD II was winding down with a higher level of violence than 
when the operation had begun. “The results of Operation TOGETHER FORWARD II are 
disheartening,” the Iraq Study Group report would later note. “Violence in Baghdad—
already at high levels—jumped more than 43 percent between the summer and October 
2006.”117 As if to punctuate the operation’s failure, in the 2-day period of October 9–10 
alone, Iraqi troops found 110 gunshot-riddled bodies in Baghdad.118 As had been the case 
with Operations SCALES OF JUSTICE and TOGETHER FORWARD I, U.S. troops could 
clear areas relatively easily, but the sparse coalition units would then move on to clear 
other areas, leaving the cleared battle space to be held by Iraqi units that often had sec-
tarian objectives or were incapable of stopping Shi’a militias from carrying out killings 
in the cleared neighborhoods. In many cases, insurgents who could track the progress of 
the sequential clearing operations around the city were able to leave neighborhoods in 
advance of cordons and searches and simply trickle back in once U.S. troops had moved 
on.
The Problem of the National Police
Casey and MNF-I had begun 2006 with high hopes for the Iraqi Interior Ministry and 
its forces, billing it as “the Year of the Police,” but of the ISF units that participated in the 
three failed iterations of the Baghdad Security Plan between April and October, the police 
were the most problematic. Among the police, Baghdad’s National Police units stood out 
for their ineffectiveness and sectarian behavior. Rather than “holding” cleared areas, the 
National Police in many cases became actively involved in sectarian purges and large-
scale arrests of Sunnis.119 To a great extent, National Police units had been infiltrated 
by sectarian commanders and militia-affiliated foot soldiers, many of whom had been 
absorbed into the Interior Ministry under the oversight of SCIRI Interior Minister Bayan 
Jabr. Compounding the problem was the fact that portions of the Interior Ministry’s intel-
ligence and targeting apparatus in 2006 remained under the control of Bayan Jabr’s Badr 
Corps ally, Bashir Nasser al-Wandi, the sectarian militant who had run the infamous 
torture center in the Jadriyah bunker discovered by U.S. officers in 2005.120 Though impli-
cated in numerous cases of torture, Wandi—known by the nom de guerre “Engineer 
Ahmed”—continued to direct Interior Ministry units during the Baghdad Security Plan 
operations, undermining MNF-I’s goals by using the operations as a cover for sectari-
an-cleansing death squad activities.
The Interior Ministry itself had been undergoing further sectarian “purification,” with 
many Sunni and non-sectarian Shi’a officers purged, usually based on false pretexts. Some 
of the purging reached levels that triggered MNF-I reactions, as when Major General Ali 
Ghaleb, a Shi’a Turkoman from Tel Afar, was dismissed from his position as director of 
the Iraqi Police Service for alleged ties to the Ba’ath Party. Ghaleb’s dismissal prompted 
Casey to write a letter to Maliki, noting that Iraq was in a critical period of transition and 
reconciliation and that Ghaleb should be reinstated because he was “a loyal servant of 
588
THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR
the people of Iraq.”121 Despite the official appeal from Casey, Maliki did not act on the 
request.
The Interior Ministry and the National Police had also been implicated in a second 
instance of detention facility abuse uncovered by U.S. forces in May 2006. The scale of the 
torture, which took place at a location known innocuously as “Site 4,” exceeded that of 
the Jadriyah bunker. When a bilateral U.S. and Iraqi team conducted a no-notice inspec-
tion of the facility run by the 1st National Police Division on May 30, they found 1,845 
detainees, including 38 juveniles, crammed into a facility designed to hold no more than 
750.122 In addition to horrendous overcrowding and unsanitary conditions, the investiga-
tors found widespread evidence of torture and abuse, including a heavy hoist and chain 
device used to lift handcuffed detainees by their wrists while they were beaten and tor-
tured, at times with electric shocks. Blood splatters marred the floor underneath the hoist. 
The juveniles, the inspectors determined, were systematically raped by the guards, with 
other detainees volunteering to the investigators that they often “heard children being 
raped at night.”123
By early July, 3 weeks into Operation TOGETHER FORWARD I, MND-B Com-
mander General Thurman and his subordinates concluded that the sectarian behavior of 
the National Police had become a serious problem.124 For instance, U.S. military advisers 
noted that members of the 1st National Police Division’s 2d Commando Brigade—infa-
mously known to Iraqis as the “Wolf Brigade”—would conduct proper neighborhood 
searches when U.S. Soldiers were present, but would later return at night to kidnap or kill 
Sunnis and sometimes burn their houses.125
Meanwhile, 2d National Police Division Commander Major General Mehdi Gharrawi 
was acquiring a brutal reputation, with dozens of witnesses reporting his direct involve-
ment in torture and murder, sometimes allegedly torturing prisoners with his own 
hands—charges for which U.S. leaders would demand the Iraqi general’s prosecution 
the following year.126 In west Baghdad, U.S. commanders saw the results of Gharrawi’s 
handiwork. As Lieutenant Colonel John Norris’s 4th Battalion, 23d Infantry—from the 
recently extended 172d Stryker Brigade—moved into the Bayaa neighborhood near Bagh-
dad International Airport, they were immediately confronted with a sectarian murder 
they referred to as the “Meat Market Massacre.”127 On October 1, gunmen in camouflaged 
uniforms abducted 22 Iraqis from a Sunni-owned meatpacking plant in Rashid District, 
and although most of the victims were later executed, a few survivors lived to tell the tale. 
Days later, while searching a field that American troops called “Dead Man’s Corner,” 
Soldiers from Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Peterson’s 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment 
in nearby East Rashid found seven of the victims, one of whom was still alive and gave 
enough information to pinpoint an execution site. At that site, U.S. troops recovered bullet 
casings apparently from the Glock pistols used by the National Police. The Americans 
quickly determined that those responsible for the murders were most likely the 8th Bri-
gade, 2d National Police Division, men under Gharrawi’s command.128 As a result, Norris 
expelled the battalion of the 8th Brigade believed responsible for the “Meat Market Mas-
sacre” from Bayaa and requested that the Iraqi Army provide a replacement force since 
the Army was more respected in the community. Nevertheless, another National Police 
battalion assumed responsibility for the area instead; a decision Norris understandably 
feared was “only going to make the situation worse.”129
589
BAGHDAD BURNS, SUMMER-FALL 2006
Abuses like these were not limited to the National Police. Throughout Baghdad, espe-
cially on the western side, both the National Police and the local police were involved 
in sectarian violence. JAM members and other Shi’a militiamen coordinated with police 
at local checkpoints as a means of carrying out sectarian murders, a practice that was a 
common feature of the violence engulfing Baghdad. Driving through a police checkpoint 
was “like Russian roulette,” one Sunni told reporters in September 2006.130 “Shi’a death 
squads leveraged support from some elements of the Iraqi Police Service and the National 
Police who facilitated freedom of movement and provided advance warning of upcom-
ing operations,” a November 2006 Department of Defense (DoD) report observed.131 In 
the Dora neighborhood, 4th BCT, 4th Infantry Division reported on November 5 that 
police attacks against Sunni locals were prompting a violent response:
This past week the NP [National Police] conducted a unilateral raid to detain a target. . . . The local 
nationals believed that this was a militia led unauthorized raid due to the lack of coalition forces. 
As a result the local nationals in the area began to defend themselves and attacked the National 
Police. This incident has further impacted the trust the local nationals have for the National Police. 
. . . [they] believe that the NP are detaining people at checkpoints and are turning them over to the 
militia. They state that they do not trust going through a checkpoint unless coalition forces are on 
the checkpoint with the NP. They continue to state that they do not trust the NP and IP and assert 
that they are undisciplined, corrupt, and that they only see the [local Iraqi police] and NP detain 
Sunni[s]. They say that the Sunnis that are taken are beaten and tortured during interrogation and 
show up beaten to death.132
Pressed by Sunni locals in October about how to tell good police from bad, one Iraqi po-
lice colonel admonished that Baghdadis should not open their doors to any Iraqi police-
man “unless he is accompanied by an American soldier.”133
These dynamics had significant implications for the MNF-I campaign plan. On August 
25, Casey had warned Rumsfeld that MNF-I might have to invoke Leahy Amendment 
restrictions and cease U.S. support for the National Police divisions in the near future.134 
Named for its sponsor, Senator Patrick Leahy, the 1997 law stipulated that the U.S. mil-
itary and Department of State could not provide assistance to foreign security forces if 
U.S. officials concluded that those police units were guilty of “gross violations of human 
rights.” That American officials were contemplating invoking the amendment in the fall 
of 2006 attested to just how much had changed since the “year of the police” had been 
announced at the start of the year.
THE WAR OF THE MINISTRIES
After the frustrations of dealing with the government of Ibrahim al-Ja’afari in 2005, 
Casey, Khalilzad, and other coalition leaders had placed great hope in the seating of 
the new Maliki government in June 2006. Abizaid, in particular, believed a 4-year gov-
ernment of more permanent ministers and a Parliament elected by almost 80 percent of 
the Iraqi electorate could play a stabilizing role after three transitional governments in 
3 years. For Chiarelli and MNC-I, meanwhile, the prospect of more effective ministers 
and ministries was an essential element of the plan to dissipate the country’s violence 
by non-kinetic means such as the provision of essential services and the development of 
the Iraqi economy. This concept echoed Chiarelli’s 2004 rubric of SWET: that burgeoning 
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ministries would be able to speed improvements in Iraq’s sewer, water, electricity, and 
trash systems. These improvements, Chiarelli predicted, would create economic growth 
and jobs that in turn would encourage Iraqi militants to abandon violence. Within months 
of the new government’s formation, however, signs emerged that the Iraqi ministries’ 
effectiveness in many cases was sliding backward. By fall 2006, the violence ravaging 
the streets of Baghdad had seeped into the operation of the Baghdad-based ministries as 
well, so that each major ministry became a sectarian battleground over which the same 
warring parties waged a violent struggle for control, often with ministerial staffs and 
security details transformed into a sectarian killing apparatus for the cleansing of various 
neighborhoods.
MNF-I leaders had particularly hoped the transition to a new government would 
bring a change to the sectarian, militia-infiltrated Interior Ministry. The replacement of 
former Badr Corps officer Bayan Jabr by the independent Shi’a politician Jawad Bolani 
as Interior Minister in summer 2006 seemed to offer hope that Badr’s militant influence 
within the ministry would diminish. However, little changed in the months after Bolani’s 
appointment. Despite his responsibility for the torture at the Jadriyah bunker, Engineer 
Ahmed remained in his position as the ministry’s deputy director of intelligence with 
little change to his activities, and coalition advisers as late as spring 2007 would describe 
him as the most powerful man inside the ministry. The Interior Ministry building itself 
was part of the problem: located in northeast Baghdad, the site was difficult for Iraqi offi-
cials to reach via Baghdad’s unsafe streets, and its various floors and wings were guarded 
by different political factions that kept nervous watch on each other. Though Bolani had 
been appointed to clean up the ministry’s activities, he rarely visited the building, decid-
ing instead to locate his office at the safer Adnan Palace near the Green Zone, which 
Bayan Jabr had also done before him. Indeed, though Jabr had become finance minister, 
he kept the same office he had used as interior minister and retained some unofficial lines 
of authority into the ministry, meaning that in late 2006 there seemed to be two compet-
ing interior ministers working remotely from the same palace, one a would-be reformer 
and one interested in preventing reform.135
Beyond the Interior Ministry, other ministries came under greater militant sway 
once the Maliki government’s slate of ministers took their posts. Under acting minis-
ter Shirwan al-Waeli, a Da’wa Party appointee who had once been a Ba’athist military 
officer, Sadrist loyalists began filling key posts in the Transportation Ministry, leading 
to a virtual takeover of portions of the state transportation infrastructure by the Mahdi 
Army and its allies. The Sadrists controlled the ministry’s civil aviation department, 
giving them significant power over the state-run Iraqi Airlines, and they also adminis-
tered Iraq’s seaports. More importantly, the Sadrists controlled many of the operations of 
Baghdad International Airport, including Iraq’s sky marshals and the British contracting 
company that provided airport security.
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Source: Photo by Public Relations Department, Ministry of Defence Republic of Serbia.
Hakim Zamili, Iraqi Deputy Minister of Health.136
In other ministries, the Sadrists used their new official positions to carry out direct 
attacks against coalition or Iraqi civilian targets, often in official uniforms and using gov-
ernment vehicles and identification. U.S. officers monitoring indirect-fire attacks on the 
Green Zone noted that Shi’a militiamen sometimes fired mortars from within the grounds 
of the Ministry of Agriculture, where JAM members served as security guards.137 Most 
egregious, though, was the Ministry of Health, which under Sadrist influence in 2006 
perversely became a sectarian killing machine. Deputy Health Minister Hakim Zamili, a 
senior Sadrist who had been a junior army officer under Saddam Hussein, oversaw the 
infiltration of Sadrist militiamen into the ministry’s security positions. As a result, the 
detachments meant to guard Baghdad’s hospitals in 2006 instead became sectarian death 
squads who killed Sunni hospital patients and used ambulances to ferry death squad 
members, militiamen, and weapons around the city. Zamili’s activities were so brazen 
that his fellow Shi’a deputy health minister, Da’wa Party politician Ammar Saffar, gath-
ered evidence and witnesses to build a case against Zamili and his henchmen. But on 
November 19, men wearing Iraqi police uniforms abducted Saffar and made a series of 
videos in which the captive deputy minister recited the demands issued by a previously 
unknown, allegedly Sunni militant group—all of which American officials determined 
was a ruse orchestrated by Zamili to conceal his involvement in the kidnapping. The 
videos culminated in the apparent on-camera shooting of Saffar, who, since his body was 
never found, became the highest-ranking Iraqi Government official to disappear during 
the country’s sectarian violence.138
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Assassinations and kidnappings were taking place in other ministries as well. The 
highest-profile of them took place the month before Saffar’s abduction. On October 9, 
2006, gunmen in Iraqi military police uniforms shot to death army Lieutenant General 
Amer Hashimi, brother of Iraq’s Sunni Vice President Tariq Hashimi, and the third 
Hashimi sibling to be murdered since 2003.139 The fact that Hashimi’s killers wore ISF 
uniforms was typical in that the militants and death squads of 2006 were finding it easy 
to infiltrate the ISF or to mimic them, all of which harmed the Iraqi public’s trust in the 
country’s security forces. The assassination also came at a time that coalition officers were 
noticing a sectarian shift in the Iraqi officer corps, with Sunni officers like Hashimi often 
targeted or intimidated into leaving their posts. Just weeks after Hashimi’s death, MNF-I 
judged that Shi’a political leaders in the Maliki government were seeking to impose sec-
tarian quotas in the senior ranks of the Iraqi Army in order to place politically loyal Shi’a 
officers in key positions.140
The wave of sectarian killings became problematic enough that on November 5, Vice 
President Richard Cheney’s national security adviser John P. Hannah raised the issue 
with Badr Corps leader Hadi al-Amiri during a visit to Baghdad. Amiri, whose own Badr 
Corps militia was deeply involved in the death squad activity Hannah was complaining 
about, attempted to misdirect blame to former regime members and the coalition for 
the rise in sectarianism, arguing that because MNF-I and the ISF had failed to protect 
Iraqi communities from sectarian attacks, those communities had turned to militias for 
their defense. For good measure, Amiri denied any Iranian involvement with the Badr 
Corps.141
Nine days after the Hannah-Amiri meeting, Baghdad witnessed the most audacious 
attack in the so-called war of the ministries. On November 14, approximately 50 police 
vehicles full of gunmen arrived at the Ministry of Higher Education in the Karada neigh-
borhood. Dressed in National Police uniforms, the well-organized gunmen closed off the 
surrounding streets, entered the building without resistance, and hauled away more than 
100 ministry employees in handcuffs.142 Not until several years later did Iraqi officials 
report that the gunmen had been Shi’a militiamen, likely members of Qais al-Khaza-
li’s Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, who had infiltrated the National Police. The gunmen drove their 
captives—presumably through the numerous ISF checkpoints of the Baghdad Security 
Plan—into Sadr City and sorted them by sect, executing the Sunnis and dumping at least 
16 of them into a mass grave that Iraqi authorities did not uncover until 2012.143 The 
smoothness of the operation—a huge logistical undertaking—illustrated the impunity 
with which Shi’a militia death squads could operate in the Baghdad region.
These constant pressures on the Iraqi ministries meant that by late 2006, U.S. officials 
visiting Iraqi ministries often found their Iraqi counterparts living in a state of siege, hun-
kered down in offices from which they rarely ventured out, sleeping on cots and making 
the dangerous trek back to their family homes only a few times a month. In some cases, 
ministries run by one party virtually fell out of regular contact with ministries run by 
enemy parties, with formerly routine matters such as delivering inter-ministry paper-
work—a key component of the Iraqis’ outdated paper-based system—having become 
deadly tasks from which couriers occasionally did not return. Within the larger minis-
tries, different floors or wings were often subdivided, occupied by different parties and 
secured by their respective militants, so that ministry entrances and stairwells became 
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checkpoints manned by militiamen posing as security details. In this state of affairs, 
much of the regular business of the government ground to a halt, so that ministries had 
little hope of spending their budgets, other than for personnel salaries.144 Such conditions 
precluded the possibility that the Iraqi Government could implement a successful SWET-
style reconstruction program, as Chiarelli and MNC-I hoped. As the sectarian violence 
sweeping central Iraq had moved into the halls of government, the Iraqi state, to which 
MNF-I had hoped it could soon transition responsibility, had ceased to function.
* * *
The end of Operation TOGETHER FORWARD II, in October 2006, brought with it 
signs that the coalition’s campaign plan was in serious jeopardy and that the assumptions 
underpinning the coalition’s entire transition strategy were crumbling. Neither the seat-
ing of a 4-year government nor the pulling back of U.S. troops from the Iraqi population 
had had a stabilizing effect. The killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had not slowed AQI’s 
operations. Three successive attempts at a Baghdad Security Plan had yielded more vio-
lence, not less, and the concept of “police primacy” in an Iraqi counterinsurgency cam-
paign had fallen apart as the national and local police became parties to the sectarian 
cleansing of Baghdad. The possibility that essential services and economic development 
could lead the country out of instability dissolved as the Iraqi state ministries went phys-
ically to war with one another. As the Iraqi capital’s population fell into a nightmare of 
street-to-street killings, the Iranian regime’s Qods Force used the chaos as cover to step 
up attacks on American troops and to help its proxies drive Sunnis out of the Baghdad 
region.
Against this backdrop, Casey’s and Abizaid’s plans to pull U.S. brigades out of the 
country in summer and fall 2006 became untenable, and they were compelled instead 
to reinforce a theater whose forces they had been determined to reduce. Finally, the dis-
parity between MNF-I’s projections and the hellish reality on the ground had caused the 
President to lose confidence in the strategy the coalition had been executing for 2 years, a 
development that would soon cause a furious search for a new approach.
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CHAPTER 21
HOPE IN RAMADI
As the situation in Baghdad unraveled during mid-2006, and central Iraq began to 
descend into sectarian civil war, a far different development unfolded in Anbar Province. 
After 3 years of increasing violence against the coalition and a growing consolidation of 
local power in Anbar by al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), a partnership between coalition troops 
and local Anbaris was about to challenge AQI’s grip on the province. This partnership 
would take hold despite AQI’s deep roots throughout the upper Euphrates River Valley, 
and it would involve coalition troops expanding their presence in the Ramadi area, a 
tactic that ran counter to Multi-National Force-Iraq’s (MNF-I) heavy emphasis on reduc-
ing the coalition’s footprint across the entire country.
AQI, THE COALITION, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE RAMADI TRIBES
The Anbar People’s Committee
The December 2005 elections represented a stunning political turnaround in Ramadi, 
where voter turnout had exceeded 80 percent—an extraordinary difference from the mere 
2 percent in the boycotted January election. The change represented a major success for 
Mohammed Mahmoud Latif, the Ramadi cleric and insurgent leader who had pushed for 
participation in the political process after judging that the January 2005 boycott had been 
a mistake. Latif had risked a great deal to promote voting in December, defying threats 
from Abu Masub al-Zarqawi and other rejectionist insurgents and even using his 1920 
Revolutionary Brigades fighters to ensure security at the polls.1
Having decided to vote in December, Anbaris faced the frustration of sending new 
representatives to the national Parliament but still having to deal with a provincial gov-
ernment in Ramadi that almost no one in the province had voted for the previous Janu-
ary. Aiming to build on the December election’s momentum, Latif immediately mounted 
a challenge to the members of the provincial government, especially the Iraqi Islamic 
Party (IIP), which he and other Anbari tribal leaders viewed as suspicious carpetbag-
gers. On January 1, 2006, Latif and more than a dozen tribal sheikhs and Anbari notables 
formed the Anbar People’s Committee, through which they planned to represent the 
Anbari tribes’ interests with the Iraqi Government and to form the nucleus of provincial 
military and police forces that would be under Latif‘s direction.2 Latif‘s move was a bold 
one but was at odds with Multi-National Force-West’s (MNF-W) existing political strat-
egy for the province. Viewing the unpopular provincial council as the province’s legiti-
mately elected representatives, MNF-W had given IIP Governor Mamoun Sami Rashid 
al-Alwani its full backing. Though most of the provincial council had fled Ramadi during 
the violence of 2005 and early 2006, Alwani remained, riding to the governor’s office each 
day in a coalition convoy and working under the protection of a company of Marines in 
the frequently bombarded provincial government center.3 Throughout 2006, Alwani did 
little more than survive—though he did that rather well, escaping more than 30 attempts 
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on his life.4 Still, as the representative of a political party that considered the tribes an 
anachronism, Alwani failed to win many allies among Anbaris through bravery alone.5 
Seeing cooperation with the provincial government as essential, MNF-W Commander 
Major General Richard C. Zilmer sought to alleviate the mutual disdain between influen-
tial Anbari tribes and the governor. Against this backdrop, Latif and his new committee 
offered themselves to Anbaris as an alternate government, an open rival to the IIP-led 
government that Zilmer and MNF-W were working hard to solidify.
Latif and the Anbar People’s Committee also challenged Zarqawi and his terrorist 
allies, who had been fighting for more than a year to create an extremist Islamic emirate 
within Anbar. AQI’s immediate response to the committee’s creation was to issue fatwas 
calling for the death of every Ramadi sheikh participating in it as well as to direct AQI 
and Ansar al Sunna fighters to attack the recruits the sheikhs had begun to assemble.6 
Working with Colonel John L. Gronski and 2d Brigade, 28th Infantry Division, Pennsyl-
vania National Guard, the coalition unit responsible for Ramadi, Latif and the committee 
signed up 671 Anbaris at a police recruiting drive at a local glass factory in the first days 
of January.  However, on the drive’s final day, January 5, an AQI suicide bomber killed 
56 potential recruits and Lieutenant Colonel Michael McLaughlin, Gronski’s tribal and 
police engagement officer.7 AQI followed up the bombing with assassinations of tribal 
leaders in the Anbar People’s Committee, and by January 18, 2006, more than half of 
the dozen or so sheikhs who had formed the committee 17 days earlier had been killed.8 
AQI’s murder of Sheikh Nasser abd al-Karim Mukhlif al-Fahdawi, a prominent leader of 
the Albu Fahad tribe, prompted many of the remaining committee members to withdraw 
from public view.
As the Anbar People’s Committee’s leaders went into hiding, AQI reinforced its fight-
ers in the Ramadi area and focused its attacks on Latif ‘s 1920 Revolutionary Brigades 
that had guarded polling places the previous month. By February 5, AQI had defeated 
Latif ‘s men and forced Latif himself to flee Ramadi to escape assassination. AQI’s vic-
tory over Latif and other rivals in Ramadi began a gradual shift among Anbaris away 
from the optimism that had followed Operation SAYAID and toward a neutral stance 
between the insurgency and the coalition. Many Anbar residents and the leadership of 
local groups such as the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades sought to retaliate against AQI, but 
in each instance, they were outfought and unable to oppose the group on their own.9
For some observers, the coalition’s failure to recognize and bolster the Anbar People’s 
Committee represented another squandered opportunity to leverage Anbari tribal power 
to reverse the dismal situation in the province. Major Benjamin Connable, a Marine intel-
ligence officer in Anbar, considered the Anbar People’s Committee an abortive awak-
ening like that of the Albu Mahal and the Desert Protectors in Al Qa’im the previous 
year and the efforts by Major Adam Such in 2004. Operation SAYAID had significantly 
degraded AQI in western Anbar, enough so that by the December election, Zarqawi and 
his followers were on their heels, and the Anbar People’s Committee had posed a real 
political threat to AQI.10 By killing police recruits, slaughtering the committee’s sheikhs, 
and renewing a campaign of violence throughout the rest of the winter, AQI had turned 
back the threat and emerged stronger than before.
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AQI Retakes Ramadi
With the Anbar People’s Committee out of the way, AQI immediately enjoyed greater 
freedom of movement in Ramadi and increased its attacks against coalition and Iraqi 
Government forces. During January 20-21, AQI and local fighters carried out two com-
plex attacks against the Ramadi government center and nearby coalition bases using indi-
rect fire, small-arms fires, rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), and car bombs.11 AQI also 
stepped up its shadow governance throughout Anbar, offering compensation payments 
to Iraqis whose homes were damaged by the coalition, an offer 300 families accepted.
Against this increased AQI activity, Gronski’s brigade’s practice of conducting bat-
talion-sized sweeps through Ramadi’s neighborhoods and then returning to forward 
operating bases without leaving a large presence inside the city proved ineffective, a fact 
that the brigade’s frustrated Soldiers and commanders increasingly recognized.12 Even 
so, the practice was in line with the brigade’s top stated objective of “protect[ing] the 
force,” which, as the brigade explained in briefings to General George W. Casey, Jr., it 
had ranked in priority above the objective of “defeat[ing] the insurgency”—an approach 
that ran counter to MNF-I’s goals.13
AQI fighters routinely mounted attacks against the government center from the aban-
doned buildings that surrounded it. They also moved freely around the city, skirting 
coalition checkpoints using side roads through the Sufiyah and 2d Officer districts. AQI 
leaders even set up a command-and-control center inside the Al Hajj Mosque in the city’s 
Qatana district from which they oversaw attacks. They also issued coded orders using 
selected excerpts from the Koran recited over the mosque’s loudspeakers. In their well-
planned attacks, AQI commanders used operations orders and sand tables to rehearse 
their operations and synchronize massed attacks by up to 150 fighters—equivalent to an 
infantry company-sized attack.14
With limited intelligence on AQI’s organization inside the city, Gronski responded by 
employing forward observers from the 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment to identify 
enemy targets that could be engaged by guided multiple-launch rocket systems fired 
from Camp Fallujah—a practice Gronski discontinued when he concluded the indirect 
fire was doing more harm than good.15 The situation was a curious role-reversal from 
most other coalition-held cities: in Ramadi, the coalition launched harassing fire against 
an insurgent force conducting coordinated battalion-sized maneuvers from bases inside 
the city.
By April, AQI had also taken over the city’s black market and become finan-
cially self-sufficient. In Ramadi alone, AQI grossed more than $500,000 per month on 
black-market fuel sales, which, when combined with its extensive criminal enterprises, 
produced a monthly influx of several million dollars, more than enough to cover expenses, 
acquire real estate, and make significant inroads into the provincial economy.16 These and 
similar revenues elsewhere in Iraq also allowed Zarqawi to operate independently of 
the senior al-Qaeda leadership outside the country.
The funds also kept fighters flowing into AQI’s ranks. Coalition troops killed over 200 
AQI fighters in March and April, but they were easy for Zarqawi to replace. By May 2006, 
with AQI’s financial network in place, the starting salary for an AQI fighter in Ramadi 
was the equivalent of $1,000 per month. The next highest-paying insurgent group, Ansar 
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al Sunna, paid far less at $250 per month. AQI also funded bonuses: $200 for a successful 
improvised explosive device (IED) attack, $500 to $700 for destroying a High Mobility 
Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), and $7,000 for shooting down a helicopter. 
In Fallujah, where AQI’s presence was more contested and lacked Ramadi’s financial 
sophistication, al-Qaeda fighters were paid between $190 and $380 per month.17 By the 
end of the spring, AQI considered much of central Ramadi and its outlying regions to be 
safe areas, as well as the center of its activities across Iraq.
“No One is Really in Control of the City”
As violence escalated in Ramadi in early 2006, Casey’s plans to reduce the footprint 
of U.S. forces in Iraq collided with AQI’s expansion in Anbar. In his deliberations over 
force levels with Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld in early March, Casey 
judged that the situation in Iraq had improved enough to allow for Gronski’s 2d Brigade, 
28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania National Guard to depart in June without another 
brigade to backfill it.18 Within days, however, Casey realized the situation in Ramadi 
had deteriorated with such speed that the plan to transition control of the city to Iraqi 
security forces upon 2d Brigade, 28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania National Guard’s 
departure might have become infeasible. On March 30, he issued a warning order to 
Colonel Sean MacFarland and his 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division to prepare to move 
from Tel Afar to Ramadi to replace 2d Brigade, 28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania 
National Guard in June.19 MacFarland’s brigade had replaced Colonel H. R. McMaster’s 
3d Armored Cavalry Regiment in western Ninawa only the month before, but having 
decided in December 2005 to off-ramp two U.S. brigades, Casey had to cover the insur-
gent hot spot in Anbar by uncovering another insurgent hot spot in Ninawa.
The violence in eastern Anbar touched Casey directly when mortar fire interrupted his 
April 13 meeting with Zilmer near Fallujah, killing two Marines and injuring 19 others. 
Following the incident, Casey questioned whether his Anbar consolidation plan could 
proceed without a major offensive in Ramadi.20 AQI’s 11 complex attacks against the U.S. 
and Iraqi forces in the city between April 9 and 24 seemed to reinforce these doubts.21 
Even so, as late as May 5, Casey briefed Rumsfeld that he still intended to hand Ramadi 
over to the Iraqis instead of replacing 2d Brigade, 28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania 
National Guard with another American unit. However, within 2 weeks, the MNF-I com-
mander acknowledged the need for additional resources as well as a major operation to 
reestablish control of the city. Casey hoped the plan to transition Anbar could be kept on 
track by having 2d Brigade, 28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania National Guard con-
duct a large operation in May, just before the brigade was scheduled to return home. On 
May 6, Casey met with Gronski, Zilmer, and Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli to hear 
2d Brigade, 28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania National Guard’s plan. He came away 
discouraged. The overall plan was “not imaginative,” the MNF-I commander told his 
staff afterward, adding that the plan was being executed by a unit that lacked a good 
intelligence picture, had too few forces, and “seemed to be distracted by their imminent 
departure.”22 “No one is really in control of the city right now,” Casey observed, “not the 
government, not the terrorists, not the coalition.”23
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Casey had contemplated launching a deliberate, two-brigade operation in Ramadi 
by overlapping MacFarland’s and Gronski’s brigades by a month, but the lateness of the 
decision to move 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division from Tel Afar made the idea impos-
sible. Instead, to reinforce MacFarland, who would leave one battalion behind in Tel Afar 
and already had sent another to Hit months earlier, Casey called forward two battalions 
from 2d Brigade, 1st Armored Division, the brigade that had remained in Kuwait as 
part of the theater reserve.24 With the 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment remaining 
in east Ramadi and a Marine battalion still at the Ramadi government center, the shift in 
combat power to Ramadi was  similar to MNF-I’s reinforcement of Baghdad for Opera-
tion TOGETHER FORWARD I.
Despite Casey’s assertion that “no one” controlled Ramadi, Zarqawi and AQI believed 
they had the city firmly in their control. However, AQI leaders were aware that the coali-
tion’s posture in the city was about to change. Lieutenant Colonel Ronald Clark’s 1st Bat-
talion, 506th Infantry Regiment received reports that insurgents within the city expected 
a Fallujah-like assault once 2d Brigade, 28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania National 
Guard departed. Although Clark knew an operation of that scale was not planned, he 
did nothing to correct the insurgents’ fears.25 By late May, his unit learned that some AQI 
leaders were evacuating the city in anticipation of a coalition attack, and many senior and 
mid-level AQI members gravitated to safe havens in the Jazeera area, the southern end of 
Lake Tharthar, Hadithah, and Syria.26
Zarqawi believed AQI’s greatest vulnerability lay in the Ramadi area tribal network 
that opposed his organization and at times cooperated with the coalition. Accordingly, as 
MacFarland’s troops conducted their 2-week relocation from Ninawa, Zarqawi and his 
allies met in the Ameriyah neighborhood of west Baghdad to devise ways to win or con-
trol the tribes. They planned to recruit five to ten trusted members of each tribe to report 
on tribal cooperation with the coalition and gather information about coalition activities, 
with the ultimate goal of establishing insurgent safe havens throughout the Euphrates 
River Valley from Al Qa’im to Ramadi.27 Meeting again at the Ibad al Rahman Mosque 
in Ramadi, AQI leaders also decided to instruct low-level fighters to remain in Ramadi 
and defend against the new coalition offensive with IEDs and other indirect means rather 
than fighting coalition troops head-on as they had done in Fallujah in 2004.
Casey’s guidance to MacFarland, meanwhile, had been “to fix Ramadi but don’t do 
a Fallujah,” an idea with which the brigade commander concurred.28 “That was fine 
because I didn’t have the combat power to do a Fallujah,” MacFarland recalled. “But 
I wasn’t quite sure how I was going to fix Ramadi. When we got there the enemy basi-
cally controlled the center part of the city.”29 The insurgency had inflicted significant 
damage on 2d Brigade, 28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania National Guard, which had 
suffered 82 Soldiers killed and another 611 wounded throughout their deployment.30 As 
Casey had judged the previous month, the coalition’s intelligence on Ramadi was poor. 
What was known was that insurgents controlled large swaths of the urban terrain, and 
coalition troops were attacked an average of 20 times a day.31 “[T]he read that I got was 
pretty superficial,” MacFarland recalled later. There were large parts of the Ramadi area 
to which 2d Brigade, 28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania National Guard “never went,” 
he noted, adding that “if they caught a lot of contact in an area, they just stopped going 
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there, especially in downtown Ramadi. So there were big parts of the map, I kind of 
joked, that I said were labeled, ‘Here be monsters’.”32
1ST BRIGADE, 1ST ARMORED DIVISION, TAKES OVER RAMADI
MacFarland and 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division officially relieved 2d Brigade, 
28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania National Guard on June 6, 1 day before AQI’s top 
leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed in a coalition air strike in Hibhib, near Balad 
(see Map 20).33 It was a promising beginning for 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division’s mis-
sion to expel Zarqawi’s followers from the city, but the task remained a daunting one. 
The brigade was responsible for an enormous area stretching from Lake Tharthar to Lake 
Habbaniyah in the south, about the size of the state of New Hampshire, with more than 
600,000 inhabitants.34 MacFarland’s brigade combat team (BCT) was unlike any other in 
Iraq. With five maneuver battalions cut from four different brigade-level headquarters, 
it was nearly twice as large as the legacy brigades that commanders had favored for 
their additional manpower. The brigade also was unique in its jointness: MacFarland 
controlled a Marine infantry battalion; Marine, Navy, and Air Force officers served on his 
staff; Seabee and Marine engineer platoons built his construction projects; and Navy Sea, 
Air, and Land Teams (SEALs) embedded with his rifle platoons, earning the nickname 
“Army SEALs.”35 Various contingents of special operations forces (SOF) had moved to 
Ramadi to support the coming fight, but the majority of the manpower came from a 
SEAL Task Group that had moved its headquarters from Baghdad to Anbar in April 
2006—nearly doubling the special operations contingent that had returned to the prov-
ince in 2005.36 To the SEAL Task Unit that directly supported him in Ramadi, MacFarland 
gave a simple mission: “Kill Insurgents.”37
The situation among Ramadi’s local security forces was far less encouraging. Only 120 
Iraqi policemen served the city, mostly in stations on the outskirts of town, and many of 
those were under insurgent influence. The Iraqi Army units in Ramadi were among the 
least developed in Iraq, both in size and in training. Unlike in Tel Afar, MacFarland had 
no viable Iraqi civilian authority to pair with, as Ramadi had neither a mayor nor a city 
council.38
Against this backdrop, MacFarland moved quickly to exploit the leadership vacuum 
left by Zarqawi’s death. A week after assuming control of the Ramadi area of operations, 
1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division launched a two-battalion attack from the south across 
the old rail bridge in Tamim to seize a foothold in the city. Their concept for securing the 
city amounted to a tactical reversal of MNF-I’s campaign plan: while MNF-I steadily was 
reducing its presence in Iraqi cities and concentrating its units on large forward operat-
ing bases, MacFarland would move his units into Ramadi’s neighborhoods, seizing and 
holding terrain as McMaster and Alford had done the year before in Tel Afar and Al 
Qa’im.39 MacFarland knew intuitively that even his reinforced brigade could not conduct 
simultaneous attacks to clear Ramadi as had been done in Fallujah. Instead, he would 
have to fight his way into the city one neighborhood at a time and establish mutually 
supporting combat outposts.40 This incremental approach was driven, in part, by limita-
tions in the amount of barrier materials and defensive fortifications available and in the 
number of engineers to emplace them. A single outpost would require 10,000 sandbags, 
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miles of concertina wire, and truckloads of plywood, among other sundries of supplies.41 
As his brigade reestablished control on the ground, MacFarland would partner and co-lo-
cate with Iraqi Security Force (ISF) units, rather than simply handing them responsibility 
for territory they could not secure on their own. By the end of June, MacFarland’s bri-
gade had established four new combat outposts within the city, as well as the heaviest 
troop density there since the 2003 invasion. The new coalition presence had its intended 
effect: “Within 48 to 72 hours of us setting up a combat outpost,” MacFarland observed, 
insurgents would “essentially impale themselves on it, and that is why we were able to 
kill so many.”42 Even so, with only a brigade to secure a city much larger than Fallujah, 
MacFarland’s plan would hinge on growing capable ISF units that could “thicken” the 
counterinsurgent ranks, something no unit in Anbar had been able to accomplish on a 
sustained basis.
Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.
Map 20. Battle of Ar Ramadi, June 2006-January 2007.
Patriquin, Deane, and the Tribes
Though MacFarland and 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division did not realize it in mid- 
summer 2006, their problem in generating reliable ISF would be solved by what seemed at 
the time to be a completely separate initiative: tribal outreach. Immediately after arriving 
in Ramadi, MacFarland had tasked his civil affairs officer, Captain Travis Patriquin, with 
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learning as much as possible about the Ramadi area tribes. The 32-year-old Patriquin was 
the right choice for the job. An unusual officer, he had served as an enlisted Soldier and 
had an interest in foreign cultures and aptitude for languages that had served him well 
as he accompanied special forces missions in Afghanistan. Earlier in his Army career, he 
had taken an Arabic immersion course in Jordan and had deployed to Kuwait with spe-
cial forces units. In Ninawa, MacFarland had used Patriquin as a liaison to local leaders, 
and the young captain had surprised the officers of the 3d Iraqi Division when he rose at 
a luncheon to inform them in Arabic that he looked forward to working with them. He 
had used his 4 months in Tel Afar to learn the Iraqi dialect, eventually speaking it well 
enough that, upon first meeting Patriquin, a stunned Sheikh Sattar of the Albu Risha tribe 
thought he must be speaking to an Iraqi in an American officer’s uniform. Sattar and 
other sheikhs were equally stunned by the novelty of an American officer who was fully 
versed in their cultural norms of conversation and socialization.43 Because of his person-
ality and ability to converse in Arabic, Patriquin immediately gained Sattar’s trust and 
became MacFarland’s primary interlocutor with the tribes, a weighty responsibility for a 
captain, but one that Patriquin relished.44
Colonel MacFarland (left), Sheikh Abu Risha (center), and Captain Patriquin (right). 
 Source: Photo courtesy of Amy Patriquin.
Colonel Sean B. MacFarland, Commander, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, Sheikh 
Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, and Captain Travis Patriquin.45
Along with Patriquin, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Deane, commander of 1st Battal-
ion, 35th Armored Regiment, a unit that had been called forward to Ramadi after sitting 
in Kuwait for 6 months, also began meeting with local sheikhs and securing their sup-
port for 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division’s planned police recruitment drives.46 The first 
drive on July 4 immediately came under indirect fire but succeeded in enlisting 80 candi-
dates, and much to Deane’s satisfaction, recruitment steadily grew thereafter.47 Deane’s 
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outreach paid particular dividends as he developed a relationship through the summer 
of 2006 with Ahmed Abu Risha and his elder brother Abdul Sattar, the leader of the 
Albu Risha tribe. Deane was the first coalition commander to realize Sattar’s potential 
influence in Anbar and Baghdad. The Albu Risha long had been active against AQI but 
had been overlooked in the coalition’s Sunni engagement efforts because of the tribe’s 
supposed lower-tier status within Anbar’s large Dulaim confederation.48 Sattar’s father, 
Sheikh Khamis Bezia, had been friendly with the coalition following the invasion, but 
AQI murdered him on November 6, 2004, at the outset of Operation AL FAJR for cooper-
ating with U.S. forces.49 With his father dead and his eldest brother Abdullah Bezia slain 
by AQI in August 2004, Abdul Sattar had become the head of the tribe, while another 
brother, Sheikh Bezia, had become Anbar Province’s deputy police chief after serving as 
a police commander in Ramadi. As one of the few surviving senior members of the ill-
fated Anbar People’s Committee, Sattar was well-known throughout the tribal system. It 
also was likely the coalition underestimated his influence because the Albu Risha’s con-
nections beyond Ramadi were not well-known. The previous Iraqi Minister of Defense, 
Sadoun Dulaimi, was a member of Sattar’s tribe, and Sattar’s brother Ahmed had served 
as a liaison between Dulaimi and the Albu Mahal sheikhs who formed the Desert Pro-
tectors in Al Qa’im in 2005. It was with Dulaimi’s support, via Ahmed Abu Risha, that 
Sheikh Sabah and the Albu Mahal had been able to arm the Desert Protectors.50 Sattar 
also had formed a partnership with one-time insurgent leader Mohammed Mahmoud 
Latif to seek a political solution to the violence racking Anbar, and both were determined 
not to allow a repeat of the defeat of the Anbar People’s Committee. The lines between 
the tribes and the insurgency were often hazy, and it was fortuitous for the coalition that 
the flexible Deane and Patriquin were on hand to navigate these complex ties as Sattar’s 
influence grew during the summer and fall of 2006.
1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, and AQI Collide
Two days before the successful July 4 police recruiting drive, Casey visited Ramadi 
and came away pleased with what he saw in MacFarland’s first month in the city. The 1st 
Brigade, 1st Armored Division had killed 170 insurgents and was killing between 5 and 
10 enemies per day, MacFarland reported, and to coincide with the recruiting drive, the 
brigade had seized the Ramadi hospital that AQI was using as a headquarters because of 
its dominant height within the city.51 But the brigade commander also wanted to change 
the signals Ramadi residents were picking up from the coalition. MacFarland found it 
unsurprising that Anbaris declined to take risks to oppose AQI when the coalition con-
tinued to emphasize American withdrawal. In MacFarland’s view, it was important to 
communicate that the coalition was establishing a presence in the city, that the insurgents 
would be killed, and that the Americans were there to stay, all themes that ran against 
MNF-I’s message.52
Throughout July, as 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division expanded its presence, AQI 
prepared to retaliate. On July 24, approximately 200 insurgents simultaneously attacked 
20 different Iraqi and coalition locations in and around the city, intending to destroy 
the police stations located near the North-South Bridge on the Euphrates River and in 
the peripheral tribal region, but MacFarland’s troops and Iraqi police forces repelled the 
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attacks. Three days later, AQI leaders Abu Salih al-Saudi, Abu Abdallah al-Saudi, and 
14 other AQI fighters were killed when coalition aircraft struck a meeting of the group’s 
leadership north of Ramadi, capping a costly 2-week period for AQI in which the group 
lost an estimated 65 killed, and many AQI members were forced to seek refuge in the 
city’s Tamim district.53 As 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division’s outposts and operations 
began to restrict AQI’s movement, the group changed tactics, instead, using mortar 
and IED attacks against Ramadi’s main coalition bases and the government center.54 On 
August 2, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division troops seized Anbar University, a long-
time hotbed of insurgent activity where it was estimated up to 30 percent of the students 
were involved with the insurgency, and a car bomb construction site was located on the 
university grounds.55 By August 10, MacFarland had established two additional combat 
outposts in the city, and the total of local police recruited in June and July had risen 
to 355, almost three times the number of police on 
duty when 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division had 
arrived.56 The tide was beginning to turn.
The Devlin Report
Throughout August, MacFarland’s troops con-
tinued to enjoy tactical successes, while Deane 
and Patriquin expanded their cooperation with 
the increasingly influential Sheikh Sattar, who had 
begun organizing a new assembly of tribal sheikhs 
to oppose AQI. At 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Divi-
sion’s higher headquarters, however, Multi-Na-
tional Force-West (MNF-W) officials had their 
reservations about the brigade’s tribal outreach 
and about the coalition’s overall prospects in 
Anbar. On August 17, Colonel Peter H. Devlin, the 
senior Marine intelligence officer in Anbar, pro-
duced a bleak assessment that declared the coali-
tion and ISF were “no longer capable of militarily 
defeating the insurgency in Al Anbar.”58 Accord-
ing to the report, the coalition had too few troops in Anbar to overcome the stalemate 
with the AQI-dominated insurgency there, with U.S. units mostly unable to establish 
sustainable security beyond the perimeters of their bases. In addition, Devlin concluded, 
both the central and local governments had collapsed in Anbar, leaving AQI to fill the 
vacuum and become the strongest political force in the province. In Devlin’s judgment, it 
was a situation “beyond repair.”59 The report quickly was leaked to the American media, 
where it seemed to cast further doubt on the increasingly unpopular campaign in Iraq. 
MacFarland noted, “Because Pete Devlin was sounding these cautionary notes up at the 
MEF Headquarters, it was a little bit more difficult for me to convince my bosses to come 
down and embrace the sheikhs.” He later said:
They were getting a lot of advice of, “Be careful, your job is really to support the governor. It’s not 
really to support these sheikhs. These sheikhs could go rogue on you.” I had to overcome that. 
Source: U.S. Army photo by Staff Sergeant 
Curt Cashour, Multi-National Corps Iraq 
Public Affairs (Released).
Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha.57
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Those were valid concerns. I don’t belittle them at all. But it did make it a little bit more challenging 
for me to try to make sure that the Marine leadership in Anbar understood that these guys [the 
Ramadi sheikhs] really can be trusted.60
For his part, Casey found the tone of Devlin’s report—and its widespread leak—unwel-
come and poorly timed. On September 2, Casey confronted Zilmer in Fallujah, express-
ing his disappointment in Devlin’s “defeatist” attitude. Warriors needed to have a more 
positive mindset, Casey told the Marine commander, adding that the MEF G-2 should be 
looking for AQI vulnerabilities rather than assuming the coalition could not win.61
THE ANBAR AWAKENING
The Founding of the Sahawa
Just 4 days after Devlin’s report concluding that Anbar permanently was lost, Sattar’s 
tribal alliance, known as the Anbar Emergency Council, went to war with al-Qaeda, just 
as the Anbar People’s Committee had unsuccessfully done in January. On August 21, AQI 
leaders Abu Bakr and Abu Uthman ordered an attack on the newly established Jazeera 
police station north of the Euphrates, an ISF outpost emplaced with the Albu Risha’s 
support. The attack set off a gas explosion that badly injured 6 army soldiers and killed 
11 of the 30 police stationed there.62 Rather than quit, as had often happened before, the 
Iraqi police, newly confident in their U.S. military support, insisted on keeping the police 
station open. On the same day, AQI fighters led by Rasheed Abu Zaayen, a militant who 
had been released from U.S. detention at Camp Bucca the previous day, assassinated the 
leader of the Albu Ali Jassim tribe, Sheikh Khaled Ali Albu-Jassim. A former Iraqi general 
and local political leader, Khaled had at one point cooperated with AQI leaders, but he 
and his tribesmen had become AQI’s enemies when they refused the terrorist group’s 
demand to hand over their weapons. Rather than returning Khaled’s body to his tribe for 
a proper Muslim burial, the AQI leaders left his decapitated corpse in the desert, forc-
ing the Albu Ali Jassim tribesmen to search for several days for his remains. The brazen 
attack on the tribally connected police station and the desecration of Sheikh Khaled’s 
body were a tipping point for the Anbar Emergency Council.63 Outraged sheikhs from 
the Albu Dhiab, Albu Assaf, Albu Ali Jassim, Albu Julib, and Albu Risha tribes gathered 
on August 31 to declare an anti-AQI front.64 On September 3, Deane reported to Mac-
Farland that the Anbar Emergency Council and its armed wing, the “Anbar Revolution-
aries,” were ready to side with the coalition publicly. The Anbar Revolutionaries were a 
potent group, drawing their fighters from the local police, army officers, and local tribes-
men, as well as from insurgent groups including Jaysh al-Haq, the Nu’man Brigade, and 
Mohammed Mahmoud Latif‘s branch of the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades.65
Clearly recognizing this nascent threat, AQI leaders gathered at least 850 fighters in 
the Ramadi area by summer’s end, including reinforcements from Bayji. With the addi-
tional forces, AQI launched a series of attacks in September in an attempt to regain the 
initiative, leading to spurts of fierce fighting. During one of these engagements on Sep-
tember 27, AQI fighters attempted to overrun a patrol from 1st Battalion, 36th Infantry 
Regiment in Hit. When his company commander and first sergeant were both hit, 2d 
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Lieutenant Walter Jackson rushed into the street to help them. Despite being grievously 
wounded twice, Jackson fought off the insurgents and recovered his commander, an act 
for which he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.66 Two days later in Ramadi, 
on its last mission before rotating home, a squad of SEALs performing over-watch for 
Soldiers in the city’s Mala’ab District came under intense fire. When insurgents threw a 
grenade among the SEALs, 25-year-old Master at Arms 2d Class Michael Monsoor, who 
had already earned a Silver Star earlier in the same deployment, immediately threw him-
self on the grenade, which killed him when it exploded. Saving his teammates with his 
sacrifice, Monsoor was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously.67
As battles raged across the city during September, MacFarland became convinced 
that supporting tribal groups like the Anbar Revolutionaries was the best solution for 
growing the local police who were essential for the city’s security. When he reported 
these developments to the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) headquarters, however, 
he was met with hesitation and skepticism. The Marine leaders had not discounted the 
potential for tribal negotiations but were going about it in a different manner. Many 
of the lineal Anbari sheikhs, heirs by birthright to tribal lines of succession, had fled to 
Jordan during the 1990s or after the U.S. invasion. These lineal sheikhs, while technically 
still tribal chieftains, had been replaced on the ground by other members of their clans 
who had stayed behind. Deane and Patriquin met with the tribal power brokers who 
had remained in Iraq, while the Marine leadership engaged the more detached tribal 
figureheads who were in Jordanian exile, creating a tension between two tribal outreach 
strategies that endured well into the following year. When Brigadier General David 
Reist, Zilmer’s deputy and MNF-W’s lead for engagements, learned that 1st Brigade, 
1st Armored Division had been closely working with Sattar, he told Deane that many 
at MNF-W considered the sheikh a criminal and that Deane should arrest him. “I’m not 
arresting him. You arrest him,” Deane had defiantly replied, and had been surprised not 
to receive a reprimand.68
On September 7, coalition troops captured senior AQI leader Abu Bakr on his way to 
meet Abu Uthman near Abu Ghraib, dealing the Ramadi AQI leadership a serious blow 
at a time when the tense relations between AQI and the tribes were coming to a head. Two 
days later, on September 9, MacFarland met with Sattar and 20 other sheikhs for the first 
time, with Sattar presenting the group’s 11-point platform for an Anbar “Awakening,” 
or “Sahawa” in Arabic. The sheikhs proposed manning new police emergency response 
units (ERU) with their tribesmen and declared that any further attacks against coalition 
troops would be considered assaults against the tribes as well. MacFarland immediately 
endorsed 10 of the tribes’ proposed points but opposed one in which the tribal leaders 
demanded the removal of Governor Alwani and in which they implied they might use 
force to expel him. Cognizant of MNF-W’s heavy investment in Alwani, MacFarland 
pressed Sattar and the other sheikhs to abandon their opposition to the governor for the 
time being.69
With coalition endorsement of most of their Awakening platform, on September 14, 
Sattar and 40 other sheikhs issued an Emergency Council proclamation, acknowledging 
their decision to work with the coalition against AQI in Anbar.70 The Anbar Emergency 
Council was the largest tribal organization the coalition had yet seen, consisting of 41 
sheikhs from 17 Anbari tribes, including 9 sheikhs from the powerful western Anbar Albu 
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Mahal and Albu Nimr tribes. Meeting near the Jazeera police station north of Ramadi on 
the same day they issued their proclamation, the council members voted to name Sheikh 
Sattar as the rightful governor of Anbar Province and proposed to seek Prime Minister 
Nuri al-Maliki’s support for a plan to reestablish security in the province.71 In this step, 
the Awakening had instantly become a rival provincial government, complete with its 
own alternate security structure. For the Ramadi sheikhs, Sattar was the province’s legit-
imate leader, not Governor Alwani.
The Awakening had an immediate impact on the security situation. As the coalition 
and the Anbar Revolutionaries stepped up their pressure on al-Qaeda’s networks, the 
number of insurgent attacks declined sharply by 50 percent during September alone.72 
As the Anbar Revolutionaries and the Emergency Council began to have a serious effect 
on the battlefield, they received a significant political boost as well when Iraq’s state-run 
television channel began to portray their campaign against AQI positively.73
The Tribes, Baghdad, and the Anbar Police
As the Awakening tribes came forward to form security units, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored 
Division worked to overcome bureaucratic obstacles to incorporating the tribesmen into 
Anbar’s formal security structures. The Interior Ministry and MNF-I centrally deter-
mined the number of police stations authorized in much of the country and had given 
Ramadi a cap of 11 stations. The tribes, eager to provide their men for the police force, 
recommended establishing police stations manned by tribesmen within their own tribal 
precincts, but MacFarland technically was prohibited from overseeing the hiring and pay 
of police who were not assigned to one of MNF-I’s already-designated stations. To solve 
this bureaucratic conundrum, the brigade creatively established sub-stations  in the tribal 
areas, each connected to a sanctioned station and with tribesmen brought onto the rolls 
and paid as if they were assigned to one of the 11 approved stations.74 Employing local 
men to staff these stations quickly paid off; they had a stake in securing their home areas 
and were well-positioned to provide 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division intelligence about 
insurgent networks in them.
In addition to the sanctioned police, scores of Anabari men stood ready to form 
the Anbar Emergency Council’s proposed emergency response units (ERU). To gain 
approval in Baghdad for this new source of counterinsurgent manpower, MacFarland 
briefed Casey on the ERU concept, while Sattar petitioned Interior Minister Jawad Bolani 
for support for the ERUs. On October 8, Bolani authorized two ERUs for Sattar and an 
additional one for Habbiniyah.75
The influx of tribal police recruits exceeded all expectations. The tribes quickly became 
so depleted of men because they were at police training in Jordan that the sheikhs asked 
MacFarland to pause recruiting in October until some of the recruits returned from train-
ing to guard the tribal areas. It was a good problem to have, MacFarland noted, since it 
indicated the virtual flood of Anbaris now willing to serve. The Awakening received yet 
another boost when, at Sattar’s urging, Anbar Revolutionary leader Brigadier General 
Hamid Hamad al-Shawqa was appointed Anbar police chief. Under Shawqa’s direction, 
the Anbar Revolutionaries allowed AQI fighters to surrender at the Jazeera police station, 
turn in their weapons, and not be targeted as long as they did not return to fighting.
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With the Interior Ministry’s endorsement of Sattar’s efforts and the installment of 
Shawqa as police chief, control of Anbar’s security forces was shifting into the hands of 
Sattar and the Sahawa.76 By October, the tribal movement also was becoming a political 
player, lobbying senior government officials in Baghdad for official recognition. For the 
Baghdad-based Iraqi Islamic Party, the Awakening was a clear political threat, one that 
needed to be co-opted or contained if the IIP was to retain its leadership of the Sunni 
political bloc. In response, Maliki, Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, and Governor Alwani 
attempted to form a competing tribal council of their own with IIP members. With the 
Awakening-IIP rivalry growing, on October 10, MNF-I facilitated a meeting between 
Sattar and Alwani that temporarily eased tensions, but the underlying political competi-
tion would remain a potential driver of instability.
Nevertheless, despite the looming power struggle among the Sunni factions, the 
events of summer and fall 2006 had produced an astonishing turnaround in the state of 
the ISF in the province. Filling the ranks of the 1st and 7th Iraqi Army Divisions based 
in Anbar had been an uphill battle, given the reluctance of Sunni men to risk being 
deployed to another part of the country once they had enlisted. Anbaris also generally 
did not view the Iraqi Army as theirs, considering it instead, an extension of the Shi’a-led 
central government, which they still regarded with deep suspicion.77 Unique among the 
division-sized sectors, MNF-W’s greatest gains in security force development material-
ized in the Iraqi police rather than in the army. The police in Anbar grew during Zilmer’s 
tenure, from 2006 through early 2007, from about 2,000—most of whom were posted in 
Fallujah—to 8,500.78 Police recruitment escalated in October with the infusion of Rama-
di’s tribal levies, and the rapid formation of the three battalion-sized ERUs Bolani had 
approved, but MNF-W observed progress in recruitment in every city across the prov-
ince.79 Such growth only occurred with the active support of Anbar’s tribes.
The Islamic State of Iraq
As Sheikh Sattar’s star ascended, al-Qaeda leaders sought to eliminate him as a threat. 
In early October, AQI Commander Abu Ayyub al-Masri sent Sattar an ultimatum that he 
had 1 month to pledge support for AQI or he would be killed.80 On October 16 and 22, 
vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attacks struck near Sattar’s home, 
apparently related to Masri’s effort to murder Sattar and dismantle the Awakening.
At the same time as these attacks against Sattar, AQI unveiled a new political ini-
tiative, the Islamic State of Iraq, which partly was an ideologically driven attempt to 
establish an Islamic emirate and partly a political response to the Sahawa. In September, 
Ayman al-Zawahiri instructed Masri to create the Islamic Emirate of Iraq, or Islamic State 
of Iraq (ISI), and to prove it was an indigenous organization by appointing an Iraqi leader. 
Masri chose an unknown figure with the nom de guerre, Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi, to lead 
the new “state.”81 Al-Qaeda senior leaders also ordered the new ISI to establish a Central 
Tribal Council to rival the Sahawa and unite Sunni tribes loyal to AQI, an arrangement to 
which many tribes in Anbar and Mosul agreed because it came with a promise of finan-
cial and material support. To celebrate the creation of the ISI, more than 60 AQI fighters 
defiantly paraded through still-contested east Ramadi on October 18, claiming the city as 
the capital of their new “caliphate.”82 Similar demonstrations spread across Anbar, giving 
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AQI a morale boost when none of the celebrations in Ramadi, Hadithah, Haqlaniyah, 
Bani Dahir, Rawah, or Rutbah met with ISF or coalition resistance.83 The AQI-led celebra-
tory parades indicated that the battle for Anbar continued.
While MacFarland had made significant progress by reclaiming parts of Ramadi 
block by block, East Ramadi remained contested territory with tribal influence limited 
and fragmented in its dense urban community neighborhoods. But the AQI-dominated 
eastern quarter of the city remained the only area of Ramadi left to be cleared, MacFar-
land reported to Casey on October 25.84 The rest of Ramadi had become calm enough 
that the brigade commander was able to take Casey on an uneventful hour-long patrol 
through the city streets to the government center, which had been the scene of intense 
AQI attacks earlier in the year. MacFarland felt close enough to what he viewed as the 
conclusion of his decisive operation that his units began the renovation of the govern-
ment center area, a complex of more than 30 buildings almost completely destroyed after 
years of fighting.85
The Sahawa, the IIP, and MNF-W
As insurgent violence in Ramadi continued to drop, Hashimi and other IIP leaders 
in Baghdad grew more uncomfortable with the Ramadi sheikhs’ new role and the U.S. 
military’s apparent endorsement of them. On October 30, Hashimi and Alwani tried to 
persuade Casey that the Ramadi sheikhs should be folded into an “Islamic Party Tribal 
Council” under Alwani’s leadership, a proposal Sattar’s group already had rejected. 
However, the MNF-I commander would not allow tribal and provincial government dis-
putes to stand in the way of what he saw as an imminent tipping point against AQI in 
Ramadi or to slow the success in building a large police force in such short time.86 Instead, 
the general urged the IIP leaders to take full advantage of the tribes’ willingness to fight 
extremists. Insisting on a centrally devised framework for arming and employing the 
tribes risked alienating them, Casey warned. As if to illustrate how the political ground 
was shifting, on the same day that Casey was quashing the IIP’s plans, Sattar was meet-
ing with Maliki to discuss how to equip the Awakening. Two days later, on November 1, 
Maliki and Casey met to discuss the tribal movement and its standoff with the unpopular 
provincial government, and the two leaders even briefly considered the option of holding 
an early provincial election in Anbar to seat a more legitimate provincial government.87
Though the election option would not materialize until 2009, Casey was determined 
to take advantage of what he perceived could be a decisive opening against AQI in Anbar. 
He had been unhappy with what he saw as MNF-W’s hesitancy to seize the opportunity 
and had opined in late September that Zilmer and his command should be taking bold 
steps “more along the lines of Operation SAYAID” from the previous year: large-scale 
activities “focus[ing] on major muscle movements, such as disrupting traffic across the 
border [and] controlling the lines of communication.”88 As if to prod MNF-W into this 
kind of approach, Casey requested that the U.S. Central Command commit its theater 
reserve, the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), to Anbar in order to “go for the 
jugular, take risk, and to be decisive”—in other words, to finish off AQI in western Iraq 
once and for all.89 Arriving in November, the MEU sent two companies to reinforce Mac-
Farland’s work in Ramadi, while the remainder fought in Hadithah to disrupt al-Qaeda’s 
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“hub” connecting the Euphrates River Valley with Bayji in the north and Rutbah in the 
west.90 Consistent with his view that Anbar had reached a tipping point, Casey believed 
the extra weight of the MEU would be decisive and described the continued fighting in 
MacFarland’s sector as the “final kinetic phase of operations in Ramadi.”91 As he made 
these moves, the MNF-I commander emphasized to Iraqi leaders such as Hashimi the 
importance of staying focused on al-Qaeda rather than getting distracted by internal polit-
ical disputes. He directed Zilmer to get involved in sorting out a compromise between 
Alwani and the tribes.92
From MNF-W’s perspective, however, the Awakening still seemed like an unreliable 
secondary effort that could jeopardize the command’s main engagement strategy with 
the larger Anbari tribes’ exiled leaders in Jordan, men who retained considerable financial 
and moral heft. Zilmer hoped to persuade them to return home and use their authority 
to bolster security force recruitment and unite their tribes against al-Qaeda.93 No signifi-
cant breakthroughs had come from this line of effort, however, and Sattar’s rise seemed 
to make such a breakthrough even less likely. Just as tension had developed between 
the tribes and the provincial government, similar resentment roiled Anbar’s tribal order, 
where leaders perceived influence as a zero-sum game. As the Awakening’s relationship 
with MacFarland’s brigade deepened, and the Ramadi violence subsided, Sattar’s capac-
ity for patronage expanded, and the Albu Risha eclipsed larger Anbari tribes such as the 
Albu Issa, Albu Nimr, and Albu Mahal, whose sheikhs chafed at the U.S. military’s inad-
vertent reordering of the traditional tribal hierarchy.
Skeptical of what MacFarland’s accommodation with Sattar might ultimately gain 
and sensitive to what it could potentially cost, Zilmer nonetheless allowed it to continue, 
hoping the bottom-up approach that tapped into the Awakening would help rather than 
hinder the top-down track of engagement with the lineal sheikhs in Jordan.94 In the hope 
of forging a connection between Alwani and the tribes, Zilmer instructed MacFarland 
to engage the governor, but within the MEF, senior officers doubted whether these two 
feuding factions could be reconciled. “The Sunni elite that once held sway over al-Anbar 
has been reduced to an ineffectual potpourri of mutually antagonistic special interest 
groups,” wrote Devlin, MNF-W’s chief intelligence officer, in another pessimistic report 
in November, seemingly written as though the sharp drop in violence and the explosion in 
tribal police volunteers had not happened.95 Slightly modified from his famously gloomy 
August assessment, Devlin’s updated report acknowledged Al Qa’im and Ramadi as rel-
ative bright spots in an otherwise failed tribal system. Yet he expressed misgivings about 
their durability given the Iraqi Government’s persistent stinginess vis-à-vis the Sunni 
province and what Devlin considered the unreliability of tribal militias.96 The Awakening 
led by Sheikh Sattar was a “force to be reckoned with,” Devlin conceded, but associated 
groups like the Anbar Revolutionaries “could become a power unto themselves.”97
Seeing little coming from the besieged provincial government in the way of mate-
rial assistance, MacFarland ignored these MNF-W warnings to avoid getting too close to 
Sattar, whom the Marine headquarters still considered untrustworthy.98 From the brigade 
commander’s perspective, MNF-W’s warnings to avoid a rapprochement with Sattar and 
the tribes were akin to a lifeguard telling a drowning man to avoid a certain flotation 
device because it was not “U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary approved.”99
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The Rescue of the East Ramadi Tribes
MacFarland’s success in weakening AQI’s grip on Ramadi, building local security 
forces, and gradually placing Iraqi forces in control of sections of the city continued 
throughout the fall. By November, the police force was growing rapidly. Most areas to 
the north and west of Ramadi had flipped against al-Qaeda, and even the disinclined 
Albu Alwan tribe in West Ramadi had joined the Awakening. Still, most tribes east of 
the city remained neutral or uncooperative due to their intimidation by or alliances 
with AQI. Lieutenant Colonel Charles Ferry’s 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment had 
recently taken control of East Ramadi from Lieutenant Colonel Ronald P. Clark’s 1st Bat-
talion, 506th Infantry Regiment, but it was no stranger to the area. It was a rare unit 
that returned to the same area of operations as its previous rotation, and, in fact, it had 
been the battalion that had handed East Ramadi to Clark the previous year. Ferry’s area 
extended east of the city and south of the Euphrates where the river made several pro-
nounced north-south bends known to the troops as the “shark fins.” As Ramadi became 
less hospitable to AQI, the shark fins, containing the areas of Sufiyah and Julaybah, had 
become key terrain for the insurgents—areas where AQI could continue to train new 
recruits and stage attacks east to Baghdad or west into Ramadi.100 The shark fins also 
were the only remaining locations from which AQI could fire mortars into Ramadi and 
on coalition locations with easy ingress and egress for insurgents along Route Michigan, 
the main supply route through Anbar.101
The westernmost shark fin, in Ramadi’s Sufiyah District, was home of the Albu Soda 
tribe, led by Sheikh Jassim Mohammed. Sheikh Jassim had represented the Albu Soda at 
the September Sahawa declaration but had been reluctant to join the Awakening fully, 
given AQI’s heavy presence in his territory. He and his small tribe had managed to estab-
lish checkpoints to control AQI movement and moved to eliminate AQI’s mortar firing 
positions within their tribal area, but AQI had retaliated by killing Jassim’s brother and 
two cousins and dumping their bodies into the Euphrates. In response, the outraged Albu 
Soda mounted raids against insurgent safe houses and delivered captured AQI fighters 
by boat across the Euphrates to the nearest police station, after which AQI leaders, intent 
on retaining their sanctuary, moved to eliminate the Albu Soda altogether.102 Considering 
the Albu Soda as one of the weakest elements of the burgeoning Awakening, AQI com-
manders believed that if they and the local branch of Ansar al Sunna could join forces to 
destroy the tribe, it might begin a domino effect that could topple the tribal movement.
MacFarland and the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division had planned a final push to 
wipe out AQI’s remaining influence in eastern Ramadi starting with the Mala’ab, the 
city’s eastern urban area, before pushing farther east to seize the shark fins.103 But events 
on the ground changed this approach. On November 24, AQI asked Sheikh Jassim to meet 
to negotiate the removal of his checkpoints. Nervous about being kidnapped, Jassim had 
notified Patriquin of the impending meeting, and the American officer had presciently 
given Jassim a satellite phone to call for help in case the negotiations became trouble-
some. On November 26, 2 days after Jassim’s meeting with AQI, more than 100 AQI 
fighters attacked the Albu Soda tribal area, and the tribe frantically called Ferry’s inter-
preter for coalition support. The newly arrived Ferry, unfamiliar with the Albu Soda’s 
situation and unsure of Jassim’s veracity, had already planned a battalion operation into 
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the Mala’ab for the following day, an important effort that a detour to help the Albu Soda 
in the shark fins would disrupt.104 Learning of Jassim’s position from Patriquin, Ferry 
realized the developing tribal battle was one his unit had to support.105 Within an hour, 
Ferry and his men had scrapped their planned operation and began maneuvering their 
battalion to Sufiyah.
The fight in the shark fins was not an orderly one. From his unmanned aerial vehi-
cle (UAV) feed, Ferry’s unit was unable to distinguish AQI and Albu Soda fighters, so 
Patriquin persuaded the Albu Soda men to wave towels so coalition troops could visually 
separate the tribesmen from the AQI fighters. Soon air strikes and artillery pounded AQI 
locations, destroying AQI trucks and fighters.106 As night fell on November 27, discerning 
an insurgent from a tribesman became increasingly difficult until Ferry convinced Jassim 
by phone to light a bonfire to mark the sheikh’s forward line of troops. After reducing 
several AQI obstacles and destroying AQI vehicles that were attempting to drag Albu 
Soda fighters away as trophies, Ferry finally linked up with Jassim on the battlefield and 
the tribe was out of danger.
By Anbar standards, the battle had been a large one. The Albu Soda lost at least 55 
tribesmen, while at least 68 insurgents were killed.107 Taking quick advantage of the vic-
tory, 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment established a new combat outpost in the Sufi-
yah shark fin, and after an additional brief fight near Fishhook Lake in December, the 
entire Sufiyah District was under U.S. and Awakening control, isolating the remaining 
insurgents in East Ramadi.108
The Death of Captain Patriquin
Ferry’s battalion would continue to fight significant AQI resistance throughout 
December and into the new year, finally controlling the second shark fin and establishing 
another combat outpost to control Julaybah by January 25, 2007. The final clearance of 
East Ramadi, the Mala’ab, would have to wait for the arrival of 1st Brigade, 1st Armored 
Division’s successor unit, Colonel John Charlton’s 1st Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, in 
February. But by any measure, the situation in eastern Anbar had already turned to the 
coalition’s advantage to a degree that had been unimaginable half a year before.
One of the architects of the historic turnaround, however, would not be present to 
see its completion. By December, Patriquin had become optimistic enough for Ramadi’s 
prospects and the growing Sahawa, that the articulate young officer had begun working 
closely with Marine Major Megan McClung, MNF-W’s chief of public affairs, to engage 
the many journalists now arriving in Ramadi to get a firsthand view of the Awakening 
and its impact. On December 6, after escorting Fox News’ Oliver North and MSNBC’s 
Sarah Childress around the city, Patriquin and McClung struck an IED that destroyed 
their HMMWV and killed them instantly.109
The loss was a difficult one for both MNF-W and 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division. 
McClung was the first female Marine officer to be killed in Iraq, the first female graduate 
of the U.S. Naval Academy to have been killed in combat, and the most senior female 
officer to be killed in the war. It equally was devastating for the Awakening sheikhs, who 
had grown so close to the ubiquitous Patriquin that they had dubbed him with the tribal 
name “Hisham Abu Risha.” When the American commands held a memorial service 
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for the officers, scores of tribal sheikhs and Anbari security officers filed into the large 
hall, with the senior sheikhs taking their place in the first row next to MacFarland in a 
visual representation of the nascent Anbari-American alliance Patriquin had helped to 
construct. “No one is going to replace Patriquin,” Sattar lamented.110
Eleven days after his death, Patriquin’s outsized influence was felt as far away as 
Washington, DC. Interviewed on Meet the Press, former Speaker of the House Newt 
Gingrich cited Patriquin’s tribal strategy as an example of what Gingrich thought the 
United States should be doing to win the war. Gingrich described a clever, stick-figure 
PowerPoint presentation the irreverent Patriquin had created, entitled “How to Win in 
Iraq,” to show the logic of tribal outreach. The PowerPoint and Patriquin’s analysis went 
viral on the Internet. In subsequent years, Patriquin’s instrumental role in bringing to 
the coalition side tribes that many had come to view as irreconcilable would lead some 
observers to compare him to T. E. Lawrence.111
Back in 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, MacFarland reflected on the captain’s 
impact on the war. “When the history of this conflict is written, his contributions will 
loom very large,” MacFarland eulogized. “And I will personally do all I can to make sure 
he receives the credit and recognition that he deserves . . . he was the architect of one of 
the [war’s] central, and perhaps the decisive aspect.”112
* * *
During 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division’s 7 months in Ramadi, the brigade esti-
mated it had killed 1,500 insurgents and detained another 1,500.113 MacFarland’s units 
had suffered 96 killed in action, while approximately 150 Iraqi soldiers and police had 
been killed. During those same 7 months, the Iraqi police force in Ramadi had grown 
to close to 3,000 strong, occupying stations throughout the city and its tribal belts, and 
with Sattar’s assistance, an additional 3,000-man ERU brigade also had been established 
as auxiliary police. Under the force of this new Sahawa-U.S. coalition, insurgent attacks 
had fallen by 70 percent, and Ramadi even had managed to hold its first mayoral election 
since 2004.114
These gains had not been achieved easily and had come despite a strategic trajectory 
in MNF-I and the Iraqi Government that was moving in a different direction. MNF-I’s 
campaign plan throughout 2006 remained focused on national elections, a reduction in 
coalition presence, and a steady security transition to Iraqi control. It also was focused 
upon national-level politics and top-down governance and reconciliation. The change in 
Anbar, however, had come from the bottom up, on both the coalition and the Iraqi sides. 
The levers of power in Anbar that turned the province against AQI had emerged from the 
Sunni tribal structure that had boycotted the national political process. They rose from 
the tactical, grassroots level rather than the national one. From December 2005 to Sep-
tember 2006, the Anbari tribes and their allies had tried to establish a parallel provincial 
governing structure that they considered legitimate, and with the Sahawa, they finally 
had succeeded. This complex tribal system ultimately delivered dedicated police and 
local security forces that allowed provincial governance to take root.
On the coalition side, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division’s operations were an anom-
aly among MNF-I’s brigades because they amounted to a distributed small-unit urban 
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presence at a time when MNF-I pressed toward its goal of reducing U.S. bases to just 50 
by the end of the year. Surprised in retrospect at the latitude he enjoyed in going against 
the strategic grain, MacFarland attributed it to a “joint dispensation.” Had his brigade 
been under an Army division, the colonel mused, he likely would have been subjected to 
greater scrutiny and thus more readily challenged by higher echelons that were pursuing 
different approaches.115
The Awakening also made clear that the lines between insurgents, provincial and 
national governance, tribes, and security forces were not as distinct as coalition units 
typically assumed. One of the Awakening’s chief architects behind the scenes, Moham-
med Mahmoud Latif, was himself a prominent insurgent leader, while many tribes 
intermittently supported or opposed the insurgency as the political winds shifted one 
way or another. Iraqi motivations were often quite localized, as tribes came under AQI 
enticement or threat to their personal safety and economic livelihood. Despite the coa-
lition’s focus on national unity and governance, local and tribal grievances more often 
than not were the dominant causes of violence against either insurgents or the coalition. 
The burgeoning Awakening demonstrated that coalition units that could decipher these 
motivations could also exploit them, sometimes delivering results that were significant 
on a regional or national scale. For the moment, the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division 
approach in Ramadi was an anomaly, but before long, it would become the centerpiece of 
a new strategy that the U.S. President and other senior leaders were desperately seeking.
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CHAPTER 22
THE FAILED TRANSITION
As Operation TOGETHER FORWARD II wound down in the fall of 2006, General 
George W. Casey, Jr., considered the disappointments of this latest iteration of the Bagh-
dad Security Plan and determined that the dynamics in the capital had to change. A 
heated encounter with Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki only confirmed this grim realiza-
tion. Casey returned to Baghdad after a week of consultations in Washington and learned 
that on the day prior—October 11—Iraqi soldiers stationed west of the Tigris River in the 
Mansour district had caught 17 men clad in army uniforms in the act of raiding a local 
Sunni residence. Protesting their arrest, the men identified themselves as members of the 
Iraqi Army on a secret mission authorized by the Prime Minister. A phone call interrupt-
ing their interrogation validated this claim. An irate major general from Maliki’s office 
demanded the release of the soldiers in custody—some of whom were assigned to an 
army unit based in Sadr City—and threatened to arrest the commander of the brigade 
holding them.1
The incident struck a nerve with Casey, who in the previous month had heard simi-
lar complaints from Iraqi brigade and division commanders about the Prime Minister’s 
office bypassing the military chain of command and ordering the release of prisoners 
without explanation. For an American commander whose strategy relied on the capabil-
ity and professionalism of the Iraqi security forces, such instances of brazen overreach 
rankled him. Paired with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, Casey confronted Maliki his 
first day back in country. When the Prime Minister unapologetically acknowledged his 
office’s role in the operation, the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) commander pointed 
out just how ugly perceptions of this incident could be. The Prime Minister was essen-
tially orchestrating raids out of Sadr City against Sunni enclaves in the capital. Sectarian 
overtones aside, the practice of circumventing the Ministry of Defense and the chain of 
command undermined the military institutions that so desperately needed to be solid-
ified. When Maliki dismissed Casey’s concern as “no big deal,” the MNF-I commander 
pushed back more fervently—enough for the Prime Minister to ask if the general was 
threatening him.2
Returning to his quarters that night, Casey wrote an e-mail to his boss at U.S. Cen-
tral Command (CENTCOM), General John P. Abizaid. Casey related that he understood 
Maliki’s frustration at having limited rapid-response capability to strike at fleeting terror-
ist targets, and the necessity of coordinating with “too many people” (i.e., the coalition) 
constantly tested the Prime Minister’s patience. However, the fact that Maliki remained 
“unrepentant and did not appear to grasp the significance or consequences of his actions” 
deeply troubled the MNF-I commander. “He is clearly frustrated with the slowness of the 
transition and wants his hands on the controls,” wrote Casey, “but he is just as clearly not 
ready to command the IAF [Iraqi Armed Forces].”3 Maliki wanted control of the security 
apparatus as quickly as possible, and for his part, Casey was willing—even eager—to 
grant it. Yet in the fall of 2006, the threats besieging Iraqi society far exceeded the ability 
of the Iraqi Government and its security forces to deal with them. Casey often made the 
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case that this gap was closing, but even if that were the case, it was closing too slowly for 
everyone’s taste. Accumulating evidence of the government’s complicity in perpetuating 
the cycle of violence—the kind illustrated by the Maliki-sanctioned October 11 raid from 
Sadr City—cast a pall over Baghdad’s near-term prospects for stability.
THE DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION IN BAGHDAD
MNF-I faced an uphill climb. The conflict remained a competition among “ethno-sec-
tarian groups vying for economic power and political influence against the backdrop 
of a residual insurgency and an increasingly sectarian terrorist campaign.”4 Such had 
been the coalition’s basic understanding of the problem since the aftermath of February’s 
Samarra mosque bombing, but conditions had become even grimmer. Shi’a death squad 
activity—once believed to be the sphere of “rogue Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia”—now 
appeared to include mainstream elements of Moqtada Sadr’s militia and others such as 
the Badr Corps. Faced with the Shi’a militia onslaught, Sunni neighborhood watches in 
Baghdad had grown more organized and had even begun to acquire limited offensive 
capability. Furthermore, the Shi’a-Sunni conflict continued to be characterized by a geo-
graphical component. Violence in October mainly occurred in the western part of the city, 
but it spread beyond the capital itself as Shi’a militias attempted to expand their control 
of Baghdad’s northern and southern lines of communication—often with the assistance 
of militia-infiltrated Iraqi units. Operation TOGETHER FORWARD II, which had for-
mally ended on October 22, took a toll on al-Qaeda in Iraq, but the growing problem of 
the Shi’a militias meant that tactical success against Sunni extremists had lost some of its 
significance.5
As Operation TOGETHER FORWARD II concluded, seven of the coalition’s 15 U.S. 
brigade combat teams (BCT) fell under the control of Major General John D. Thurman’s 
4th Infantry Division, assigned as Multi-National Division–Baghdad (MND-B). At the 
time, three of these units occupied territory in the northern and southern “belts” just out-
side the city; four operated inside Baghdad proper. East of the Tigris River, 4th Brigade, 
101st Airborne Division focused on pursuing insurgents based in the beleaguered Sunni 
enclave of Adhamiya while struggling to limit Shi’a militia forays out of Sadr City and 
across the Army Canal. Two brigades split the western half of the capital, with 2d Brigade, 
1st Armored Division responsible for the northern sections of Mansour and Kadhimiyah, 
and 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division operating across the breadth of Rashid. The 172d 
Stryker Brigade served as a strike force operating in trouble spots throughout the city. 
These American units were joined by elements of two Iraqi Army divisions—the 6th and 
the 9th—as well as two National Police divisions of dubious utility. Plans had existed 
since the late spring to move two additional Iraqi Army brigades from the outlying prov-
inces to Baghdad, but the Ministry of Defense had failed to deliver on what would have 
been a welcome infusion of Iraqi manpower.6
As Ramadan ended and October gave way to November, Thurman and MND-B 
observed a few positive indicators of levels of violence, but the atmosphere was generally 
gloomy. Militants had carried out an average of 80 attacks per day in Baghdad in October. 
MND-B reported an average of 76 attacks per day the first week of November, a number 
that held about steady throughout the month.7 “Incidents” tracked as part of the broader 
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ethno-sectarian conflict followed a more uneven trend during this period. According to 
coalition estimates, during the week of October 28 to November 3, 274 Iraqis were killed 
in a total of 147 incidents in Baghdad. Security-related incidents dropped to 99 the follow-
ing week, shot back up to 158 the next, and then settled down to 137 toward month’s end.8 
The brutality of the sectarian conflict translated into intense fighting for coalition units in 
and around the capital. During a patrol in the Hurriyah district on October 30, an element 
from the 172d Stryker Brigade was caught in an ambush with the platoon leader’s vehicle 
disabled by an explosively formed penetrator. Despite being wounded himself, Sergeant 
Gregory D. Williams, Jr., recovered his wounded lieutenant and provided suppressive 
fire until assistance arrived. For his actions, he was awarded the Distinguished Service 
Cross.9 Similarly, Chief Warrant Officer David F. Cooper received the Distinguished Ser-
vice Cross for heroism he displayed on a November 27 mission targeting foreign fighters 
in the Baghdad belt area between Taji and Lake Tharthar. After one of the other helicop-
ters in his flight from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment was shot down, 
Cooper set up a defensive perimeter to await the recovery team. Attacked by a massive 
enemy force that included dismounted personnel and vehicles armed with anti-aircraft 
cannons, Cooper flew multiple strafing runs and prevented the ground perimeter from 
being overrun.10
The intense fighting highlighted that levels of violence remained far above those rou-
tinely observed before the February 2006 Samarra mosque bombing. When U.S. forces 
captured Saddam Hussein in December 2003, the coalition had high hopes that justice 
served would bring a stabilizing sense of closure to Iraqi society. Nearly 3 years later, 
however, the Iraqi Government braced itself against an anticipated backlash in the wake 
of the November 5 announcement that the former dictator had been sentenced to death 
by hanging.11 A curfew and vehicle ban in Baghdad dampened violence for a short time, 
but as the month of November progressed, the coalition detected an elevation of sui-
cide attacks. These had averaged 35 per month from January to August 2006 but had 
risen to above 50 in both September and October.12 The near-simultaneous explosions of 
four car bombs in the Shi’a-populated district of New Baghdad on November 19 served 
as a reminder of al-Qaeda in Iraq’s staying power.13 Four days later, on November 23, 
Sunni extremists rocked Sadr City with the detonation of six car bombs in the space of 
90 minutes, killing 181 civilians and wounding another 247.14 The combined attack was 
the deadliest since the war in Iraq had begun in 2003, and a rattled Casey reported to the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he considered the bombings in Sadr City as sig-
nificant as the Samarra mosque attack the previous February.15
Indeed, JAM and other Shi’a militias showed signs of striking back hard in retaliation 
for al-Qaeda’s high-profile attacks. Reports surfaced that the militias intended to side-
step the curfew by donning Iraqi security forces uniforms and operating official vehicles. 
Indirect fire  against Sunni mosques mounted.16 Shi’a militants added to the chaos with 
a spate of high-level kidnappings.17 With JAM on the move and al-Qaeda poised to con-
tinue its onslaught, the sectarian violence in Baghdad seemed out of control. MNF-I’s 
spokesman repeated assertions that Iraq was not in a state of civil war, but the command’s 
internal assessment painted a different picture. In the wake of high-profile attacks and 
reprisals, three of MNF-I’s four “civil war indicators” pointed in an unfavorable direction 
(with the fourth inconclusive).18 The security situation seemed to have deteriorated since 
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the previous month when a leaked report from CENTCOM depicted the “index of civil 
strife” in Iraq as edging consistently toward “chaos.”19
In Search of an “Iraqi Solution”
The central tenet of MNF-I’s strategy was that “enduring success will only be achieved 
by Iraqis.”20 If, as Casey believed, “Iraqi problems require Iraqi solutions,” then the 
deployment of additional American troops to the theater would yield temporary and 
local security gains but fail to supply the leverage necessary to arrive at a long-term solu-
tion. As Casey accumulated experience as MNF-I commander, he grew more convinced 
that there was a subtle danger in “doing too much with your own hands.”21 Even as 
the security situation deteriorated in the fall of 2006, he subjected the question of troop 
levels to a rigorous test: would increasing the current number of American Soldiers in 
Iraq move MNF-I closer to the end state of an Iraqi Government securing its citizens or 
not? Lower-level commanders nervous about the tactical situation were, in effect, chal-
lenged to think about the long-term implications. When debates about off-ramps or rein-
forcements were framed in this way, Casey’s subordinates often demurred.22 If the end 
state was a self-reliant Iraq, argued Casey, then a foreign military force actively engaged 
in maintaining order ultimately hampered progress toward that goal. To win—to meet 
its strategic objectives in the most expeditious manner—the United States had to draw 
down, he believed, while gradually adapting its force posture to support an increasingly 
sovereign Iraq.
By late 2006, Casey saw additional reasons to counsel against further U.S. troop 
involvement. He and other commanders doubted whether the Iraqi Government wanted 
stability as much as the coalition did.23 Casey suspected that powerful factions within 
the government viewed the continuing cycle of violence as advancing their interests, yet 
the complex interplay of violent actors in Baghdad only bolstered his inclination to shift 
responsibility toward the Iraqis. Reflecting on this difficult period, Casey later admitted 
to asking himself whether he should have allowed the U.S. military to shoulder more of 
the security burden. “If it had been just a counterinsurgency, I probably would have,” he 
recalled.24 Because the conflict was fundamentally a struggle for political and economic 
power among diverse ethno-sectarian groups, he judged that an outside actor like the 
coalition was not in a position to navigate these turbulent waters. The more complex the 
situation, the less inclined Casey was to put American Soldiers at risk.25 The impending 
rotation of the U.S. division and brigades in Baghdad also reinforced his predisposition 
to make only minor adjustments to the military plan and to scale back involvement in 
favor of allowing the Iraqis to lead.
When it came to the question of bringing in additional American troops, the MNF-I 
commander felt certain that the domestic U.S. political context militated against this option 
in any case. Since Casey’s assumption of command in 2004, the Secretary of Defense 
(SECDEF) had prescribed a path to success that entailed drawing down American forces 
while reducing their role vis-à-vis the Iraqis, an approach to which Casey—as well as 
Abizaid—generally subscribed. Like Casey, SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld’s opposition to 
increasing the U.S. presence was rooted partially in his concern that American Soldiers 
would tend to carry out combat missions themselves rather than risk failure at the hands 
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of less capable Iraqi units. The downside of the U.S. military’s “can-do” attitude was that 
it undermined the urgency with which the Iraqi Government approached the transfer of 
security responsibility, Rumsfeld believed. Making Iraqi units too reliant on their U.S. 
partners would dissuade them from eventually taking the lead in security operations 
and, in the long run, extend the American military commitment, he concluded. From the 
beginning, Rumsfeld communicated to Casey that time was of the essence.26 For both, it 
was not a stretch to associate a rise in U.S. troop levels in late 2006 with “doing too much” 
for the Iraqis and extending the length of the war.
THE SHI’A SOUTH: “EMBERS UNDER ASHES”
Across the Shi’a south, the British-led Multi-National Division–Southeast (MND-SE) 
had carried out an economy of force mission under a similar belief that coalition troop 
levels should diminish over time. British leaders were under increasing pressure to sup-
port rising troop commitments in Afghanistan, faced criticism at home over the unpop-
ular Iraq War, and were persuaded that the southern provinces were already sufficiently 
stable. As such, they made transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi forces the focus 
for their deploying commanders.27 The transition to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) was 
an important milestone not only on the road to Iraqi “security self-reliance,” but also 
as a prerequisite for the withdrawal of United Kingdom (UK) troops from the country. 
Granting PIC status to each of the four provinces in MND-SE was the ticket out of Iraq.
Unfortunately, the perception of comparative calm in the MND-SE sector created a 
false sense of security that encouraged transition on the basis of wishful thinking rather 
than actual conditions on the ground. Since the first years of the coalition’s Iraq cam-
paign, the United States and Britain had operated under an accommodation of sorts. U.S. 
commanders were content to leave what they regarded as an economy of force mission 
to their European allies in the south. British officers, in turn, would manage and resource 
the mission enough to keep things in Basrah under control, while carrying out a series of 
incremental force reductions. Nonetheless, while the sectarian homogeneity of the Shi’a 
south spared the region from a cycle of retaliatory death squad activity, violence and 
criminality had escalated all the same in 2006, undermining development, governance, 
and security. The lack of British enthusiasm for the war prevented MND-SE from play-
ing a more active role in securing the population, and Shi’a militias sought to fill the 
void, with destabilizing consequences. In reality, the informal U.S.-UK accommodation 
unwittingly made the British “mere observers of the gradual transfer of power . . . to Ira-
nian-backed militias,” as one officer described it.28 Maliki acknowledged the worsening 
problems, particularly in Basrah, and developed a security plan for the city to shore up 
public confidence, reduce police corruption, confront the militias, and uphold the rule 
of law.29 He declared a state of emergency there in June 2006, and the following month 
established a Basrah Security Committee chaired by Major General Ali Hamadi, his senior 
military adviser. Like much of Iraq in the second half of 2006, the populous southern city 
was the scene of a communal power struggle involving multiple factions. A besieged 
governor championed the interests of his own Fadhila Party while competing militias 
engaged in a campaign to infiltrate or undermine the local state apparatus. Distrustful of 
the governor and alarmed by deteriorating conditions in the province, Maliki staffed the 
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Basrah Security Committee with his confidantes. One of them forebodingly characterized 
the city as “embers under ashes: when the ashes are removed the flames will return.”30
Meanwhile, the 10th Iraqi Army Division wrestled with loyalty and capacity issues 
due in part to an inept commander, the low priority it received in terms of equipment 
and funding, and a large number of Basrah natives in its ranks who were vulnerable 
to intimidation by local militias. The early British decision not to embed advisers with 
the division’s subordinate units during operations also hampered their development.31 
Hamadi, Maliki’s man in Basrah, put little stock in the division’s abilities. Only about 50 
to 60 percent of the division was reliable, Hamadi judged, and its soldiers were not strong 
enough to stand up to JAM in any case. He rated the police as far worse, gauging their 
reliability at 15 to 25 percent. At best, Iraqi security forces in Basrah turned a blind eye to 
death squad activities. At worst, the local security forces were private militias beholden 
to political parties engaged in a war among themselves. The solution to the loyalty prob-
lem, he argued, was to raise one or two battalions of tribal recruits answerable only to the 
Basrah Security Committee.32 The penchant for creating a responsive military organiza-
tion outside of the normal chain of command seemed ubiquitous.
Elsewhere, MND-SE pressed ahead with the transition to provincial Iraqi control. In 
July 2006, the division transferred security responsibility for Muthanna Province to the 
Iraqi Army and handed over Camp Smitty, a base outside the city of Samawah, after 
which the Australian task force that had been posted there relocated to Tallil Airfield near 
Nasiriyah and assumed an “operational overwatch” role.33 Days later, however, hun-
dreds of Iraqis overwhelmed the indigenous guard force and stripped the camp almost 
bare, making off in pickup trucks with everything from air-conditioning units and com-
puters to bedding and kitchen utensils. The looting tarnished the luster of what Maliki 
had billed as a “great national day,” and threw doubt on Iraq’s readiness to take this first 
significant step toward “building a stable and democratic future” in the southern prov-
inces, as UK Defense Minister Desmond Browne optimistically described it.34 In nearby 
Dhi Qar, the battalion-sized Italian contingent had begun to draw down in preparation 
for the Iraqi assumption of provincial control in September as Italy moved to complete 
its troop withdrawal. A third southern province—Najaf, in MND-B’s sector—was slated 
to go to PIC in December.35 These supposed success stories masked internal Iraqi strug-
gles that continued, with varying degrees of violence, long after the transitions occurred. 
Even in relatively stable Muthanna Province, where the Supreme Council for the Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) controlled the levers of political and military power, the pop-
ulation suffered from JAM intimidation.36
From Salamanca to Sinbad
When Major General Richard D. Shirreff assumed command of MND-SE in July 2006, 
he brought a new perspective on British operations that challenged the prevailing mindset 
of transition and withdrawal. He was troubled by the worsening security environment, 
not least the shortage of resources that seemed to prevent the division from forestalling 
it. In Maysan Province, bordering Iran, the cities of Amarah and Majar al Kabir were 
“effectively no-go areas,” where any UK operations resulted in serious fighting.37 Just one 
battalion covered Basrah city, and that unit was capable of deploying only 200 soldiers 
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on the streets at any time.38 According to Shirreff, the strategy of gradual withdrawal not 
only risked failure in Iraq, but also jeopardized the reputation of the British Army, as well 
as the UK’s reputation as a reliable ally of the United States.39 “We had a strategy that 
involved extraction rather than . . . achieving mission success,” he recalled later. “It was, 
in a sense, an exit strategy rather than a winning strategy.”40 The general believed that 
without security, there could be no stability or economic development on which to base 
the withdrawal. Security, he argued, was the prerequisite for PIC. What he witnessed 
upon his arrival in Iraq was instead a “cycle of insecurity.”41
British Under Secretary of State for Defence Twigg (left) and Major General Shirreff (right). Source: U.S. 
Army photo by Specialist Rhonda Roth-Cameron, Joint Combat Camera Center Iraq (Released).
British Under Secretary of State for Defence Derek Twigg  
and Major General Richard D. Shirreff, 
General Officer Commanding, MND-SE Visit Basrah.42
Shirreff envisioned a large-scale, resource-intensive operation to confront the militias 
and restore security. He developed this concept in conjunction with the British 3d Mech-
anized Division headquarters and the 19th Light Brigade prior to their Iraq deployment. 
Adopting a “clear, hold, build” methodology, the plan divided Basrah into 16 districts, 
each to be tackled sequentially through a series of “pulses” and “pauses.” After British 
troops “pulsed” into a district and conducted clearing operations that targeted criminals 
and indirect-fire cells, Iraqi forces would follow in order to reestablish their presence in 
the area during a deliberate “pause.” Then would come development projects designed 
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to deliver quick results and create jobs, Shirreff hoped. A requested surge in support 
from the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for Interna-
tional Development did not materialize, thus undercutting the comprehensive civil-mili-
tary approach Shirreff sought.43
To conduct this operation, dubbed Operation SALAMANCA, Shirreff required addi-
tional forces, and, given London’s reluctance to deploy more troops to Iraq, the MND-SE 
commander looked for them inside his organization. Visiting Camp Abu Naji on the 
outskirts of Amarah in late July, Shirreff conferred with the commander of the Queen’s 
Royal Hussars, who convinced the general to close down the base. Amarah’s inhospi-
table security environment kept the battle group bottled up, and frequent mortar fire 
added to its woes. Furthermore, sustaining the formation required a 3-day round trip by 
the entire division reserve, involving over 200 logistics vehicles every 2 weeks. Seeing an 
opportunity, Shirreff agreed to transfer Camp Abu Naji to the Iraqis. Splitting the 1,200-
man battle group, he ordered half to exchange their tanks and infantry fighting vehicles 
for wheeled Land Rovers and conduct a mobile screening operation along the Iranian 
border. As part of this tactical readjustment, the others would report to Basrah, where 
they would augment the main effort.44
The subsequent events surrounding the British withdrawal from Camp Abu Naji 
reflected poorly on the Iraqi security forces, as well as on MND-SE. In mid-August, troops 
from a battalion of the 4th Brigade, 10th Iraqi Army Division mutinied when their leaders 
informed them of a plan to deploy the unit north to Baghdad for Operation TOGETHER 
FORWARD. With its ranks infiltrated by both JAM and Badr Corps fighters, the bat-
talion collectively refused to participate and ended the protest only when the brigade 
commander announced that the imminent move had been canceled.45 Meanwhile, the 
Queen’s Royal Hussars continued their withdrawal and completed the ill-timed transfer. 
Within hours of the British leaving camp, a mob of 5,000 Iraqis, including several hun-
dred armed men, demanded entry. The Iraqi guard force, consisting primarily of former 
mutineers, happily obliged after receiving a promise of safe passage. As they had done 
at Camp Smitty, looters stripped Camp Abu Naji of all that could be carried away, while 
the local Sadrist office broadcast over loudspeakers, “This is the first Iraqi city that has 
kicked out the occupier!”46 Militants claimed that indirect-fire attacks had chased off coa-
lition forces, and senior U.S. leaders at MNF-I interpreted the British decision that way 
as well.47
Emboldened, JAM continued its campaign to wrest control of Amarah from the Badr-
led local police, enjoying the support of the province’s Sadrist governor as it did so. 
Kidnappings and assassinations escalated dramatically in October when JAM fighters 
overran a number of police stations, prompting the dispatch of Iraqi Army battalions 
from Basrah and the deployment of British units to the outskirts of the provincial capi-
tal.48 While highly embarrassing for MND-SE, the aftermath of the Camp Abu Naji trans-
fer also highlighted the questionable state of the 10th Iraqi Army Division.
When Shirreff briefed Operation SALAMANCA to General Peter Chiarelli in August, 
he sought U.S. involvement in his plan. In doing so, Shirreff bucked the trend among Brit-
ish commanders of accepting—and even encouraging—MND-SE’s treatment as a separate 
entity within MNC-I.49 Approaching Chiarelli as a genuine tactical subordinate, Shirreff 
asked for American reinforcements to support clearing operations in Basrah. Struck by 
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the MND-SE commander’s unusually aggressive concept, Chiarelli offered a U.S. battal-
ion from his operational reserve, a company of AH–64 helicopters, one unmanned aerial 
vehicle to close a gap in British surveillance coverage, and $80 million to supplement 
development projects.50 Casey also agreed in principle with Operation SALAMANCA 
after Shirreff promised to maintain MND-SE’s screen along Maysan’s eastern border to 
discourage Iranian weapons smuggling.51 Yet the idea of employing U.S. forces to aug-
ment the Basrah effort appalled civilian and military leaders in London, who considered 
it tantamount to an admission of British failure. At Britain’s Permanent Joint Headquar-
ters (PJHQ), the UK chief of joint operations instructed Shirreff to turn down the offer, but 
to compensate, PJHQ agreed to reinforce MND-SE with a battalion from the Staffordshire 
Regiment and another that had been preparing for a stint in Cyprus. Shirreff welcomed 
the concession, but deployment timelines for the newly committed units would delay the 
start of the operation and cause it to extend beyond the end of his 6-month tour.52
The ambitious effort envisioned by Shirreff would eventually be scaled down. If Brit-
ish leaders in the United Kingdom had little inclination to fully support Operation SALA-
MANCA, the Iraqi Government was also reluctant to confront the Shi’a militias head-on, 
preferring to seek a political accommodation with the Sadrists and other Shi’a militants. 
Briefed on the plan in August, Iraqi National Security Adviser Mowaffaq Rubaie rejected 
it based on the recommendation of Maliki’s Da’wa Party adviser on Basrah matters, Safa 
al-Safi. The Prime Minister requested a modified approach that focused primarily on 
economic development, with the Iraqi security forces conducting only limited security 
operations. Shirreff reworked the concept in September 2006, alongside members of the 
Basrah Security Committee and presented the revised plan—Operation SINBAD—to 
Maliki, Rubaie, and Casey later that month.53 Skeptical of the MND-SE commander’s 
aggressive approach to put the restive province on a sound footing, senior officers at 
PJHQ emphasized merely the narrative of success over what could actually be accom-
plished and derisively labeled the operation “Spinbad.”54
COMMANDERS IN BAGHDAD TAKE STOCK
While their senior headquarters wrestled with how to change course to dampen the 
sectarian conflict in Baghdad, U.S. BCTs operating in the city continued to engage in a com-
plex, frustrating, and, at times, befuddling war. Since the January 2005 elections, MNF-I 
had envisioned a steady transition as coalition units reduced their presence throughout 
the country and passed control to improving Iraqi security forces. By November 2006, 
this overarching thrust of the campaign remained, but leaders at the tactical level found 
it increasingly problematic, particularly in Baghdad. East of the Tigris River, for example, 
4th Brigade, 101st Airborne Division witnessed a three-way fight among Sunni insur-
gents, JAM, and the coalition—with the ill-defined loyalties of local Iraqi security forces 
obscuring the way forward even more. Determining how U.S. troops participated in this 
sectarian melee most effectively was murky. Brigade commander Colonel Thomas Vail 
complained of “the lack of a clear, unified definition of the endstate” and offered the trou-
bling judgment that the Iraqi Government and security forces’ goals “are not necessarily 
aligned with ours.”55
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If the question of how to end the fighting in Baghdad seemed unsettled, BCT com-
manders were certainly not confused about the nature of the violence. Those posted in 
the capital in the fall of 2006 were nearing the end of their year-long combat tours. When 
asked by Casey for their views on the security situation, few held back. All saw the units 
they led embroiled in sectarian conflict—a struggle far more complicated and demand-
ing, they believed, than a classic counterinsurgency. What made their mission especially 
difficult was the destructive bias of the Iraqi Government itself. The unanimity among 
BCT commanders assigned to MND-B was staggering. To a man, they branded the gov-
ernment and its security forces as instigators of sectarian violence. “JAM [Jaysh al-Mahdi] 
has been [executing] and continues to execute a deliberate, decentralized, campaign to 
control East Baghdad,” wrote Vail, with death squads operating energetically and pub-
licly and Iraqi security forces in support, either actively or passively.56 Colonel Michael H. 
Shields, commander of the 172d Stryker Brigade, noted that the Iraqi Government “facil-
itates JAM activities,” including the maintenance of a safe haven in Sadr City.57 In the 
northwest quadrant of the capital, Colonel Robert Scurlock, in charge of 2d Brigade, 1st 
Armored Division assessed that “most Iraqi people view the militias as the government 
in most neighborhoods.”58 The perception strongly held among Sunnis that local security 
forces were “heavily influenced” or simply “run” by Shi’a militia leaders only seemed to 
confirm this close connection.59 Iraqi security forces in Rashid District provided both tacit 
and deliberate support to JAM, and Colonel Michael F. Beech, the brigade commander 
there, had linked the National Police directly to the mass murder of Sunnis on two recent 
occasions.60 In the rural and largely Sunni belts south of Baghdad, newly arrived Colonel 
Michael Kershaw, commanding 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, reported observ-
ing sectarian violence only “in areas where GOI [Government of Iraq] forces are in the 
lead”—not a ringing endorsement of Iraqi progress toward stability.61
While MNF-I balked at characterizing the conflict as a civil war, the brigade com-
manders in Baghdad were much more inclined to do so. Reflecting on the mobilization of 
local Sunni militias to confront JAM intimidation in Mansour and Kadhimiyah, Scurlock 
saw the possibility of a rapidly downward spiral. “To have a true civil war you need to 
have opposing political and ideological views, backed by population centers and mili-
tias,” he wrote. “We are dangerously close to seeing this on a widespread scale.”62 In 
Rashid, Beech feared similar implications of the deteriorating security situation. “The 
threat of self-sustaining and expansive Iraqi civil war in the capital city is now only being 
contained by U.S. forces,” he reported.63
How the brigade commanders viewed the character of the conflict affected their judg-
ment on how coalition military power should be applied. Given their widely shared 
assessment of the fight as a sectarian conflict, several commanders viewed separating the 
belligerents as the primary role of U.S. forces. “At the tactical level, most of the counter-
insurgency principles apply,” concluded Colonel John Tully, commander of 2d Brigade, 
4th Infantry Division, but adhering to counterinsurgency doctrine at the operational and 
strategic levels of war was “destined for failure as long as the central government is con-
trolled by sectarian forces.”64 Absent a legitimate host-nation government, Tully added, 
coalition forces had to “mediate the conflict at a local level.”65 Posted on the northern out-
skirts of Baghdad in Taji, Colonel James Pasquarette, the commander of 1st Brigade, 4th 
Infantry Division, agreed that U.S. troops were typically seen as “honest brokers” in the 
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ongoing sectarian conflict by both Sunni and Shi’a actors. Pasquarette considered security 
as foundational to the needs of the population, and—as honest brokers—the Americans 
were especially well-suited to provide that security.66 From his area south of the capital, 
Kershaw concurred, commenting that where sectarian violence routinely occurred, the 
job of the coalition was “to prevent two rivals from exterminating each other.”67
A separate assessment prepared around the same time by MNC-I officers for Chiarelli 
took a similar stance. “If the course is not diverted soon,” Chiarelli’s officers warned, 
“then a large-scale ethno-sectarian conflict (civil war) is assured.”68 Their paper called 
for a “fundamental shift” in the coalition’s approach to one of peace enforcement oper-
ations. Forces in and around Baghdad should impose a “forcible separation of belliger-
ent parties,” intervene to restore order, and redouble efforts to retrain civil authorities 
and enhance government credibility.69 “The establishment of physical separation,” they 
posited, “will force a halt in the cycle of violence, creating time for other . . . methods of 
conflict resolution to be utilized.”70 Of course, undertaking such an approach required 
more troops.
Troop presence mattered in the eyes of Multi-National Division-Baghdad’s (MND-
B) brigade commanders, and it also appeared to matter to Iraqis. A division assessment 
in November 2006 found beleaguered Sunni residents in Ghazaliyah relieved to see the 
coalition assuming a more prominent role in providing security. Another assessment 
brought bad news, but it reinforced the same point: in areas where citizens believed that 
coalition forces were leaving, they were less likely to engage and pass on information.71
Troubled by what they saw, the U.S. brigade commanders advocated a new approach. 
If additional troops were not forthcoming, then U.S. leaders needed to change how they 
employed those on hand. The commanders pushed for taking a harder line against 
JAM—“the most significant threat to stability and to coalition forces,” ventured Beech.72 
Sensing (and lamenting) a reluctance to target high-level JAM fighters, Scurlock advised 
ramping up operations to disrupt the militia, detaining its leaders, and then ignoring 
Iraqi demands for their quick release.73 Vail, the commander responsible for Sadr City, 
proposed a deliberate effort to “fractionalize” JAM in order to drive a wedge between the 
mainstream elements of the militia and the more radical factions that were emerging.74 
Causing dissension among JAM’s subgroups might be one way to compensate for a lim-
ited number of U.S. troops.
Adjusting the relationship between coalition and Iraqi units was another. All the bri-
gade commanders assigned to MND-B submitted that the Iraqi security forces in their 
areas of operations bore careful watching. Three officers explicitly recommended revi-
talized unit partnerships to address this pressing need.75 Shields described an arrange-
ment whereby a coalition battalion could cover the same battle space as an Iraqi Army or 
National Police brigade, as well as the police stations there. Such an arrangement would 
not only facilitate closer monitoring by the American unit but also establish a means for 
Iraqi units under distinct chains of command to monitor each other. Shields viewed the 
partnership as a way to improve Iraqi fighting capability since Iraqi security forces “fight 
harder when they know the [coalition force] is minutes away.”76 In turn, an emphasis on 
partnership would drive U.S. leaders to “maintain a continuous presence in [the] zone.”77 
He suggested that a battalion keep one to three platoons forward at all times, ready to 
respond to an Iraqi unit’s call for assistance within 30 minutes.78 Other commanders put 
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a premium on an American presence in order to “align ISF objectives with our own” and 
“limit [their] latitude to passively or actively support sectarian violence.”79 They pro-
posed encouraging the Iraqis to develop an offensive mindset through more combined 
operations and urged the adoption of “combat outposts with direct access to the popula-
tion.”80 Kershaw went so far as to admonish, “Get off the roads and on foot and into the 
hinterlands and side streets.”81 This last bit of advice would take time to institutionalize. 
Still, this set of recommendations offered in the fall of 2006 served as a forerunner of con-
cepts to come.
Amid a Flurry of Transitions, MND-B Consolidates
Given the candid and rather dismal views of the U.S. BCT commanders in Baghdad, 
it was not surprising that Thurman’s 4th Infantry Division saw the situation in a similar 
light following Operation TOGETHER FORWARD II. With Shi’a militants contesting the 
mixed areas in western Baghdad and pushing out into the Sunni belts surrounding the 
city, Thurman considered JAM and other Shi’a militias’ expansion the foremost threat to 
stability. Thurman recognized that the militias’ activity consisted of far more than repri-
sals. The Shi’a militants had seized the initiative, and Sunni attacks now appeared retalia-
tory in nature. Such was the extent of Shi’a aggression as the division saw it. Yet the Iraqi 
Government appeared unwilling to deal firmly and impartially with the militias. The 
Prime Minister’s inaction in the face of rising Shi’a-perpetrated violence led Thurman to 
believe that neutralizing al-Qaeda vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) 
networks would only slow—not break—the cycle of violence in Baghdad.82
The imminent turnover of U.S. units in Baghdad affected the way ahead as well. Of 
the four BCTs operating in the city, three were scheduled to hand over their battle space 
and return home in November. The fourth—the 172d Stryker Brigade—was slated to 
depart without replacement, leaving a sizable gap in combat power until December when 
another Stryker brigade would relocate to the capital from Mosul. Two more BCTs posted 
north and south of Baghdad would also rotate out during this 30-day period—as would 
Thurman’s division headquarters itself. To keep MND-B’s head above water, Thurman 
had three battalions that would remain through the unit turbulence. These anchors of 
continuity were attached to each of the BCT areas in the capital and directed to increase 
their operational tempo during the transition. The division would also boost its available 
combat power by adjusting its coverage of the numerous checkpoints inside the city.83 
In the coming weeks, MND-B intended to focus its operations west of the Army Canal 
in neighborhoods where the most violence occurred. This effectively made operations in 
and around Sadr City an economy of force mission and served as an admission that the 
coalition had little to gain there—especially given the Iraqi Government’s ambivalent 
stance toward operating against Shi’a militants.84 MND-B’s plan to concentrate only on 
Operation TOGETHER FORWARD’s “focus areas” seemed a quiet plea for additional 
manpower. The decision to withdraw from checkpoints, the temporary loss of battalions, 
and the repeatedly delayed arrival of additional Iraqi Army brigades lent a sense of des-
peration to the division’s last few weeks in country.85
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CENTCOM Has Its Doubts
Skepticism about the Baghdad Security Plan extended to the highest levels of CENT-
COM as well. Following a mid-October visit to Iraq, Abizaid determined that the dynamic 
should change and passed on his impressions to Casey. Abizaid had known Thurman for 
decades, and hearing the MND-B commander’s firsthand report on the disappointing 
results of the TOGETHER FORWARD operations made a profound, sobering impres-
sion. While the threat from al-Qaeda remained serious, the sectarian violence that accom-
panied the Shi’a militias’ campaign to dominate Baghdad could prove “fatal” to MNF-I’s 
mission, in Abizaid’s assessment. That the situation seemed “normal” across the rest of 
Iraq mattered little in the face of rising Sunni-Shi’a tensions in the capital. Whatever hap-
pened in Baghdad would be decisive. Besides JAM and other militants’ deliberate effort 
to drive Sunnis from Baghdad’s neighborhoods and extend control over the city, Abizaid 
was also concerned about increasing sectarianism in the Iraqi security forces. Singling 
out the National Police as especially troublesome—as Thurman had done—he deemed 
Ministry of Interior units and institutions as “at best dysfunctional and at worst a deep 
piece of the sectarian problem.”86 Recent personnel assignments in key Iraqi Army units 
suggested that the same problem had begun to grip the Ministry of Defense.87
The need for the coalition to reverse the alarming trends in the security situation had 
become even more urgent, but Abizaid believed that any meaningful reversal would 
require “serious commitment by the Iraqis.” By this, he meant “firm Iraqi governmen-
tal intervention, particularly against Jaysh al-Mahdi and bad MOI [Interior Ministry] 
units.”88 In the short term, Casey’s forces could attempt to address the dire situation in 
the capital militarily. However, for robust military action to have any lasting effect, it 
needed to be complemented by actions to advance reconciliation and, according to Abi-
zaid, progress in this area depended almost entirely on the Iraqis. Achieving mutually 
reinforcing progress in the areas of security and governance was the way to reduce sec-
tarian violence in Baghdad, he judged. This was the task before Casey and Khalilzad as 
the CENTCOM commander saw it.89
POLITICAL DEFEAT OF THE BAGHDAD AND BASRAH SECURITY PLANS
Casey and Maliki: A Troubled Partnership
Unfortunately, political progress was far from imminent. Worse, the Iraqi Govern-
ment seemed to be playing a deliberately disruptive role, but the MNF-I commander 
had failed to appreciate the extent of its troublesome behavior. As the coalition struggled 
to check the escalating violence in the summer and fall of 2006, Casey gradually real-
ized that Maliki and his allies interpreted any organized Sunni activity—hostile or oth-
erwise—as the potential forerunner of a broader Ba’athist resurgence. This led the Prime 
Minister to balk at authorizing operations against Shi’a militias that he and other Shi’a 
leaders seemed to think they might someday need to defeat the Ba’ath.90 This state-sanc-
tioned sectarianism became evident to U.S. troops executing the “clear-hold-build” con-
cept underpinning Operations TOGETHER FORWARD I and II. After clearing Sunni 
neighborhoods, the Americans noticed a lag in the delivery of basic services that could 
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not be explained by a simple lack of ministerial capacity. Sectarian bias on the part of the 
Shi’a-run ministries was clearly at play. A similar unseemly bias affected the behavior of 
the Iraqi security forces.91
Casey’s experience with Maliki illustrated a complex side of civil-military relations: 
how should a theater commander approach negotiations regarding military strategy and 
security operations with a host-nation head of government driven by his own narrow 
political interests? As Casey saw it, Maliki was the head of a legitimate government that 
subscribed to civilian control of the military and was due Casey’s respect and deference. 
Although not Casey’s boss, he was regarded by the MNF-I commander as a partner. In 
this partnership, Casey conceived of his role as providing military advice and then letting 
Maliki lead, not twisting the Prime Minister’s arm against his political interests. It was 
up to Maliki to weigh the risks and make decisions. Casey believed he had little ability to 
affect the Prime Minister’s decision-making calculus in any case, and he was not inclined 
to do so if it would undermine Maliki’s leadership in real and perceived ways.92
Casey had his own views about what was best for Maliki, but he could not know all 
of the factors that shaped the Prime Minister’s political calculus. In late 2006, the general 
was especially sensitive to Maliki’s need to maintain the support of the Sadrists to stay 
in power, as inconvenient—or even detrimental—as that relationship was for coalition 
operations at the time. Casey consented to give Maliki space to maneuver since a collapse 
of the Maliki government could potentially set back the campaign’s progress by 6 to 12 
months.93 Facing the likely expiration in December 2007 of the UNSCR that authorized 
the coalition’s mission, that was time MNF-I could ill afford to lose. Nonetheless, Casey 
was much less willing to tolerate decisions that threatened to undermine Iraq’s security 
institutions—especially the army. Iraq could limp along and manage the symptoms of a 
low-grade civil war, he believed, but if the Iraqi Army itself fractured, the entire edifice 
of the coalition’s transition-based strategy would crumble along with it.94
In a sense, the general was in line with then-President George W. Bush’s approach. 
Regarding Maliki, Bush saw assertions of independence and decisiveness as positive 
signs and instructed Casey and Khalilzad to “nurture his spirit of leadership.” Now that 
the United States had an Iraqi Prime Minister who appeared eager to lead, it should 
“work with him” and “hold his hand” through the difficult issues if necessary.95 This per-
spective was consistent with Casey’s interpretation of UNSCR 1546, which assigned the 
MNF-I commander a responsibility to establish a “security partnership” with the Iraqis. 
As Casey saw it, the UNSCR unconventionally assigned to him—the military command-
er—a “direct role with the sovereign government of Iraq to coordinate” this partnership.96 
To those like Rumsfeld who routinely expressed their frustration with Maliki’s leader-
ship, Casey counseled, “You need to walk a mile in Maliki’s shoes.”97 The Prime Minister 
was under tremendous pressure from all sides, and additionally, the process of hammer-
ing out political deals involving diverse stakeholders took time. In early November, the 
general went so far as to attribute some of the recent improvement he had witnessed in 
Iraq to Maliki’s efforts.98 Publicly too, Casey had sung the Prime Minister’s praises. In 
what he considered damage control, Casey had issued a press release in late September 
to counter criticism conveyed anonymously to journalists by subordinate commanders 
in MNF-I. Maliki was doing the best he could in a challenging situation, Casey declared, 
and he remained a reliable partner.99
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The Temporary “Pulse” of Operation SINBAD
Far from the sectarian politics and death squads of Baghdad, MND-SE’s Operation 
SINBAD finally commenced on October 28, when two companies from the 1st Battal-
ion, Staffordshire Regiment, pulsed into northern Basrah’s Muftiah University District 
near the Iraqi Naval Academy.100 Far from being either ready or willing to participate, 
the 10th Iraqi Army Division provided a meager two dozen soldiers. The Staffords and 
the 1st Royal Green Jackets would lead later “pulses,” with assistance from the Danish 
battle group in a few of the city’s northern districts. Over a period of 3 days, coalition 
troops cordoned off areas, established vehicle checkpoints, and conducted patrols. They 
emphasized assessing and strengthening district police stations, expecting that police-
men would begin to assert their authority on Basrah’s streets.
As planned, each limited geographical “pulse” was followed by a “pause” of up to 
a month in order to conduct police training and to initiate quick-impact projects like 
painting public buildings, constructing soccer fields, refurbishing schools, and restocking 
medical centers. As the coalition spent development money on one district, citizens in 
other neighborhoods clamored for similar job opportunities and community improve-
ments. “It underlined the importance of money as a ‘weapon system’ in complex stabili-
zation operations,” one commander recalled, lamenting the dearth of UK-provided funds 
typically available to MND-SE leaders at the tactical level.101 Still, Shirreff had to remind 
Maliki in November that Operation SINBAD was not simply about reconstruction. It had 
a security component as well, and the British commander hoped to extend its impact by 
pushing into Basrah’s city center during the operation’s next phase.102 While raids had 
killed or captured a number of militants, JAM and other militias continued to contest 
Operation SINBAD’s modest and temporary incursions. Sniper fire met British troops at 
each pulse, and indirect-fire attacks on coalition outposts intensified over time. Casey, 
on an early November trip to Basrah, was struck by how the problem of indirect-fire 
consumed MND-SE commanders and their staffs—not to mention the U.S. and UK civil-
ian-run offices co-located with the headquarters.103 Indeed, frequent rocket and mortar 
attacks effectively drove the British-led provincial reconstruction team out of Basrah 
Palace in the fall, forcing the team’s relocation to Kuwait until facilities could be prepared 
for it at MND-SE’s main base outside the city.104 Casey saw the threat of indirect-fire as a 
strategically significant issue, distinct from SINBAD’s almost trivial focus on improving 
“atmospherics” in certain neighborhoods. Alarmed, the MNF-I commander asked Chi-
arelli to consider directing Shirreff to discontinue the operation and turn MND-SE’s full 
attention to stopping indirect-fire attacks. JAM, Casey perceived, was attempting to force 
a UK withdrawal through a rain of rockets and mortars, and he wanted to avoid another 
embarrassing coalition pullout along the lines of Camp Abu Naji.105 Indirect-fire attacks 
across MND-SE continued to rise in December, topping more than 25 per week during 
the final 2 weeks.106
In Casey’s view, the British had allowed the situation in the south to get out of control 
and had failed to adapt their overarching approach once political and military consider-
ations made it untenable.107 Abizaid had similar thoughts on Basrah’s turn for the worse, 
but, given the crisis in Baghdad in late 2006, he had little to recommend when it came to 
improving MND-SE’s prospects. During an October visit, the CENTCOM commander 
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flew into Basrah and saw Shirreff. He left feeling uneasy. “Basra is a concern,” he wrote 
Casey, adding that the situation in Iraq’s largest southern city was “probably not as good 
as Richard thinks.”108
Operation SINBAD culminated on the night of December 25 with the destruction of 
the Jamiat police station—the headquarters of Basrah’s notorious Serious Crimes Unit 
and the site where British troops had fought militia-allied local police the previous year. 
Thoroughly infiltrated by militia members, the station had become a den of systemic 
corruption and torture. Three days earlier, the British had arrested seven members of 
the Serious Crimes Unit for running a death squad. On the night of the raid, Royal Engi-
neers breached the Jamiat station walls, allowing Staffordshire Regiment troops in infan-
try fighting vehicles to penetrate the compound. As they cleared the buildings, soldiers 
found 127 prisoners showing obvious signs of torture and took them into protective cus-
tody. The Royal Engineers used explosives to demolish the station.109
Operation SINBAD made local and temporary security gains but failed to achieve its 
main objective of reversing the deteriorating situation in Basrah over the long term. In 
the end, militia influence and intimidation of the populace continued, attacks against the 
coalition in MND-SE rose, and Iraqi forces remained incapable and unwilling to assume 
responsibility for security even as the British prepared to transfer additional bases in 
2007. Shirreff’s plan depended on a host of resources, requiring troops and reconstruc-
tion money not only to “clear” an area but also to “hold” and “build.” Civilian and mil-
itary leaders in London had declined to resource MND-SE adequately, allowing the 
constraints of politics and army force structure to exert greater influence on troop levels 
than the logical requirements of a daunting ground campaign.110
While Shirreff’s efforts to employ a comprehensive approach by integrating civilian 
agencies were well-intentioned, the improved communications it generated mattered 
little if poor security confined British aid workers to coalition operating bases and pre-
vented their engagement with Iraqis. Similarly, the Maliki administration’s failure to 
support Shirreff’s plans politically and militarily contributed to Operation SINBAD’s 
shortfalls. The Prime Minister’s hesitancy to confront Shi’a militias watered down the 
decisive operation the British commander had envisioned, making it a shadow of its orig-
inal design. Militia infiltration, a lack of training, and low personnel strength ensured 
that the Iraqi security forces could not enforce the rule of law on their own. As a result, 
the British could cobble together enough troops to clear an area, but when the pulse and 
pause concluded, and coalition forces moved on, JAM and other militias would dominate 
Basrah’s districts once again.111
Backing Down: The Army Canal Checkpoints and Specialist Ahmed al-Taie
The vastly differing views between the coalition and the Iraqi Government about 
how to address Baghdad’s Shi’a militants and their destabilizing activities came to a 
head at the end of October with the kidnapping of an American Soldier. On October 
23, Shi’a militants seized U.S. Army Specialist Ahmed al-Taie, an Iraqi-born American, 
during the Soldier’s unauthorized absence from a coalition base to call on his family in 
the Karada neighborhood of Baghdad. Kidnapped by local JAM members who had pre-
viously observed him visiting his Iraqi wife, within hours al-Taie was handed over to 
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Qais al-Khazali’s Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq militia, the most powerful of the Iranian-sponsored 
Special Groups. Suspecting the missing Soldier was being held in Sadr City, Thurman 
and MND-B ramped up coalition presence at the Iraqi-manned Army Canal checkpoints 
on Sadr City’s western edge to 24 hours per day. With American troops monitoring their 
operations, Iraqi National Police units searched every vehicle crossing the bridges over 
the canal. The measure not only disrupted JAM’s freedom of movement, it also accom-
panied a surge of coalition activity in and around the safe haven that knocked the militia 
back on its heels. Soldiers from the 4th Brigade, 101st Airborne Division conducted a 
U.S.-only cordon and search operation targeting a Sadr City mosque and did so unchal-
lenged during daylight hours.112
Maliki immediately objected to the checkpoints ostensibly because they caused traffic 
jams and stifled commerce in East Baghdad. In reality, the Prime Minister was under 
pressure from the Sadrists to persuade MNF-I to relax its presence at the checkpoints. 
Maliki believed that Moqtada Sadr would call for a nationwide strike if the Iraqi Govern-
ment allowed the checkpoints to continue.113 Given his careful efforts to court the Sadrists 
politically, the Prime Minister took this threat seriously, believing that such a confronta-
tion could trigger the fall of his government.114 
After days of chiding from Maliki, Casey directed MNC-I and MND-B on the morn-
ing of October 30 to scale back the rigor of the checkpoints, adopting random vehicle 
checks and thus preventing long queues from forming in and around Sadr City. Some 
U.S. reports, however, indicated that Taie was still alive and detained in Sadr City and 
that the combined checkpoints along the Army Canal were keeping his captors from 
moving him to a more remote location. In an appeal to Casey a few hours later, Chiarelli 
called the evidence supporting this assessment “overwhelming.” Echoing the sentiments 
of Thurman and MND-B, Chiarelli urged Casey to reconsider his directive and reinstate 
100 percent checks. Aside from the obvious advantage of bolstering the chances of Taie’s 
recovery, Chiarelli saw longer-term value in maintaining the Army Canal checkpoints. 
In the few days the checkpoints had been fully in place, his commanders had seen clear 
signs that they were disrupting JAM’s campaign of sectarian cleansing in mixed areas of 
the city.115 They were “absolutely essential” in cutting down death squad activity, Chi-
arelli concluded.116
The next day, October 31, Casey went to see Maliki. Visibly exhausted, the Prime 
Minister greeted the general with a half-joking query: “Why are you always giving me 
trouble?”117 He wanted to know how MNF-I could justify the punishment of three million 
Sadr City residents over the loss of a single Soldier. Taie’s Iraqi origin and relation to his 
uncle Entifadh Qanbar, a Sunni politician and an ally of Ahmad Chalabi, seemed in Mali-
ki’s eyes to undermine the coalition’s claim on the missing American. “This guy is one of 
us, not one of you,” Maliki added incredulously.118
Casey challenged the Prime Minister’s rationale for lifting the checkpoints. Shi’a com-
plaints about excessive traffic congestion in East Baghdad were exaggerated, he said. The 
general had flown over the city recently and had seen for himself. Maliki admitted as 
much but reiterated his need to act in order to minimize the incident’s political liability.119 
Leveling with the Prime Minister, Casey presented the disadvantages associated with lift-
ing the checkpoints. First, he said, relaxing the search criteria at the canal bridges might 
jeopardize the effort to find Taie and reflect poorly on Maliki in the court of U.S. public 
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opinion. The Prime Minister slyly retorted that, in an unrelated conversation with Bush, 
the American chief executive had told him not to fret about what Americans thought 
about the war in Iraq. Secondly, Casey continued, Maliki would be seen as “caving to 
the Sadrists”—an especially damaging charge should death squad activity increase as 
the general guessed it would. Finally, the Prime Minister would be perceived as “caring 
more about Shi’a than Sunni Iraqis,” the MNF-I commander warned. But the decision 
rested with Maliki, Casey concluded.120 Unsurprisingly, within hours, Maliki announced 
his order lifting “all barriers and checkpoints and opening all crossing points into Sadr 
City.” A government press release described the measure as one that would facilitate 
traffic movement in Baghdad. Future traffic controls, it declared, would take place only 
at night during curfew hours or in the case of emergencies.121
Chiarelli had long doubted the Iraqi Government’s evenhandedness in the increas-
ingly bloody sectarian struggle. Even so, the confrontation over the checkpoints left him 
“stunned” and “angered,” he told historians later.122 Sunni Vice President Tariq Hashimi 
viewed the matter with similar gravity. He heard about the result of Casey’s meeting 
with Maliki almost instantly and phoned the general, leaving a foreboding message: the 
checkpoint decision would be catastrophic for the Sunnis of Baghdad.123 It laid bare the 
meager extent of the coalition’s remaining influence over Maliki.124
The incident also spelled the end of Specialist Taie. With the checkpoints effectively 
lifted, MNF-I lost track of him and his captors. A 10-second proof-of-life video was posted 
on a Shi’a militant website 3 months later in February 2007, but, otherwise, the United 
States would see no physical sign of him until Khazali and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq returned 
Taie’s remains in February 2012, a few weeks after American troops left Iraq.125
Diverging End States
The dispute over the checkpoints was emblematic of the frequent clashes between 
Chiarelli and Casey. Chiarelli appreciated the fact that the MNF-I commander endured 
tremendous political pressure, but he could not help but think that the force and corps 
headquarters were both “disconnected from reality.”126 To continue to wage a counterin-
surgency hampered by so formidable an obstacle as the host-nation government and its 
Prime Minister seemed futile to the MNC-I commander. Chiarelli later bristled at charges 
that he had fought a 9-to-5 war with forces that commuted to their areas of operations 
each day. Rather than attempt to defend this as the preferred way to conduct operations 
to secure the population, the general cited the guidance he had received from higher 
headquarters.127 Throughout 2006, MNC-I’s orders had been to close forward operating 
bases at a steady pace as part of a campaign to transition responsibility to the Iraqis. A 
corps order published in April had called for a reduction in coalition bases from 110 to 54 
by the end of 2006. With just weeks remaining in Chiarelli’s tour, the modified goal look-
ing ahead to 2007 was 30 bases.128 “There was no point where I was told to stop shutting 
down” forward operating bases, he recalled.129 Chiarelli later described MNF-I’s plan as 
one that—after February or March 2006—“should never have been executed.”130 He had 
voiced his concerns, but Casey had dismissed or downplayed many of them, Chiarelli 
believed.131
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According to Chiarelli, the inability to influence the Iraqi ministries plagued the coa-
lition throughout 2006.132 The corps commander had begun his tour intent on “winning 
the peace” through largely “non-kinetic” means such as the delivery of basic services and 
providing economic opportunity for civilians. However, a woefully dysfunctional gov-
ernment was infertile ground for an approach that depended so much on the development 
of civil capacity. By the end of the year, the disorder plaguing the central government 
reached its peak. Still embroiled in a crippling and destructive “war of the ministries,” 
the arms of the executive branch effectively fought as proxies in a struggle for power. 
The government was collectively held hostage by the cycle of sectarian violence, while 
various subcomponents worked against each other to exacerbate the cycle.
Ever since the first months of Maliki’s administration, Chiarelli believed he had 
detected the ruthless implementation of a sectarian agenda in various ministries.133 By 
fall 2006, his frustration had reached the point of suspecting that the government of 
Iraq defined progress in starkly different terms than the coalition striving to support 
it. MND-B saw the same problem and considered it a matter of two parties sharing a 
common end state but pursuing it by different means. The coalition and the Iraqi Govern-
ment both desired stability in Baghdad that would lay a foundation for future political 
and economic development, Thurman’s command judged, but while the coalition sought 
this goal by eliminating death squads and accelerants of sectarian violence, the govern-
ment seemed set on doing it by consolidating Shi’a power and running the Sunnis out of 
town.134
In his final weeks in Iraq in November–December 2006, Chiarelli jettisoned MND-B’s 
attempt at nuance and declared that the coalition and the Government of Iraq were pur-
suing completely different and increasingly diverging end states. The coalition adhered 
to a balanced approach, protecting both Sunni and Shi’a neighborhoods, while transition-
ing security responsibility to what it hoped would be nonsectarian Iraqi security forces. 
To Chiarelli, it had become clear that Maliki aimed to limit coalition freedom of action 
while JAM and other Shi’a militias expanded their control in and around Baghdad. The 
government, he inferred, was not serious about reconciliation, an essential milestone for 
moving forward. On the contrary, it obstructed the process by tolerating or encouraging 
the spread of sectarian influence in the army and police. The two end states in Chiarelli’s 
mind included different sets of “winners” and “losers.” In the coalition’s end state, Sunni, 
Shi’a, and Kurdish citizens would be regarded equally, while al-Qaeda and Shi’a militias 
lost out. In the other, the Sunnis collectively fell into the loser’s column, and Shi’a mili-
tias emerged as victorious. “While various players in [the] GOI have different visions for 
Iraq’s future,” he concluded, “dominant players (Shi’a and Kurds) are rapidly moving 
towards an end state that differs substantially from the end state envisioned and pursued 
by the coalition.”135
Frustrated with Chiarelli’s focus on the political and economic aspects of the conflict, 
Casey thought his subordinate was too distracted. As the “guys with the guns,” the corps 
needed to concentrate first and foremost on employing its military power as effectively as 
possible and to worry less about what the Iraqi Government did or did not do, the MNF-I 
commander admonished his subordinate.136
Nonetheless, Casey himself wondered whether a “Shi’a hand” was manipulat-
ing Maliki and pressuring the Prime Minister to rein in the coalition. From the MNF-I 
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commander’s vantage point, Maliki did very little to stop the growth of JAM’s power—
particularly since that growth benefited him politically.137 He would need to be persuaded 
to modify his approach. Casey agreed with Rumsfeld adviser Stephen Cambone, who 
suggested that the Iraqis were still “struggling to find their own end state.”138 But this 
was too charitable. MNF-I’s efforts in late 2006 to change the dynamic in Baghdad were 
hamstrung by Iraqi sectarian bias. If reducing violence in the capital required a serious 
Iraqi commitment as Casey believed, then Maliki and his allies inside and outside the 
government undoubtedly were committed. They were just pursuing an agenda much at 
variance with the coalition’s aims. Something had to change.
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CONCLUSION: 
FROM INSURGENCY TO CIVIL WAR, 2004-2006
From December 2003 to December 2006, the war in Iraq evolved from a relatively 
loose insurgency against the U.S.-led coalition into a horrific ethno-sectarian civil war that 
tore at the fabric of Iraqi society and threatened Iraq’s very existence as a unitary state. 
This 3-year period, which began with the false hope that Saddam Hussein’s capture in 
December 2003 would cause the insurgency to evaporate, quickly entered a demoralizing 
stage caused by the April 2004 uprisings and the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. Had it not 
been for the response of the departing 1st Armored Division as an unplanned operational 
reserve, the coalition might well have suffered a strategic defeat along the lines of the 
1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam. The shock of the April crisis dispelled the coalition’s unre-
alistic ideas that the Iraq mission might be handed off in 2004 to a United Nations (UN) 
or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) peacekeeping force. It also exposed the 
fact that the coalition had too few troops for the mission, a condition that would persist 
for most of the war. The uprising made coalition commanders wary for the next 4 years of 
provoking a war with the Sadr movement. It also bolstered the Sunni insurgency, which 
promulgated a narrative that it had fought the coalition to a standstill in Fallujah.
The summer 2004 transition of coalition commands from Combined Joint Task Force-7 
(CJTF-7) to Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), and of commanders from Lieutenant 
General Ricardo Sanchez to General George W. Casey, Jr., appeared to right the ship by 
bringing new direction and organization to a flagging coalition effort. As Iraq moved into 
a UN-sponsored electoral process, Casey and MNF-I’s “fight to the elections” appeared 
to deal the Sunni and Shi’a insurgencies a serious blow in fall 2004. The battles in Najaf, 
Fallujah, and Samarra showed that no insurgent force could hold terrain in the face of a 
concerted coalition attack and that select Iraqi units such as the 36th Commandos could 
be integrated usefully into coalition operations. The clearing of insurgent sanctuaries 
enabled the January 2005 election to take place, and with a new Iraqi Interim Government 
on the horizon, the strategy—agreed upon by Casey, General John Abizaid, and Secretary 
of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld—of transitioning security responsibility to the 
Iraqi Government and its new security forces seemed to promise to stabilize the country.
In hindsight, however, U.S. leaders had misjudged the situation. The fall 2004 bat-
tles had left Moqtada Sadr’s and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s forces intact enough to fight 
another day, and the 36th Commandos’ performance had given coalition leaders the mis-
taken impression that the Iraqi Army as a whole was growing quickly enough in capabil-
ity. The Sunni insurgency in particular was strong enough to produce a Sunni boycott of 
the January 2005 elections that had far-reaching negative consequences. Coalition lead-
ers had assumed that elections would have a unifying effect through the creation of an 
Iraqi Government whose popular legitimacy would sap the insurgency of its strength. 
In actuality, the Sunni Arab boycott froze Sunnis out of the new government formation 
and constitutional process, leaving them terrified that they had handed political power to 
Shi’a Islamist parties that meant them harm. In the aftermath of this polarizing election, 
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the insurgency that had begun in 2003 as a movement to expel the U.S.-led coalition 
gradually devolved into a conflict between sectarian militant groups on both sides of 
the Sunni-Shi’a and Arab-Kurd divides, with the election itself serving as an accelerant 
toward civil war. Within the Sunni insurgency, Zarqawi and his al-Qaeda in Iraq aimed 
at provoking a sectarian civil war by carrying out a relentless terror campaign against the 
Iraqi Shi’a community. Other Sunni resistance groups, having realized the strategic error 
of the January 2005 boycott, began to split from Zarqawi and negotiate to join the political 
process. However, Iraq’s Shi’a population responded to Zarqawi’s attacks by turning to 
its own ruthless militias to protect its communities and strike back against Iraqi Sunnis, 
further escalating the sectarian conflict. At the same time, in northern Iraq, Sunni militant 
groups intensified a war against the Kurds along the Green Line in hopes of expelling 
Kurdish forces and communities from territories occupied by the Kurdish parties in 2003.
Coalition leaders were slow to recognize these changes in the character of the conflict 
and did not reexamine the fundamental assumptions of the campaign. Instead, they con-
tinued to formulate plans and conduct operations as though Sunni and Shi’a militants 
were fighting mainly to expel the coalition rather than fighting each other for power 
and survival. After the seating of the government of Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja’afari 
in spring 2005, many of the Iraqi governance and security institutions the coalition was 
helping to build came under the control of sectarian parties who used those institutions 
for sectarian ends. In the Baghdad region, in particular, Shi’a death squads aligned with 
the Iraqi Government and Sunni insurgent death squads each began to prey on civilians 
from the opposing sect, creating a growing sense of fear among the populace.
In summer 2005, as these dynamics grew stronger, the United States was undertaking 
two initiatives designed to disrupt the Sunni insurgency in its Syrian sanctuary and to 
give the new Iraqi Government the means with which to secure the country itself. The 
first initiative involved the deployment of teams of military advisers to embed within 
and mentor the multiplying Iraqi Army and police units—a mission the U.S. Army had 
not conducted on a large scale since the Vietnam war. The additional requirement to 
deploy several thousand senior officers and noncommissioned officers as advisers fell 
on a U.S. Army already stretched thin by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet U.S. 
Army leaders did not seek a significant increase in the Army’s end strength and did not 
halt the modernization (or transformation) of the Army’s brigades, a process that made 
a large number of active units temporarily unavailable for deployment. In the place of 
these active units, the Army chose to deploy large contingents from the National Guard, 
resourcing the 2005 rotation of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM with almost 70,000 reserve 
component troops. As a result, during the pivotal 2005 election year, nearly half of the 
coalition’s total force was from the reserve component.
The same summer, Casey undertook a second initiative, this one to disrupt the Sunni 
insurgency’s car-bomb campaign against Baghdad by shifting almost a division’s worth 
of coalition combat power to the Iraq-Syria border zone. While this shift succeeded in 
disrupting the flow of foreign fighters across the border, hard-won tactical victories in 
Tel Afar and Al Qa’im obscured the reality that at the operational level the campaign 
was heading in the wrong direction. Those successes had come by pulling critical combat 
power away from central Iraq and removing the most effective brake on sectarian violence 
just as the conflict among the warring Iraqi factions was accelerating there. With death 
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squads from sectarian militias and rogue sections of the government working to cleanse 
the Baghdad region of rival sects, the cycle of violence in central Iraq was approaching 
the point of civil war.
The October and December elections of 2005 left coalition leaders with the sense that 
Iraqis, especially Sunnis, were choosing the democratic political process over the insur-
gency and that the Iraqi security forces that had secured the voting were ready to begin 
taking responsibility for security. For Casey and MNF-I, the time seemed right to begin 
the U.S. troop drawdown that he had believed since August 2004 would be the eventual 
path to success in Iraq, and to accelerate the transition of responsibility and bases to 
the Iraqis. MNF-I’s assessments were clouded by the fact that violence against coalition 
troops was decreasing as AQI and other militia groups became more focused on killing 
fellow Iraqis. They were also clouded by the coalition’s flawed evaluations of the Iraqi 
security forces, which often failed to capture intangible factors such as Iraqi units’ will 
to fight. Finally, in retrospect, coalition leaders and strategists should also have recog-
nized far earlier the danger that Iraq would descend into ethno-sectarian civil war in 
the aftermath of the collapse of the Iraqi state in 2003. They should also have predicted 
that hastily organized elections held amid a violent ethno-sectarian power struggle were 
almost certain to be destabilizing rather than stabilizing events. In contrast to the gener-
ally homogeneous United States, which needed 13 years to write a constitution, ratify it, 
and seat an elected government after declaring independence, the heterogeneous Iraq 
would have less than 2 years to accomplish the same tasks after the transition of sover-
eignty. Recognizing these factors might have led the coalition to act with greater caution 
as it sped toward Iraqi elections and the erection of a new state.
These dynamics came to a head in the aftermath of the Samarra mosque bombing in 
February 2006. In the days following the attack, Casey and MNF-I mistakenly perceived 
only a temporary spike in violence and judged that the Iraqi political process would sta-
bilize the country. MNF-I leaders’ denials that Iraq had fallen into civil war echoed the 
coalition’s 2003 denials of an active insurgency and stifled conversation about whether 
the coalition’s fundamental strategy needed to be changed. Also as in 2003, MNF-I in 
2006 believed the situation could be resolved by tactical responses. As the situation con-
tinued to deteriorate, however, Casey came to realize that the conflict had shifted from 
an insurgency against coalition forces to a complex war among Iraqis for political and 
economic power. Even so, Casey maintained that Iraqis needed to resolve their sectarian 
problems themselves, a conclusion that validated his decision to continue with MNF-I’s 
campaign plan of transitioning authority and bases to the Iraqis and reducing his force 
to 10 U.S. brigades by the end of 2006. The seating of a national unity government under 
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and the promising 
outreach to Sunni insurgents seemed to validate Casey’s decision as well.
In actuality, the shrine bombing did not mark the start of the Iraqi civil war, but rather 
the point at which MNF-I’s perception of the conflict began to catch up with the reality 
that resistance to the coalition was no longer the principal cause of Iraq’s violence. In 
truth, Iraq’s violent power struggle had begun with the fall of Saddam and only intensi-
fied during the tenure of the Ja’afari government. The four major groups Casey perceived 
as defining the security environment in the post-Samarra period—Sunni extremists, 
Shi’a extremists, the Sunni resistance, and Iran—had all been competing fiercely in Iraq’s 
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communal struggle since mid-2004, if not earlier. By the end of Operation TOGETHER 
FORWARD II in October 2006, the assumptions underpinning the coalition’s transition 
strategy had crumbled: neither the seating of a 4-year government, nor the receding of 
U.S. troops from the Iraqi population, nor the death of al-Qaeda in Iraq’s (AQI) leader 
had created a stabilizing effect. Pressured by militants on all sides, the Iraqi Government 
ministries had virtually ceased to function, rendering reconstruction plans moot. As U.S. 
commanders were forced to cancel their planned withdrawal of combat brigades in mid-
2006, then-President George W. Bush lost faith in the coalition’s transition strategy and 
began to seek a new one. Simply put, the transition had failed.
EXPLAINING THE FAILURE OF THE TRANSITION STRATEGY
The key reasons for the failure of the transition strategy begin with the coalition’s 
understandable but mistaken decision to focus on operations against insurgent groups 
in 2004-2006 rather than on preventing the emerging Iraqi civil war. In the context of an 
Iraqi civil war, the elections of 2005 proved to be destabilizing events that handed control 
of the state and its resources to one party in that war, to be used against another warring 
party. In addition, the coalition leaders’ assumption that the presence of foreign troops 
created antibodies and insecurity in Iraq was counterproductive. As coalition forces began 
withdrawing from the Iraqi population in 2005-2006, they left a security vacuum that the 
warring parties’ militants filled, to the detriment of the population. As Casey instructed 
his units to consolidate on larger bases, they began to lose awareness of the security situ-
ation in the streets and neighborhoods of their areas of operations, undermining Casey’s 
own guidance for MNF-I units to conduct counterinsurgency operations. This loss of sit-
uational awareness masked the growing danger of sectarian violence, a danger that coa-
lition leaders compounded by deciding to off-ramp two full brigades scheduled to arrive 
in 2006. By the time MNF-I finally realized in mid-2006 that the character of the conflict 
had changed, it was too late—the coalition did not have enough forces to suppress the 
escalating violence.
The coalition leaders’ antibody theory was paired with the assumption that reducing 
the coalition footprint was necessary to prevent the Iraqis from developing a dependency 
on coalition forces that would slow the Iraqi security forces’ growth. Taken together, 
these concepts produced continual pressure from senior U.S. leaders and commanders 
to reduce forces. At the operational and tactical levels, these factors meant that coalition 
units were constantly starved of manpower, and that CJTF-7 and MNF-I went 3 years 
without a true operational reserve. The predictable result was the opening of geographic 
gaps in security that insurgent groups recognized and exploited.
Another key component of the transition strategy was the premise that Iraqi security 
forces, which coalition commanders assumed would not create the same antibodies as 
foreign troops, could be quickly and effectively built, thereby enabling coalition forces to 
withdraw. Several factors hindered the coalition from developing Iraqi military capabil-
ities sufficiently to take over security tasks and achieve this goal. First, the sheer scope of 
the security force assistance mission in Iraq went far beyond what the U.S. military was 
prepared to accomplish and vastly exceeded the capacity of the U.S. Special Forces that 
traditionally executed such missions. The ad hoc transition teams were an inadequate 
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substitute, with their size, composition, and command relationships with tactical com-
manders all proving to be challenges that degraded their effectiveness.
The coalition’s early decision that the Iraqi security forces should be designed without 
capabilities that could be threatening to Iraq’s neighbors compounded these problems, 
given the danger of Iraq’s surrounding region. More importantly, perhaps, it resulted 
in an Iraqi Security Force (ISF) that was unable even to maintain internal security. In 
addition, the decision to use contractors to provide the ISF’s logistics hobbled the ISF’s 
long-term development while creating the temptation and opportunity for corruption 
that corroded Iraq’s new security institutions.
These deficiencies were masked by Multi-National Security Transition Com-
mand-Iraq’s (MNSTC-I) and MNF-I’s focus on flawed metrics for ISF effectiveness. Rather 
than subjectively evaluating Iraqi units’ ability to fight, the Transition Readiness Assess-
ment (TRA) primarily focused on quantifiable factors such as the number of soldiers 
present and equipped. It also missed the crucial issue of each Iraqi unit’s ethno-sectarian 
makeup, which might have served as an indicator of whether the ISF was truly a national 
force or a politicized one. Nevertheless, the TRA became a key component of determining 
progress in the coalition campaign plan and in making decisions to drawdown coalition 
forces.
Beyond political and security transition, the coalition undermined its own counterter-
rorism and counterinsurgency operations by its incoherent detention policies and opera-
tions. The decision to treat captured insurgents under the Geneva Conventions as civilian 
detainees rather than enemy prisoners of war meant the issue of detention was convoluted 
and challenging for the duration of the war. The United States never solved this problem, 
and insurgents and terrorists took advantage of the dead space and legal loopholes that 
existed between the two Geneva Conventions categories. These challenges, coupled with 
constant political pressure to reduce detainee population, resulted in overcrowding and 
insurgent recruitment in detention facilities, as well as a dysfunctional review system 
that repeatedly released large numbers of the enemy back to the battlefield. The coali-
tion’s own detention system gave the enemy breathing space in which to mature and to 
make the battlefield a more dangerous place for coalition troops.
Finally, the coalition’s transition strategy never satisfactorily addressed the issue of 
destabilizing interventions by Iraq’s neighbors in 2004-2006—especially the Syrian and 
Iranian regimes. The Syrian regime allowed its territory to become a base for Ba’athist 
militants and militant jihadists who infiltrated into Iraq and fueled a sectarian terror cam-
paign there—a decision that would later have consequences for the survival of the Syrian 
state itself. Meanwhile, on Iraq’s eastern border, Iran funneled support to Shi’a militant 
proxies fighting U.S. and coalition forces and conducting large-scale sectarian cleansing 
in central Iraq. Washington policymakers recoiled from addressing the serious threat 
these twin insurgent sanctuaries posed to MNF-I’s campaign. This policy failure resulted 
in inadequate operational-level answers to a strategic problem, such as the misguided 
shifting of coalition combat power from Baghdad west to the Syrian border in 2005.
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INNOVATIONS, ADAPTATIONS, AND SIGNS FOR THE FUTURE
Despite the failure of the transition campaign, the years 2004-2006 saw considerable 
innovation and change, some of which developed from the bottom up and some that 
were the result of strategic decisions. General Peter Schoomaker’s choice to continue 
Army transformation amid the strains of two wars represented one such strategic deci-
sion that had an operational impact in the Iraq theater for the entire war. Army transfor-
mation was beneficial in pushing key resources such as intelligence assets and analysts 
down to the brigade level, where they were useful in the decentralized Iraq operating 
environment. At the same time, however, the troop strength of Army brigades decreased 
considerably, which was problematic in population-centric counterinsurgency warfare. 
As a result, the net benefit of transformation for the Iraq War is unclear.
In the realm of civil-military operations, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad’s and Casey’s 
decision to transplant the concept of provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) from Afghan-
istan to Iraq represented another substantial innovation. In principle, the injection of 
PRTs aimed to integrate different elements of national power into the struggle to improve 
Iraq’s ability to govern, which presumably would improve its legitimacy. In practice, 
U.S. Government agencies were slow to execute and manage this integration in 2006. 
Most non-Department of Defense agencies lacked the resources to make a considerable 
contribution and lacked the authority to force government personnel to take danger-
ous PRT assignments. A lack of familiarity with interagency operating procedures and 
a lack of Arabic language capacity further hindered effective operations as the PRTs got 
underway. Only later in the war would PRTs begin to have a significant operational 
impact.
More beneficial than these strategic initiatives was the increasingly effective inte-
gration between special operations and conventional forces from 2004 to 2006. Whereas 
during the earliest phases of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, special operations forces 
(SOF) had been given their own battle space, by 2004 SOF elements were consistently 
operating in the battle space of conventional forces. As traditional SOF-conventional ste-
reotypes and misperceptions began to break down, new relationships and operating pro-
cedures began to develop. By 2006, special operators and conventional units were learning 
to operate symbiotically, taking advantage of each other’s strengths and compensating 
for each other’s weaknesses. Using the joint doctrinal relationship of “supported” and 
“supporting” elements, MNF-I effectively integrated SOF units into its campaign plan, 
at times even making the SOF units the supported element and assigning conventional 
forces to assist them. As the war progressed, the personal relationships and improvised 
operational procedures that had developed from 2004-2006 paid significant dividends.
SOF also underwent a revolutionary internal innovation during this period, learn-
ing how to fight networked insurgencies more effectively. Before the war, special oper-
ations doctrine held that direct-action missions—raids or ambushes—should be based 
on highly detailed intelligence and meticulously planned, with the executing unit often 
spending days preparing for a mission that might last minutes or hours. Given the fleeting 
nature of insurgent targets in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, SOF upended conventional 
wisdom and doctrine, planning missions based on a minimal amount of intelligence and 
launching them with little preparation. Special operators often relied on a playbook to 
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determine tactical options and launched multiple missions per night, aiming to obtain 
the additional intelligence needed to launch follow-on raids and to create a compounding 
effect through repeated blows on the insurgency. By inflicting significant losses in short 
periods of time, the special operators sought to induce shock in the insurgents’ organi-
zational networks and rob them of the initiative. Stuck in a reactionary cycle, insurgent 
groups experienced difficulty generating operational effects, thereby providing space for 
conventional forces to advance the objectives of the larger campaign plan. Such innova-
tions, in their infancy in 2004-2006, came to have significant operational effects in the later 
years of the war.
At the same time that SOF units were learning how to dramatically increase the tempo 
of their operations, some conventional units were rediscovering and employing tradi-
tional counterinsurgency tactics, as in Tel Afar and Al Qa’im in 2005 and Ramadi in 2006. 
In those cases, counterinsurgency tactics, extensive partnership with Iraqi units, and U.S. 
military support for grassroots reconciliation paid dividends. So did the coalition troops’ 
increasing skill in dealing with factions that had formerly fought them but whose moti-
vations could be leveraged against al-Qaeda in Iraq and other irreconcilable insurgents. 
Though these approaches were successful at the tactical level, they did not have a strate-
gic impact in 2005-2006 because they ran counter to MNF-I’s focus on national elections, 
a reduction in the coalition military presence, and steady transition to Iraqi control.
Nevertheless, as the failure of that MNF-I campaign plan in late 2006 led President 
Bush and other senior U.S. leaders to search for a new strategy, the examples of local 
success in Tel Afar, Al Qa’im, and Ramadi would loom large. Counterinsurgency tactics, 
partnership with Iraqi units, and reconciliation with former insurgents would become 
the centerpieces of the coalition’s thinking and operations in 2007, under new command-
ers with a new campaign plan.
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AFTERWORD
The U.S. Army War College (USAWC) was honored to support the effort for this 
study and to publish these volumes. Since our vision is to develop strategic leaders and 
ideas invaluable to the Army, the Joint Force, and the Nation, the publication of these vol-
umes is emblematic of this study’s purpose. In fact, this study represents what Secretary 
of War Elihu Root envisioned when he established the USAWC in 1901. He directed its 
students to consider three important strategic issues: national defense, military science, 
and responsible command—aspects which are relevant to this study. 
It is our hope these volumes will prompt and enable further studies on other levels 
and aspects of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition to hundreds of hours of 
interviews, as a byproduct of this work, over 30,000 pages of documents were declassi-
fied, and will be made available online. Over time, all of these primary sources will be 
reviewed and reassessed by others, including the Staff College and USAWC students, 
as a way to continue to improve as a profession. To further assist with studying these 
volumes, we are publishing them in a searchable digital format, negating the need for a 
lengthy index. Additionally, while this is an extensive study, it is by no means complete. 
Many areas fell outside the scope of this study and will require further in-depth research, 
areas such as logistics, humanitarian assistance, special operations, and conventional 
mutual efforts, along with U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM’s) decisions and wider 
U.S. and international partner decisions, which impacted the strategic and operational 
direction and resources in Iraq itself. 
This study reinforces the importance of what we do at the USAWC as part of profes-
sional military education and the need to continue to innovate and improve our efforts. 
The central problems in Iraq and Afghanistan typically started at the strategic level. We 
rightfully need to address the many operational and tactical issues highlighted through-
out this study. However, that is not sufficient to solve the overall challenges we will face 
in the foreseeable future. We have to get the strategy right and be prepared for the inev-
itable natural tendency toward strategic drift and strategic depreciation. The U.S. Army 
has traditionally had an almost overwhelming faith in technology and doctrine, on the 
changing character of war, which is often reflected in this study. We can and will analyze 
and learn from it. At the same time, we cannot overcommit to the lessons from this war. 
As Dr. Mike Neiberg, our USAWC Chair of War Studies, recently reinforced to me, “The 
next war we fight will be quite different and will render many of the operational and tac-
tical suggestions here overcome by events.” The question is which ones? At the USAWC, 
we are committed and will further reinforce the importance of the study of strategy, the 
nature of war, and the essence of leadership and decision-making at the strategic level, 
and at the sometimes “Gordian Knot” nexus of strategy and operations. 
On this the 100th anniversary of the end of World War I, I am mindful that this study 
is part of a longstanding tradition within our Army to critically assess past strategies, 
operations, and decisions to inform decisions and actions in the future. This commitment 
to self-evaluation, study, and adaptation serves not only to ensure the future readiness 
of our Army, but honors those who likewise committed themselves to the security and 
defense of our Nation during this conflict.
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SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY AND  
GENERAL EDITOR’S NOTES ON SOURCES
With respect to the wars of the post-9/11 era, the Department of Defense (DoD) has 
not yet emulated Chief of Staff of the Army General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s directive of 
November 20, 1947, that the Army should accomplish “the maximum downgrading of 
all information on military subjects” pertaining to World War II. “The Army possesses no 
inherent right to conceal the history of its affairs behind a cloak of secrecy,” Eisenhower 
wrote 2 years after the end of World War II, adding that:
the historical record of the Army’s operations as well as the manner in which these were 
accomplished are public property, and except where the security of the Nation may be jeopardized, 
the right of the citizens to the full story is unquestioned. Beyond this, the major achievements with 
which the Army is credited are in fact the accomplishments of the entire nation. The American 
public therefore should find no unnecessary obstacle to its access to the written record. The history 
of the Army in World War II, now in preparation, must, without reservation, tell the complete 
story of the Army’s participation, fully documented with references to the records used. The 
preparation of this history does not, however, constitute any reason or excuse for denying to the 
public immediate access to facts and records, where they deal solely with the operations of the 
Army, and where the security of the Nation is not involved.1
Eisenhower’s directive made the U.S. Army’s records accessible to researchers and 
led to the Army’s famous “Green Book” series of histories of the war, as well as a host of 
other important studies. By contrast, accessing the U.S. military’s operational records and 
internal analyses of the Iraq War is difficult for today’s historians. It will be some years 
before the U.S. military’s archival records are available and in a coherent enough state for 
scholars and the public to systematically delve into them. What follows is a select list of 
sources used for this volume, along with the general editor’s notes about the operational 
records and oral history interviews the Chief of Staff of the Army’s (CSA) Operation 
IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) Study Group used, and the current state of access to the most 
important repositories. The primary sources used in Volume 1 of The U.S. Army in the Iraq 
War, including more than 30,000 pages of documents declassified for this project, will 
reside in a research archive at the Army Heritage and Education Center (AHEC) in Carl-
isle, PA, with digital copies also at the Center of Military History (CMH) in Washington, 
DC, and the National Defense University (NDU) at Fort McNair, DC.
OPERATIONAL RECORDS
The U.S. military commands in Iraq generated hundreds of terabytes of digital oper-
ational records from 2003 to 2011. As this volume went to press in 2018, this vast data-
base was in disarray, with no clear prospect for cataloging it and making it accessible to 
researchers in the near term. The largest digital collections are at CMH and at U.S. Cen-
tral Command (CENTCOM), which, between them, hold more than 300 terabytes of clas-
sified and unclassified records pertaining to the Iraq War. Both organizations continually 
increase their holdings as units contribute records that in some cases have languished 
for years. CMH and CENTCOM hold a similar amount of Afghanistan war records as 
well. To organize and mine this material properly would require far more people and 
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resources than CMH and CENTCOM can currently support. At the existing pace of pro-
cessing, it will be several years before the full holdings are accessible to military research-
ers, and longer still before they are available to the public. Not until the U.S. Government 
invests the appropriate level of resources and time in these records will Americans be 
able to fully distill the lessons of the Iraq War—or even to fully exploit the information 
the government already possesses to gain important insights about the enemy in Iraq 
with whom, in 2018, we are still at war.
Despite its vast size, the records that CMH and CENTCOM hold are incomplete. The 
U.S. Army went to war in early 2003 with a detailed plan for retaining records from the 
period of the invasion, but when Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) 
left Iraq in summer of 2003, no authority in the Iraq theater was responsible for retain-
ing the military records generated there and no theater plan instructed units how to do 
so for themselves. Consequently, many units between mid-2003 to mid-2005 destroyed 
their operational records as they left the theater, meaning that the U.S. military’s records 
for that period have extensive gaps. The documentary record was also damaged by a 
large-scale loss of data servers at CENTCOM during the same period. Not until the Army 
began deploying military history detachments to support the major operational com-
mands in mid-2005 did a systematic collection of records at those commands take place.
The CSA OIF Study Group spent thousands of hours sifting through the data held 
by CMH, CENTCOM, and other organizations. This research yielded many important 
documents and insights from CJTF-7, Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I), United States 
Forces-Iraq (USF-I), the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq, MNC-I, CFLCC/Third 
Army, CENTCOM, and subordinate commands, including a wealth of digital materi-
als produced at the division level and below. These resources include a broad range of 
records, such as internal memorandums and e-mails, communications between military 
and civilian leaders, records of commander’s conferences, operations orders and frag-
mentary orders, planning documents, information papers, command briefings, intelli-
gence assessments, periodic command assessments, weekly reports to the secretary of 
defense (SECDEF), battle update assessments, Iraqi security forces development updates, 
security transition plans, detention policies and reports, and after action reviews. The 
study group used these materials to develop an understanding of how operational-level 
decisions were made, implemented, and perceived.
The personal papers of senior U.S. commanders provided a unique glimpse into com-
mand decision-making processes and commanders’ intent at the operational and theater 
strategic levels of the Iraq War. The papers of General John P. Abizaid and Lieutenant 
General Ricardo Sanchez at the AHEC Military History Institute (MHI) offered many 
insights into the conduct of the Iraq campaign in 2003-2004. These were particularly 
valuable because there was no systematic archiving of records from CJTF-7 during that 
period. The papers of General Tommy Franks, housed at CENTCOM, are rich with detail 
from 2001 to 2003 but are largely inaccessible to researchers; they remain classified in the 
compartment that protected the security of the long-since-completed planning for the 
2003 invasion, with no sign as to when the Department of Defense (DoD) might declas-
sify them.
The richest collection of command papers is that of General George W. Casey, Jr., 
which is housed at the NDU at Fort McNair, DC, and covers his entire career as a general 
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officer. These extensive, well-organized records provided an invaluable journal of events 
and assessments inside MNF-I during 2004-2007. General David H. Petraeus’s command 
papers from MNF-I, CENTCOM, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 
International Security Assistance Force are also held at NDU, but unfortunately U.S. 
authorities suspended access to a large portion of the classified segment of this collection 
in 2013 and thus far have taken no steps to restore it. General Raymond T. Odierno’s 
extensive papers from his command tenures in Iraq and his tenure as CSA provide a 
valuable record of MNF-I and USF-I from late 2008 to August 2010, and these will be 
archived at AHEC.
The study group also accessed archival materials and operational records at a number 
of military organizations. The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth, KS, 
has a large collection of source documents for volumes I through VI of On Point, four vol-
umes of which have not yet been published. The Center for Army Lessons Learned, also 
at Fort Leavenworth, has an extensive collection of analyses and unpublished references 
mostly focused at the tactical level. The Center for Army Analysis at Fort Belvoir, VA, 
and the Joint Improvised Threat Defeat Agency at the Pentagon, Washington, DC, both 
have unique collections of operational data gathered by their analytical teams in Iraq and 
outside Iraq, and the study group was able to access products from both organizations 
during its research. Additionally, the study group had access to special operations forces 
archives and publications at Fort Bragg, NC, and MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, FL. The 
archives at Special Operations Command, in particular, are superb and capture nearly 
every aspect of the joint special operations force across the breadth of the war. Unfortu-
nately, declassifying this material is difficult, limiting its usefulness for scholarly studies.
For portions of this study, the records held by DoD’s Conflict Research Records 
Center (CRRC) were useful. The CRRC’s holdings included documents captured from 
Saddam’s regime and from al-Qaeda and its associated movements, including the Islamic 
State of Iraq, the forerunner to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which the CRRC 
translated and made available to researchers. The CRRC’s 63,000 pages of translated doc-
uments from Saddam’s regime represented fewer than 10 percent of its collection regard-
ing the Iraqi dictator.
Unfortunately, the CRRC was defunded and shut down in June 2015, and its work on 
translating additional documents ceased. Its holdings were transferred to the Institute 
for Defense Analyses in Alexandria, VA, for safe keeping, but, as this volume went to 
press, DoD had not yet settled on a new means of making the records accessible again 
or of restarting the work of translating documents from al-Qaeda and associated move-
ments and the Saddam regime—even though there are indications that those records 
hold important insights about the origins and composition of ISIS.
Finally, for records related to the United Kingdom’s (UK) role in the Iraq War, the 
OIF Study Group found the extensive public records assembled by the British Govern-
ment’s Iraq Inquiry to be essential. The Iraq Inquiry’s records include both operational 
documents and detailed interviews with key British military figures from the Iraq War. 
At the UK Ministry of Defence, the Army Historical Branch in London, United Kingdom, 
also holds a near-complete set of operational records from British units and commanders 
that served in Iraq. Though the vast majority of the Historical Branch’s records remain 
classified, it is by far the best organized of the major collections of operational documents.
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INTERVIEWS
Department of Defense organizations collected thousands of oral history interviews 
during the course of the Iraq War, most of which have not yet been examined by histo-
rians. The OIF Study Group had access to many of these, though the collection of inter-
views is so vast that only a small portion has been transcribed. The study group also 
conducted over 200 interviews of its own, many of which have been transcribed and will 
reside in the group’s archive at AHEC. The largest collection of oral history interviews is 
at CMH, which holds thousands of largely uncatalogued interviews conducted by mil-
itary history detachments throughout the war. The vast majority of CMH’s interviews 
have not been transcribed, and in mining this collection, the OIF Study Group had to 
narrow its research to interviews with several hundred key leaders. In addition, many 
of CMH’s interviews were considered classified at the time they were conducted for 
operational security reasons, and, though there is virtually nothing in them that remains 
operationally sensitive today, there is no process underway to review them for declas-
sification, other than the small portion that the OIF Study Group was able to declassify 
during the course of its work. Another large collection of several thousand interviews 
resides at the Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) at Norfolk, VA. As at CMH, 
however, many of the JCOA’s interviews remain classified, and the JCOA does not allow 
easy access to, or use of, these materials, though the vast majority of them are no longer 
operationally sensitive.
The best-organized collection of oral history interviews is at the CSI. CSI provided the 
OIF Study Group with unfettered access to its hundreds of transcribed, unclassified inter-
views, many of which were of high quality and historical significance. Also at Fort Leav-
enworth, the Center for Army Lessons Learned has a collection of over 200 interviews 
with personnel from the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq conducted during 2012-2013 
that offer important insights into the difficult tasks that confronted that organization as 
Iraq’s security situation unraveled. At the USAWC, the MHI archive includes division 
commander lessons learned documents and oral history interviews from many senior 
commanders who held important positions in Iraq. At CENTCOM, the command history 
office has dozens of important interviews with commanders and key staff officers, some 
of which were conducted at an unclassified level. Finally, in the course of his important 
research for the Institute for Defense Analyses on operations in Anbar Province, William 
Knarr accumulated scores of important interviews with U.S. and Iraqi military and civil-
ian leaders.
What follows is a list of the interviews referenced in Volume 1 of The U.S. Army in the 
Iraq War.
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General (Ret.) John P. Abizaid 
Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Martin Adams 
Colonel (Ret.) John Agoglia
Robert Alberts
Lieutenant General Joseph Anderson
Lieutenant Colonel Charles Armstrong
Rick Atkinson
General Lloyd Austin
Amatzia Baram
Colonel (Ret.) Kevin Benson
Major General William H. Brandenberg
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III
Lieutenant General Robin Brims
Brigadier General (S) Scott Brower
Major General Jeffrey Buchanan
Major General (Ret.) Aziz Swady Noor    
   al-Bukhutree
President George W. Bush
General (Ret.) George W. Casey, Jr.
Lieutenant General Robert Caslen
General (Ret.) Peter W. Chiarelli
Lieutenant General Marco Chiarini
Colonel Ronald F. Clark
Lieutenant General Charles Cleveland
Colonel Chris Connor
Major General Anthony Cucolo
Dan Darling
David Dawson
Lieutenant General Keith W. Dayton
Colonel Edmund J. Degen
Colonel Manny Diemer
Lieutenant Colonel Michael Donahue
Major General Edward Donnelly
Major General Paul D. Eaton
Colonel Lee English
Brigadier General Billy Don Farris
Major General Barbara Fast
Major (Ret.) Thomas S. Fisher
General John D. “Jack” Gardner
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates
General Frank Grass
Colonel (Ret.) Robert Green
Lieutenant Colonel Mark Grdovich
Brigadier General John Gronski
Celeste Ward Gventer
National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley
Lieutenant General David Halverson
Colonel Jeff Hannon
Commander Rebecca Harper
Colonel (Ret.) Derek J. Harvey
Colonel (Ret.) James Hickey
Major General (Ret.) Patrick Higgins
Major General William C. Hix
Brigadier General Frederick “Ben” Hodges 
Colonel Dan Hodne
Lieutenant General David Hogg
CW4 Charles Hof
Gregory Hooker
Colonel (Ret.) Bjarne “Mike” Iverson
Colonel Bill Ivey
Iraqi Major General Najim Jabouri
General (Ret.) John M. “Jack” Keane
Lieutenant General (Ret.) Francis “Frank”  
    Kearney
Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Robert Kelley
Lieutenant General Poul Kiaerskou
Colonel Randy Lane
Colonel Kevin Leahy
Ambassador Douglas Lute
Major Kevin Bruce Marcus
General (Ret.) James N. Mattis
General (Ret.) Stanley McChrystal
Colonel (Ret.) Michael McCormick
Colonel (Ret.) Kevin McDonnell
General (Ret.) David D. McKiernan
Lieutenant General Herbert Raymond “H.  
    R.” McMaster
Regis Matlak
Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz
Lieutenant General (Ret.) Paul T.    
    Mikolashek
Colonel Charlie Miller
Colonel Steven Miska
Colonel Mark Mitchell
Interviews Conducted by the CSA’s OIF Study Group
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West Point Center for Oral History
Institute for Defense Analyses
Lieutenant Colonel Pat Morrison
General (Ret.) Richard B. Myers
Major General Richard Nash
Douglas Nolen
Lieutenant General Michael Oates
Lieutenant Colonel David Oclander
General Raymond T. Odierno
Brigadier General Mark O’Neill
Colonel Paul Ott
Brigadier General Hector Pagan
General Sir Nicholas R. Parker
Colonel Dave Pendall
General (Ret.) David H. Petraeus
Colonel Louis B. Rago II
Kathleen Reedy
Major General Michael Repass
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
Brigadier General Rick Rife
National Security Advisor Mowaffaq  
    Rubaie
Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ricardo Sanchez
General (Ret.) Peter J. Schoomaker
Kalev “Gunner” Sepp
Abram Shulsky
Colonel Steve Sifers
Emma Sky
Colonel (Ret.) Marty Stanton
Colonel Michael Steele
Lieutenant Colonel Kent Strader
Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Adam Such
General (Ret.) Gordon R. Sullivan
Brigadier General Sean Swindell
Colonel Zsolt Szenthiralyi
Major General Joseph J. Taluto
Major General James D. Thurman
Lieutenant General Kenneth Tovo
Lieutenant General John Vines
Major General Rick Waddell
General (Ret.) William S. Wallace
Lieutenant General Marshall B. Webb
Lieutenant General William G. Webster, Jr.
Colonel (Ret.) Richard Welch
Brigadier General (Ret.) Thomas White
Rear Admiral (Ret.) Edward Winters
Major General (Ret.) Walter Wodjakowski
Ambassador Paul Wolfowitz
Lieutenant General Richard Zahner
Major General Robert Abrams Lieutenant General Rick Lynch
Colonel Julian Dale Alford
Ayad Allawi
Colonel Ralph Baker
Captain Jim Calvert (pseudonym)
Colonel Casey Haskins
Mullah Nadhim Mahmoud Khalil Jabouri
Sheikh Kurdi Rafee Farhan al-Mahalawi
Sheikh Ahmed Bezia Fteikhan al-Rishawi
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Combat Studies Institute
Marine Corps History and Museums Division
Major General Richard F. Natonski
Marine Corps University
 
 
General (Ret.) John P. Abizaid
Colonel Robert Abrams
Brigadier General Rod Barham
Colonel Peter Bayer
Lieutenant Colonel Chris Beckert
Colonel Kevin Benson
Major General Daniel P. Bolger
Brigadier General Robert B. Brown
Major Stephen Campbell
Colonel Edward Cardon
General George W. Casey, Jr.
Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli
Major Mark Cloutier
Colonel Donald Currier
General Martin E. Dempsey
Major Michael Doherty
Major General Paul D. Eaton
Colonel (Ret.) Todd Ebel
Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Joseph Fischer
General (Ret.) Tommy Franks
Colonel Bruce Gant
Lieutenant Colonel Michael Gibler
Lieutenant Colonel Glenn Goddard
Brigadier General Carter Ham
Colonel Bill Hickman
Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad
Colonel Chris King
Major Jeremy Lewis
Major Chris Liermann
Colonel Sean MacFarland
Major General John P. Mclaren
Lieutenant General Thomas Metz
Brigadier General Mark A. Milley
Lieutenant General Richard Natonski
Lieutenant Colonel Peter A. Newell
Colonel John Norris
Lieutenant Colonel Wesley Odum
Brigadier General Peter J. Palmer
Lieutenant General Joseph Peterson
General David H. Petraeus
Brigadier General Dana Pittard
Lieutenant Colonel James Rainey
Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Reed
Lieutenant Colonel Tom Rickard
Colonel Sean Ryan
Colonel Steven Salazar
Major Craig Schuh
Colonel Robert E. Scurlock
Brigadier General Richard Sherlock
Major General (Ret.) Charles “Chuck”  
   Swannack, Jr.
Colonel Jeffrey Terhune
Major Sean Tracy
Colonel Thomas Vail
Lieutenant General John R. Vines
Major General William G. Webster, Jr.
Major General John R. Allen
Colonel Joseph Anderson
Colonel Kevin Benson
Major Thomas Fisher
Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner
Frank Miller
Lieutenant Colonel Wesley Odum
Major Daniel Soller
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